Twilight of the pollsters

422 Pages·2017·3.33 MB·English

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Twilight of the pollsters
A social theory of mass opinion in late modernity

Marius S. J. Ostrowski
All Souls College
Hilary Term 2017

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of DPhil in Politics at the
Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford. I declare and confirm
that the following submission is my own work except where otherwise indicated, that it has not
previously been submitted for assessment, either at Oxford or at any other institution, and that all
sources have been cited appropriately.

Word count: 105,687 words
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Abstract

Twilight of the pollsters: A social theory of mass opinion in late modernity
Marius S. J. Ostrowski, All Souls College, Hilary Term 2017
DPhil in Politics

This thesis examines how the occupations people hold, and the social classes in which they are situated,
affect the way in which they form and express opinions. At a theoretical level, it unites the ‘deep-
structure’ macroanalysis of social theory with the individualised microanalysis of how subjects form and
express opinions in opinion research, reviving an approach that has not been pursued since early-20th-
century social research. At a practical level, it responds to several recent and prominent failures of
prediction by the opinion polling industry, and asks whether a broader understanding of ‘mass opinion’
can help avert such failures in future. The thesis argues that opinions are subjects’ judgments about their
social conditions, based on mental pictures they have of these conditions that combine the values and
attitudes they hold with the information they have about their environment. Subjects form opinions
based on these pictures via three ‘means of thinking’—personality-traits, emotions, and reason—and
express them using two kinds of ‘means of articulation’—bodily organs and media. The thesis shows
how the variety of occupations subjects hold, and the extremity of class differentials between them,
introduce substantial plurality into their values and attitudes, the way they acquire information, how
they think, and how they articulate themselves. In particular, it highlights the considerable asymmetries
between higher- and lower-class subjects regarding: which parts of their social conditions they are
experts about, and how far they are influenced by others; whether they think about their conditions more
emotionally or with reasoning; and how great a range and quality of opportunities they have to articulate
their views. The thesis closes by suggesting that these findings offer opinion researchers and social
theorists clear directions for measuring ‘mass opinion’ in new ways, and potentially emancipating the
voices of subjects whose opinions are suppressed in late-modern society.
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For my parents,
to whom I owe everything.
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Wer bin ich — und wenn ja, wie viele?
Who am I — and if so, how many?
——Richard David Precht

pÒll' o„d' ¢lèphx, ¢ll' ™c‹noj žn mšga.
Multa novit vulpes, verum echinus unum magnum.
A fox knows many things, but a hedgehog one big thing.
——Erasmus, after Archilochus

We are all experts in our own experiences.
——modern proverb

Ne supra crepidam sutor iudicaret.
A shoemaker should not judge beyond the shoe.
——Pliny

Are you thinking what we’re thinking?
——UK Conservative party election slogan, 2005

CLAUDIUS: He hath not fail’d to pester us with message.
——William Shakespeare, Hamlet, I.2

“I don’t think—”
“Then you shouldn’t talk,” said the Hatter.
——Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland
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Contents

Preface · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · page 7
Introduction: Twilight of the Pollsters · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 16
§1. The fractured field of opinion research · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 19
§2. Renewing social analysis of mass opinion · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 24
§3. Occupation, class, and mass opinion · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 28
§4. Overview of this enquiry · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 34
I. Outline of a social theory · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 37
§1. Defining ‘the social’: material and relational conditions · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 38
§2. Social agency and the domains of social activity · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 41
§3. Occupations and classes · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 52
§4. From agency to identity: habitus and socialisation · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 58
§5. Mass opinion: ideation, communication, and discourse · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 65
§6. Conclusion · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 75
II. The nature and basis of opinion · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 76
§1. Judgment and its objects · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 77
§2. The means of thinking: personality-traits, emotions, and reason · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 89
§3. The means of articulation: bodily organs and media · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 109
§4. Conclusion · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 126
III. Experts in our own experience: pluralism in predispositions and information · · · · · · · · · · · · · 128
§1. The social constitution of predispositions · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 129
§2. The social sources of information · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 146
§3. The main influences on judgment in late modernity · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 161
§4. Conclusion · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 187
IV. Are you thinking how we’re thinking?: pluralism in opinion-formation · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 189
§1. Occupation, class, and the means of thinking · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 190
§2. Personality-traits: progressive reasoners and reactionary emoters · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 200
§3. Emotions: positive reproducers and negative rethinkers · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 214
§4. Reason: rational purists and reasonable approximators · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 229
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§5. Conclusion · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 236
V. They have not fail’d to pester us with message: pluralism in opinion-expression · · · · · · · · · · · 238
§1. Occupation, class, and the means of articulation · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 239
§2. Bodily organs: sophisticate poseurs and common obsequy · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 249
§3. Media: omnivolent magnates and sporadic gadflies · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 259
§4. Conclusion · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 273
Conclusion: Beyond the Pollsterdämmerung · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 275
§1. ‘Between foxes and hedgehogs’: the social nature and basis of opinion · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 276
§2. Occupation, class, and mass opinion: a review · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 279
§3. Measuring and emancipating mass opinion · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 282
Bibliography · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 293
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Preface

