Undercover Armies: CIA and Surrogate Warfare in Laos

598 Pages·2009·29.43 MB·English

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UNDERCOVER ARMIESD
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The Center for the Study ofIntelligence
(U) The Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) was founded in 1974 in
response to Director ofCentral Intelligence James Schlesinger'sdesire tocreate
within CIA an organization that could "think through the functions of intelli
gence and bring the best intellects available to bear on intelligence problems."
The Center, comprising professional historians and experienced practitioners,
attempts todocument lessons learnedfrompastactivities,explore theneeds and
expectations of intelligence consumers, and stimulate serious debate on current
and future intelligence challenges.
(U)Tocarry outits mission,CSI publishesStudiesinIntelligenceandbooksand
monographs addressing historical, operational,doctrinal, andtheoretical aspects
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tains theAgency's HistoricalIntelligence Collection.
Comments and questions may beaddressed to:
Center for the Study ofIntelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505
The other works of Thomas L Ahern, Jr., published in this series by the
Centerfor the Study of Intelligenceare:
• The WayWe Do Things: Black Entry OperationsInto North Vietnam,
1961-19640 I
• Good Questions, WrongAnswers: CIAsEstimates ofArms lra~c
Through Sihanoukville, Cambodia During the Vietnam War (2004,
I I
• CIAand Rural Pacification inSouth Vietnam0(2001,I
I I
L--_
• CIAand theHouse ofNgo: CovertActioninSouth Vietnam, 1954-630
I I
(2000,
• CIA and the Generals: Covert Support to Military Government in
South VietnamD(1999,1 I
, :
I·
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UNDERCOVER ARMIES:
CIA and Surrogate Warfare in Laos
0
1961-1973
Thomas L. Ahem, Jr.
CIA I-listoryStaff
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Cf,NTEl\.H.lllrue
~" STUDY,,, INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC
2006
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PARTTwo: 1965-70 209
Chapter Ten D
IntheShadow ofVietnam 211
Chapter Eleven D
Onthe Frontline inSamNeua 233
Chapter Twelve
Introduction toInterdictionD 257
Chapter Thirteen
1he High WaterMarO 275
Chapter Fourteen .
AHolding OperationD 297
Chapter Fifteen
The "Mea Heartland"D 323
PART THREE: 1970-72 347
Chapter Sixteen D:
Taking the Wartothe Enemy 349
Chapter Seventeen
I 1 373
Chapter Eighteen
Sting Like a BeeD 407
Chapter Nineteen
Vietnamization and EscalationD : 421
Chapter Twenty .
RedLight atthe EndoftheTunneID 443
EPILOGUE: 1973-75 483
Chapter Twenty-one .
WithanEye onParisD 485
Chapter Twenty-two
Going the WayofVietnamD 515
Chronology 531
Appendix: TheNarcotics Questionl 535
1
SourceNote and Suggested Reading 549
Index 553
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MAPS
Laosground war,1961-75.D xvi
Laostopographicalmap.O xxi
Distribution ofethnicgroupsinLaos, 19670 : xxii
D
Communist-controlled areasinLaos, 1962 xxiii
Southern Laosvillage securityprogram, mid-19660 xxiv
Communist-controlled roads,c.May 1964D xxv
PrincipalfeaturesoftheHo ChiMinh
Trailnetwork,early 1972D xxvi
Supportfacilitiesfor combatairoperationsover
Laosand North VietnamD xxvii
Comparisonofcontrolled areas, 1962vs. 1970 xxviii
P~;;::e~~:gn;~::~~;~~tar
229
Tacticalsituation inMR2,mid-April1970D 340
Tacticalsituation inLangTieng-Sam Thong
sector,c. lateJune 19700 344
Southern Laosinterdictionoperations
asof4July 19700 362
Phase IofSouth Laos interdiction' .
operations,August 19700 366
Phase11ofSouthLaos interdiction
operations, October19700 , 368
Dry-season tactical objectivesin
northern Laos,1970-71D 389
Tacticalsituation inMR2
as of5January 19710 391
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nTh
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Plannedoffensive west ofthe
D
Plain ofJars, 3March 1971 397
Plannedoffensive against the .
