Thomas Aquinas on How Habits Affect Human Powers and Acts

235 Pages·2017·0.86 MB·English

THECATHOLICUNIVERSITYOFAMERICA
ThomasAquinasonHowHabitsAffectHumanPowersandActs
ADISSERTATION
SubmittedtotheFacultyofthe
SchoolofPhilosophy
OfTheCatholicUniversityofAmerica
inPartialFulfillmentoftheRequirements
FortheDegree
DoctorofPhilosophy
By
BlaiseEdwardBlain
Washington,D.C.
2017
ThomasAquinasonHowHabitsAffectHumanPowersandActs
BlaiseEdwardBlain,Ph.D.
Director: TobiasHoffmann,Ph.D.
Theaimofthisdissertationistoprovidethegroundworkforadeeperunderstandingofhabitsby
consideringinasystematicfashionsomefundamentalquestionsabouttheeffectsofhabitsonhuman
powers and acts in light of Thomas Aquinas’s philosophical writings. The opening chapters offer
a general consideration of human powers and acts in the context of which I also explain Aquinas’s
accountofwhyhabitsarenecessaryfortheperfectionofthehumanbeing. Inthesubsequentchapters,
I explain how, on Aquinas’s account, habits with rational objects can be present in powers of the soul
withcorporealorgansandwhythewillisinneedofhabits. IalsoofferanaccountofAquinas’sstriking
positionthatahabitinonepowercanaffecttheactsofadifferentpower,evenwithoutthemediation
ofanotheract,givingspecialattentiontoAquinas’saccountofknowledgebyconnaturality.
ThisdissertationbyBlaiseEdwardBlainfulfillsthedissertationrequirementforthedoctoraldegreein
philosophyapprovedbyTobiasHoffmann,Ph.D.,asDirector,andbyKevinWhite,Ph.D.,andAngela
Knobel,Ph.D.asReaders.
TobiasHoffmann,Ph.D.,Director
KevinWhite,Ph.D.,Reader
AngelaKnobel,Ph.D.,Reader
ii
ForthegloryofGod,
InhonoroftheBlessedVirginMaryandSt. Joseph,hermostchastespouse,
Andfortheloveofmywifeandchildren
iii
Acknowledgments
IamespeciallygratefultomydirectorTobiasHoffmann,mycommitteemembersKevinWhiteand
AngelaKnobel,andJohnMcCarthy,theDeanoftheSchoolofPhilosophyfortheirencouragement
andguidanceduringthewritingofthisdissertation. Iwouldalsoliketothankinaspecialway
DominicBolin,HerbertHartmannandMichaelStaron,whoseconversationswithmeabout
philosophyhavehelpedmetogainamoreprofoundunderstandingofmanytruths. Finally,Iam
deeplygratefultomywifeandchildren,whohavesupportedandencouragedmethroughoutmy
graduatestudies.
iv
Contents
Introduction 1
1 Objects,Powers,andtheNecessityofHabits 13
1.1 Objects,Powers,andtheComplexWorldofHumanExperience . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
RationalPowersandObjects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.2 TheNecessityofHabits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
EarlyTexts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
LaterTexts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2 HumanActs 65
2.1 AquinasandtheAristotelianAccountofNaturalMotion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
TheDefinitionofMotion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
MotionAsImperfectAct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
MotionAsActofMoverandMobile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Inclination,Movement,andRest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.2 MotionfromThingstotheSoul: SensitiveandIntellectualCognition . . . . . . . . . 75
Sensation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Abstraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
ActsofReason . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
2.3 MotionoftheSoultoThings: AppetiteandPracticalReasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
ActsoftheSensitiveAppetite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
ActsofWillandPracticalReason . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
2.4 TheTwofoldOrderoftheSensitiveandtheRational . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
TheContinuationoftheSensitiveandtheRational . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
TheObedienceorSubjectionoftheSensePowerstoReason . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
TheParticipationoftheSensitiveinReason . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
3 TheSubjectofHabit 138
3.1 HabitswithRationalObjectsandtheSensitivePartoftheSoul . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
InadequateResponsestotheDifficulty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
Aquinas’sAccountofHabits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
v
TheOrderofHabitsintheSensitivePartoftheSoultotheRational . . . . . . . . . 156
3.2 TheWill’sNeedforHabits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
EarlierTexts: AReasontoDoubttheExistenceofHabitsintheWill . . . . . . . . . 167
LaterTexts: WhytheWillNeedsNaturallyAcquiredHabits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
4 HabitAsPrincipleofActs 176
4.1 TheInfluenceofHabitupontheActsofItsOwnSubject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
Habit: InfallibleInclinationtoGoodorEvil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
Habit: PerfecterofNaturalInclination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
4.2 HowHabitsAffecttheActsofPowerstoWhichTheyDoNotBelong . . . . . . . . 187
GeneralAccount . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
SpecificCases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
