Tibetan Buddhism in Western Perspective

273 Pages·1977·17.491 MB·English

by  H. V. Guenther

\lribetan jiubbbism
in Western
~erspectibe
Cfeollecteb of
~rtide.s
J)erbert
~. ~uentber
Copyright© 1977 by Dharma Publishing
Printed in the United States of America
All rights reserved~ No part of this book
may be reproduced in any form without written
permission. For information, address:
Dharma Publishing; 5856 Doyle St.,
Emeryville, California 94608
Acknowledgements
Grateful acknowledgement is made for permission to reprint the following
essays:
"Excerpts from the Ga~Q.avyiiha Siitra," Stepping Stones, Vols. I and II,
1950-51.
"The Concept of Mind in Buddhist Tantrism," journal of Oriental Studies,
edited by Michael Smithies, Vol. III, pp. 26lff, Hong Kong:© Hong Kong
University Press, 1956.
"Levels of Understanding in Buddhism," journal of the American Oriental
Society, Vol. 78, pp. 19ff, New Haven, 1958.
'1The Philosophical Background of Buddhist Tantrism," journal of Oriental
Studies, edited by Michael Smithies, Vol. V, pp. 45ff, Hong Kong:© Hong
Kong University Press, 1959-60.
"Indian Buddhist Thought in Tibetan Perspective-Infinite Transcendence
versus Finiteness," History of Religions, edited by Mircea Eliade et al, Vol.
III, No. 1, pp. 83ff, Chicago:© The University of Chicago Press, 1963.
"Some Aspects of Tibetan Religious Thought," History ofR eligions, edited by
Mircea Eliade et al, Vol. VI, No. 1, pp. 70ff, Chicago:© The University of
Chicago Press, 1966.
"Mentalism and Beyond in Buddhist Philosophy," journal of the American
Oriental Society, Vol. 86, pp. 288ff, New Haven, 1966.
"The Spiritual Teacher in Tibet," Hermes, pp. 226ff, Paris, 1966/67.
"Tantra and Revelation," History of Religions, edited by Mircea Eliade et al,
Vol. VII, No.4, pp. 279-301, Chicago:© The University of Chicago Press,
1968.
"The Spiritual Guide as Mystic Experience," R. M. Bucke Society Newslet
ter-Review, Vol. III, No. 1, pp. 22-26, Montreal, 1968.
"Towards an Experience of Being Through Psychological Purification," A
Study of Klesa, edited by Genjun H. Sasaki, pp. 478-493, Tokyo: © Shi
mizukobundo Ltd., 1975.
ISBN 0-913546-49-6; 0-913546-50-x (pbk)
Library of Congress Number: 76-47758
Typeset in Fototronic Plantin and printed by
Dharma Press, Emeryville, California
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
C!Content~
IntroductiDn Vll
Excerpts from the Gal)qavyliha Sfitra 3
The Concept of Mind in Buddhist Tantrism 36
The Levels of Understanding in Buddhism 60
The Philosophical Background
of Buddhist Tantrism 83
Indian Thought in Tibetan Perspective:
Infinite Transcendence Versus Finiteness 110
Some Aspects of Tibetan Religious Thought 139
Mentalism and Beyond in Buddhist Philosophy 162
The Spiritual Teacher in Tibet 178.
Tantra and Revelation 196
The Spiritual Guide as Mystic Experience 225
Towards an Experience of Being
Through Psychological Purification 233
Index 251

