UCLA Electronic Theses and Dissertations

170 Pages·2013·0.78 MB·English

UCLA
UCLA Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Title
More than Words: Stances as an Alternative Model for Apology, Forgiveness and Similar
Speech Acts
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3z03x8qv
Author
Helmreich, Jeffrey Stuart
Publication Date
2013

Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
Los Angeles

More than Words:
Stances as an Alternative Model for Apology, Forgiveness and Similar Speech Acts

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in Philosophy

by

Jeffrey S. Helmreich

2013

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

More than Words:
Stances as an Alternative Model for Apology, Forgiveness and Similar Speech Acts

By

Jeffrey S. Helmreich
Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy
University of California, Los Angeles, 2013
Professor Seana Shiffrin, Chair

We have the power to make dramatic moral differences with words. In particular, certain
speech acts – apologizing, forgiving, taking responsibility – change the moral dynamics between
people, thereby restoring relationships, relieving moral debts and grounding historic
reconciliation.
Few dispute this power, even as it continues to amaze us in practice. Yet, despite an
illuminating burst of scholarly attention to many aspects of apology, forgiveness and moral
repair in recent years, their power remains elusive. That is, we still have an incomplete grasp of
what, exactly, about saying “I’m sorry,” or “I forgive you” effects such significant moral change.
The dissertation seeks to understand and account for that power. At the same time, it also
seeks a new account of these speech acts and their sincerity conditions, not only for individual
ii
people but for corporate and institutional bodies, as well. These twin projects are joined by the
same underlying conviction: to capture how these speech acts accomplish so much, we need a
new understanding of what they are.
Chapters I and II begin this explanatory project by focusing on the classic case of
apologies, taking issue with traditional accounts of apologetic expression as representing or
revealing something – such as how the speaker feels or what she believes. These views cannot
make sense of the way an apology responds remedially to a past wrongdoing, as illustrated most
dramatically by cases where the victim knows everything the apology could reveal.
Instead, I argue that apologies, and similar speech acts, should be understood less as
expressions than as ways of treating someone that counteract the mistreatment begun by the
actions for which one apologizes. This model requires a new, relational understanding of both
apologies and of the actions that give rise to them.
Chapter III focuses on the formal speech act of forgiveness, by which a victim can alter
the moral status of her offender – rendering apologies and other acts of moral repair unnecessary,
and their absence no longer blameworthy. I argue that forgiveness has this impact because, and
to the extent that, it takes place in contexts in which the moral power of other remedial steps like
apology are already at work. As with apologies, then, forgiveness emerges as less a unilateral
expression than an interactive approach to another person, which can help restore their
relationship.
Together the accounts present apologies, forgiveness and similar speech acts as active
ways for people to relate to each other, whose sincerity depends more on commitments and
dispositions to act than on emotions and psychological states. With this framework in place, it
iii
becomes clear why even institutions – countries, courts, companies – can sincerely apologize,
forgive and engage each other in similar speech acts, as I argue in Chapter IV.
The resulting picture of utterances like apology and forgiveness departs from the speech-
action dichotomy that Austin and Searle began challenging half a century ago. On the account
developed here, certain speech can function as action over and above what it communicates,
while some actions have meaning beyond their material impact on the world. The area of moral
repair, then, sheds new light on what action can mean and speech can do.

iv
The dissertation of Jeffrey S. Helmreich is approved

Mark Greenberg

Barbara Herman

Pamela Hieronymi

David Kaplan

Herbert Morris

Seana Shiffrin, Committee Chair

University of California, Los Angeles
2013

v
To Alan Michael Helmreich, unforgettable inspiration
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract of the Dissertation …………………………………………………………………..… ii
Acknowledgments ……………………………………………………………………….....… viii
Vita ……………………………………………………………………………………….…...... x
Introduction …………………………………………………………………………………….. 1
Chapter I: Apologies as Stance-Takings ………………………………………………………. 5
Chapter II: The Problems of Agent Regret ……………………………………………………. 40
Chapter III: Forgiveness ………………………………………………………………………. 82
Chapter IV: Institutional Stances……………………………………………………………… 111
Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………………. 151
Bibliography ………………………………………………………………………………….. 154

vii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Not long after I arrived at UCLA, I asked Seana Shiffrin to be my advisor. It has proved
to be one of the best decisions I’ve ever made, not least in its impact on every aspect of the work
that follows. Her contribution and influence is simply too great to try to capture here, except to
say that it includes the stunning example she set as philosopher, teacher, and person. I cannot
imagine a better and more dedicated advisor, or a more perfect model of how to synthesize
intellect and principle.
Given my luck in choice of advisor, it should have been too much to expect to have, in
the same department, an additional faculty supporter such as Barbara Herman. To my great
fortune, she gave enormously to this project and to my journey here, from the transformative
comments on my drafts to the thrilling talks in her office, always leaving me at once inspired and
unsettled. My dissertation – and the way I try to do philosophy – owe immeasurably to Barbara.
Herbert Morris came later to this project, but I still feel guilty about having grabbed so
much of his striking and insightful attention, which reshaped all my thinking about regret,
remorse, moral repair and so much else. I’m equally grateful to Herb for sharing his paradigm-
shifting thoughts with me in person, in a wonderful series of sessions across West Los Angeles
that taught me so much and felt way too short.
All three of these teachers – my dissertation’s principal readers – also impressed upon me
the value of keeping moral philosophy sensitive to moral life and experience, rather than treating
it as the mere application of conceptual analysis to ethical questions. I hope a trace of this
orientation will be found in the dissertation, at least in its choice of method and emphasis.
viii