Tocqueville on Algeria

38 Pages·2008·1.45 MB·French

Tocqueville on Algeria
Author(s): Melvin Richter
Source: The Review of Politics, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Jul., 1963), pp. 362-398
Published by: Cambridge University Press for the University of Notre Dame du lac on behalf of Review of
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Tocqueville on Algeria
Melvin Richter
I
N ANY list of the mostp enetratinga nd least deceivedp olit-
ical theorists of the nineteenth century, Alexis de Tocque-
ville must be rankedh igh. Few othersp erceivedt he dangers
both of egalitarianisma nd of racial thinking; of secular religions
as well as of state churches; of historical determinism,a s well as
of those other explanationsw hich equally well underminer esponsi-
bility by attributing everything to mere chance or to the appear-
ance of exceptional individuals. Tocqueville insisted upon the
obligation of free men to determineb y empirical investigationj ust
what are the genuine alternativesc onfronting them. By his own
effort to perform this task, he made a classic contribution to the
study of the relationshipsb etween social organizationa nd political
institutions.
Yet the time has passed when Tocqueville needed to be praised.
Indeed it is precisely the uncritical adulation of some admirers
that may provoke a reaction against him. It would be well for
Tocqueville to be studied as a serious thinker, rather than to be
puffed as a prophet or seer. Who has not been fatigued by still
another referencet o that passage in Democracy in America where
Tocqueville speculated whether within a century Russia and the
United States would share control of the world? But a theorist's
influence upon the thought of a later age ought not to be estimated
by its repetition of his successfulg uesses or striking epigrams. His
ideas exert a creative power only when they are being subjected
to vigorous criticism and reworking by those who care enough
to separate what is worth preservingf rom what ought to be dis-
counted as due to demonstrablee rror or ideological bias.
In Tocqueville's case, it is particularlyn ecessaryt o understand
his meaning both in relation to the overt reasons he gave and to
the context within which he functioned. For his ideas were oriented
to choice and action, rather than to careful definition and syste-
matic consistency. These qualities he disdained as being of more
concern to the man of letters than to the practicing statesmana nd
citizen. From an early age he involved himself with actual politics.
362
TOCQUEVTLLFOEN ALGERIA 363
This participationb oth registereda nd altered Tocqueville's initial
ideals and tools of analysis. Yet we know little more about the
causesh e championedt han what he chose to tell us in his Souvenirs;
and little more about his operative political values than the formal
statements of principle contained in his printed works. Both
sources are unsatisfactory. Tocqueville's account of his role in the
committee which drafted the Constitutiono f the Second Republic
cannot be taken at face value. Paul Bastid has demonstratedi n
detail both the errorsT ocqueville propagated about the American
presidencya nd his lack of energy and foresight in what he did to
prevent Louis Napoleon's seizure of power.1 This is surprising,
and surely worth knowing. The same is even more true of the
stand he took on the French conquest and colonizationo f the terri-
tories now known as Algeria.
Tocqueville conspicuouslyf ailed to apply to the French action
in North Africa the sociological insight and ethical awareness he
had demonstratedi n his study of the United States. There he had
found indefensible the effects of force and exploitation, not only
upon the victims, but upon those who ostensibly benefited from
the means at the disposal of colonists and slaveholders. No such
judgments occur in his treatment of French policy in Algeria.
What makes this difference so striking is the fact that he was
alreadyw riting on Algeriab efore he had completedt he Democracy.
When in the 1840's Tocqueville attacked the "philanthropy"o f
those Frenchmen who condemned the cruelty of their country's
African operation, he nevertheless used the same liberal and
humanitariana rgumentst o support the abolition of slavery in the
French colonies, and to distinguish his own position from that of
his young assistant,G obineau, in their correspondence.