3lntrobuction
<!&
ver a century ago, Alexander Csoma de Koros, who
against his original intention was to become a pioneer in Tibetan
studies, made the erroneous statement that "the literature of
Tibet is entirely of Indian origin." He did not realize that he had
come across a small, although by Western standards enormous,
section of writings in Tibetan-the bKa'-'gyur and the bsTan
'gyur-and that he had been duped by the Tibetan 'propaganda'
that everything the Tibetans had to offer had come to them from
India. This propaganda which the Tibetans themselves even
tually came to believe in, seems to have had its root in a political
situation in the eighth century which the Tibetans later cam
ouflaged with an historical hoax-the so-called Samye debate
which we now, on the evidence of contemporary sources from
Tun-huang, know never to have taken place. Anyhow, the
statement by Alexander Csoma de Koros became the credo of
the academic world and even today, despite an overwhelming
evidence to the contrary, it is still fervently subscribed to both in
the East and in the West. The implication is that to a large extent
so-called studies in Tibetan have actually remained studies in
Sanskrit or what was supposed to have been Sanskrit.
When I began my academic studies in 1936 I was naturally
exposed to this climate of misinformedness and misrepresenta
tion. It was then in 1950 when I took up my academic duties
viii Introduction
at Lucknow University and later at the Sanskrit University at
Varanasi that I was given the chance to recognize the falsity of
what was thoughtlessly (or should I say 'irresponsibly'?) per
petuated in academic circles all over the world. The recog
nition of this falsity for what it is does not imply that India
did not play a significant role in the history of ideas in the rest
of Asia. Her role was essentially to give a tremendous stimulus
to thought, and the works that were translated from Indian
sources ('Indian' must be understood as a blanket-term for
everything reflecting ideas having come from India and having
been absorbed and developed, maybe with an admixture of
their own, by the indigenous people in the border areas of
India proper and, in Central Asia) bear enough evidence that the
translators not only thought about the subject-matter they
were going to translate, but also were aware of the problems
involved. They were 'task-oriented', and it is this quality of
theirs, so sadly lacking in the contemporary scene ·of the hu
manities, that made their works so precise and valuable. Furth
ermore, the fact that the Tibetans constantly referred to their
own thinkers and to how they had understood and developed the
stimulus that had come from India, rather than playing the game
of correlating Tibetan words with Sanskrit terms, was decisive
for my )taking up the study of Tibetan thought and Tibetan
Buddhism in their distinct Tibetan quality.
Much of what is discussed in Tibetan works is of a philo
sophical and psychological nature. Any discussion of any topic
involves the use of language, whether written or spoken, and a
language, in the narrow sense of the word, is made up of words.
(Apart from this specific feature there are the language of ges
ture, the language of music, the language of the visual arts, etc.,
etc.) Words themselv:es have no meaning, but acquire meaning
through their use in a specific task field. In this usage both
stipulative and reportive definitions fuse imperceptibly. The
important point to note is that it is always the task that deter
mines in which sense we are going to use a word, either by
selecting one of the several meanings which are already attached
to the word we are going to use on the occasion, or by stipulating
Introduction ix
a meaning that is felt to be more precise and clearer than the one
it already has, or by inventing a new word because we do not find
one in existence for some meaning we have in mind. Never is
language and its use something mechanical. But linguists keep
forgetting this and also fail to take into account that language
carries with it the imprint of our physical, social, and spiritual
consciousness and that only as a proc~ss can it speak to us. Its
end product has, quite literally, nothing to say.
Philosophy, before it is reduced to stale isms ('realism',
'idealism'-'Buddhism' being no exception), is a serious and
demanding task because it makes us think and re-think a prob
lem. In order to be able to do this the problem must be clearly
focussed. Such a problem may be 'mind', 'matter', 'space',
'time', 'relativity', 'Being', 'Sarp.sara', 'Nirval).a' -there is no
end to what can be thought and rethought. Again, in order
to be able to focus the problem a person must be up to this task
which in the realm of philosophy requires a thorough grounding
in philosophical methodology and philosophical questioning,
for without such prerequisites a person who is gping to address
himself to a problem will. never be able to understand where or
what the problem is. Once a problem has been recognized and ,
focussed it will have to be elucidated. I intentionally speak
of 'elucidation' and not of 'solution'. There are no solutions,
only fresh problems to be elucidated and to be brought into per
spective. If ever philosophy were to give a 'definite' answer
not only would it have destroyed itself, it would have brought
about spiritual death ~and the end of humanity. Elucidation
means to bring to light, not to come up with pretentious-sound
ing answers which in fact are no answers because no questions
have been asked, and which merely reinforce a widespread
indifference to the advancement of knowledge and a deep
rooted unwillingness to learn because learning might involve
a departure from stereotypes.
The incontestable evidence for the fact that the Tibetans
were capable of thinking independently and that they, as is only
:natural, developed a language geared to the task of philosoph
ical inquiry coupled with a keen insight into psychological
Introduction
X
processes-of course, not every Tibetan was or is a philosopher
and, as the Tibetans themselves quite frankly admit, only very
few really understand the technical writings and their implica
tions-presents a significant phenomenon in the history of ideas
and opens up a new field of research. Whenever one has to deal
with a new phenomenon one soon learns that traditional ideas
and concepts do not pay very well and that for the most part they
have outlived their usefulness already long ago. Therefore a new
approach has to be .made and this necessitates a new set of
concepts or new stipulative definitions. This I have attempted in
the following essays of this book. They are exploratory in nature
and I wish to emphasize that I never could (nor will I ever)
subscribe to a mood of 'definiteness' because this mood is sopo
rific and geared to a static conception of man and the universe and
to a mechanical mode of dealing with them. Although definite
ness with the deterministic interpretatipn displays a certain
attractiveness which seems to be natural and more easy, this
attrac;tiveness is but the pervasive fallacy of assuming that
everything is reducible to quantifiable platitudes.
The essays selected for this book were written at various
times and in various places, always in closest contact with
Tibetan scholars representing the 'Brug-pa bKa' -brgyud and
rNying-ma traditions whose way of thinking offers a key
to the understanding of Buddhism as a living force of 'exten
sive becoming' that seems to constitute the nature of human
thought and human spiritual growth.
Apart from minor stylistic changes so as to ensure consis
tency in presentation, and a few additions for clarification of
extremely concise statements, the essays have been left unaltered
so as to bring out the specific implications that, where 'process' is
the keynote, we have as yet no adequate language nor a corre
sponding conceptual framework at our disposal, and that any
reduction to any static model, however comfortable such an
outworn and outmoded procedure may seem, is incompatible
with the actual 'facts'.
In conclusion, I want to acknowledge the benefit of stimu
lating discussions I had with the members of the Nyingma