Transcendental Arguments in Moral Theory PDF
Preview Transcendental Arguments in Moral Theory
Transcendental Arguments in Moral Theory Transcendental Arguments in Moral Theory Edited by Jens Peter Brune, Robert Stern and Micha H. Werner ISBN 978-3-11-046980-6 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-047021-5 e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-046989-9 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A CIP catalog record for this book has been applied for at the Library of Congress. Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2017 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck ♾ Printed on acid-free paper Printed in Germany www.degruyter.com Table of Contents J.P. Brune, R. Stern, M.H. Werner Introduction 1 A Reflexions on the general structure and problems of transcendental arguments Robert Stern Silencing the Sceptic? The Prospects for Transcendental Arguments in Practical Philosophy 9 Boris Rähme Ambition, Modesty, and Performative Inconsistency 25 Friedrich Reinmuth On Pain of Self-Contradiction? Obligatory Acceptance and Rejection in Alan Gewirth’s dialectically necessary Method 47 Niels Gottschalk-Mazouz Claims as Departure Points for Transcendental Arguments: Understanding Argumentation as a Game 71 Dennis Badenhop Still Lonely: The Moral Solipsist after Transcendental Argumentation 89 B Uses and discussions of transcendental reasoning based on the self-reflective structure of personal autonomy, rational agency, or human self-understanding Sorin Baiasu Constitutivism and Transcendental Practical Philosophy 109 VI TableofContents Deryck Beyleveld Transcendental Arguments fora Categorical Imperative as Arguments from Agential Self-Understanding 141 Marcus Düwell Transcendental Arguments and Practical Self-Understanding – Gewirthian Perspectives 161 Gerhard Schönrich Transcendental Arguments in Favour of Absolute Values 179 Christian Illies Neither for Beasts nor for Gods: Why onlymorally-committed Human Beings canaccept Transcendental Arguments 195 C Transcendental reasoning inspired by pragmatism, linguistics, and theories of intersubjectivity Konrad Ott Normative Pragmatics: Approach, Promise, Outlook 213 Micha H. Werner Social Constitutivism and the Role of Retorsive Arguments 231 Wolfgang Kuhlmann Transcendental-Pragmatic Foundation of Ethics. Transcendental Arguments and Ethics 247 Wulf Kellerwessel Conceptual Pragmatism and Normativity: Clarence Irving Lewis 265 Jens Peter Brune Transcending Value: Two Readings of Performative Inconsistency 283 Sami Pihlström Transcendental Anti-Theodicy 301 TableofContents VII Matthias Kettner Argumentative Discourse: The Transcendental Starting Point of Apelian Discourse Ethics 325 Notes on Contributors 349 Index 351 J.P. Brune, R. Stern, M.H. Werner Introduction Transcendental arguments are usually seen as a specific way to defend certain claimsagainstfundamentalscepticaldoubts.Accordingtomostinterpretations, their specific structure is characterized by the fact that they aim at defending someclaimXbyshowingthatthetruthofXisanecessaryconditionforthepos- sibilityofY,wherebyYistakentobesomethingthatwillnotorevencannotbe contested by the sceptic (Stern 2015),e.g.because it is part of what she herself already – albeit perhaps only implicitly – has claimed or accepted (Gethmann 1995). There is some discussion about the definition and the distinct features of transcendental arguments, though, and, correspondingly, about the precise extensionoftheconcept.WhileKantcertainlydidmosttoestablishtranscenden- tal reasoning as a distinct way of philosophical argument (Walker 2006), tran- scendental arguments in the sense of our broad definition can already be found in ancient and medieval philosophy (Aristotle, Met., 1005b35–1006a28, cf. Illies 2003, p. 45f.;Thomas Aquinas S. Th., 1 qu. 2 ad 1 obj. 3, cf. Siegwart 2010). Probably the most important reference point for the more recent discus- sion on transcendental argumentswas Peter Strawson’s Individuals (1959). Dur- ingthedecadesofdiscussionfollowingitspublication,variousversionsoftran- scendental arguments have been categorized, evaluated, further developed, or put into different epistemological or