Transnational Threats

256 Pages·2000·0.64 MB·English

TRANSNATIONAL THREATS:
BLENDING LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND MILITARY STRATEGIES
Edited by
Carolyn W. Pumphrey
November 2000
*****
The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do
not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of
the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This
report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.
*****
I would like to acknowledge a special debt to the following persons:
Richard H. Kohn and Peter D. Feaver, the outgoing and incoming
Executive Secretaries of Triangle Institute for Strategic Studies
(1999-2000); Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., Director of the Strategic Studies
Institute (SSI), U.S. Army War College, who conceived this conference
and assisted every step of the way; Colonel Bernard F. Zipp of SSI, with
whom I worked closely in organizing the conference and who bore all my
shortcomings with great patience; Rye Barcott (conference rapporteur)
and Jonathan Phillips (transcriber), both of the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, without whose excellent and timely assistance
my own task as editor would have been so much harder; and Joseph
Caddell of North Carolina State University who, as always, provided
invaluable critical input when it was most needed.
*****
Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be
forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War
College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Copies of this report
may be obtained from the Publications and Production Office by calling
commercial [phone], FAX [phone], or via the Internet at
[email protected]
*****
Most 1993, 1994, and all later Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)
monographs are available on the SSI Homepage for electronic
dissemination. SSI’s Homepage address is: http://carlisle-www.army.
mil/usassi/welcome.htm
*****
ISBN 1-58487-037-0
ii
CONTENTS
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. v
1. Introduction
Carolyn W. Pumphrey . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1
2. An Overview from Law Enforcement’s
Perspective
Spike Bowman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19
3. Transnational Threats: U.S. Military
Strategy
Daniel S. Roper. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 41
4. Information and Terroristic Use of Mass
Weapons: The Larger Context
Kenneth A. Minihan . . . . . . . . . . . .. 51
5. Intelligence Problems as They Relate to
International Crime Organizations and
Drug Trafficking
William J. Olson . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 57
6. Transnational Threats Vis-`a-Vis Law
Enforcement and Military Intelligence:
Lessons on the Emerging Relationship
Elizabeth Rindskopf-Parker. . . . . . . .. 65
7. Terrorism by Weapons of Mass
Destruction: A Reassessment
of the Threat
Bruce Hoffman. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 85
iii
8. Terrorism and Weapons of Mass
Destruction: A Review and New
Paradigm
Jeffrey F. Addicott . . . . . . . . . . . .. 105
9. Bruce Hoffman’s View of Terrorism
by Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Another Perspective
Victor Utgoff. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 133
10. The National Information
Infrastructure: The Role of the
Department of Defense in Defending It
Daniel T. Kuehl . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 137
11. Daniel T. Kuehl’s View of DOD’s Role in
Defending the National Information
Infrastructure: Another Perspective
Phillip E. Lacombe. . . . . . . . . . . .. 163
12. Daniel Kuehl’s View of Information
Warfare and the Defense of U.S.
Information Systems: Another
Perspective
Richard Marshall. . . . . . . . . . . .. 173
13. Combating Transnational Organized
Crime
Phil Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 185
14. Phil Williams’ View of Criminal
Organizations and Drug Trafficking:
Another Perspective
Thomas V. Fuentes . . . . . . . . . . .. 203
iv
15. Phil Williams’ Views on Combating
International Organized Crime:
Another Perspective
James R. McDonough . . . . . . . . . .. 213
16. Preparing for War in the Fourth
Dimension: A Reality Check
David M. Crane . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 221
17. Terrorism and National Defense:
The Congressional Perspective
William Natter . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 231
18. New Institutions and New Ways
of Operating
Jeffrey A. Hunker . . . . . . . . . . . .. 237
About the Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 253
v
FOREWORD
On February 2-3, 2000, the U.S. Army War College, the
Triangle Institute for Security Studies, and the Duke
University Center for Law, Ethics, and National Security
co-sponsored a conference in Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
The conference examined transnational threats, including
terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction, cyber
threats to the national infrastructure, and international
organized crime. The goal was to evaluate the seriousness of
such threats and discuss strategies for dealing with them.
In particular, the conference sought to address the question
of how military and law enforcement could blend their
strategies to better counter transnational threats. A
secondary purpose was to clarify the role of the military in
meeting challenges that transcend national borders and
threaten our national interests.
This book highlights some of the main issues and themes
that ran through the conference. After looking at the
various threats and undertaking a risk assessment, the
book considers the unique aspects of transnational threats,
and then identifies the key challenges facing the United
States, paying particular attention to the role of the
military. To conclude, the book discusses some of the steps
that should be taken to secure ourselves against
transnational threats. The Strategic Studies Institute is
pleased to publish this volume as a contribution to the
debate on important national security issues.
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
vii
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Carolyn W. Pumphrey
On February 2-3, 2000, the U.S. Army War College, the
Triangle Institute for Security Studies, and the Duke
University Center for Law, Ethics, and National Security
cosponsored a conference in Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
The conference examined transnational threats, including
terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
cyber threats to the national infrastructure, and
international organized crime. The goal was to evaluate the
seriousness of such threats and discuss strategies for
dealing with them. In particular, the conference sought to
address the question of how military and law enforcement
could blend their strategies to better counter transnational
threats. A secondary purpose, as noted by Major General
Robert H. Scales, Jr., at the start of the meeting, was to
clarify the role of the military in meeting challenges that
transcend national borders and threaten our national
interests.
