Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India: Nagarjuna, Jayarasi, and Sri Harsa (Studies in Comparative Philosophy and Religion)

259 Pages·2018·3.25 MB·English

by  Ethan Mills

Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India
Studies in Comparative Philosophy and Religion
Series Editor: Douglas Allen, University of Maine
This series explores important intersections within and between the disciplines
of religious studies and philosophy. These original studies will emphasize, in
particular, aspects of contemporary and classical Asian philosophy and its
relationship to Western thought. We welcome a wide variety of manuscript
submissions, especially works exhibiting highly focused research and theoretical
innovation.
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I dedicate this book to the memory of my mother, Linda S. Mills
(1949–2000), who encouraged the love of reading and learning that
got me this far. In addition to teaching me the importance of laughter
and ice cream breaks, she used to say something that I only recently
realized has been influencing my philosophical development all along:
it doesn’t matter what you believe as long as you’re a good person.
Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical
India
Nāgārjuna, Jayarāśi, and Śrī Harṣa
Ethan Mills
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Contents
Preface
Acknowledgments
Abbreviations for Classical Texts
Introduction: Classical Indian Skepticism about Philosophy: Expanding the
History of Philosophical Skepticism
1 Skeptical Roots in Early Indian Philosophy: Ṛg Veda, Upaniṣads, and Early
Buddhist Texts
2 Nāgārjuna’s Buddhist Skepticism: From Emptiness to the Pacification of
Conceptual Proliferation
3 Nāgārjuna and the Cause of Skepticism
4 Jayarāśi’s Cārvāka Skepticism: Irreligious Skepticism about Philosophy
5 Jayarāśi and the Delightful Destruction of Buddhist Epistemology
6 Śrī Harṣa’s Advaita Skepticism: The Critique of Realism and the Possibility
of Mysticism
7 Śrī Harṣa on Knowledge, Existence, and the Limits of Philosophy
Conclusion: The History of Indian Skepticism and Mitigated Skepticism about
Philosophy
References
Index
About the Author
Preface
Sometime during my childhood I came to suspect that many people around me
professed to believe things they had no business believing. Many of these
pronouncements, of course, concerned areas of perennial disagreement such as
politics and religion, but I also noticed this feature with regard to judgments
about other people’s life choices, fashion sense, or even preferences in food and
entertainment. My youthful suspicion wasn’t so much that I knew any better, but
that most people didn’t seem to know as well as they thought they did.
Eventually I succumbed to the sort of dogmatism that besets most of us in our
late teens and early twenties—the age at which we know everything—bolstered
by the fact that I had become a philosophy major as an undergraduate at Hamline
University (the dogmatism was my own doing, not that of my excellent
professors!).
My passion for philosophy led me to graduate school. During my MA program
at the University of Hawai’i, my youthful suspicions reawakened and I
developed a deep interest in philosophical skepticism. At this point I took
skepticism in the contemporary sense to consist of a truth-claim that we lack
knowledge in some or all domains, a thesis that seemed to provide a possible
explanation for my youthful suspicion that nobody really knows what they’re
talking about. Maybe I was right after all.
After a brief hiatus—during which I seriously contemplated careers outside of
academic philosophy—I began a PhD program at the University of New Mexico.
During my first year in New Mexico, I was overcome with the feeling that there
was something wrong with me. Aside from the imposter syndrome that assails
almost everyone in graduate school, I noticed that most of my professors and
fellow graduate students possessed something I did not: a deep conviction that
some philosophical positions are correct at the expense of their competitors. I, on
the other hand, wasn’t even sure about skepticism any more.
At this point I began to study seriously the works of Sextus Empiricus,
Nāgārjuna, and Jayarāśi (Śrī Harṣa would come later). Contrary to the vast
majority of philosophers, historical and contemporary, for these ancient skeptics