United States Antitrust Law & Economics PDF
Preview United States Antitrust Law & Economics
U S NITED TATES A L NTITRUST AW E AND CONOMICS S E C O N D E D I T I O N by E E INER LHAUGE Petrie Professor of Law, Harvard University This publication was created to provide you with accurate and authoritative information concerning the subject matter covered; however, this publication was not necessarily prepared by persons licensed to practice law in a particular jurisdiction. The publisher is not engaged in rendering legal or other professional advice and this publication is not a substitute for the advice of an attorney. If you require legal or other expert advice, you should seek the services of a competent attorney or other professional. Nothing contained herein is intended or written to be used for the purposes of 1) avoiding penalties imposed under the federal Internal Revenue Code, or 2) promoting, marketing or recommending to another party any transaction or matter addressed herein. a 2008 THOMSON REUTERS/FOUNDATION PRESS a 2011 by THOMSON REUTERS/FOUNDATION PRESS 1 New York Plaza, 34th Floor New York, NY 10004 Phone Toll Free 1–877–888–1330 Fax 646–424–5201 foundation–press.com Printed in the United States of America ISBN 978–1–59941–880–3 Mat #41054822 S U M M A R Y O F C O N T E N T S TABLE OF CASESMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM xiii CHAPTER 1 IntroductionMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 1 A. The Framework of Legal Issues Raised by Basic Antitrust Eco- nomicsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 1 B. An Overview of U.S. Antitrust Laws and Remedial StructureMMMMMMMM 10 CHAPTER 2 Which Horizontal Agreements Are Illegal?MMMMMMMMM 49 A. Relevant U.S. Laws and General Legal StandardsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 49 B. Horizontal Price–FixingMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 53 C. Horizontal Output RestrictionsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 77 D. Horizontal Market DivisionsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 87 E. Horizontal Agreements Not to Deal With Particular FirmsMMMMMMMMMMM 94 1. Boycotts by Unrelated RivalsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 95 2. Exclusions and Expulsions From a Productive Collaboration of RivalsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 101 F. Are Social Welfare Justifications Admissible?MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 114 G. Does Intellectual Property Law Justify an Anticompetitive Re- straint? MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 153 H. Buyer CartelsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 169 CHAPTER 3 What Unilateral Conduct Is Illegal?MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 178 A. Relevant Laws & Basic Legal ElementsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 178 B. The Power Element MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 183 1. Economic and Legal Tests of Market Power GenerallyMMMMMMMMMMMMM 184 2. Legal Tests of Monopoly PowerMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 191 3. Market DefinitionMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 192 4. AftermarketsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 224 C. Second Element: Anticompetitive Conduct MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 233 1. General StandardsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 234 2. Predatory PricingMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 236 3. Predatory Overpaying by a MonopsonistMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 259 4. The Economics of Price DiscriminationMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 263 5. Exclusions From Owned Property–Unilateral Refusals to Deal 268 6. Price SqueezesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 302 D. Causal Connection Between First and Second Elements Required? 310 E. Attempted MonopolizationMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 312 iii iv SUMMARY OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 4 Vertical Agreements That Restrict Dealing With RivalsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 323 A. IntroductionMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 323 B. Exclusive DealingMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 325 C. TyingMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 359 D. Loyalty and Bundled DiscountsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 404 CHAPTER 5 Agreements and Conduct That Arguably Distort Downstream Competition in Distributing a Supplier’s Products MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 439 A. IntroductionMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 439 B. Intrabrand Distributional Restraints on ResaleMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 442 1. Vertical Nonprice Restraints on DistributionMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 443 2. Vertical Maximum Price–FixingMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 451 3. Vertical Agreements Fixing Minimum Resale PricesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 458 4. How to Characterize AgreementsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 482 C. Price Discrimination That Arguably Distorts Downstream Compe- titionMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 487 CHAPTER 6 Proving an Agreement or Concerted ActionMMMMMMM 508 A. Are the Defendants Separate Entities?MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 508 B. Standards for Finding a Vertical AgreementMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 528 C. Standards for Finding a Horizontal Agreement or Concerted Ac- tionMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 534 1. Parallel Conduct Equally Consistent With an Independent MotiveMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 535 2. Parallel Conduct that Would Be Unprofitable if Not Engaged in by Other Firms MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 545 3. Agreements or Practices That Facilitate Oligopolistic Price CoordinationMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 562 CHAPTER 7 MergersMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 585 A. Horizontal MergersMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 590 1. Unilateral EffectsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 593 2. Oligopoly EffectsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 