These contradictionsw ere visible before the publication of the
latest volume in the new complete edition of Tocqueville. But in
this collection of Tocqueville'sw ritings and speecheso n colonialism
- perhaps the single most revealing, and certainly the best-edited
volume in this series- Andre Jardin has given us materialsw hich
put their author in a perspectiver ather different from what some
of his admirers might have suspected.2 This is not to say that
Paul Bastid, "Tocqueville et la doctrine constitutionnelle," Alexis de
Tocqueville: Livre du Centenaire, 1859-1959 (Paris, 1960), pp. 51-53.
2 Alexis de Tocqueville, Oeuvres completes, ed. J. P. Mayer, t. III, Ecrits
et Discours politiques (Paris, 1962), v. I. Texte &tabli et annot par Andre
Jardin.
364 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
Jardin, or J.-J. Chevalier, who collaborated in the highly intelli-
gent and informative introduction, betray any uneasiness about
Tocqueville's thought or conduct. Rather they argue that he suc-
ceeded in reconciling his political values with his espousal of colo-
nialism in North Africa:
Slavery,A lgeria,B ritishI ndia, the problemso f colonizationo, r of
contactsa mong differentr aces- these mattersa re treatedb y the
same expert and lucid pen, which, in the Democracyi n America,
analyzed the structureo f democratics ocieties and revealed the
true sourceso f their governmentsa' ction. But this pen serves as
well France'sm ajor interests,i n additiont o those values- truth,
justice,a nd libertys o dear to its author.3
Tocqueville, in their opinion, by advocatingt he seizure and settling
of Algeria, in no way abandoned the principles he had expressed
in the work that made his reputation.
These conclusions,i t seems to me, are mistaken. Tocqueville's
stand on Algeria was inconsistentw ith the Democracy. When this
issue forced him to choose, he placed nationalisma bove liberalism;
the interests of "progressive"C hristian countries above the rights
of those that were not.
In another paper, Jardin has revealed for the first time how
Algeria came to assume such importance in Tocqueville's mind.4
This occurred before he went to America; after his return, he
considered settling there, but decided to write the Democracy
instead. Before this task was done, he wrote two long newspaper
articles on Algeria. Already he was seeking to make his name
known to voters so that he might be elected to the Chamber. After
his election in 1839, he consideredh imself to be not only an expert
on Algeria, but almost the sole member to perceive that it was
France's most valuable interest. This belief prompted him to visit
North Africa, and to return, despite an attack of fever which had
almost killed him during his first voyage. Algeria was the only
non-Westerns ociety he knew at first hand except for the American
Indian tribes he had encounteredi n North America. But Tocque-
ville was so concerned to diagnose the problems of domination by
a Europeanp ower of a much larger number of natives with a reli-
gion other than Christianity,t hat he began in the early 1840's a
3 Ibid., 9.
Andre Jardin, "Tocqueville et l'Alg6rie," Revue des Travaux de l'Acade-
mie des sciences morales et politiques, 4e s6rie, 1962 (ler semestre), 61-62.
TOCQUEVILLE ON ALGERIA 365
manuscript devoted to analyzing what the British had done in
India. Although never completed, the fragment reprinted in its
entirety is an impressive specimen of what Tocqueville could do
by his distinctivem ethod of penetratingt o the strengthsa nd weak-
nesses of a political society.5 As in the case of a highly revealing
memorandum he wrote upon his return from Algeria in 1841
(here publishedf or the first time), Tocqueville used his intellectual
tools to serve the purposeso f a Westerns tate bent upon conquering
a territory outside of Europe.6 When he laid bare the political
consequenceso f Islam or Hinduism, he did so in order to indicate
how the European power had or ought to have taken advantage
of weaknesso n the part of Algerianso r Hindus. Whereasi n almost
all his other writings, religion is viewed as a potential source of
strength for a free government, in this volume it appears purely
as a weak point in non-Christians ocieties apt to be invaded by
European powers. Nothing was worse, in Tocqueville'sv iew, than
for a society to be conquered. Hence any religion incapable of
inspiringi ts devotees to fight against aggressorsi s not worth much.
