Transformations of the Soul: Aristotelian Psychology 1250-1650

248 Pages·2008·1.28 MB·English

by  Dominik Perler (ed.)

Transformations of the Soul

Transformations of the Soul
Aristotelian Psychology 1250-1650
Edited by
Dominik Perler
LEIDEN • BOSTON
2009
Also published as Volume 46, No. 3 (2008) of Brill’s journal Vivarium.
This book is printed on acid-free paper.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Transformations of the soul : Aristotelian psychology, 1250-1650 / edited by Dominik Perler.
p. cm.
Published as volume 46, no. 3 (2008) of Brill’s Journal Vivarium.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 978-90-04-17367-5 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Aristotle. De anima. 2. Psychology. 3. Soul.
4. Philosophy of mind. 5. Life. I. Perler, Dominik. II. Title.
B415.T73 2008
128—dc22
2008046849
ISBN 978 90 04 17367 5
Copyright 2009 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.
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printed in the netherlands
contents v
CONTENTS
Introduction ................................................................................. 1
Dominik Perler
Th e Early Albertus Magnus and his Arabic Sources on the Th eory
of the Soul .................................................................................... 10
Dag Nikolaus Hasse
Th e Inner Cathedral: Mental Architecture in High Scholasticism 31
Peter King
Some Varieties of Semantic Externalism in Duns Scotus’s
Cognitive Psychology ................................................................... 53
Richard Cross
Why Is Th ought Linguistic? Ockham’s Two Conceptions of the
Intellect ........................................................................................ 80
Martin Lenz
Ame intellective, âme cogitative: Jean de Jandun et la duplex
forma propria de l’homme ............................................................. 96
Jean-Baptiste Brenet
Diversité des fonctions et unité de l’âme dans la psychologie
péripatéticienne (xive-xvie siècle) .................................................. 120
Joël Biard
From an Outsider’s Point of View: Lorenzo Valla on the Soul ...... 146
Lodi Nauta
Cardano’s Eclectic Psychology and its Critique by Julius Caesar
Scaliger ......................................................................................... 170
Ian Maclean
Cartesian Scientia and the Human Soul ....................................... 196
Lilli Alanen
vi contents
Marin Cureau de la Chambre on the Natural Cognition of the
Vegetative Soul: An Early Modern Th eory of Instinct ................... 221
Markus Wild
As the book and journal versions were printed concurrently, double
page numbers were inserted. Th e page numbers in the above table
of contents refer to the bracketed page numbers in the following
pages.
viva
rium
Vivarium 46 (2008) 223-231
www.brill.nl/viv
Introduction
Dominik Perler
Humboldt-Universität, Berlin
A special issue dedicated to Aristotelian psychology in the period between
1250 and 1650 hardly requires extensive explanation or justifi cation. Aristote-
lianism was so dominant in this period, and De anima gave rise to such a
considerable number of commentaries, disputed questions and treatises, that
it would be surprising if the fate of this text did not attract the interest of his-
torians of philosophy. In fact, it would be astonishing if anyone interested not
just in psychology but in philosophy of nature in general neglected to look at
the way De anima shaped philosophical debates. After all, this text is a crucial
part of Aristotle’s writings on natural philosophy, and commentators read it as
a work belonging to this part of philosophy, often along with Physica, De sensu
et sensato, De generatione et corruptione and other writings dealing with natural
philosophy. Anyone who wants to understand how nature was conceived by
medieval and early modern philosophers ought to look at the way they
explained the soul as part of nature—as something that is not opposed to liv-
ing bodies or simply added to them, but that functions as “the principle of
life” and that makes living bodies the very things they are. Th at is why a study
of the soul is a crucial part of the study of nature.
Nevertheless, the title of this issue may give rise to some doubt, perhaps
even to irritation. I would like to mention three questions one might ask quite
spontaneously when reading the title. First, one might wonder why the word
“transformations” is used as a key word. Should we not talk in a more modest
way about commentaries on Aristotelian texts? After all, it was the commen-
tary literature that played a crucial role in the transmission of Aristotle’s theory
of the soul from ancient to modern times. Th erefore, one should examine the
commentaries, both their content and their special form, and compare them
to the original texts.
Second, one may ask why the old-fashioned word “soul” is emphasized in
the title. Of course, Aristotle and his commentators wrote about the soul,
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2008 DOI: 10.1163/156853408X360894
224 [2] D. Perler / Vivarium 46 (2008) 223-231
explicitly using the words “psychê ” and “anima”. And Aristotle conceived of
the soul as an all-embracing principle of life, including the vegetative aspects,
not only as a principle of mental life. But would it not be more appropriate to
talk about the mind when looking at the Aristotelian tradition from a modern
point of view, thereby paying attention to those parts of Aristotelian psychol-
ogy that explain the mind and its relation to the body? And should we not
focus on the account given of features that are characteristic of the mind, say,
of intentionality and consciousness?
Th ird, one may ask why the title puts an emphasis on the period between
1250 and 1650. Why is there no mention of the Middle Ages, the Renaissance
and the Early Modern Period, as it is the case in so many handbooks and
encyclopedias? And why is no priority given to one of these three periods? In
each of them there are plenty of authors and texts that deserve to be analyzed.
So, why should one cover such a long period?
Let me sketch an answer to each of these questions. I hope this will not only
shed some light on my motivation for preparing this issue, but also hint at
some methodological problems we need to take into account when approach-
ing the fi eld of Aristotelian psychology. In fact, methodological concerns are
as important as concerns with textual details, because methodological deci-
sions set the framework for an analysis of individual texts and have an impact
not only on the solutions presented to various problems but also on the very
problems that are posed.
Let me start with the fi rst question. Why should we talk about transforma-
tions? When a transformation occurs, there is neither a simple continuation of
something existing, nor a sharp break with the old or a revolution that sweeps
it away and replaces it with something new. A transformation rather is a long
and steady process in which something new is growing out of something that
already exists. What is so interesting about a transformation is the fact that the
starting point and the end point of the process are utterly dissimilar, even
though there are numerous stages in between that are strikingly similar to each
other. Take the example of the caterpillar that, becoming a butterfl y, goes
through various stages of transformation. In its second stage it is quite similar
to how it was in its fi rst stage, and in its third stage it is still quite similar to
how it was in its second stage. Nevertheless, the last stage yields something
new that is completely dissimilar to the animal in the fi rst stage. Th is surpris-
ing process is possible because an internal as well as an external change is tak-
ing place. Th e caterpillar changes itself internally by creating a cocoon and
restructuring its organism. At the same time, the external conditions (the sea-