612 3. Post–Merger EntryMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 623 4. Efficiencies & Weighing the EquitiesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 628 5. The Failing Firm DefenseMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 646 6. The Relevance of Buyer Power, Sophistication, or ViewsMMMMMMMMMM 653 B. Vertical MergersMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 664 C. Conglomerate MergersMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 679 INDEXMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 695 T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S TABLE OF CASESMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM xiii CHAPTER 1 IntroductionMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 1 A. The Framework of Legal Issues Raised by Basic Antitrust Eco- nomicsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 1 B. An Overview of U.S. Antitrust Laws and Remedial StructureMMMMMMMM 10 CHAPTER 2 Which Horizontal Agreements Are Illegal?MMMMMMMMM 49 A. Relevant U.S. Laws and General Legal StandardsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 49 B. Horizontal Price–FixingMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 53 United States v. Trenton PotteriesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 53 Questions on Trenton PotteriesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 55 Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) v. Columbia Broadcasting SystemMMMMMM 56 Questions on BMIMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 63 Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc’yMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 65 Questions on MaricopaMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 73 Texaco Inc. v. DagherMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 74 Questions on Texaco v. DagherMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 76 C. Horizontal Output RestrictionsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 77 NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of OklahomaMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 78 Questions on NCAAMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 86 D. Horizontal Market DivisionsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 87 Palmer v. BRGMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 87 Questions on Palmer v. BRGMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 89 U.S. DOJ/FTC, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among CompetitorsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 91 Questions on FTC–DOJ Guidelines MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 94 E. Horizontal Agreements Not to Deal With Particular FirmsMMMMMMMMMMM 94 1. Boycotts by Unrelated RivalsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 95 Klor’s Inc. v. Broadway–Hale Stores, Inc.MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 95 Questions on Klor’sMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 97 Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am. v. FTCMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 97 Questions on Fashion Originators’MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 100 2. Exclusions and Expulsions From a Productive Collaboration of RivalsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 101 United States v. Terminal Railroad Ass’nMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 101 Associated Press v. United StatesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 105 Questions on Terminal RR and Associated PressMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 107 Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific StationeryMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 109 Questions on Northwest StationersMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 113 F. Are Social Welfare Justifications Admissible?MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 114 National Society of Professional Engineers v. United StatesMMMMMMMMMMM 115 Questions on Professional EngineersMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 120 FTC v. Indiana Federation of DentistsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 122 v vi TABLE OF CONTENTS F. Are Social Welfare Justifications Admissible?—Continued Questions on Indiana DentistsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 126 FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’nMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 127 Questions on Trial Lawyer’s Ass’nMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 131 California Dental Ass’n v. FTCMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 132 Questions on California DentalMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 140 Burdens and Orders of Theory and Proof after California DentalMMM 141 The Policy Relevance of Nonprofit StatusMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 142 The Legal Treatment of Nonprofits Under U.S. LawMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 143 United States v. Brown UniversityMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 144 Questions on United States v. BrownMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 151 G. Does Intellectual Property Law Justify an Anticompetitive Re- straint? MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 153 United States v. General ElectricMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 154 Questions on General ElectricMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 156 United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc. MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 158 Questions on New WrinkleMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 160 U.S. DOJ/FTC, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellec- tual Property (1995)MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 161 Questions on the U.S. GuidelinesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 168 H. Buyer CartelsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 169 Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal SugarMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 169 Questions on MandevilleMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 172 Countervailing Power and the Problem of the Second BestMMMMMMMMMMM 174 CHAPTER 3 What Unilateral Conduct Is Illegal?MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 178 A. Relevant Laws & Basic