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139 139 AnarchistDevelopmentsinCulturalStudies “Post-Anarchismtoday” 2010.1 Toward an Anarchist Film Theory: Reflections on the Politics of Cinema ∗ Nathan Jun Abstract Cinema,likeartmoregenerally,isbothanartisticgenreandapolitico- economicinstitution.Ontheonehandthereisfilm,amediumwhich disseminatesmovingimagesviatheprojectionoflightthroughcellu- loidontoascreen.Individualfilmsor“movies,”inturn,arediscrete aestheticobjectsthataredistinguishedandanalyzedvis-à-vistheir formandcontent.Ontheotherhandthereisthefilmindustry—the elaboratenetworkofartistic,technical,andeconomicapparatuses whichplan,produce,market,anddisplayfilmstoaudiences. Since itsinception,boththeaestheticandpoliticalaspectsofcinemahave beensubjecttovariousformsoftheoreticalanalysiswhichhavebeen subjecttocritiqueinturn.InthispaperIofferabriefsurveyofthese analysesandcritiquesfollowedbyasketchofanalternativeapproach tofilmtheory.DrawingupontheideasofFoucaultandDeleuze,this “anarchist”filmtheoryseekstopresentaviablecriticalmethodology whileatthesametimeelucidatingtheliberatorypotentialoffilm. I.ThePoliticsofFilmTheory: FromHumanismtoCultural Studies Prior to its emergence as a distinct academic discipline in the 1970s, filmstudiescouldberoughlydividedintotwodistinctbut closely-relatedcamps: humanism,whichanalyzedcinemainterms ∗ NathanJunisassistantprofessorofphilosophyandcoordinatorofthephilosophy programatMidwesternStateUniversityinWichitaFalls,Texas. Heisco-editor (withShaneWahl)ofNewPerspectivesonAnarchism(Lexington,2009)and(with DanielSmith)DeleuzeandEthics(EdinburghUniversityPress,forthcoming2010)and authorofAnarchismandPoliticalModernity(Continuum,forthcoming2011).Hehas alsopublishedandpresentedwidelyonthetopicsofpoststructuralismandclassical anarchism. 139 139 140 140 140 NathanJun of its promotion of, or opposition to, classical Enlightenment val- ues(e.g.,freedomandprogress),andvariousschoolsofformalism, whichfocusedontheformal,technical,andstructuralelementsof cinemaingeneralaswellasofindividualfilms.1AsDanaPolannotes, humanistcriticsfrequentlyvacillatedbetweenskepticismtoward cinemaandprofound,evenhyperbolicadulationofit(Polan,1985: 159). Tosome,filmrepresented“thedeathofcultureforthebenefit ofacorruptanddebasingmasscivilization”(ibid.).2Toothers,film didnotkillculturesomuchasdemocratizeitbydestabilizingthe privileged,elitestatusofart(cf.,Cavell,1981). Ultimately,however, “theproandconpositionsmergeintheircommongroundoforigi- narypresuppositions: theyunderstandartasredemption,transport, utopianoffer”(Polan,1985: 159). Likethepro-filmhumanists,formalistcriticsemphasizedtheartis- ticdepthandintegrityofcinemaasgenre. (Thisisespeciallytrue of auteur theory, according to which films are expressions of the unique ideas, thoughts, and emotions of their directors; Staples, 1966–67: 1–7.) Unlikehumanism,however,formalismwascentrally concernedwithanalyzingthevehiclesormechanismsbywhichfilm, asopposedtootherartisticgenres,generatescontent. Thisconcern gave rise, in turn, to various evaluative and interpretive theories whichprivilegedtheformalelementsoffilm(e.g.,cinematography, editing,etc)overandaboveitsnarrativeorthematicelements(cf., Arnheim,1997,1989;Bazin,1996,1967;Eiseinstein,1969;Kracauer, 1997;Mitry,1997). Incontrasttotheoptimistichumanistsandtheapoliticalformal- ists, the Marxist critics of the Frankfurt School analyzed cinema chieflyasasocio-politicalinstitution—specifically,asacomponent oftherepressiveandmendacious“cultureindustry.”Accordingto HorkheimerandAdorno,forexample,filmsarenodifferentfrom automobilesorbombs;theyarecommoditiesthatareproducedin ordertobeconsumed(Horkheimer&Adorno,1993: 120–67). “The technologyofthecultureindustry,”theywrite,“[is]nomorethan theachievementofstandardizationandmassproduction,sacrific- ingwhateverinvolvedadistinctionbetweenthelogicofworkand thatofthesocialsystem”(ibid.,121). Priortotheevolutionofthis industry, culture operated as a locus of dissent, a buffer between 1 Foranexcellentoverviewofformalisminfilmtheory,see(Andrews,2000:341–51). 