metaphysical contexts. For the most part, the contributions to this discussion, especially those subsequent to Barry Stroud’s influential paper on transcendental arguments (Stroud 1968), have not been overlyoptimistic regardingthe potentialoftranscendental arguments. Itisnocontradictionthattheprojectofradically“de-transcendentalising”(Rorty 1978;cf.Niquet1991)philosophyhasalsolostsomeofitsrevolutionarymomen- tum.Itseemsthatmanyauthors,proponentsandcriticsoftranscendentalargu- mentsalike,haveturnedtosomewhatmoremoderatepositionsduringthemost recent years of discussion (cf. Brueckner 2010; the contributions in Stern 1999; Stern 2000, 2007; Strawson 1985; Walker 1989). The controversy may have reached a point where the limitations of transcendental arguments as well as those of the earlier objections against their possibility have become more clear.Why, then, do we add yet another volume to the list of publications on transcendental arguments? Firstly,theoverwhelmingmajorityofexamplesthathavebeentheobjectof systematic methodological discussion are drawn from contexts of theoretical, notpracticalphilosophy.However,itisnotcompletelyobviousthatthepromises and problems of transcendental arguments in the context of theoretical philos- DOI10.1515/9783110470215-001 2 J.P.Brune,R.Stern,M.H.Werner ophy are identical to those in moral philosophy. Arguments aiming at the refu- tation ofexternalworldscepticismmaybeconfrontedwith differentchallenges than those that aim to vindicate some practical principle, at least if we do not take for granted certain forms of moral naturalism. Some authors explicitly claimed that some transcendental arguments in moral philosophy are not vul- nerable tosome of the objections that were made pertinent tothose arguments inthediscussioninfluencedbyStroud’sclassicalpaper.Basedonacoherentist orpragmatistunderstandingofmoralphilosophy,theyarguethatthemainpoint oftranscendentalargumentsisnottodefendknowledgeclaimsaboutindepend- ent facts. Hence, they think, objections like those against transcendental argu- mentsthataimatrefutingexternalworldscepticismarenotrelevant(e.g.Skid- more 2002). Secondlyandmoreimportantly,inmanycontributionstomoralphilosophy thathavebeenpublishedsincethe“rehabilitationofpracticalphilosophy”(Rie- del 1972),we find a large variety of arguments that are either explicitly called transcendental arguments or that at least fall under some of the usual defini- tions of such arguments. Unsurprisingly, such arguments show up frequently inversionsof(neo‐)Kantianethics,albeitinverydifferentforms(Apel1972;Dar- wall2006;Gewirth1978;Korsgaard1996;O’Neill1989),aswellasinversionsof (neo‐)Hegelianism(Hösle1990).However,wealsofindversionsoftranscenden- tal arguments in moral philosophy inspired by Thomas Aquinas (Finnis 2011; Ricken 1983), and “hybrid” theories that try to combine elements from all thosetraditions(Illies2003).However,wealsofindusesoftranscendentalargu- ments in realist, even in “robust” realist (meta‐)ethical theories (cf. David Enoch’s “indispensability arument” that, according to him, “may be thought of as a kind of a transcendental argument” Enoch 2011, 79, fn. 71). Some of thosemoralphilosopherswhomakeuseofcertainversionsoftranscendentalar- guments also tried to clarify their general structure (e.g. Illies 2003; Kuhlmann 1985) or even published more extensively on the general epistemological prob- lems of transcendental arguments (e.g. Niquet 1991,1994). However,thereseemtoberoomforastillmorethoroughmethodologicalre- flectionontheusesoftranscendentalreasoninginrecentcontributionstomoral philosophy.Philosophersfromdifferenttraditionsofmoralreasoningmaylearn from each other by comparing their respective versions of transcendental argu- ments.Theymayalsogainamorepreciseunderstandingoftheirownarguments and of the specific challenges tothem byconnecting to the moreextensive dis- cussionontranscendentalargumentsthatwefindinepistemologyandmetaphy- sics.On the other hand, experts on transcendental arguments who used to dis- cuss mostly examples from theoretical philosophy may also gain valuable insights by widening their focus to arguments from moral philosophy.
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