If this mode of thought recalls Machiavelli, the same is true
of Tocqueville's candid considerationo f what would have to be
done by the French to take and hold Algeria. This document,
never intended for publication, is altogether free from the edify-
ing tone its author assumed on occasion in his more deliberate
dialogues with his public and posterity. From this text it is pos-
sible to see the origin and real meaning of Tocqueville's parlia-
mentarys peeches on Algeria (all of which are reprintedh ere from
the Moniteur), as well as the two reportsh e did as rapporteurf or
the Chamber's:C ommittee on Algerian Affairs, state papers as
celebrated in his day as they are now unknown. Despite their
elegant acknowledgmentso f the obligations owed by a Western
and Christian country to other cultures, these reports envision an
inequality between the two races in Algeria after the conquest.7
Tocqueville's writing on Algeria is worth reading both for the
light it sheds on his political values and for the use made of his
5 Tocqueville, ed. Mayer, t. III, v. I, 443-507.
6 Ibid., 213-82.
7 On this point there is a discrepancyb etween the introduction by Chevallier
and Jardin, which states that Tocqueville envisioned a permanent inequality,
and the paper of Jardin, who believes that Tocqueville was against permanent
inequality. Cf. Tocqueville, ed. Mayer, t. III, v. I, 26, 32, and Jardin, op. cit.,
p. 69.
366 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
political sociology. What he emphasizedw as the relation between
the formal political institutions of Moslem and Kabyle society to
their patterns of stratification,r eligion, elites, voluntary association,
and local self-government. But his interest was narrowly instru-
mental. Nothing concerned him more than the problems of state-
craft: how to subjugate, how to administer efficiently, how to
colonize a vanquished territory. All of Tocqueville's intellectual
resourcesw ere called into play. These included the intensive study
of governmentd ocuments, including statistics; the eliciting of per-
tinent information from qualified experts at home and abroad;
and close personal observation, based on interviews carefully set
down in his travel journals. All this information was put into
categorieso f a comparativeh istoricals ociologyv ery broad in scope.
Many of the issues raised by George W. Pierson about the relation
of Tocqueville's observationt o his conclusions are actually appli-
cable to his work on Algeria.8 His travel notes for his first voyage
to Algeria can be supplementedb oth by this volume and by a full
account of his second voyage by a journalist who accompanied
him.9 From his correspondence,a s well as from his early news-
paper articles, it can be seen to what extent ideas he held prior
to his visits persisted, or were modified and even discarded. His
official reports reveal what constraintsh e accepted in his role as
rapporteur and what part of his own views survived. On such
occasions he could not put at the center of his analysis general
hypotheseso f the sort found in his books. Yet no one could call
his reports the dull weekday product of a mind which reserved
its best efforts for the Sunday of abstract speculation.
Tocqueville'sm asteryo f the administrativep rocessw ill surprise
those who attribute to him only the vague antibureaucratic
cliches of mid-nineteenthc entury Liberalism. Indeed the intellec-
tual level of these state papers is high enough to raise the question
of why they are based on such dubious moral and political assump-
tions. Already the Algerian issue had acquired its power to distort
the judgment of almost all Frenchmen. For in Tocqueville's case
little that he said or wrote during the French conquest bears any
8 George W. Pierson, Tocqueville and Beaumont in America (New York,
1938).
9 Tocqueville, ed. Mayer, Voyages en Angleterre, Irlande, Suisse, et Algerie
(Paris, 1958), t. V, v. II. Texte 6tabli et annotc par Mayer et Jardin. For the
journalist's report, A. Bussiere, "Le Marechal Bugeaud et la Colonisation de
l'Alg&rie,"R evue des Deux Mondes (Novembre, 1853), 449-506.
TOCQUEVILLE ON ALGERIA 367
recognizable connection to his earlier statements about what con-
stitutes honor and justice in the dealings of Western states with
populations less well-armed. Once victory seemed assured, how-
ever, his language at least, returned to the tone of the Democracy.
