To Know or Not to Know: Beyond Realism and Anti-Realism

255 Pages·1995·7.19 MB·English

by  Jan Srzednicki (auth.)

TO KNOW OR NOT TO KNOW
SYNTHESE LffiRARY
STUDIES IN EPISTEMOLOGY,
LOGIC, METHODOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Managing Editor:
JAAKKO HINTIKKA, Boston University
Editors:
DIRK VAN DALEN, University of Utrecht, The Netherlands
DONALD DAVIDSON, University of California, Berkeley
THEO A.F. KUIPERS, University of Groningen, The Netherlands
PATRICK SUPPES, Stanford University, California
JAN WOLENSKI, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland
VOLUME244
TO KNOW OR NOT TO KNOW
Beyond Realism and Anti-Realism
JAN SRZEDNICKI
University of Melbourne
SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Srzednicki, Jan T. J.
To know or not to know beyond realism and antl-realism I by Jan
Srzednicki.
p. em. -- tSynthese library ; v. 244.)
Includes bibliographical references (p. xxx-xxxl and index.
ISBN 978-90-481-4418-1 ISBN 978-94-017-3542-1 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/97-8-9-4-0-17-35-42-1
1. Knowledge, Theory of. I. Tltle. II. Series.
BD162.S78 1994
121--dc20 94-20319
ISBN 978-90-481-4418-1
Printed on acid-free paper
All Rights Reserved
© 1995 Springer Science+B usiness Media Dordrecht
Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 1995
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,
including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and
retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner.
A NOTE
The present book was a long time coming, it took a while writing and
harks back to a body of work done on other projects and publications
over a number of years. It would seem appropriate to acknowledge my
indebtedness to all who ever worked with me. That would be a small
book in itself, especially if one were to include the contribution of the
literature one read. This being an impossible project let the above words
stand for my thanks to all my philosophical benefactors.
I should yet mention some trigger occasions, and influences that made
me undertake and develop the present project. Some few years ago I used
the expression "Clear-Meaning Expressions", Professor Wolniewicz'
interest in it persuaded me to investigate further, and the present perspec
tive opened. I have then lectured on this perspective in the Jagiellonian
University Krak6w 1989/90, and followed it up by conducting seminars
at the University ofTrento 1991, and lecturing a term in Warsaw Uni
versity in 1992. That assisted materially in developing the theory. I am
grateful for these opportunities, and the discussions provided via them.
Some preliminary materials have been published in some earlier form
before, and to wit: Chapter 1 uses material from Logical Concerns of
Philosophical Analysis, That appeared as a chapter in 'Logic Counts'
E. Zamecka-Bialy (e d. ), Dordrecht ( 1990). Further it relates to some new
material published in Polish in 'Klopoty Poj~ciowe', Warsaw (1993).
Lastly, but not least material used in the Introduction and Conclusion
has been mostly rehearsed in On The Possibility of Knowledge in T.
Airaksinen and W.W. Gasparski (eds.) Practical Philosophy and Action
Theory, Braunschweig (1993). Most of the material so used was at an
earlier stage of development than the present. It is with pleasure that I
express my gratitude to the publishers of the above items for the use
of these materials. I am especially grateful to Mr. Horst Imberger for
his painstaking editorial reading, and reviewing of the manuscript. He
provided an indispensable reader's perspective, and made numerous
excellent suggestions. Without it the final revision would have been
much the worse. I thank him for the vast amount of work he put in it,
for his good judgement as well as for preparing the Analytical Table of
v
vi A NOTE
Contents. Thanks are also due to Ms. Maja de Keijzer, and Mr. Alexan
der Schimmelpenninck of Kluwer's whose steady help, encouragement,
and unfailing good humour were of inestimable assistance to the author.
I should like to mention gratefully the publisher's referee whose com
ments provided just the incentive and encouragement needed by the
author for a fresh look at, and consideration of the book.
