Torpedo Junction : U-Boat War Off America's East Coast, 1942

395 Pages·2014·8.04 MB·English

by  Homer

Torpedo Junction
TORPEDO JUNCTION
U-Boat War Off
America’s
East Coast,
1942
Homer H. Hickam, Jr.
Naval Institute Press
Annapolis, Maryland
BLUEJACKET BOOKS
The latest edition of this work has been brought to publication with the generous assistance of
Marguerite and Gerry Lenfest.
Naval Institute Press 291 Wood Road Annapolis, MD 21402
© 1989 by the United States Naval Institute Annapolis, Maryland All rights reserved. No part of this book
may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including
photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in
writing from the publisher.
First Bluejacket Books printing, 1996
ISBN 978-1-61251-578-6 (eBook) The Library of Congress has cataloged the hardcover edition as
follows:
Hickam, Homer H., 1943– Torpedo junction: U-Boat war off America’s East coast, 1942 / by Homer H.
Hickam, Jr.
p. cm.
Bibliography: p.
Include index.
1. World War, 1939–1945—Naval operations—Submarine. 2. World War, 1939–1945—Naval operations,
German. 3. World War, 1939–1945—Campaigns—North Atlantic Ocean. 4. Atlantic Coast (U.S.)—
History. 5. Gulf Coast (U.S.)—History. I. Title.
D591.H53 1989
940.54'51—dc19
89-3005
CIP
Print editions meet the requirements of ANSI/NISO z39.48-1992 (Permanence of Paper).
15 14 13 18 17 16
To the United States Coast Guard Cutter Dione (WPC 107). Wherever she is,
may she be happy in the knowledge that she served her country well.
The massacre which the U-boats were able to “enjoy” along the Atlantic
coast in 1942 was as great a national disaster as if saboteurs had blown
up half a dozen of our biggest munitions factories.
SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON
I will show that the U-boat alone can win the war . . . nothing is
impossible to us!
ADMIRAL KARL DOENITZ
The only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the U-
boat peril . . . the U-boat attack was our worst evil. It would have been
wise for the Germans to stake all upon it.
WINSTON CHURCHILL
CONTENTS
Foreword
Preface
Introduction
1 Paukenschlag
2 Hatteras
3 The Dione
4 The American Shooting Gallery
5 The Battle Expands
6 The Jacob Jones
7 The Friday the 13th Patrol
8 The USS Dickerson
9 On the Sea of Death
10 The Q-Ships
11 The Hambleton and Emmons Cruise
12 The Night of the Roper
13 The Bucket Brigades
14 The Tankers Are Stopped
15 Proud Day, Bitter Day
16 The Bravest Little Ships
17 Torpedo Junction Moves South
18 Into the Gulf
19 The First Convoys
20 The Tactics Change
21 The Saboteurs
22 Hopes Unfulfilled
23 The YP 389 and the U-701
24 More Lessons Learned
25 Harry Kane and the U-701
26 Victory
Appendix
Notes
Bibliography
Index
FOREWORD
T
his thoroughly documented and detailed account of the 1942 slaughter of
ships by U-boats off the East and Gulf Coasts of the United States is by
far the best that I have read covering that black episode in our naval
history. During the first six months of 1942, foreign invaders dominated our
coastal waters for the first time since the War of 1812. While the navy’s
attention was riveted on the far Pacific and the Japanese Combined Fleet,
arguably the best navy in the world at that time, the Allied merchant marine was
being decimated on our Atlantic doorstep. When midyear arrived, more tonnage
had been sunk by a handful of U-boats than had been put down in the Pacific by
the entire Japanese Navy from Pearl Harbor to Midway! Painful though the
losses were, they might have proven terminal except for the intervention of
Hitler, who refused to release more U-boats from his own intuitive projects. As a
result, there were never more than a dozen U-boats manned by 500 or so men on
the American station at any time, and the first did not arrive until weeks after
war was declared. That such a small force could inflict such damage was a
damning indictment of both our readiness and our priorities.
As we read this fascinating account, it seems incredible that we were so
unprepared after having observed for two years the U-boats and their
performance against the British. The often amateurish efforts of our forces in the
early months is not remarkable; such is usual at the onset of war. These were the
same men who two years later as seasoned combat veterans were sweeping the
seas. But the absence of ASW ships, doctrine, and training; the refusal to set up
convoys; the employment of the few available warships in solo sweeping and
patrol operations twenty-five years after it had been proven to be a useless tactic
against submarines; and the refusal to employ fleet destroyers against an enemy
running amuck only a few miles away defies logic. One answer seems to lie in
the orientation and dogmatic personality of Admiral Ernest J. King, COMINCH,