Toward a Nuclear Peace: The Future of Nuclear Weapons PDF
Preview Toward a Nuclear Peace: The Future of Nuclear Weapons
TOWARD A N U C L E A R PEACE TOWARD A NUCLEAR PEACE Also by Michael J. Mazarr Missile Defenses and Asian-Pacific Security Light Forces and the Future of U.S. Military Strategy *START and the Future of Deterrence *Also published by Macmillan TOWARD A NUCLEAR PEACE The Future of Nuclear Weapons Edited by Michael J. Mazarr and Alexander T. Lennon M MACMILLAN ISBN 978-1-349-60795-2 ISBN 978-1-349-60793-8 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-60793-8 © Center for Strategic and International Studies 1994 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1994978-0-312-10404-7 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London WI P 9HE. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. First published 1994 by THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire R021 2XS and London Companies and representatives throughout the world A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Design by Acme Art, Inc., New York, NY CONTENTS Part I: United States Nuclear Policy by Nuclear Strategy Study Group 1. The Future of Arms Control ................... 3 2. The Case for Further Progress 11 3. How Much Is Enough? 21 4. Deterrence in Europe 35 5. Regional Deterrence 57 6. Strategic Defenses. 69 7. Nuclear End States 87 Appendix 1 First-Strike Survivability and Defense Penetration by Steve Fetter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 Appendix 2 Military Targets for a Minimum Deterrent: After the Cold War, How Much Is Enough? by Michael 1. Mazarr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 Part II: European Nuclear Forces 8. Britain, Nuclear Weapons, and the Future of Arms Control by Lawrence Freedman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 145 9. French Nuclear Policy: Adapting the Gaullist Legacy to the Post-Cold War World by Edward A. Kolodziej. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 10. Russian Views of Nuclear Weapons by Sergei Rogov . . . . . . . . . 205 About the Authors . 217 About the Editors 219 Index ...... . 221 - Part I United States Nuclear Policy by Nuclear Strategy Study Group -1 The Future of Arms Control In June 1992, U.S. president George Bush and Russian president Boris Yeltsin met in Washington for their first major summit. The two leaders, chiefs of state from formerly bitter adversaries now meeting as friends, announced a number of major initiatives. Most profound, in many ways, was their accord on nuclear arms control: by roughly the year 2000, Bush and Yeltsin agreed, Russia and the United States would cut their strategic nuclear arsenals to a level of not more than 3,500 warheads, less than a third of their peak during the cold war. Many observers immediately hailed the agreement as the most important symbol to date of the cold war's passing and a positive step toward lasting U.S.-Russian friendship. Perhaps unintentionally, however, START II (as the initiative has become known) achieved something else as well. It exhausted the consensus, in the United States and elsewhere, on the future of arms control. Most arms control specialists in the United States, as well as officials in Europe and other regions with a stake in U.S.-Russian relations, had agreed that reductions to roughly 3,000 warheads on each side were a good idea. (Table 1.1, "National U.S. and Russian Strategic Forces Under START II," displays force totals under the accord.) Most U.S. analysts also concurred that banning land-based interconti nental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with more than one warhead, another central element of START II, would improve strategic stability. Once one began talking about reductions below 3,000 warheads, how ever-or about complementary arms control measures like a Comprehens ive Test Ban Treaty, a pledge of no first use of nuclear weapons, or a ban on tactical nuclear weapons-that consensus broke down. The U.S. Air Force, backed by an influential outside report prepared at the Defense 4 TOWARD A NUCLEAR PEACE u.s. Department's request, argued that world responsibilities demanded the indefinite maintenance of a nuclear arsenal close to 3,000 warheads in size, supported by continued nuclear testing and a robust modernization program. Cautious observers questioned the value of further cuts, arguing that smaller nuclear arsenals were not inherently desirable-and might actually be inherently undesirable. In an important sense, therefore, nuclear arms control has reached a crossroads. The end of the cold war and beginning of a new U.S.-Russian relationship made START II, or something very like it, almost inevitable. From that point forward, however, the stewards of U.S. arms control policy will be wading through increasingly tangled intellectual-and political thickets. Deeper reductions and other, more ambitious, arms control initia tives will magnify the trade-offs, controversies, and risks-as well, perhaps, as the benefits-of the process. This part aims to layout a coherent path for this difficult period ahead, one that capitalizes on the opportunities offered by the end of the cold war while preserving central U.S. national interests. Our analysis focuses on the medium and long term and discusses what might be achieved within the framework of existing U.S. nuclear policy as well as speculating on some possible nuclear end states. Our ideas and conclusions will emerge throughout the following chapters, but it may be useful to make one thing clear at the outset: We believe strongly that START II should not be the end of the line in U.S.-Russian arms talks. There will be an inevitable pause, because before the United States and Russia can consider going beyond START II, they must first meet its terms. This in itself will be a difficult enough challenge, one likely to absorb several years of diligent effort. And it is critical that this task be done well and thoughtfully: getting the implementation and verification of START II right is a key prerequisite for subsequent accords. Nonetheless, progress beyond START II is necessary, justified, and probably inevitable in both numerical and operational arms control. The U.S. government must begin thinking about what interests it has at stake in the arms control process and what accords would meet those interests. In other words, the United States needs a new road map for nuclear arms control. ONE PREREQUISITE: CONTINUED REFORM IN RUSSIA A pressing question that immediately arises in connection with any study of arms control has to do with politics in Russia: What does one assume about the end of the cold war? Does one take it for granted that U.S.-Russian
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