Faced with the choice of either presenting a compact statement of
the theory that would display its perspective as clearly as possible, or
a much longer, and more user-friendly presentation that might well
dissipate the sharpness of that perspective I chose the first alternative
for better or worse. Consequently the specific difficulties that I mention
in the Introduction might be somewhat heightened.
Footnotes that contain reading material are numbered within chapters,
and appear at the end of the chapter. Bibliographical notes contain no
reading material, are not numbered, and appear in text thus: (Moore,
1923) they give only author's surname plus the year of publication;
details are found in the Bibliography at the end of the volume. The
bibliography is compact but it may contain items that may not be referred
to in the text.
For the convenience of the reader an Analytical Table of Contents,
and a Glossary of Basic Terms are provided.
The index is not extensive, but it should assist in displaying the
structure of the work.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ANOTE v
ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS ix
GLOSSARY OF BASIC TERMS xv
INTRODUCTION xvii
CHAPTER 1 I PARADIGMATIC BASE 1
CHAPTER 21 FACT VS. HYPOTHESIS 23
CHAPTER 31 SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE 37
CHAPTER 4/ PRE-CONDITIONS OF KNOWLEDGE 1 62
CHAPTER 5 I PRE-CONDITIONS OF KNOWLEDGE 2 84
CHAPTER 61 PRE-CONDITIONS OF KNOWLEDGE 3 105
CHAPTER 7 I ONTOLOGICAL COMMITMENT 139
CHAPTER 81 THE NORMATIVE CONSTRAINT 167
CHAPTER 91 CONCLUSION: A PICTURE OF THE
THEORY 188
BIDLIOGRAPHY 209
INDEX 211
vii
ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION xvii
1. The General Problem of Epistemology xvii
2. The General Project of the Book xxiv
CHAPTER 1 I PARADIGMATIC BASE 1
1.1. The Ordinary Language School of Philosophy;
The Fulcrum of Knowledge 1
1.1.1. The Rationale for the Linguistic Paradigm:
Clear-Meaning Expressions 1
1.2. The Linguistic Paradigm: The Search for Clarity and
Simplicity 3
1.2.1. Moore's Defence of Common Sense 3
1.2.2. The Importance of Clarity in Paradigmatic
Expressions 4
1.2.3. The Problem of Free Will as an Example of Clarity 6
1.2.4. Lesniewski's Attempt to Ground Knowledge 7
1.2.5. The Consequences of Rejecting the Moorean
Paradigm 9
1.2.5.1. Eddington's Argument 9
1.2.5.2. Ryle's Systematically Misleading
Expressions 10
1.3. Paradigmatic Knowledge: The Need for Different
Perspectives 11
1.3.1. The Requirement of a Revised Epistemic
Perspective 11
1.3.2. Paradigmatic Simples: The Problems with
Sense-Data 13
1.4. A Re-Examination of Linguistic Analysis 14
1.4.1. A Review of the Authority of Common Sense 14
1.4.2. The Viability of Other Types of Paradigm 16
1.5. Summary and Conclusion 19
ix
X ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 2/ FACT VS. HYPOTHESIS 23
2.1. The Conditions for Theoretical Adequacy 24
2.1.1. Theories and Paradigms 24
2.1.2. Finding the Epistemic Base for Theory 25
2.1.2.1. The Conditions for: Sound, Viable and
Adequate Hypothesis 26
2.1.2.2. The Paradigmatic Base: Articulate Thought
and Individuation 27
2.2. The Function and Test of a Theory-Matrix 28
2.2.1. The Difficulty with Testing Theory 29
2.2.2. The Problem of Finding Theory-Independent
Subject-Matter 30
2.2.3. The Tests for Soundness and Power 31
2.2.3.1. Soundness 31
2.2.3.2. Power 32
2.3. The Importance of Paradigmatic Foundations vs. Theory 32
2.3.1. The Fit between Theory-Base and Subject-Matter 32
2.3.2. The Epistemic Status of Theory 33
CHAPTER 3/ SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE 37
3.1. The Need for a Non-Explicit Base for Knowledge 38
3.1.1. A Kantian Interpretation of the Sources of
Knowledge 39
3.1.2. The Role of Transcendental Argument 40
3.1.3. Problems with One-Dimensional Sources:
The Need for Replacement Hypothesis 42
3.1.4. Finding Direct Support for the Two Sources
Doctrine 44
3.2. Identifying the Conditions for Reliable Epistemological
B~ ~
3.2.1. The Importance of Distinguishing between
'Knowing' and 'Known' 46
3.2.2. The Conditions for Articulate Thought: The Role of
Paradigmatic Expressions 48
3.2.2.1. The Inadequacy of Moore's Paradigmatic
Expressions Re-Examined: Looking for
a Way Out 49
3.2.2.2. The Nature of Epistemic Paradigms 50