2 See,forexample,Leavis(1952).OnLeavis’dismissalofcinemaandmassculturemore generally,seeMulhern(1979). 140 140 141 141 TowardanAnarchistFilmTheory 141 runawaymaterialismontheonehandandprimitivefanaticismon theother. Inthewakeofitsthoroughgoingcommodification,culture becomesamassculturewhosemovies,television,andnewspapers subordinateeveryoneandeverythingtotheinterestsofbourgeois capitalism. Massculture,inturn,replacesthesystemoflabouritself astheprinciplevehicleofmodernalienationandtotalization. ByexpandingtheMarxist-Leninistanalysisofcapitalismtocover theentiresocialspace,HorkheimerandAdornoseverelyundermine thepossibilityofmeaningfulresistancetoit. Ontheirview,thelogic ofEnlightenmentreachesitsapexpreciselyatthemomentwhen everything—includingresistancetoEnlightenment—becomesyet anotherspectacleintheparadeofculture(ibid.,240–1). Whatever formsofresistancecannotbeappropriatedaremarginalized,rele- gatedtothe“lunaticfringe.”Thecultureindustry,meanwhile,pro- duces a constant flow of pleasures intended to inure the masses againstanylingeringsentimentsofdissentorresistance(ibid.,144). Theultimateresult, asToddMaynotes, isthat“positiveinterven- tion[is]impossible;allresistance[is]capableeitherofrecuperation withintheparametersofcapitalismormarginalization[...]there isnooutsidecapitalism,oratleastnoeffectiveoutside”(1994: 26). Absentanyprogramfororganized,massresistance,theonlyoutlet leftfortherevolutionarysubjectisart: thecreationofquiet,solitary refusalsandsmall,fleetingspacesofindividualfreedom.3 Thedominanceofhumanistandformalistapproachestofilmwas overturnednotbyFrankfurtSchoolMarxismbutbytheriseofFrench structuralisttheoryinthe1960sanditssubsequentinfiltrationofthe humanitiesbothinNorthAmericaandontheContinent. AsDudley Andrewnotes,thevariousschoolsofstructuralism4didnotseekto analyzefilmsintermsofformalaestheticcriteria“butrather[...] to ‘read’ them as symptoms of hidden structures” (Andrew, 2000: 343; cf., Jay, 1993: 456–91). By the mid-1970s, he continues, “the mostambitiousstudentswereintentondiggingbeneaththecom- monplacesoftextbooksand‘theorizing’theconsciousmachinations ofproducersofimagesandtheunconsciousideologyofspectators” (ibid.). Theresult,notsurprisingly,wasafloodofhighlyinfluential books and essays which collectively shaped the direction of film theoryoverthenexttwodecades.5 3 ThispositionreceivesoneofitsfullestarticulationsinMarcuse(1964). 4 Forexample,Barthesiansemiotics,AlthusserianMarxism,andLacanianpsychoanaly- sis. 141 141 142 142 142 NathanJun Oneofthemostimportantstructuralistswas,ofcourse,Jacques Derrida. Onhisview,wedowelltorecall,aword(or,moregenerally, asign)nevercorrespondstoapresenceandsoisalways“playing” off other words or signs (1978: 289; 1976: 50). And because all signs are necessarily trapped within this state or process of play (whichDerridaterms“differance”),languageasawholecannothave afixed,static,determinate—inaword,transcendentmeaning;rather, differance“extendsthedomainandtheplayofsignificationinfinitely” (ibid, 280). Furthermore, if it is impossible for presence to have meaningapartfromlanguage,andif(linguistic)meaningisalways inastateofplay,itfollowsthatpresenceitselfwillbeindeterminate — which is, of course, precisely what it cannot be (Derrida, 1981: 119–20). Without an “absolute matrical form of being,” meaning becomesdislodged,fragmented,groundless,andelusive. Thefamous consequence,ofcourse,isthat“Iln’yapasdehors-texte”(“Thereis nooutside-text”)(Derrida,1976: 