Legal ElementsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 178 B. The Power Element MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 183 1. Economic and Legal Tests of Market Power GenerallyMMMMMMMMMMMMM 184 2. Legal Tests of Monopoly PowerMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 191 3. Market DefinitionMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 192 United States v. du Pont & Co. (The Cellophane Case)MMMMMMMMMMMMM 193 du Pont (The Cellophane Case) and Various Bases for Defining MarketsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 199 U.S. DOJ/FTC, Horizontal Merger GuidelinesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 205 Note on the U.S. Market Definition GuidelinesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 216 Is Market Definition Necessary?MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 218 Technical Methods Used in Market DefinitionMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 221 4. AftermarketsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 224 Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs.MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 224 Questions on KodakMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 232 C. Second Element: Anticompetitive Conduct MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 233 1. General StandardsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 234 2. Predatory PricingMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 236 a. Below–Cost Predatory PricingMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 237 Brooke Group Ltd. (Liggett) v. Brown & Williamson Tobac- co Corp.MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 237 Note and Questions About BrookeMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 245 The U.S. Conflict on the Proper Cost MeasureMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 248 Elhauge, Why Above–Cost Price Cuts to Drive out Entrants Do Not Signal Predation or Even Market Power—and the Implications for Defining CostsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 249 b. Above–Cost Predatory PricingMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 251 TABLE OF CONTENTS vii C. Second Element: Anticompetitive Conduct—Continued Enforcement Policy Regarding Unfair Exclusionary Conduct in the Air Transportation IndustryMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 252 Note and Questions on the Proposed U.S. Department of Transportation Enforced PolicyMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 254 United States v. AMR Corp.MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 255 Questions on American AirlinesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 259 3. Predatory Overpaying by a MonopsonistMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 259 Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross–Simmons Hardwood LumberMMMMMMMMMMM 259 Note and Questions on WeyerhaeuserMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 263 4. The Economics of Price DiscriminationMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 263 5. Exclusions From Owned Property–Unilateral Refusals to Deal 268 Otter Tail Power Company v. United StatesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 269 Questions on Otter TailMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 274 Should Natural Monopolies Be Immune From Monopolization Liability?MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 278 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 278 Questions on Aspen SkiingMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 285 Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs.MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 288 Questions on the Kodak Duty to Deal With RivalsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 290 Verizon Commun. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. TrinkoMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 291 Questions on Verizon v. TrinkoMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 297 Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization StandardsMMMMMMM 298 The U.S. Essential Facilities DoctrineMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 299 The Application of U.S. Antitrust Duties to Deal to Intellectual PropertyMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 301 6. Price SqueezesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 302 Pacific Bell Telephone v. Linkline CommunicationsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 303 Questions on LinklineMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 309 D. Causal Connection Between First and Second Elements Required? 310 Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization StandardsMMMMMMMMMMMM 310 Monopoly LeveragingMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 312 E. Attempted MonopolizationMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 312 Lorain Journal v. United StatesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 312 Questions on Lorain JournalMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 314 United States v. American AirlinesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 315 Questions on American Airlines Attempted Cartel CaseMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 317 Spectrum Sports v. McQuillanMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 318 Note and Questions on Spectrum SportsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 320 CHAPTER 4 Vertical Agreements That Restrict Dealing With RivalsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 323 A. IntroductionMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 323 B. Exclusive DealingMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 325 United States v. GriffithMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 330 Note and Questions on Griffith and Lorain JournalMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 332 Standard Fashion v. Magrane–HoustonMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 334 Questions on Standard Fashion MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 335 Standard Oil and Standard Stations v. United StatesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 335 Questions on Standard StationsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 340 FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising ServiceMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 341 