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TRANSFORMING POLITICS INTO CONSTITUTIONS: THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN LATIN AMERICA PROF. ANA MARIA BEJARANO TRANSFORMING POLITICS INTO CONSTITUTIONS: THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN LATIN AMERICA PROF. ANA MARIA BEJARANO 2001 Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2018 with funding from University of Toronto https://archive.org/details/transformingpoliOObeja UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO Faculty of Law Spring of 2001 Course: Transforming Politics into Constitutions: The Politics of Constitution-Making in Latin America” Professor: Ana Maria Bejarano 1. Introduction 1.1 Ana Maria Bejarano, "Transforming Politics into Constitutions: The Politics of Constitution-Making in Colombia and Venezuela", Project Proposal (pp. 1-10). 2. Why a Constitution? 2.1. Sven Steinmo and Kathleen Thelen, “Introduction”, in Steinmo, Sven, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth (editors), Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis, Cambridge, 1992 (pp. 1-32). 2.2 Russell Hardin, “Why a Constitution?”, in Bernard Grofman and Donald Wittman, eds.. The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism, New York, Agathon Press,1989 (pp. 100 - 120), 3. The process of constitution-making (I): 3.1 Jon Elster, “Deliberation and Constitution-Making”, in Jon Elster (editor), Deliberative Democracy, Cambridge University Press, 1998 (pp. 97 - 122). 3.2 Daniel L. Nelson and Matthew Soberg Shugart, “Constitutional Change in Colombia. Policy Adjustment Through Institutional Reform”, in Comparative Political Studies, Volume 32, Number 3, May 1999 (pp. 313 - 341). 4. The process of constitution-making (II): 4.1. Robert Goodin, “Institutions and their Design”, in Robert E. Goodin, The Theory of Institutional Design, Cambridge University Press, 1996 (pp. 1-53). 5. The consequences of constitutional choice (I): 5.1. Jon Elster, “Consequences of constitutional choice: reflections on Tocqueville”, in Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, Constitutionalism and Democracy, Cambridge University Press, 1988 (pp. 81-101). 5.2 Jon Elster, “Arguments for constitutional choice: reflections on the transition to socialism”, in Ibidem (pp. 303 - 326). 6. The consequences of constitutional choice (II): 6.1. Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering. An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes, New York, New York University Press, 1994 (pp. ix - xi and 197 - 204). 6.2. Ana Maria Bejarano, “The Constitution of 1991: An Institutional Evaluation Seven Years After”, in Charles Bergquist and Gonzalo S^chez (editors), Waging War and Negotiating Peace: Violence in Colombia, 1990 - 2000, Wilmington, DE, Scholarly Resources Inc. [forthcoming], (pp. I - 26). 7. Constitutions and Democracy: the debate and its implications 7.1. Jon Elster, “Introduction”, in Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, Constitutionalism and Democracy, Cambridge University Press, 1988 (pp. 1-17). 7.2. Cass R. Sunstein, “Constitutions and democracies: an epilogue”, in Ibidem (pp. 327 - 353). 4