Unfolding Ambition: Strategic Candidacy Decisions in Senate Primary Elections

318 Pages·2013·2.3 MB·English

by  Hugh Crumley

Unfolding Ambition: Strategic Candidacy Decisions in Senate Primary Elections
by
Aaron Scott King
Department of Political Science
Duke University

Date:_______________________
Approved:

___________________________
David Rohde, Supervisor

___________________________
John Aldrich

___________________________
Michael Munger

___________________________
Jason Roberts

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the Department of Political Science
in the Graduate School of Duke University

2013

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ABSTRACT
Unfolding Ambition: Strategic Candidacy Decisions in Senate Primary Elections
by
Aaron Scott King
Department of Political Science
Duke University

Date:_______________________
Approved:

___________________________
David Rohde, Supervisor

___________________________
John Aldrich

___________________________
Michael Munger

___________________________
Jason Roberts

An abstract of a dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the Department of Political Science
in the Graduate School of Duke University

2013
Copyright by
Aaron Scott King
2013
Abstract
Theories of ambition have taught us that higher offices are valuable commodities
to certain politicians, and under the right circumstances, the benefits of running for an
office outweigh the associated risks. Yet some ambitious politicians emerge as
candidates while others do not. In this dissertation, I present a Theory of Strategic
Candidacy Decisions to explain how primary elections unfold. With new comprehensive
data on the timing of candidacy decisions, I test several hypotheses regarding the
determinants of electoral and fundraising success, the timing of strategic candidacy
decisions, the interactions of prospective officeholders, and the impact of strategic
retirements on primary races for the United States Senate. Using both qualitative and
quantitative tools, including event history techniques to capture the complex dynamics of
primaries, I find that potential candidates interact with one another and the unique
political context within each race and emerge from the pool of potential candidates in
systematic ways. In the end, the strategic behavior of ambitious politicians has
implications for the slate of candidates available to the electorate and ultimately, on the
quality of representation between legislators and constituents.

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Contents
Abstract .............................................................................................................................. iv
List of Tables ...................................................................................................................... x
List of Figures ................................................................................................................... xii
Chapter 1 - Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1
Chapter 2 - Previous Research .......................................................................................... 12
2.1 – Theoretical Issues – Ambition and the Electoral Timeline ................................ 15
2.2 – Data Issues – Constructing the Pool of Potential Candidates ............................ 18
2.3 – Methodological Issues – Accounting for Strategic Decisions Making .............. 20
Chapter 3 - Theory of Strategic Candidacy Decisions...................................................... 22
3.1 - Candidate Decisions-Making and Campaign Potential ...................................... 26
3.2 – Candidate Decision-Making and Uncertainty .................................................... 29
3.3 – Strategic Interactions Between Potential Candidates ........................................ 31
3.3.1 – Higher Quality Candidates and Earlier Candidacy Decisions ...................... 34
3.3.2 – Lower Quality Candidates and Later Candidacy Decisions ......................... 37
3.3.3 – Motivations from Game Theoretic Models ................................................... 39
3.3.3.1 – The Chicken Game and Early Candidacy Decisions.................................. 39
3.3.3.2 – The Chain Store Game and Late Candidacy Decisions ............................. 42
Chapter 4 - A Dynamic Data Collection Strategy ............................................................ 45
4.1 – General Motivations and Goals ......................................................................... 45
4.2 – Constructing Pools of Potential Candidates: An Exercise in Backward Induction
..................................................................................................................................... 48

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4.3 – Assumptions of Data Collection Strategy .......................................................... 51
4.4 – Brief Summary of Data ...................................................................................... 55
4.5 – The 2010 Race for Senate in Florida ................................................................. 56
Chapter 5 - Candidate Quality and Success in Primary Elections .................................... 59
5.1 – Identifying Candidate (and Potential Candidate) Quality .................................. 64
5.1.1 – Several Hypotheses ....................................................................................... 64
5.1.2 – Data on Candidate Experience and Fundraising ........................................... 67
5.1.2.1 – Candidate Experience and Rate of Entering Primary Races ..................... 67
5.1.2.2 – Candidate Experience and Winning Primary Races .................................. 73
5.1.2.3 – Candidate Experience and Fundraising in Primary Races ....................... 75
5.1.3 – Data on the Timing of Candidacy Entry ....................................................... 81
5.2 – Analysis of Electoral and Fundraising Success in Primary Elections ............... 84
5.2.1 – Model Design and Empirical Implications ................................................... 84
5.2.2 – Results with Standard Measure of Electoral Experience .............................. 86
5.3 – Alternatives Specifications of Electoral Experience .......................................... 94
5.3.1 – Current vs. Former Electoral Experience ...................................................... 96
5.3.2 – Four Ordinal Levels of Experience ............................................................... 99
5.4 – Implications for Understanding Candidate Quality in Primary Elections ....... 102
Chapter 6 - The Timing of Candidacy Decisions ........................................................... 104
6.1 - Dual Influence of Strategic Decision Timing ................................................... 109
6.2 – Experience and the Timing of Candidacy Decisions ....................................... 111
6.2.1 – Several Hypotheses ..................................................................................... 112

