To Command the Sky: The Battle for Air Superiority Over Germany, 1942-1944 (Smithsonian History of Aviation and Spaceflight)

375 Pages·2006·5.11 MB·English

by  Stephen L. McFarland

TO
COM 0
THE SKY
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TO
o
COM
THE SKY
THEBATTLE FORAIRSUPERIORITY
OVERGERMANY,1942-1944
StephenLMcFarlandand
WesleyPhllUpsNewton
The University ofAlabama Press
Tuscaloosa
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'fhe UniversityofAlabama Press
'fuscaloosa,f\labalna 35487-0380
Cop~';ght © 1991 by the Snlithsonian Institution
Manufactured in the United States ofAmcl;ca
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To
Maurer Maurer, historian ofairpower
Carl E. McFarland, sU1Vivor ofthe Hump's "Aluminum Trail"
Connie McFarland and children, Jennifer andJeffrey
Merlin Newton and children, Linda, Alan, and Brent
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CONTENTS
Preface to the Paperback Edition viii
Acknowledgments xi
Introduction 1
1. The Challenge 11
2. Training to Destroy 61
3. Trial and Error-Early Operations 81
4. To the Brink-The Fall Crisis 117
5. Transition to Air Superiority-Big Week 157
6. Berlin, the Strategic Fighter Campaign, and Control
ofthe Air 193
Epllogue 239
Appendix 249
Notes 253
Bibliographic Essay 297
Selected Bibliography 305
Credit Lines 317
Index 319
vii
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PREFACE TO THE
PAPERBACK EDITION
In the decade since To Command the Sky first appeared, the U.S.
Air Force has experienced seemingly unparalleled, unchallenged,
and relatively effortless control ofthe air. The currentgeneration can
be excused for taking such for granted, though ithas not always been
so. This success has been built on the experience ofWorld War II,
when the airmen whose story is told in this book fought, died, and
killed to ensure victory for the United States.
Since Vietnam, the U.S. Air Force and its philosophers have en
gaged in a struggle to redefine American air power by emphasiz
ing doctrine. Concurrent with this effort has been a reevaluation of
its history through adoctrinal lens. In this indoctrinationeffort, writ
ers on air warfare have struggled with terminology. Is it air superi
ority, command ofthe air, control ofthe air, counterair strategy, air
supremacy, air dominance, or, in the words ofthe Air Force's basic
doctrine publication, AFMl-l, "orchestrating aerospace control"?
This doctrinal frenzy and these successes in actual wars, however,
have not altered the lessons of this book nor the record of what
happened in the Second World War.
Doctrine, at its most basic, is nothing more than what is taught
by aperson, group, ororganization. To speakofanAmerican orGer-
viii
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PREFACETOTHEPAPERBACKEDITION IX
man doctrine of air superiority in the Second World War, however,
is to use the perspective gained in the almost sixty years since the
events of this book to revise or rewrite what actually happened in
1942-1944. Tens of thousands of airmen died while hundreds of
thousands of airmen fought to find a way to win the air war over
Western Europe. To reduce this struggle to something called "doc
trine" is to distort the events of the war. In 1942-1944, the issue
of air superiority was in doubt. American commanders tried bomb
ing, fighter sweeps, aerial escort, and guerilla air warfare to win air
superiority. The struggle came down to attrition-cause death and
destruction to the enemy at a rate the enemy could not sustain. This
was not doctrine. This was not teaching. This was trying to win a
war by destroying the enemy. As one of the men who participated
in this struggle said, "we really didn't know what we were trying
to do. We were doing it but not defining it."l Trying to identify doc
trine here gives a sense of logic and order to a struggle that was in
so many ways desperation and chaos.
The U.S. ArmyAirForces won this battle for the skies overWest
ern Europe due to numerical and technological superiority, courage,
tactics, luck, and enemy mistakes, but morethan anything else, train
ing and a willingness to modify tactics and strategies as the warcon
tinued. The struggle came down to American versus German pilots
for which numerical superiority only made a difference in the long
run; for which the superiority of one aircraft over another disap
peared in the few seconds available for actual combat when flying
at a combined speed ofsix hundred or more miles per hour and be
cause any American advantage disappeared as American pilots flew
great distances to reach the German heartland; andfor which courage
abounded onboth sides. Ultimately, however, itcame down to train
ing, strategy, and tactics. German tactics, strategy, and training pol
icy did not evolve to keep pace with changing conditions and tech
nologies, reflecting, perhaps, the inflexible dogma of the Nazi
philosophy at the root ofthe war. As one studentofthis battlenoted,
"The Germans devised abrilliant strategy that was forced into acon
text in which it could not succeed."2 Hap Arnold, Barney Giles,
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