Yet there remains some doubt about his sincerity when he warned
against exploitation of the defeated territory in words that today
provoke astonishment:
If we demonstrate by our behavior that we consider the native
population merely as an obstacle to be circumvented or smashed,
if by our rule we bring them not well-being and enlightenment
but destruction, then the only issue between the two races will
be that of life and death. Sooner or later Algeria will become
the bloody arena for a mortal combat between these two peoples
with mercy neither offered nor accepted. In such a struggle, one
or the other would have to die. May God forbid that this be our
destiny.1o
Another extraordinary prediction, it will be said. Perhaps.
Yet as is so often the case with such statements,t here is a substan-
tial difference between what we now read into these words and
what the author meant to say when he wrote them. To re-create
their original context, it will be necessary to consider the condi-
tions under which France came to dominate Algeria as well as
Tocqueville's attitude at various stages of this enterprise. Despite
Tocqueville'sd efense of colonialismo n moral and political grounds,
rather than in terms of economic advantage, he could not alter
the logic of the situation. As a recent French treatment of the
subject put it: "There was a conqueror who imposed his rule
upon the vanquished, and, once the territory had been brought
under control, imposed the right of conquest. These two facts
dominate and explain the history of French Algeria."l-
II
Diplomatic historians and political scientists often attempt to
explain a nation's foreign policy by attributingt o its rulers a type
of rational calculation based upon the permanent interests of the
state. Against this view, it is often argued that matters which
ought to be consideredo nly in referencet o their effects upon--other
10T ocqueville, ed. Beaumont, t. IX, 443; or, ed. Mayer, t. IIi,v. I, 329..
11 Gabriel Esquer, Histoire de PAlg6rie (1830-1960) (Paris, 1960), p. 8.
368 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
countries are in fact more often decided for reasons proper to a
nation's internal affairs. Tocqueville thought this to be a charac-
teristic weakness of democracies in their diplomacy.l2 Which of
these two theories applies best to the series of French decisions
which led to the taking of Algiers in 1830, restricted occupation
from 1830 to 1840, and, finally, total conquest and deliberate
colonizationo f the area from 1841-1847? It will come as no sur-
prise that the historians of these fateful events have not agreed
on any one explanation, and indeed have on the whole favored
the hypothesis that decisions were not taken on any other basis
than improvised reactions to unforeseen emergencies. According
to the most familiar interpretation,t he seizure of Algiers in the
closing weeks of the Restoration could not have been more for-
tuitous. The city, long the headquartersf or a profitable piracy,
was governed by a Dey nominally subject to Turkish authority.
During the discussion of a debt incurred by the Directory and
disavowed by the Restoration, the Dey struck the French consul
with his flywhisk. Wounded by this affront to national honor,
various ministries ordered Algiers to be blockaded, and then to
be taken by storm. The champions of this hypothesis admit that
CharlesX badly needed some new source of prestige.'3 Ch.-Andre
Julien, however, has asserted that the Dey was manipulated by
powerful merchant interests on the one side, and, on the other,
that the decision of the Polignac ministry to take the city was
promptedb y the desire to distractp ublic attention from the attack
upon civil liberties which Charles X was planning through the
Ordonnances.14I n any case, the Dey's capitulationw as not enough
to prevent the overthrowo f the Bourbons.
When Louis-Philippe came to power, he found himself con-
fronted by the question of what to do with Algiers and the French
troopst here. Should he withdrawt hem? Should he seek to expand
French power in North Africa? There was a group of anticolonial-
ists, but there was also some enthusiasm,p articularlyi n the South
of France, about possible economic advantagess temming from the
victory won by the expedition. What, if any benefits, might come
to a Europeann ation seekingt o extend its control into the interior,
12T ocqueville, De la dfmocratie en AmJrique, ed. Mayer, I, 238-240.
18E squer, Histoire de PAlgerie, pp. 5.7.
14Ch.-Andr6 Julien, "L'Algerie de 1830 i 1870," La Rlvolution de 1848,
XXI (1925), 3-7.
