Types and Tokens: On Abstract Objects

197 Pages·2009·0.66 MB·English

by  Linda Wetzel

TYPES & TOKENS
On Abstract Objects
Linda Wetzel
Types and Tokens

Types and Tokens: On Abstract Objects
Linda Wetzel
The MIT Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts
London, England
© 2009 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Wetzel, Linda, 1951–.
Types and tokens : on abstract objects / Linda Wetzel.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-262-01301-7 (hardcover : alk. paper)
1. Type and token (Linguistics). 2. Language and languages—Philosophy.
I. Title.
P128.T94W47 2009
111′.2—dc22
2008043056
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
For Sylvain Bromberger and Richard Cartwright

Contents
Acknowledgments ix
Introduction xi
1 The Data 1
Type–Token Use in Philosophy 1
The Data 3
Conclusion 21
2 Types Exist 23
1 Types Exist 24
2 Objections 28
3 The Alleged Trouble with Abstract Objects 30
Conclusion 50
3 Paraphrasing, Part One: Words 53
1 Goodman’s and Sellars’s Suggestion 55
2 Words 58
Conclusion 70
4 Paraphrasing, Part Two 73
1 Other Paraphrases 73
2 Characterizing Statements 77
3 Old Glory 85
4 Quantification 87
5 Class Nominalism 88
Conclusion 92
5 The Trouble with Nominalism 93
1 What Goodman and Quine Say 93
2 The Trouble with Nominalism 99
Conclusion 103
viii Contents
6 Remarks on a Theory of Word Types 105
1 Kinds 106
2 Questions (1) through (5) 112
Conclusion 124
7 A Serious Problem for Realism? 125
1 What Are Occurrences of Expressions? 125
2 What Are Occurrences Generally? 130
3 David Lewis’s “Against Structural Universals” 138
Concluding Remarks 150
Notes 151
References 163
Index 175
Acknowledgments
Although the bulk of this book was written during the period 1996–1999,
some material appeared in print earlier than 1996, and revisions were made
up until 2007. Thus there has been ample time for teachers, colleagues,
students, friends, and anonymous reviewers to make suggestions and criti-
cisms that have had a constructive impact on this book (and ample time
for me to forget some of their contributions). As it is impossible to acknowl-
edge all these contributions, below are the names of those who get the
lion’s share of the credit.
My long-time mentor, Sylvain Bromberger, contributed to my apprecia-
tion of the importance of types, especially in linguistics. Although our
views diverge in signifi cant ways, his early platonic views about types
informed my own view. He raised the question of the relationship of types
to their tokens, and his later nominalist views about types served as a
foil to my own platonist views. He has commented generously on drafts
for encyclopedia entries I’ve published on types and tokens, and most
importantly, he has offered his invaluable comments on this book at an
American Philosophical Association’s “Author Meets Critics” session.
Over the years I’ve been much infl uenced by my thesis supervisor, Dick
Cartwright, both for his general approach to metaphysics, with its careful
scrutiny of ordinary and scientifi c language, as well as for his platonism.
He kindly lent me his unpublished lecture notes on abstract objects, which
opened my eyes to the diversity to be found among abstract objects and
enlightened me on the difference between tokens and occurrences. Along
with Dick Cartwright, the late George Boolos effectively turned me into a
platonist with his comments on one of my early efforts defending, of all
things, nominalism. His guidance, concern, and support over the years
were invaluable. The late Jerry Katz lent a sympathetic, patient, platonist
ear over the course of many discussions and arguments. His unabashed
platonism served as a foil to my more abashed platonism.