Thomas Reid on Mind, Knowledge, and Value PDF
Preview Thomas Reid on Mind, Knowledge, and Value
(cid:2) (cid:2) OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,//,SPi (cid:2) (cid:2) Thomas Reid on Mind, Knowledge, and Value (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,//,SPi (cid:2) (cid:2) MIND ASSOCIATION OCCASIONAL SERIES Thisseriesconsistsofcarefullyselectedvolumesofsignificantoriginalpaperson predefinedthemes,normallygrowingoutofaconferencesupportedbyaMind AssociationMajorConferenceGrant.TheAssociationnominatesaneditoror editorsforeachcollection,andmaycooperatewithotherbodiesinpromoting conferencesorotherscholarlyactivitiesinconnectionwiththepreparationof particularvolumes. Director,MindAssociation:M.Fricker PublicationsOfficer:JulianDodd RecentlyPublishedintheSeries: FoundationsofLogicalConsequence EditedbyColinR.CaretandOleT.Hjortland TheHighestGoodinAristotleandKant EditedbyJoachimAufderheideandRalfM.Bader HowWeFight EthicsinWar EditedbyHelenFroweandGeraldLang TheMoralityofDefensiveWar EditedbyCécileFabreandSethLazar MetaphysicsandScience EditedbyStephenMumfordandMatthewTugby ThickConcepts EditedbySimonKirchin Wittgenstein’sTractatus HistoryandInterpretation EditedbyPeterSullivanandMichaelPotter PhilosophicalPerspectivesonDepiction EditedbyCatharineAbellandKaterinaBantinaki EmergenceinMind EditedbyCynthiaMacdonaldandGrahamMacdonald Empiricism,PerceptualKnowledge,Normativity,andRealism EssaysonWilfridSellars EditedbyWillemA.deVries (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,//,SPi (cid:2) (cid:2) Thomas Reid on Mind, Knowledge, and Value edited by Rebecca Copenhaver and Todd Buras 1 (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,//,SPi (cid:2) (cid:2) 3 GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OXDP, UnitedKingdom OxfordUniversityPressisadepartmentoftheUniversityofOxford. ItfurtherstheUniversity’sobjectiveofexcellenceinresearch,scholarship, andeducationbypublishingworldwide.Oxfordisaregisteredtrademarkof OxfordUniversityPressintheUKandincertainothercountries ©theseveralcontributors Themoralrightsoftheauthorshavebeenasserted FirstEditionpublishedin Impression: Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedin aretrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans,withoutthe priorpermissioninwritingofOxfordUniversityPress,orasexpresslypermitted bylaw,bylicenceorundertermsagreedwiththeappropriatereprographics rightsorganization.Enquiriesconcerningreproductionoutsidethescopeofthe aboveshouldbesenttotheRightsDepartment,OxfordUniversityPress,atthe addressabove Youmustnotcirculatethisworkinanyotherform andyoumustimposethissameconditiononanyacquirer PublishedintheUnitedStatesofAmericabyOxfordUniversityPress MadisonAvenue,NewYork,NY,UnitedStatesofAmerica BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationData Dataavailable LibraryofCongressControlNumber: ISBN –––– Printedandboundby CPIGroup(UK)Ltd,Croydon,CRYY LinkstothirdpartywebsitesareprovidedbyOxfordingoodfaithand forinformationonly.Oxforddisclaimsanyresponsibilityforthematerials containedinanythirdpartywebsitereferencedinthiswork. (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,//,SPi (cid:2) (cid:2) Contents ListofAbbreviationsforWorksbyThomasReid vii NotesonContributors ix Introduction ToddBurasandRebeccaCopenhaver . ThomasReid’sExperimentumCrucis ToddBuras . ThomasReidonInstinctiveExertionsandtheSpatialContent ofSensations ChrisLindsay . PerceptualandImaginativeConception:TheDistinctionReidMissed MarinaFolescu . FourQuestionsaboutAcquiredPerception JamesVanCleve . SeeingWhiteandWrong:ReidontheRoleofSensationsinPerception, withaFocusonColourPerception LucasThorpe . ThomasReidonAestheticPerception RebeccaCopenhaver . ThomasReid’sExpressivistAesthetics RachelZuckert . ReidonAestheticResponseandthePerceptionofBeauty LaurentJaffro . PragmatismandReid’s“ThirdWay” PatrickRysiew . TheDefenseoftheFirstPrinciplesofCommonSenseinReid’s Epistemology:ANewUseforTrack-RecordArguments AngéliqueThébert (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,//,SPi (cid:2) (cid:2) vi contents . Theism,Coherence,andJustificationinThomasReid’sEpistemology GregoryS.Poore . DoesReidHaveAnythingtoSayto(theNew)Hume? TerenceCuneo . ReidonFavors,Injuries,andtheNaturalVirtueofJustice LewisPowellandGideonYaffe Index (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,//,SPi (cid:2) (cid:2) Seeing White and Wrong Reid on the Role of Sensations in Perception, with a Focus on Colour Perception LucasThorpe What Do We Perceive? Reid commentators can be divided into those who offer what one could call more or less liberal accounts of perception. On the less liberal side of the divide are commentatorssuchasRyanNichols,JamesvanCleve,and,perhaps,ToddBuras.The least liberal position, which I will call the narrow account of perception, is that of RyanNichols().AccordingtoNichols,wecanonlyliterallybesaidtoperceive physicalobjectsandprimaryqualities.AlthoughJamesVanCleve()deniesthat whatReidcalls‘acquiredperception’isgenuineperception,herecognizesthatReidhas amoreliberalaccountofwhatcanbeperceivedthanNichols,acceptingthatReidis committedtothepositionthatwecanliterallyperceivesecondaryqualities.However, I will argue that Van Cleve’s interpretation of Reid’s theory of perception implicitly commitsReidtothenarrowaccountofperception,asitimpliesthatforReidwecannot literallyperceivesecondaryqualitiessuchascolours. OnthemoreliberalsideofthedividewefindcommentatorssuchasLaurentJaffro, Rebecca Copenhaver,andmyself.Jaffro,forexample, argues thataccordingto Reid we can literally perceive aesthetic qualities, such as the excellence of a work of art; CopenhaverhasarguedthatwhatReidcalls‘acquiredperception’isliterallyaform ofperception.1 Althoughtheprimaryfocusofthisessayisoncolourperception,the motivationisbroaderthanthis.Thecentralclaimthatwillbedefendedandexplained hereisthatReidiscommittedtothepositionthatdirectperceptionofanobjector quality is compatible with an indirect, or what he calls “relative,” conception of the objectorquality.Thiscommitmentiscentraltohisaccountofcolourperception,forhe believesthat,althoughwecandirectlyperceivesecondaryqualities,ourconceptionof 1 See,forexample,Jaffro,ChapterinthisvolumeandCopenhaver(). (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,//,SPi (cid:2) (cid:2) seeing white and wrong thesequalities,atleasttheconceptionthatplaysaroleintheperceptualact,isrelative. In defending such an account of colour perception, I hope to persuade other Reid scholars to adopt a wider or more liberal conception of perception in general. The thoughthereisthat,ifweopenthedoortocolour,wearegoingtohavetoinvitein allofcolour’sfriendstoo.AndgivenReid’saccountofcolourperception,colourhasa lotoffriendsthatsomecommentatorsdonotwanttoinvitetotheperceptionparty, suchasmoralqualities.IfweacceptReid’saccountofcolourperceptionandwebelieve thatwecanliterallyperceivecolours,thenitbecomesdifficulttoprovideaprincipled reasonnottoadoptanextremelyliberalaccountofperception,anaccountthatIam sympathetic to for ethical reasons, for I believe that we can literally perceive some moralqualities,suchasthewrongnessofanactionandthemoralworthofanother humanbeing. Commentators committed to a less liberal interpretation of Reid’s account of perceptionareatleastimplicitlycommittedtothepositionthatReidoftenuses“per- ception”or“perceive”inanon-technical,orwhatReidmightcalla“figurative,”sense.2 