Transnational threats are major security threats for the
21st century. They are characterized by their global nature,
which means, by definition, that these threats straddle both
the domestic and foreign spheres. Whereas responsibility
for U.S. national security threats in the past clearly
belonged to the military and responsibility for domestic
security belonged to law enforcement, these clear-cut
divisions no longer exist. This poses some profound
constitutional and security challenges. On the one hand,
institutions that have developed separately must now learn
to work closely together and to blend their strategies in
order to ensure our nation’s security. On the other hand, the
division of military and law enforcement functions is closely
linked to the preservation of our liberties, and the task of
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merging them is fraught with hazards. In the very act of
preserving our security, we run the risk of forfeiting some of
our liberties. Blending law enforcement and the military is
thus a vital but dangerous balancing act.
This introduction will synthesize some of the main
findings of the conference participants and attendees. After
looking at the various threats and undertaking a risk
assessment, we will consider the unique aspects of
transnational threats. We will then identify the key
challenges facing the United States, paying particular
attention to the role of the military. To conclude, we will
discuss some of the steps that should be taken to secure
ourselves against transnational threats.
A Threat Assessment.
Our starting point must be to evaluate the nature of the
threats we face. Only when we understand what is at stake
can we determine what we can put at risk.
Terrorism entails the use of psychological warfare to
achieve political goals. The perpetrator of an act of
terrorism lacks the legitimacy of a nation-state or other
recognized political entity. Terrorism is thus usually
(though not inevitably) classified as a crime. Contemporary
terrorist networks typically are not state-sponsored. A
number of terrorist acts have been perpetrated by sub-state
groups, and individual terrorism is also a potential problem.
The aims and objectives of contemporary terrorists are often
unclear. In part, this is the result of deliberate policy on
their part; anonymity enables them to capitalize on the fear
and alarm generated by their violence. Their organizations
are also far more amorphous than was typical of traditional
terrorist groups, making them harder to retaliate against
than in the past.
Terrorists today have a frightening capability in that
they can now get access to (or manufacture) nuclear,
biological, and chemical WMD. In the estimation of Bruce
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Hoffman, they are not likely to resort to the use of such
weapons for a variety of reasons. In part, it is because such
weapons cost a lot to acquire, test, and manage. In part, it is
because terrorists can achieve their goals just as effectively
by using more traditional weapons. They must also consider
the possibility that they will alienate public sympathy if
they inflict massive casualties. Hoffman argues that the
more likely threat may come from an unconventional
chemical, biological, or radiological weapon built on a
deliberately small scale. Such an attack would generate just
the right amount of alarm and fear to serve the purposes of
the terrorists.
Given these realities, the threat of terrorism involving
WMD is, in Hoffman’s view, less than generally assumed.
While rapid technological innovation and opposition to
perceived U.S. hegemony suggest that future terrorist use
of WMD cannot be precluded, his estimate is that the threat
is currently somewhat exaggerated. His assessment is not,
it should be noted, fully shared by commentators Jeffrey
Addicott and Victor Utgoff. In their estimation, remote
though it may be, the mere chance that such a catastrophic
incident might take place, makes terrorism by WMD a
threat of considerable magnitude.
Cyber threats come in two varieties: information
warfare and cyber-crime. Both threats are directed against
the U.S. information infrastructure. The distinction
between the two types derives from the intent of the
perpetrator. If the attacks are carried out with the intent to
disrupt or undermine the government, they constitute war.
If, by contrast, they are carried out for reasons of personal or
organizational gain, they are crimes.
Dan Kuehl and commentators Richard Marshall and
Phillip Lacombe all stressed the seriousness of these
threats. The national information infrastructure is of
critical and growing importance to American economic
strength, political vitality, national will, and military
power. Cyber attacks, especially if they take place in the
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context of more conventional military hostilities directed
against the United States, have the potential to do
enormous damage. Cyber crimes, too, can be immensely
costly. Even if a hacker is penetrating systems for
amusement rather than out of deliberate malice, the
damage can be considerable. Our increasing dependence on
cyberspace makes the United States vulnerable, especially
as the private sector owns and controls much of the medium.
We are also at risk because we awoke to the threat relatively
late, because technology is changing at a pace unmatched in
earlier times, and because the environment is a new one.
The revolutionary new environment obliges the United
States to revise many of our traditional paradigms before
we can develop effective strategies. As a result, we find
ourselves less well prepared to deal with these threats than
with many others.
Organized crime is defined by Phil Williams as the
continuation of business by criminal means. It is
characterized by association for criminal purposes,
corruption, and violence. The international criminal
organizations of today are larger in size, scope, and power
than those of earlier times. Their composition is
increasingly multi-ethnic, and the criminals are showing a
growing ability to cooperate among themselves. Many
organizations have tremendous resources. They have
tapped into the new opportunities presented by the
internationalization of trade, finance, and communication.
They are adaptable and flexible. They show an ability to
exploit states in direct relationship to their vulnerabilities
and have a flair for minimizing the risks to themselves.
From the standpoint of the United States, we are not, in
Phil Williams’ estimate, in direct danger. Organized crime
thrives best where the state is weak and corrupt; the United
States serves rather as a host-state, i.e., a state which offers
good markets. Inasmuch as the intention of organized
criminals is to exploit and manipulate the United States
rather than destroy it, the threat is limited. As Tom Fuentes
puts it, it is not in the interest of a leech to kill the blood
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