158). Everythingisatextsubjectto theambiguityandindeterminacyoflanguage;whatevernoumenal existenceunderlieslanguageisunreadable—hence,unknowable— tous. IncontrasttoMarxist,psychoanalytic,andfeministtheorists,who generallysharedtheFrankfurtSchool’ssuspiciontowardscinema andthefilmindustry,Derrideancriticsarguedthatcinematic“texts” donotcontainmeaningsorstructureswhichcanbeunequivocally “interpreted”orotherwisedetermined(cf.,Brunette&Wills,1989). Rather,thecontentofafilmisalwaysandalready“deconstructing” —thatis, underminingitsowninternallogicthroughtheplayof semioticdifferences. Asaresult,filmsare“liberated”bytheirown indeterminacyfromthehermeneuticsoftraditionalfilmcriticism, which“repress”theirownobjectpreciselybyattemptingtofixor constituteit(Brunette&Wills,1989: 34). Spectators,inturn,are freetoassignmultiplemeaningstoagivenfilm,noneofwhichcan beregardedasthe“true”or“authentic”meaning. Thislatterramificationprovedenormouslyinfluentialonthedis- ciplineofculturalstudies,themodusoperandiofwhichwas“todis- coverandinterpretthewaysdisparatedisciplinarysubjectstalkback: howconsumersdeformandtransformtheproductstheyusetocon- structtheirlives;how‘natives’rewriteandtroubletheethnographies of(andto)whichtheyaresubject...”(Bérubé,1994: 138;seealso 5 OfparticularimportanceareBaudry(1986: 299–319),Heath(1976: 68–112),Metz (1973:40–88;1974),Mulvey(1975:6–18). 142 142 143 143 TowardanAnarchistFilmTheory 143 Gans,1974,1985: 17–37;Grossberg,1992;Levine,1988;Brantlinger, 1990;Aronowitz,1993;During,1993;Fiske,1992;McRobbie,1993). AsThomasFrankobserves, Thesignaturescholarlygestureoftheninetieswasnotsome warmed over aestheticism, but a populist celebration of the power and ‘agency’ of audiences and fans, of their ability to evade the grasp of the makers of mass culture, and of their talentfortransformingjustaboutanybitofculturaldetritus intoanimplementofrebellion(Frank,2000: 282). Suchagestureismadepossible,again,byDerrida’stheoryofde- construction: theabsenceofdeterminatemeaningand,byextension, intentionality in cultural texts enables consumers to appropriate andassignmeaningthemforandbythemselves. Asaresult,any theorywhichassumesthatconsumersare“necessarilysilent,pas- sive,politicalandculturaldupes”whoaretrickedormanipulated bythecultureindustryandotherapparatusesofrepressivepower isrejectedas“elitist”(Grossberg,1992: 64). A fitting example of the cultural studies approach to cinema is foundinAnneFriedberg’sessay“CinemaandthePostmodernCondi- tion,”whicharguesthatfilm,coupledwiththeapparatusoftheshop- pingmall,representsapostmodernextensionofmodernflaneurie (Friedberg,1997: 59–86). LikeHorkheimerandAdorno,Friedbergis notinterestedincinemaasanartformsomuchasacommodityoras anapparatusofconsumption/desireproduction. Atthesametime, however,Friedbergdoesnotregardcinemaasprincipallyavehicle of“massdeception”designedbythecultureindustrytomanipulate themassesandinurethemtodomination. Althoughsherecognizes theextenttowhichthetransgressiveandliberatory“mobilizedgaze” oftheflaneuriscapturedandrenderedabstract/virtualbythecine- maticapparatusofthecultureindustry(ibid.,67),shenonetheless valorizesthis“virtuallymobile”modeofspectatorshipinsofarasit allowspostmodernviewersto“tryon”identities(justasshoppers “tryon”outfits)withoutanyessentialcommitment(ibid.,69–72). Thiskindofapproachtoanalyzingfilm,thoughostensibly“rad- ical”initspoliticalimplications,isinfactanythingbut. AsIshall argue in the next section, cultural studies — no less than critical theory—restsoncertainpresuppositionswhichhavebeenseverely challengedbyvarioustheorists. MichelFoucault,inparticular,has demonstratedtheextenttowhichwecanmovebeyondlinguistic 143 143 144 144 144 NathanJun indeterminacybyprovidingarcheologicalandgenealogicalanalyses