Cumulative ForeclosureMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 343 Tampa Electric v. Nashville Coal MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 346 viii TABLE OF CONTENTS B. Exclusive Dealing—Continued Note and Questions on Tampa ElectricMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 350 United States v. MicrosoftMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 351 The U.S. Lower Court Splits on Foreclosure Thresholds and Terminability RelevanceMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 357 Questions on Microsoft’s Exclusive Dealing HoldingsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 358 C. TyingMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 359 Jefferson Parish Hospital v. HydeMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 371 Questions on Jefferson Parish MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 381 Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs.MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 384 Questions on KodakMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 390 Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 391 Questions on Illinois Tool WorksMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 395 United States v. MicrosoftMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 397 Questions on U.S. Microsoft Case Holdings on TyingMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 403 D. Loyalty and Bundled DiscountsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 404 United States v. Loew’s Inc.MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 414 Questions on Loew’sMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 416 FTC v. Brown ShoeMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 417 Questions on FTC v. Brown ShoeMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 419 Concord Boat v. Brunswick Corp.MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 419 Questions on Concord BoatMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 422 LePage’s Inc. v. 3MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 423 Questions on LePage’sMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 430 Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealthMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 430 Questions on Cascade HealthMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 436 The U.S. Lower Court Splits on Loyalty and Bundled DiscountsMMMM 437 CHAPTER 5 Agreements and Conduct That Arguably Distort Downstream Competition in Distributing a Supplier’s Products MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 439 A. IntroductionMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 439 B. Intrabrand Distributional Restraints on ResaleMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 442 1. Vertical Nonprice Restraints on DistributionMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 443 Continental T.V. v. GTE SylvaniaMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 445 Questions on SylvaniaMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 450 2. Vertical Maximum Price–FixingMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 451 State Oil Co. v. KhanMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 453 Questions on State Oil v. Khan MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 458 3. Vertical Agreements Fixing Minimum Resale PricesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 458 Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc.MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 458 Notes and Questions on LeeginMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 479 4. How to Characterize AgreementsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 482 a. Are Dual Distribution Agreements Vertical or Horizontal or Neither?MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 482 b. Vertical Agreements to ‘‘Boycott’’ the Rival of a Dealer Without Any Procompetitive JustificationMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 483 NYNEX v. DisconMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 483 Questions on NYNEX v. DisconMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 486 C. Price Discrimination That Arguably Distorts Downstream Compe- titionMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 487 Robinson–Patman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 13MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 487 FTC v. Morton Salt Co.MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 488 TABLE OF CONTENTS ix C. Price Discrimination That Arguably Distorts Downstream Compe- tition—Continued Questions on Morton Salt MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 492 Texaco v. HasbrouckMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 493 Questions on Texaco v. HasbrouckMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 499 Volvo Trucks N.A. v. Reeder–Simco GMCMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 500 Questions on VolvoMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 505 Other Robinson–Patman Act ProvisionsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 507 CHAPTER 6 Proving an Agreement or Concerted ActionMMMMMMM 508 A. Are the Defendants Separate Entities?MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 508 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 508 Questions on CopperweldMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 512 The Relevance of Agency RelationsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 514 American Needle v. National Football League MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 515 Note and Questions on American NeedleMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 523 B. Standards for Finding a Vertical AgreementMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 528 Monsanto Co. v. Spray–Rite Service Corp.MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 529 Questions on Monsanto MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 532 C. Standards for Finding a Horizontal Agreement or Concerted Ac- tionMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 534 1. Parallel Conduct Equally Consistent With an Independent MotiveMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 535 Theatre Enterprises v. Paramount Film DistributingMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 535 Questions on Theatre EnterprisesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 537 Matsushita Electric