Und doch sehr oft, wenn wir uns von dem Beabsichtigten für ewig getrennt sehen, haben wir schon
auf unserm Wege irgend ein anderes Wünschenswerthe gefunden.
And yet very often, when we find ourselves forever separated from what we had intended, we
have already found something else desirable along the way.
——Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, ‘Maxim 68’1

It would be an understatement to say that this thesis has ended up in a very different place to
where it started. When I first applied to the DPhil, the UK had just gone through one of the most
turbulent summers in its recent history. On 4 August 2011, a 29-year-old mixed-race Londoner, Mark
Duggan, was shot and killed by police officers from the Specialist Firearms Command (CO19) of the
Metropolitan Police as part of an investigation into gun crime within the black community. Police
mishandling of the aftermath of Duggan’s death led to a peaceful protest outside Tottenham police
station escalating into a violent pitched battle between members of the local community and riot police.
This, in turn, exploded into several nights of rioting and looting across London, with ‘copycat violence’
flaring up in other towns and cities throughout England, ultimately causing five deaths, 202 police and
civilian injuries, and more than £200m of damage. As the country entered a state of flux for nearly a
week, public discourse in its many forms erupted into rancorous debate about the personal, social, and
political reasons for this pervasive breakdown of order. Whether through opinion pieces in the press,
interviews and discussion programmes on radio and television, posts and comments on blogs and social
media, or in their responses to surveys and opinion polls, vast swathes of the population from all walks
of life seized the opportunity to document their reactions to the events of those few days. Across all of
them, mass opinion covered various combinations of possible factors that caused the riots, ranging from
consumerism, youth culture, endemic criminality, and family breakdown to police racism, poor
education, lack of opportunities, and a society-wide values crisis. For each one, mass opinion rapidly