oftheformationofmeaning-producingstructures. Suchstructures, heargues,donotemergeinavacuumbutareproducedbyhistor- ically-situated relations of power. Moreover, power produces the verysubjectswhoalternatelyaffectandareaffectedbythesestruc- tures,anotionwhichunderminestheconceptofproducer/consumer “agency” upon which much of critical theory and cultural studies relies. Thoughpowerrelationshavethepotentialtobeliberating ratherthanoppressive,suchaconsequenceisnotbroughtaboutby consumeragencysomuchasbyotherpowerrelationswhich,follow- ingGillesDeleuze,eludeand“deterritorialize”oppressivecapture mechanisms. AsIshallargue,thecontemporarycinematicappara- tusiswithoutadoubtaformofthelatter,butthisdoesnotmean thatcinemaassuchisincapableofescapingalongliberatorylines offlight. II.FoucaultandFilmTheory TidygeneralizationsaboutFoucaultareneithereasynorparticu- larlyworthwhiletomake. Yetifthereisasinglepithyaphorismthat capturesthespiritofhisproject,itisBacon’s“Ipsascientiapotestas est”—knowledgeitselfispower. Foucault’sperspectiveisofcourse verydifferentfrom—indeed,inradicaloppositionto—theproto- EnlightenmentscientismofBacon,forwhomknowledgeisalways powertodo. Asweshallsee,knowledgeforFoucaultisratherpower to say, on the one hand, and power to be said, on the other. This distinctionunderliesthemetaphilosophicalcharacterofFoucault’s analysis,whichrepudiatesthenotionoftranscendent“Knowledge” and instead focuses on the complex power relations which make possible,giveriseto,andshapetheveryideaofknowledge(s). ForFoucault,allstatementsbelongtoaparticulardiscourse,which isthesetofallpossiblestatementsthatcanbearticulatedabouta particulartopicwithinaparticularhistoricalperiod(Foucault,1994: 79, 158). Discoursedefinestheboundariessurroundingwhatcan andcannotbesaid,andtothisextentshapesorconstructswhatcan beknown,i.e.,theobjectofknowledgeitself. Foucault’searlyworks areprincipallyconcernedwiththeconditionsofpossibility(“histori- calaprioris”)thatmustbeinplaceinorderforcertainstatements (again, that which can be said) to actually emerge within a given 144 144 145 145 TowardanAnarchistFilmTheory 145 discourse(ibid.,86–92).6Theyarealsoconcernedwithdemarcating andanalyzingdiscursiveformations—thehistoricalrupturesanddis- continuitieswherebynewformsofdiscourseappearandsupplant older forms of discourse (Foucault, 1972: esp. Part II, chapter 2). Foucaultreferstothismodeofanalysisas“archeology”(Foucault, 1994: xxii). Thepointofthearcheologicalmethodis“tograspthestatement in the narrowness and singularity of its event; to determine the conditionsofexistence,tofixitslimitsasaccuratelyaspossible,to establishitscorrelationswithotherstatementswithwhichitmay belinked,andtoshowwhatotherformsofarticulationitexcludes” (Foucault,2003: 401). ForFoucault,knowledgeisnotathing(e.g., aparticularmentalstate)butratherarelationbetweenstatements withinaparticulardiscourse—specifically,therelationofwhatcan bespokenorthoughttothatwhichcannot. Foucault’smajorworksintheearlyperiodinvolvetheapplication ofthearcheologicalmethodtoaparticulardiscourse. InMadness andCivilization,forexample,heanalyzesthediscourseofmadness vis-à-visvarioushistoricalinstitutions: theworkhouse,thehospital, theasylum,etc(1965). Theappearanceofanewdiscursiveforma- tion(e.g.,thediscourseofmadnessorinsanity)givesrisetoanew institutional form (e.g., the asylum), a new knowledge form (e.g., psychiatry) and a new object of knowledge (e.g., the insane). By reflectingontheconditionsofpossibilitywhichwerenecessaryin orderforparticularinstitutionalformstoemerge,Foucaultuncovers anewformofdiscursiveknowledgethathasbeenconstructedin history. Theearlyworksseektodescribeparticulardiscursiveformations (through“archeology”)butnottoexplainhowandwhytheycame about. Beginning with Discipline and Punish, Foucault turns his attention to analyses of how power relations produce knowledge withinparticulardiscursiveformations(amethodthathecalls“ge- nealogy”)(Foucault,1995). Tothisend,hemovesbeyonddiscursive formationstoaconsiderationofotherformsofknowledgethatare formedandconstitutedbypower—viz.,non-discursiveformations 6 Forexample,statementsaboutairplanescouldnotbeutteredintheMiddleAges becausethehistoricalaprioriconditionnecessaryfortheproduction,transmission, andintelligibilityofsuchstatementswithindiscourse(viz.,theactualexistenceof airplanes)wasnotyetsatisfied. 