TOCQUEVILLE ON ALGERIA 369
what sort of resistance it might encounter - these were questions
no one in France could at that time answer. The July Monarchy
reacted in the way that was to become habitual: it temporized, it
evaded making any choice which might provoke disapproval. What
this meant in North Africa was the limited occupation of Algiers
and certain other coastal areas, a policy that continued with
modification until 1840. But with the appearance of a young,
energetic, and highly capable leader, Abd-el-Kader, a serious threat
was posed to the indecisive policy of the cabinet. The number of
its troops in 1831 was 18,000; in 1834, 30,000; in 1838, 48,000.15
A decision had to be made, and it was General Bugeaud, then a
deputy, who stated the issue in a decisive speech: "I say that
restricted occupation is a chimera and a dangerous chimera. In-
deed as long as you remain in the small area to which your occu-
pation is restricted, you will never attack the heart of your enemy's
position."'6
There were only two choices, either Algeria must be abandoned
or else it must be completely conquered:
As for abandoning Algeria: official France is unwilling to do so
... I see no prospect of a government strong enough to get out
of Algeria, even if such a step were indicated by the trend of
events there .... Since withdrawal is impossible, the only remain-
ing alternative is total domination.17
?Bugeaud's words gained importance because he was himself
the man most likely to be named Commander-in-Chief in the event
that total conquest were to become the official policy. Speaking
with perfect candor, he set out the means necessary to attain that
end. His strategy was that of total war. With an army of 100,000
men and equivalent appropriations to support that force, he could
break the enemy. Instead of the defensive strategy hitherto fol-
lowed by a European-type army, complete with heavy artillery
and complicated supply lines, Bugeaud prescribed a continual
offensive carried out by mobile columns and light infantry. The
goal was not so much to meet and fight the enemy as to destroy
his material basis of existence. This was to be done by burning
15 Tocqueville, ed. Beaumont, IX, 423.- The figures rose to 70,000 in 1841,
76,000 in 1843, 83,000 in 1845, and 101,000 in 1846.
16G en. Paul Azan (ed.), Par l'lpie et par la Charrue: Ecrits et Discours
de Bugeaud (Paris, 1948), p. 63.
17I bid., pp. 64-65.
370 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
his villages and preventing him from sowing, harvesting, and graz-
ing; the entire population must be considered as the foe. In the
chamber that heard these proposals, some deputies were squeamish
enough to balk at the prospect of such an operation. True, the
Arabs were scarcely gentle to the French soldiers they took, but
after all they were defending their homeland and were no crueler
to the Europeans than to their tribal enemies. To such criticism,
Bugeaud responded:
These murmurs seem to indicate that the Chamber finds my means
too barbaric. Gentlemen, war cannot be waged in the spirit of
philanthropy. Once you choose war as an end, you cannot reject
any means whatever.... I shall always prefer the interests of France
to an absurd philanthropy directed towards foreigners who decapi-
tate those of our soldiers who are wounded or taken prisoners.18
This speech carried the day and Bugeaud, once given the
command by Guizot, was as good as his word. The razzia became
the standard operation against all tribes that resisted or were naive
enough to think that they could remain neutral: villages were
razed, harvests burned, livestock confiscated or slaughtered, and,
most moder touch of all, certain resisting tribes which sought
refuge in caves were smoked to death.
This is how a razzia appeared to one French officer:
We arrive at tents abandoned by their owners who, awakened,
by the approach of our soldiers, have fled in disorder with their
flocks. Shots from all sides rain upon these miserable people, sur-
prised and without defense. Men, women, and children are soon
surrounded; their flocks are seized. Everything that cannot be
carried off is put to the torch. The tribes whose resources we
have taken are thus made to feel the need for a long peace to
restore themselves.19
Saint-Arnaud described his campaigns of 1842 to his brother
in extraordinarily frank and vivid terms:
We are in the middle of the mountains between Milianah and
Cherchell. We hardly fire a shot, we burn everything (April 5,
1842). The country of the Beni-Menasser is superb.... We have
burned everything. Oh war, oh war! How many women and
children have died of cold and misery in the snows of the Atlas
18 Ibid., pp. 67-68.
19E squer, Histoire de l'Algdrie,p . 33.