1 Goethe 1833, vol.49.
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crystallised into an almost stereotypical division between ‘right-wing’ and ‘left-wing’ views—a fault-line
that persisted to a greater or lesser extent across all of the ways in which it was expressed.
It was out of my attempts to make sense of this problem that my DPhil project gradually took
shape. As those closest to me would doubtless attest, I have never tired of recounting the story of when,
and how, I first came to choose my doctoral topic: drinking with an old undergraduate friend in the
Marquis of Granby after a somewhat nondescript day in the office interning at a thinktank. The
Marquis—typically packed with researchers, civil servants, journalists, and other politics junkies jostling
for space and spilling out onto the street—was unusually deserted for a balmy summer’s evening. It was
the third day of the riots, and across the city many companies had sent their employees home absurdly
early in order to avoid any accidental run-ins with marauding rioters. The Westminster bubble was
apparently no exception. As my friend and I sat nursing our drinks and quietly discussing the recent
events, alone except for a somewhat antsy-looking bartender, it struck us quite how deeply unnecessary
and ironic the panic in London’s political workforce was. Unnecessary because the whole London
political quarter sits in the more-or-less literal shadow of the Palace of Westminster and New Scotland
Yard power nexus. It would be difficult to think of a place less at risk from the violence of the precariat
in the whole of London, possibly excluding the soulless wasteland of Canary Wharf. (Needless to say,
this triumphant logic was a little lost on worried friends and family, who were aghast that we had not
joined the bourgeois exodus earlier in the day.) And it was ironic since it meant that even the people
tasked with operating and influencing the bureaucratic machinery of government had briskly abandoned
their faith in the state’s ability to ‘do its job’ in the most basic conceivable way.
But there was a deeper, and far more serious, aspect to this outbreak of mass panic among the
residents and workers of London and elsewhere in the UK. In effect, over the course of the first few
days of rioting, popular confidence, or trust, in the government’s authority was drastically eroded. In the
absence of a meaningful state response, members of a variety of faith, ethnic, and other communities—
the Sikh community in Southall, the Turkish and Kurdish communities in Dalston, Hackney, and
Haringey, the Bengali community in Whitechapel, and the fans of Millwall and Charlton football clubs
in Eltham—organised patrols and protective cordons to prevent rioters looting and destroying property
in their localities. Likewise, social network users across London organised clean-up squads, colloquially
termed ‘Riot Wombles’, in Ealing, Clapham, and elsewhere on Twitter via the hashtags #riotcleanup
and #riotwombles, and on Facebook via a series of ‘groups’ and ‘events’. These and other movements
were merrily endorsed and strategically co-opted by a variety of political figures—often in a warped
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attempt to buttress the incumbent Coalition government’s flagging (and now defunct) ‘Big Society’
agenda for greater voluntarism in public policy. But the problem remained that once the immediate
societal rupture of the riots was resolved, the authority of state apparatuses would need to be re-
established. (As mass rioting turned into mass looting it became fairly evident that the UK was not in
the throes of any form of revolutionary conjuncture, nor were there many demands in evidence for a
serious reconfiguration of the UK’s political institutions.) At the same time, there would have to be some
tangible change in the terms on which such a re-establishment of authority would need to take place.
Neither the UK government, nor British society as a whole, could afford to simply pretend that the riots
had not happened, or that they were a mere aberration that should not prevent the continuation of
‘business as usual’. Yet, as my friend and I observed, the transparent schism within the UK population’s
views about what had caused the rupture—and hence what any ‘new settlement’ for governmental
authority would need to address directly—made finding a common basis for these terms of re-
establishment all the more challenging, and for the same reason all the more urgent.
This DPhil thus began life as a project to see what public policy (in the UK and possibly further
afield) could learn from the events of the UK’s very own recent ‘state of exception’—and mass opinion
about them—in order for effective governmental authority to be re-established in a ‘post-riots’ society.
Needless to say, it did not settle there for long. After about two years of research, which also saw some
of the most profound personal and professional changes in my life so far—including my first positions
as a graduate tutor and policy researcher, as well as my unexpected promotion from my old home in
Magdalen to the mystical halls of All Souls—it became clear that a full structural analysis of the sort I
had hoped to deliver was well beyond the maximum possible scope of my DPhil research. Specifically,
it had become apparent that both the events of the riots themselves, and the understanding of mass
opinion I was using to evaluate discourse about them, were vastly more complex than I had anticipated.
In order to do them full justice, I found that I would have to address them within the parameters of
separate projects. I was consequently faced with the choice of which ‘half’ of my initial enquiry to pursue
for my DPhil submission. As entertaining as it surely would have been to spend another year or two
doing close textual analysis of the avalanches of apoplexy in the tabloid coverage of the riots and their
aftermath, I eventually decided on the more novel and abstract option of exploring the concept of ‘mass
opinion’ instead. I still harbour hopes of using my two years of work on the riots in a future project, once
this DPhil is complete. (After all, I would hate to think that I spent a summer reading the Daily Mail
for nothing.)
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Of course, in reality, the fundamental motivation of this enquiry is not so far removed from the
core assumption of my original project. I still cleave to the view—endorsed by many social and political
theorists throughout history, not least David Hume and Walter Lippmann—that the legitimacy and
success of political authority depends strongly on how political institutions respond to, and incorporate,
the substantive views of the populations they seek to govern. The difference between this enquiry and
my initial project on the riots lies in the fact that, rather than analysing a particular parochial instance
of societal crisis to illuminate what the substantive content of mass opinion is in a given polity (the UK),
I have chosen instead to focus on the diversity of the forms that mass opinion in general takes in late
modernity to illuminate what it is (what social object or behaviour) that political institutions are
supposed to be responding to, and incorporating. Insofar as there is an identifiable crisis to which I can
pin this project, it takes the form not of a societal rupture, but of a stark, and highly visible, failure of
research methodology. The failure in question is the major disaster that the opinion polling industry
collectively experienced at the 2015 UK general election, where the statistical dead heat between the
Conservative and Labour parties in the final polls before the day of the election completely failed to
materialise, with the results instead showing a huge victory for the Conservatives by well over 6%. This
watershed moment—which I fancifully called a ‘Pollsterdämmerung’ in an online article for the New
Statesman—was the first of its kind since the well-known débâcle in 1992, and prompted extensive
methodological soul-searching within the industry, and even a full investigation and report by the British
Polling Council.2 The fruits of this introspection have been rather less than impressive, and singularly
failed to prevent a second (albeit less well publicised) failure of prediction for the 2016 referendum on
UK membership of the EU. Rather than a breakdown in social order, then, it is this apparent impasse
in the validity of opinion research towards which this enquiry is now oriented. In other words, my project
has become more general, abstract, and interpretative, and less contingent, concrete, and prescriptive,
since I began it in autumn 2012. It has been a highly enjoyable and informative change in tack, but one
that has come at the cost of a year’s delay to my original completion schedule. I leave it to the reader to
decide whether my shift away from the riots as an anchor for my research was ultimately ‘worth it’.
Over the last four or so years of doctoral research, as well as the five years of university education
before that, I have accumulated more professional and personal debts of gratitude than I can ever hope
to repay. As any of my students will testify—and as I argue in this enquiry—I view social thought as a

2 Ostrowski 2015.