145 145 146 146 146 NathanJun andtheformationofsubjects. Non-discursiveformationsareprac- ticesthroughwhichpowerismanifestedinparticularforms(e.g., theprison,theasylum,thehospital,etc). Subjects(e.g.,prisoners, madmen,patients,etc)inturn,arecreatedthroughtheprocessof beingacteduponbynon-discursivepractices. ForFoucault,powerisnotandcannotbecentralizedintheform ofasinglecoerciveapparatussuchas“capitalism.”Itexistsnotonly atthemacro-levelofsociety(e.g.,inideologies,governments,etc.) butalsoatthemicro-levelofsubjects(asindisciplinarypower)(ibid., 135–69). TheinvisiblesurveillanceofthePanopticonrevealsaform ofpowerthatisdynamic,ubiquitous,anddiffuse(ibid.,195–228). It operatesonlyintherelationsofthosetowhomitapplies. Itcanbe exertedonindividualbodies(anatomo-power)orentirepopulations (bio-power) Foucault, 1990: 140). It is not an absolute force but ratherarelationshipthatexistsbetweenforces—asetofactionsor forcesexerteduponotheractionsorforces,oruponsubjects(2003: 137). Itisthecapacitytoactuponandtobeactedupon,thusisnot onlyrepressivebutproductiveaswell. WhenFoucaultsaysthatpower“openspossibilities,”heisrefer- ring specifically to the capacity of power to bring about new dis- cursiveandnon-discursiveformationsandhencetoproducenew formsofknowledge. Becausepowerisamodeofreciprocalaffec- tivity,however,itnotonlyproducesknowledgebutisproducedby knowledgeinturn. Therangeofpossiblestatementscircumscribed byaparticulardiscursiveformationisshapedbypowerrelations, butthevisiblemanifestationofpowerrelations(forexample,atthe levelofpracticesandtheformsthesepracticestakeininstitutions) isinturnshapedbywhatcanbesaid. Howdoesthisreciprocalshapingtakeplace? Inthefirstinstance, werecallthatpowermakesactionspossibleandismadepossible by them in turn. This is because all actions, once actualized by power,arerelatedtootheractions(henceotherpossiblemodalities ofpower). Buttosay, speak, utter, write, orcommunicateinany way is to perform a certain kind of action — namely, the action ofproducingstatementswithinaparticulardiscourse. Knowledge, then, is essentially the power to produce statements which are in turncapableofbeingrelatedtootherstatementswithinaparticular discourse. TruthforFoucaultissimplythemechanismwherebythis powerisexercised: 146 146 147 147 TowardanAnarchistFilmTheory 147 ‘Truth’istobeunderstoodasasystemoforderedproceduresfor theproduction,regulation,distribution,circulationandopera- tionofstatements[...]Eachsocietyhasitsregimeoftruth,its ‘generalpolitics’oftruth: thatis,thetypesofdiscoursewhich it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and authoritiesthatenableonetodistinguishtrueandfalsestate- ments,themeansbywhicheachissanctioned;thetechniques andproceduresaccordedvalueintheacquisitionoftruth;the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true(Foucault,2003: 316–17). InDisciplineandPunish,asintheearlierarcheologicalworks,Fou- caultanalyzesdiscursiveformationssurroundingtheinstitutionsof disciplineandpunishment. Thechangecomesinhisextendingthis analysistonon-discursiveformations(practices)and,mostimpor- tantly,tothepowerrelationswhichgiverisetobothdiscursiveand non-discursiveformations. Thus,forexample,Foucaultdiscussesthe non-discursiveformationofpunishmentactualizedintheinstitution