4.3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
Conclusion 212
Bibliography 216
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Table of Abbreviations
Decar. Quaestiodisputatadecaritate
Decard. Quaestiodisputatadevirtutibuscardinalibus
Deebd. ExpositiolibriBoetiiDeebdomadibus
Deente Deenteetessentia
Demalo Quaestionesdisputataedemalo
Depot. Quaestionesdisputataedepotentia
Despe Quaestiodisputatadespe
Despir. Quaestiodisputatadespiritualibuscreaturis
DeTrin. SuperBoetiumDeTrinitate
Dever. Quaestionesdisputataedeveritate
DGC InlibrumprimumAristotelisDegenerationeetcorruptioneexpositio
DVC Quaestiodisputatadevirtutibusincommuni
ELP ExpositiolibriPeryermeneias
ELPA ExpositiolibriPosteriorum
Indean. SentencialibriDeanima
InMetaph. InduodecimlibrosMetaphysicorumAristotelisexpositio
InPhys. CommentariainoctolibrosPhysicorumAristotelis
InSent. ScriptumsuperlibrosSententiarum
InSent.(EarlierRedaction) ScriptumsupertertioSententiarum: EarlierRedaction
QDA Quaestionesdisputataedeanima
Quod.II QuodlibetII
Quod.V QuodlibetV
Quod.VIII QuodlibetVIII
Quod.X QuodlibetX
Quod.XII QuodlibetXII
SCG Summacontragentiles
SLE SententialibriEthicorum
ST Summatheologiae
vii
Introduction
Habit: Principle of Human Perfection
According to Thomas Aquinas, human beings, unlike angels, do not acquire perfection all at once,
but must instead be led by the hand from imperfection to perfection.1 Whereas the angels merited
eternal happiness by a single act, human beings must struggle to achieve beatitude by means of many
actions. For humans beings to persevere in this struggle with greater ease and assurance, however,
these acts are not sufficient by themselves. We also need to acquire stable dispositions to these acts,
dispositions that Aquinas calls habits (in Latin: habitus). Without such habits, consistently excellent
behavior is impossible from a practical point of view. The necessity of habits in human life is clearly
appreciatedbyAquinas,fortwiceinhiswritings,hedevotesanentirearticletoarguingforthenecessity
of habits.2 According to Aquinas, the need for habits is not restricted to moral activity alone; habits
arealsonecessary forthelife ofthemind. Forexample,human beingsneed habitsnotonly ofjustice
andcourageinordertoactmorally,butalsoofscienceandwisdominordertoknowrealityinamore
complete and profound fashion. For this reason, habits are of great interest not only to students of
ethics and moral theologians, but also to philosophers of knowledge and more generally to anyone
wishingtoperfecthisorherhumancapacities,whethermoralorintellectual.
Whiletheimportanceofhabitsisevident,adeepunderstandingofthemismoredifficulttoobtain,
1 SeeforexampleSCG,IV,cap. 55.
2 OnearticleappearsinhisearlycommentaryonPetertheLombard’sSentences;theotherappearsinhisSummatheologiae
neartheendofhiscareer. SeeInSent.,III,d. 23,a. 1andST,I-II,q. 49,a. 4. Therearealsoseveralotherdiscussionsof
thenecessityofhabitsdevelopedbyAquinasinothercontexts. Amorecompleteaccountwillbegivenbelowinchapter
one.
1
2
becausetheyarenotknowndirectlybutonlybymeansoftheactionstowhichtheygiverise.3 Onedoes
notknowwhatjusticeandcourageare,forexample,untiloneseesjustandcourageousacts. Yetinspite
of their elusiveness, habits remain involved in a host of pressing ethical and psychological questions.
Amongthesearequestionssuchaswhetherthereexistmoralhabitsthatalwaysinclinetheirpossessor
intherightway,howhabitsaffectone’sperceptionofandjudgmentaboutmoralsituations,andwhat
influence habits can have or ought to have on our emotions. The difficulty of providing satisfactory
answers to such questions is evident, not only because we lack an immediate experience of habits,
but also because adequately answering such questions presupposes a highly developed philosophical
accountofhumannatureandaction.
ThephilosophyofThomasAquinasprovidesapromisingstartingpointfromwhichtostudyhabits,
not only on account of his sharp mind and sound methodological principles, but also because he
develops a philosophical account of habits against the backdrop of a detailed philosophy of human
natureandaction. However,eveninthemasterfulworkofAquinas,certainofhisteachingsonhabits
arenotimmediatelyclear. Inparticular,importantquestionsariseinconnectionwithAquinas’saccount
ofhowhabitsperfectpowersandactsofthesoul.4 InAquinas’saccount,theperfectionbroughtabout
byahabitgenerallyinvolvesmultiplepowersandactsofthesoul. Forexamplesomeonewiththehabit
ofcouragefeelsfearinaccordancewithreason. Thismeansthatthehabitissomehowrelatedbothto
thatperson’scapacityforfearandtohisorherrationalcapacity. Atthesametime,Aquinasholdsthat
the courageous person both correctly judges the amount of fear and daring that a situation demands
and also feels fear in the right way and to the correct degree. Thus the habit of courage appears to
have an influence on both affective and cognitive acts. Positions such as these illustrate the need for
3 Cf.ST,I,q.87,a.2.
4 It is worth mentioning that Aquinas speaks not only of habits in powers of the soul, but also of certain “habitual
dispositions”ofthebody,suchashealth. (Cf.ibid.,I-II,q.50,a.1.) Inthisdissertation,however,Iwillremainprincipally
focusedonthosehabitswhichbelongtopowersofthesoul,althoughIwillbrieflydiscussthehabitualdispositionsofthe
bodyaswell.