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6.2.2 – Comparing Decision Timing Across Races and Time ................................ 114
6.3 – Preliminary Analysis ........................................................................................ 116
6.4 – Challenges in Modeling Candidacy Decisions ................................................ 121
6.5 – A Simple Example of Survival Analysis and Candidacy Decisions................ 122
6.6 – Non-Parametric Estimators of Candidacy Decisions in Senate Primaries ....... 126
6.7 – Alternative Models of Candidacy Decisions ................................................... 136
6.7.1 – Parametric Models ...................................................................................... 136
6.7.2 – Semi-Parametric Models with Surviving Fractions .................................... 139
6.8 – Accelerated Failure Time Mixture Cure Models of Candidacy Decisions ...... 142
6.9 – Recapitulation of Impact of Experience on Candidacy Decisions ................... 147
Chapter 7 - Strategic Interactions of Potential Candidates ............................................. 149
7.1 – Inside the Black Box: The 2010 Race for the Senate in Florida ...................... 150
7.1.1 – Setting the Stage: Martinez Retires ............................................................. 151
7.1.2 – The Road to the Democratic Primary ......................................................... 151
7.1.3 – The Road to the Republican Primary ............................................................ 157
7.1.4 – Reflections on the Florida Primaries............................................................. 161
7.2 – A Bird’s Eye View of Strategic Interactions in Candidacy Decisions ............ 162
7.2.1 – Asymmetric Influence of Potential Senate Candidates ............................... 163
7.2.2 – Several Hypotheses ..................................................................................... 164
7.3 – Empirical Strategy ........................................................................................... 169
7.3.1 – Data Manipulations ..................................................................................... 169
7.3.2 – Survival Methods with Time-Dependent Covariates .................................. 172

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7.4 – A Dynamic Analysis of the Timing of Candidacy Decisions .......................... 174
7.4.1 – Using High Quality Candidates in Race as a Linear Covariate .................. 174
7.4.2 – Using the Number of High Quality Candidates in Race as a Quadratic ..... 181
7.5 – Reflections on the Strategic Interactions of Potential Candidates ................... 184
Chapter 8 - Strategic Retirements and Ambition ............................................................ 187
8.1 – The Role of Retirements .................................................................................. 189
8.1.1 – Shocks to the Decision Timeline ................................................................ 189
8.2.1 – Previous Work on the Consequences of Retirements ................................. 191
8.2 – Retirements and the Theory of Strategic Candidacy Decisions ....................... 193
8.2.1 – Expectations on the Interactions of Retirements and Candidacy Decisions . 195
8.2.1.1 – Expectations for Individual Goals .............................................................. 198
8.2.1.2 – Expectations for Party Goals ....................................................................... 200
8.2.1.3 – Other Conflicts Between Individual and Collective Goals ..................... 202
8.2.2 – Several Hypotheses on the Timing of Retirements ..................................... 202
8.2.3 – Empirical Strategy for the Study of Retirement Decisions ......................... 203
8.3 – Analysis of Retirement Decisions .................................................................... 205
8.3.1 – Frequency of Retirements Over Time ......................................................... 205
8.3.2 – Consequences of Retirement Decisions on Pool of Potential Candidates .. 207
8.3.3 – Fundraising and Electoral Consequences of Retirement Decisions............ 213
Chapter 9 - Implications for Representation and Future Work ....................................... 227
9.1 – An Brief Summary ........................................................................................... 228
9.2 – Implications for Representation ....................................................................... 237

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9.2.1 – The Complex Concept of Representation ................................................... 238
9.2.2 – Ambition, Strategic Decision Making, and Representation ........................ 240
9.3 – Avenues for Further Research ......................................................................... 248
9.3.1 – Efforts to Improve Data Collection ............................................................. 250
9.3.2 – The Impact of Electoral and Party Institutions ........................................... 254
9.3.3 – Methodological Refinements ...................................................................... 257
9.3.4 – The Future of Representation ...................................................................... 259
Appendix A ..................................................................................................................... 262
Appendix B ..................................................................................................................... 270
Appendix C ..................................................................................................................... 272
Appendix D ..................................................................................................................... 275
Work Cited ...................................................................................................................... 278
Biography ........................................................................................................................ 305

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List of Tables
Table 4.1 - Summary of Data at Primary Level (1994-2010 Senate Races) ..................... 56
Table 4.2 - Notable Events in Florida primaries for the US Senate (2010) ...................... 58
Table 5.1 - Experience Levels of Potential Senate Candidates, 1994-2010 ..................... 70
Table 5.2 - Selected Levels of Experience of Potential Senate Candidates ...................... 71
Table 5.3 - Selected Experience Levels and Declare Timing for Senate Candidates ....... 83
Table 5.4 - Logit Models Explaining Primary Winner ..................................................... 88
Table 5.5 - Logit Models Predicting Primary Win - Challengers Only ............................ 91
Table 5.6 – OLS Models Predicting Log(Receipts).......................................................... 93
Table 6.1 - Experience of Potential Candidates and Decision Timing ........................... 117
Table 6.2 - Decision Timing for Select Levels of Experience ........................................ 119
Table 6.3 - Life Table for Hypothetical Decision Timeline ........................................... 124
Table 6.4 - Life Table For Kaplan-Meier Estimator for All Potential Candidates (Select
Entries) ............................................................................................................................ 127
Table 6.5 - Accelerated Failure Time Mixture Cure (ATFMC) Models of Candidacy
Decision Making ............................................................................................................. 143
Table 6.6 - AFTMC Model for Ordinal Levels of Experience ....................................... 147
Table 7.1 - Number of Candidates with Electoral Experience in Primary Races ........... 172
Table 7.2 - Dynamic AFT Models for Several Measures of Experience ........................ 175
Table 7.3 - Dynamic AFT Models for Open Seat Hypotheses ....................................... 179
Table 7.4 - AFT Models for Ordinal Levels of Experience ............................................ 181
Table 7.5 - AFT Models of Survival Times with Quadratic Term for Time-Dependent
Covariates ....................................................................................................................... 182

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