oftheprison. Powerrelations,then,producenon-discursiveformationsatthe levelofpractice(e.g.,punishment)whichareinturnmadevisiblein institutions(e.g.,theprison). Moreover,thesepracticesproducenew formsofknowledge(e.g.,criminology)whichinturnproducenew objectsofknowledgeatthelevelofthesubject(e.g., thecriminal type). ThisrevealsanotherofFoucault’sessentialinsights: thatsub- jectsareproducedandshapedbypowerrelationsvis-à-visbecoming objectsofdiscourse(e.g.,study,inquiry,analysis,classification,etc) andpractices(e.g., work, education, discipline, consumption, etc). ToparaphraseW.V.Quine(andturnhimonhishead),tobeistobe theobjectofapraxisandthesubjectofatheory. Mysubjectivityis exhaustedbythepowerexertedonmebyothersandtheworldand thepowerwhichIexertinturn. Aradicalconsequenceofthisviewisthatsubjects,strictlyspeak- ing,arenotontologicallybasicinthewaytheyarefor,say,Sartre. This does not mean that individual subjectivities do not exist for Foucault—theydo. Hispointisthatthereisnopreexistenthuman natureoressencewhichprovidestheontologicalfoundationofsub- jectivity. Thebodyaloneisbasic;andbodiesareconstantlybeing createdandre-createdassubjectsbothbyaffectingotherbodiesand bybeingsoaffected. Capitalistpower,forexample,ismanifestedin practiceatthelevelofinstitutions(e.g.,shoppingmalls)andexerted 147 147 148 148 148 NathanJun uponbodies. Thisrelationbetweenthebodyandpowergivesriseto particularformsofsubjectivity—viz.,thatoftheconsumer(whose bodyisaffected bypower)and, forexample, thecultureindustry (whichaffectsthebodiesofothersthroughpower). FromaFoucauldianperspective,cinemaisbothadiscursiveand non-discursive formation: a mode of knowledge manifested con- cretely at the level of individual films and a mode of power man- ifestedconcretelyatthelevelofthefilmindustry. Thereciprocal relationbetweenfilmsandthefilmindustry,inturn,producesapar- ticularformofsubjectivity—thatoftheviewerorspectator. Against bothcriticaltheoryandculturalstudies,Foucaultwouldclaimthat therelationbetweenfilmsandspectatorsisneitherwhollypassive norwhollyactive. Themeaningofaparticularfilmmaybeassigned toitbyaparticularspectator,butthespectatorquaspectatorispro- ducedinturnbyhisorherviewingofthefilm. Moreover,therange of meanings ascribable to a film and the corresponding modes of spectatorshiptheyproduceareboundedbyconditionsofpossibil- ity—towit,thecomplexnetworkofdiscursiveandnon-discursive formationswhichproducebothfilmsandspectators. Allofthisisbywayofsayingthat: (a)cinemaassuchisnotre- ducibleeithertoitsformal(i.e.,discursive)orpolitico-economic(i.e., non—discursive)components; rather, bothcomponentsproduce andshapeeachotherreciprocally;(b)themeaningofcinemaisnot reducibleeithertotheproductionorconsumptionofcinematicob- jects;rather,meaningbothcreatesandiscreatedbyviewer-subjects; (c)theparticularformswhichfilmstake,theparticularmeanings whichareassignedtothem,andtheparticularmodesofspectator- shipwhichassignsaidmeaningsaremutuallyirreducible; allare producedbyacomplexnetworkofpowerrelations. Tothiswemust add(d)thatthepowerrelationswhichgiverisetocinemaquacin- emaareneitherrepressivenorliberatoryinandofthemselves. The extenttowhichcinemamayberegardedasoneortheotherdepends entirelyonthepoliticalandsocio-economicrelationswhichaffect andareaffectedbyit. Asthehistoryofcinemamakesplain,thereisnowaytodisentan- glefilmfromcapitalism. Ontheonehand,Westerncapitalismgave rise to industrial technology, the market economy, the tri-partite classsystem,etc.,allofwhichareconditionsofpossibilityforthe emergenceofcinema. Ontheotherhand,theproliferationofcinema asamodernmediumofcommunicationcontributedtothetransfor- mationofcapitalism(i.e.,fromindustrialcapitalismtomultinational 148 148
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