AndReid’susageofthisword,andperceptuallanguage,isingeneralfarbroaderthan currentphilosophicalusage.Forexample,Reidoftentalksof“perceiving”dutiesand themeaningofwordsandthingssuchas“theweightofaship.”3Now,commentators committed to narrow accounts of perception try to read away such usages of the word,andimplicitlyassumethatReid usesperceptuallanguage eitherambiguously orcarelessly;andasageneralinterpretiveprinciple,weshouldnotresttoomuchof ourinterpretationonthesingleuseofaparticularwordinaparticularcontext.Reid’s use of the word “perception,” however, is far more precise and univocal than some commentatorswouldhave.Reidhimselfrepeatedlystressesthatphilosophersneedto be extremely careful in their use ofwords and even argues that “there is no greater impediment to the advancement of knowledge than the ambiguity of words” (EIP Ii,).Givensuchclaims,andhisclaimthatmuchthatiswrongwiththephilosophy ofhisdayhastodowiththetendencyofphilosopherstousetheword‘perception’in anambiguousway,oneshouldbewaryofattributingsuchambiguousandlooseusage toReid.Unlesswehavegoodreasonstodootherwise,weshouldtakewhatReidsays atfacevalue.Forexample,itseemscleartomethatwhenReidtalksof“perceiving”an obligationorduty,Reidisusinghiswordscarefullyandmeanswhathesays. 2 Asanexampleofa“figurative”useofaword,Reidexplainsthat“Imightsay,Iperceivethatsucha personhashadthesmall-pox;butthisphraseisfigurative,althoughthefigureissofamiliarthatitisnot observed.ThemeaningofitisthatIperceivethepitsinhisface,whicharecertainsignsofhishavinghad thesmallpox”(EIPIi,). 3 ForexampleReidwritesthat,“[Man]perceivesittobehisdutytoacttheworthyandhonourable part...”(EAPIntroduction,;emphasisadded).Similarlyhewritesthat“Itwouldbeverystrangeindeed, ifmankindhadalwaysusedthesewordssofamiliarly,withoutperceivingthattheyhadnomeaning”(EAPI i,;emphasisadded).Andintalkingaboutwhathecallsacquiredperception,hearguesthat“[A]painter perceivesthatthispictureistheworkofRaphael,thattheworkofTitian;ajeweler,thatthisisatruediamond, thatacounterfeit;asailorthatthisisashipofton,thatof;thesedifferentacquiredperceptionsare producedbythesamegeneralprinciplesofthehumanmind...”(IHMVIxxiv,–;emphasisadded). (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,//,SPi (cid:2) (cid:2) lucas thorpe Let ustakea closer lookat candidates forwhatcan be immediatelyperceivedby Reid.AllReidscholarsacceptthataccordingtoReidwecanimmediatelyperceive: . physicalobjects;4 . primaryqualities(suchashardness). Inthisessay,Iwillconcentrateondefendingtheviewthat,accordingtoReid,wecan alsoperceive: . secondaryqualities,suchascolours. Indefendingthisclaim,IrejecttheexplicitpositionofRyanNicholsandtheimplicit positionofJamesVanCleve.IwillexplainReid’saccountofwhatisinvolvedinthe perceptionofsuchqualities.Ibelieve,however,thatReid’saccountofperceptionisfar moreliberalthanthis.ForIbelievethat,givenReid’saccountofcolourperception,if weacceptthatwecanliterallyperceivecolours,whichseemstobeaplausiblecommon senseposition,then,attheleast,itmakesiteasiertoarguefortheclaimthatwecan literallyperceivefourmoretypesofthing: . moralobjectsand/orqualities,suchasobligations,ortherightness/wrongness ofanaction; . thedispositions,mentalstates,andperhapseventhepowersofotheragents,such asembarrassmentwhensomeoneblushes; . aestheticqualities,suchasgrandeurandbeauty;and, . thingssuchas‘theweightofaship’and‘itsbeingbyPicasso.’ There is good textual evidence to support the claim that Reid is commited to the viewthatwecanliterallyperceivesuchobjects.Thereisconflictingtextualevidence, however, on Reid’s position concerning two other putative objects of perception, namely: . otherfiniteminds;and, . certainqualitiesofGod,suchashisgrandeur. Inaddition,Reidseemstobecommittedtotheviewthatweliterallyperceive: . meanings(of,say,writtenwords);and . changes. NowIamnotconvincedthatwe,literally,perceivethemeaningofwords,although a case might be made that we do perceive the significance of things such as smoke 4 AlthoughsomeonelikeVanCleve,whobelievesthatperception,strictlyunderstood,requireswhat Reidcallsa‘direct’conceptionoftheobject,mighthaveaproblemhereasReidiscommittedtotheposition thatourconceptionofphysicalobjectsis‘indirect’orrelative.ThusReidclaimsthat“ournotionofbodyis notdirectbutrelativetoitsqualities.Weknowthatitissomethingextended,solid,anddivisible,andwe knownomore”(EAPIi,;emphasisadded).SoVanCleveisimplicitlycommittedtothepositionthat, accordingtoReid,wedonotreallyperceivebodies,butonlytheirprimaryqualities. (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,//,SPi (cid:2) (cid:2) seeing white and wrong andtracksinthesnow.Inaddition,althoughIagreewithReidthatweimmediately perceivechanges,Ithinkthatgivenhisownaccountofthenatureofperception,Reid himself faces problems accounting for the perception of changes, and in particular motion. For Reid himself is explicitly committed to the view that the perception is quite distinct from memory and that, strictly speaking, we can only perceive whatispresent.Ourperceptionofchanges,however,involvesnotjustawarenessof somethingpresentbutalsoofthepast.Reid’sinabilitytoaccountforourperception ofchangeisthebiggestfailinginReid’saccountofperception.Itisclearthatwecan, literally, see changes, and Reid accepts this. But, given the importance Reid places on the distinction between perception, which is necessarily of what is present, and memory,whichisnecessarilyofwhatispast,Reidfacesaproblemexplaininghowthe perceptionofchangesispossible.Attheveryleast,itisnotobvioushowaReidianis toaccountforourperceptionofchanges. Now,althoughIthinkReid’saccountofwhatcanbeperceivedisextremelyliberal, therearecertainimportantclassesofthingsthatReidbelievesthatwecannot,strictly speaking,besaidtoperceive.AmongstthosethingsthatReidclaimsarenotobjects ofperceptionare: . mysensations; . myself,andtheoperationsandpowersofmymind; . thepast. As George Pappas points out, in the Inquiry Reid sometimes uses language that suggeststhathethinksthatsensationscanbeperceived(Pappas,).Ithink,for once,weshouldregardthesepassagesasslipsofthepenonReid’spart.Iamunaware ofpassagesinhislaterworkswhereReidmakesasimilarclaim.Inhislaterworkshe explicitlyarguesthat,strictlyspeaking,sensationsarenotperceived,althoughtheycan beconsciouslyattendedto.5Ofcourse,forReidconsciousattentionisstructurallyvery similartoperception,inthatitinvolvesaconceptionoftheobjectandanexistential belief,butconsciousnessisdirectedinwardswhereasperceptionisdirectedoutwards, andReidclearlydistinguishesconsciousnessandperceptionasdistinctfaculties. The Role of Sense Organs and Sensations in Perception in General Having briefly enumerated the types of things that Reid thinks can be immediately perceived,Iwillnowturntohisaccountofthenatureofperception.Iwillbeginby examininghisaccountofperceptioningeneral,beforeturningtohisaccountofwhat isinvolvedinourperceptionofsecondaryqualities,andparticularlycolours. 5 ThusReidclaims,inhisdiscussionoftheexplicationofwordsintheEssaysontheIntellectualPowers, that“Perceptionisappliedonlytoexternalobjectsnottothosethatareintheminditself.WhenIampained, IdonotsaythatIperceivepain,butthatIfeelit,orthatIamconsciousofit.Thusperceptionisdistinguished fromconsciousness”(EIPIi,). (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2) (cid:2)
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