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Routledge Revivals Towards a Critical Sociology For the better part of its history sociology shared with commonsense its assumption of the ‘nature-like’ character of society—and consequently developed as the science of unfreedom. In this powerful and engaging work, first published in 1976, Professor Bauman outlines the historical roots of such a science and describes how the contemporary trends in sociology emerging from phenomenology and existentialism did little to challenge this preoccupation. Rather, he claims, they deepened and extended it by stressing the key role of commonsense, particularly the ways in which it is sustained and embedded in the routines and assumptions of everyday life. Professor Bauman sets out the form of a critical sociology, based on emancipatory reason. His main concerns are the ‘validity’ of commonsense and the truth of a theory which would resolve to transcend the limitations of commonsensical evidence. Aimed at human liberation, this book is designed to question the very same routines and assumptions of everyday life informed by commonsense. Towards a Critical Sociology An essay on commonsense and emancipation Zygmunt Bauman First published in 1976 by Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd This edition first published in 2010 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2009. To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk. © 1976 Zygmunt Bauman All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Publisher’s Note The publisher has gone to great lengths to ensure the quality of this reprint but points out that some imperfections in the original copies may be apparent. Disclaimer The publisher has made every effort to trace copyright holders and welcomes correspondence from those they have been unable to contact. ISBN 0-203-85570-1 Master e-book ISBN ISBN 13:978-0-415-57164-7 (hbk) ISBN 13:978-0-203-85570-6 (ebk) ISBN 10:0-415-57164-2 (hbk) ISBN 10:0-203-85570-1 (ebk) TOWARDS A CRITICAL SOCIOLOGY By the same author CULTURE AS PRAXIS TOWARDS A CRITICAL SOCIOLOGY An essay on commonsense and emancipation ZYGMUNT BAUMN If a decent society has been a possibility for at least a very long time, the real problem becomes to explain why humanity did not or perhaps could not want one Barrington Moore, Jr ROUTLEDGE DIRECT EDITIONS ROUTLEDGE & KEGAN PAUL London and Boston First published in 1976 by Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd Broadway House, 68–74 Carter Lane, London EC4V 5EL and 9 Park Street, Boston, Mass. 02108, USA Manuscript typed by Pam Pope Printed and bound in Great Britain by Unwin Brothers Limited, The Gresham Press, Old Woking, Surrey A member of the Staples Printing Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2009. To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk. © Zygmunt Bauman 1976 No part of this book may be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except for the quotation of brief passages in criticism ISBN 0 7100 8306 8 CONTENTS 1 THE SCIENCE OF UNFREEDOM 1 ‘Second nature’ defined 1 ‘Second nature’ deified 12 ‘Second nature’ and the commonsense 25 2 CRITIQUE OF SOCIOLOGY 39 The Husserlian revolution 39 The existentialist restoration 48 ‘Second nature’ vindicated 57 3 CRITIQUE OF UNFREEDOM 64 Technical and emancipatory reason 64 ‘Second nature’ seen historically 73 Can critical sociology be a science? 81 Truth and authentication 92 NOTES 102 Chapter 1 THE SCIENCE OF UNFREEDOM ‘SECOND NATURE’ DEFINED Whatever may be currently said about the form sociology ought to take, sociology as we know it (and as it has been known ever since it was given this name) was born of the discovery of the ‘second nature’. ‘Nature’ is a cultural concept. It stands for that irremovable component of human experience which defies human will and sets un-encroachable limits to human action. Nature is, therefore, a by-product of the thrust for freedom. Only when men set out self- consciously to make their condition different from what they experience, do they need a name to connote the resistance they encounter. In this sense nature, as a concept, is a product of human practice which transcends the routine and the habitual, and sails on to uncharted waters, guided by an image of what-is-not-yet-but-ought-to-be. The realm of unfreedom is the only immutable meaning of ‘nature’ which is rooted in human experience. All other features predicated upon the concept are once, or more than once, removed from the ‘directly given’, being outcomes of the theoretical processing of elementary experience. For instance, nature is the opposite of culture, in so far as culture is the sphere of human creativity and design; nature is inhuman, in so far as ‘being human’ includes setting goals and ideal standards; nature is meaningless, in so far as bestowing meanings is an act of will and the constitution of freedom; nature is determined, in so far as freedom consists in leaving determination behind. Neither the images nor models of nature prevalent at any given time can be considered necessary attributes of the concept. The ‘thematic content’ of the concept (as Gerald Holton would put it) (1) has changed in the last century almost beyond recognition. The intrinsic order and harmony of the law-abiding cosmos has been replaced by an impenetrable labyrinth which, only thanks to the scientist’s chalk marks, becomes passable; discovery of the ‘objective order’ has been replaced by the imposition of intelligible order upon meaningless diversity. The one element which has survived, and, indeed, has emerged unscathed from all these ontological revo-lutions, is the experience of constraint effectively placed on human action and imagery. And this is, perhaps, the only ‘essence’ of nature, pared to the bones of theoretically unprocessed pristine experience. There is, however, yet another sense in which nature can be conceived as a by-product of human practice. Nature is given to human experience as the only medium upon which human action is turned. It is present in human action from its very beginning, from its very conception as a design of a form yet to be objectified by action; nature is what mediates between the ideal design and its objectified replica. Human action would not be possible but for the presence of nature. Nature is experienced as much as the locus, as it is perceived