Plain ofJars, 21June 19710 .426
Tactical Situation inMR 2as ofJuly 19710 430
Tactical situation inlate December 19710 436
Tactical situation inMR 2 inearly January 19720 442
Plannedoffensive operations in
MR 2as February 19720 .450
,
Planningfor second phase of
Operation 114March 19720 452
1
I I
Phase'!ofOperation
August197L:]. 464
P~;~~~::~a;~;25
! 468
p~::;;n~:~;,~:e:r;~;;b
1, 476
Tactical situation onthe Bolovens Plateau
as of15December19720, 478
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ABBREVIATIONS
BG Bataillon Guerrilla, the renamed SGU battalion
CASI Continental Air Services International
CAT Civil Air Transport. the Taiwan-basedairline that
grew out ofGen. ClaireChennault's "Flying
Tigcrs"
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CINCPAC Commander-in-ChiefPacific of US armed forecs
CDNI Committee for the Defenseofthe National
Interest. an informal association ofanticommunist
Lao political and military leaders
COS Chiefof Station
DDP Deputy Directorfor Plans
DRV Democratic Republic of Vietnam
FAC Forward Air Controller
FAR Forces ArmiesRoyales(Royal [Laotian] Armed
Forces)
Helio Helio-Courier, a single-engine. fixed-wing
STOLaircraft
ICC International ControlCommission
KMT Kuornintang, the political party of Gen. Chiang
Kai-shek's Chinese Nationalists
MAAG Military Assistance Advisory Group
MACV Military Assistance Command Vietnam
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NLHS Neo Lao Hak Sat. the political front ofthe
communistPathetLao
SEC~/fMR
r:;J
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NSAM National Security Action Memorandum
NVA North Vietnamese Army
PEO Program Evaluation Office of the US Operations
Mission in Vientiane .
PGNU Provisional Government ofNational Union
RLG Royal Laotian Government
RTA Royal Thai Army
SEACORD Southeast Asia CoordinationCommittee,
composedof theMACVcommanderand the US
ambassadors toSouthVietnam, Laos, and Thailand
SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SGU Special Guerrilla Unit
SNIE Special National Intelligence Estimate
SOG Special OperationsGroup, aMACV element
staffed by the US Army Special Forces
SOT Special OperationsTeam
STOL Short-takeoff-and-landing
USAID United States Agency for International
Development
USOM UnitedStates Operations Mission, afield office of
the Agency for International Development
WSAG Washington SpecialAction Group, theinteragency
body charged with oversightof covertaction
SErCl:/IMR
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INTRODUCTION
D
The Cork in the Bottle
The day before his inauguration as president of the United States, John F.
Kennedy met President Dwight D. Eisenhower and several cabinetofficers at
the White House. Kennedy had solicited the meeting, partly for cosmetic rea
sons-"reassuring the publie as to the harmony of the transition"-but also
because hewas, inhisown words,"anxious toget somecommitmentfrom the
outgoing administration as to how they would deal with Laos." Receiving
Kennedy intheCabinet Room on 19January 1961,Eisenhower andhis advis
ers had more to say about the tiny country's strategic importance than about
specific means of keeping the "cork in the bOtllO"eas they put it, to prevent
communistdominion over mostof theFar East
I
The Western-oriented Royal Laotian Government (RLG) was tbreatened
both by an army mutiny and by a North Vietnamese-sponsored communist
insurgent movement, the Pathet Lao. The mutinous RLG units were the
army's best, certainly capable oftaking onthebest ofthedissident forces. But
most of the army reflected the lethargy of its officer corps, which was drawn
from the colonial elite that had served the French, and now lacked either the
energy orthe legitimacy for effective leadershipD
Well aware of its own military impotence, the RLG feared that asking the
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) to intercede would only pro
voke further North Vietnamese incursions. Eisenhower recognized Laotian
anxiety, but thought that if thecountry fell to thecommunists, "it would bring
unbelievable pressure to bear on Thailand, Cambodia, and South Vietnam."
He considered Laos so important that, in the words of one Kennedy adviser,
"Ifit reached thestage wherewecould notpersuade others to actwith us,then
D
hewould be willing, asalast desperate hope, tointervene unilaterally."2
It seems that Kennedy had to wait until he took office to learn of the airlift
ofweapons andequipmentalready on its way toatiny village perched on one
Memoranda byparticipantsatthemeeting, ForeignRelations ofthe UnitedStates, 1961-1963,
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\/hlumeXXiV,TheLaos Crisis(hereaftercited asFRUS 196~-1963), 19-25
SEcn~-4:1'IMR