v. Zenith RadioMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 537 Questions on MatsushitaMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 542 Cement Manufacturers Protective Ass’n v. United StatesMMMMMMMMMMM 543 Questions on Cement ManufacturersMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 545 2. Parallel Conduct that Would Be Unprofitable if Not Engaged in by Other Firms MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 545 a. Where Parallel Conduct Is Implausible Without an Explicit AgreementMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 545 Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n v. United StatesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 545 Questions on Eastern States LumberMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 547 American Column & Lumber v. United StatesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 547 Questions on American ColumnMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 552 American Tobacco v. United StatesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 553 Questions on American TobaccoMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 555 b. Where Parallel Conduct Follows Common Invitations or Secret MeetingsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 555 Interstate Circuit v. United StatesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 555 Questions on Interstate CircuitMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 559 c. Where Parallel Conduct Can Be Explained by Oligopolistic Price InterdependenceMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 561 3. Agreements or Practices That Facilitate Oligopolistic Price CoordinationMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 562 Maple Flooring Manufacturers Ass’n. v. United StatesMMMMMMMMMMMMM 563 Questions on Maple FlooringMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 568 United States v. Container Corp.MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 569 Questions on ContainerMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 573 x TABLE OF CONTENTS C. Standards for Finding a Horizontal Agreement or Concerted Ac- tion—Continued United States v. United States GypsumMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 575 Questions on GypsumMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 578 FTC v. Cement InstituteMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 579 Questions on Cement InstituteMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 584 CHAPTER 7 MergersMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 585 A. Horizontal MergersMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 590 1. Unilateral EffectsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 593 U.S. DOJ/FTC, Horizontal Merger GuidelinesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 593 Questions on the U.S. Guidelines on Unilateral EffectsMMMMMMMMMMMM 604 FTC v. Staples, Inc.MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 605 Questions on StaplesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 611 U.S. Agency Enforcement ActivityMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 612 2. Oligopoly EffectsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 612 U.S. DOJ/FTC, Horizontal Merger GuidelinesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 612 Questions on U.S. Guidelines on Oligopoly EffectsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 616 Qualitative v. Empirical AssessmentsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 616 FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co.MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 616 Questions on FTC v. HeinzMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 622 3. Post–Merger EntryMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 623 U.S. DOJ/FTC, Horizontal Merger GuidelinesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 623 Questions on U.S. Guidelines on EntryMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 626 FTC v. Staples, Inc.MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 626 Questions on StaplesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 628 4. Efficiencies & Weighing the EquitiesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 628 U.S. DOJ/FTC, Horizontal Merger GuidelinesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 628 Questions on U.S. GuidelinesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 630 Merger Efficiencies and Total v. Consumer WelfareMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 631 Note and Questions on Consumer Welfare v. Total WelfareMMMMMM 634 FTC v. Staples, Inc.MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 635 Note and Questions on StaplesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 638 FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co.MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 639 Questions on FTC v. HeinzMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 644 How to Balance the Equities in Merger CasesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 645 5. The Failing Firm DefenseMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 646 International Shoe v. FTCMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 646 Note and Questions on International Shoe v. FTCMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 648 Citizen Publishing v. United StatesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 649 Note and Questions on Citizen’s PublishingMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 650 U.S. DOJ/FTC, Horizontal Merger GuidelinesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 652 Note and Questions on Merger Guidelines on the Failing Firm DefenseMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 652 6. The Relevance of Buyer Power, Sophistication, or ViewsMMMMMMMMMM 653 a. Mergers Between Buyers That Create Buyer PowerMMMMMMMMMMMM 653 U.S. DOJ/FTC, Horizontal Merger GuidelinesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 655 b. Should Mergers Between Sellers Be Deemed Constrained by Buyer Power?MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 656 U.S. DOJ/FTC, Horizontal Merger GuidelinesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 656 Questions on Whether Buyer Power Should Alter Assess- ments of Mergers That Otherwise Create Seller Market PowerMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 656
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