Thinking Outside the Box in Multilateral Disarmament and Arms Control Negotiations

271 Pages·2006·1.81 MB·English

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UNIDIR/2006/20
Thinking Outside the Box
in Multilateral Disarmament
and Arms Control Negotiations
John Borrie and Vanessa Martin Randin
Editors
UNIDIR
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
Geneva, Switzerland
About the cover
Frieden (Peace) was a gift from the artist René Brandenberger to the City of
Geneva in honour of the Conference on Disarmament in 1983. The
sculpture is installed near the Palais des Nations in Geneva, Switzerland.
© Photo courtesy of John Borrie.
Note
The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this
publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the
part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of
any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the
delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.
*
* *
The views expressed in this publication are the sole responsibility of the
individual authors. They do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of
the United Nations, UNIDIR, its staff members or sponsors.
UNIDIR/2006/20
Copyright © United Nations, 2006
All rights reserved
UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION
Sales No. GV.E.06.0.16
ISBN 978-92-9045-187-7
Thinking Outside the Box in Multilateral Disarmament and Arms Control
Negotiations is the third volume of papers from UNIDIR’s project
Disarmament as Humanitarian Action: Making Multilateral Negotiations
Work.
The project’s first volume of work, released in 2005, is entitled Alternative
Approaches in Multilateral Decision Making: Disarmament as Humanitarian
Action.
The second publication, Disarmament as Humanitarian Action: From
Perspective to Practice, was published in 2006.
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The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)—an
intergovernmental organization within the United Nations—conducts
research on disarmament and security. UNIDIR is based in Geneva,
Switzerland, the centre for bilateral and multilateral disarmament and non-
proliferation negotiations, and home of the Conference on Disarmament.
The Institute explores current issues pertaining to the variety of existing and
future armaments, as well as global diplomacy and local tensions and
conflicts. Working with researchers, diplomats, government officials, NGOs
and other institutions since 1980, UNIDIR acts as a bridge between the
research community and policy makers. UNIDIR’s activities are funded by
contributions from governments and donor foundations. The Institute’s web
site can be found at:
www.unidir.org
CONTENTS
Foreword by Patricia Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
About the authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
Chapter 1
What do we mean by “thinking outside the box”
in multilateral disarmament and arms control negotiations?
John Borrie
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
An inconvenient truth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Approaching disarmament from the bottom up . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Beyond the box . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Chapter 2
Diplomats, civil society and academia:
some thoughts on the limits of the discourse
Vanessa Martin Randin
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
International relations and the study of cooperation . . . . . . . . 15
Game theory perspectives and multilateral arms control
and disarmament negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Two-level games: an alternative framework
for understanding cooperation? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Civil society activism in arms control and
disarmament processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
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Chapter 3
NGOs and multilateral disarmament diplomacy:
limits and possibilities
David Atwood
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
The state system and the limits of inclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
What does “access” mean and what difference does it make? . 37
Promising avenues for NGO engagement in
multilateral diplomacy settings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Towards a new “community of practice” for NGOs . . . . . . . . . 49
Chapter 4
Changing perceptions and practice in
multilateral arms control negotiations
Rebecca Johnson
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Three approaches to multilateralism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Framing objectives and outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Negotiating tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Chapter 5
Cooperation and defection in the Conference on Disarmament
John Borrie
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Deadlock and its discontents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
It’s all or nothing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Recognizing inefficient equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Chapter 6
Engineering progress: a diplomat’s perspective
on multilateral disarmament
Daniël Prins
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
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Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Transformative potential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Flexibility in regional groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
Flexibility in procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Flexibility in relations with headquarters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
Flexibility in involving non-state partners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
Ever-increasing complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
Chapter 7
A physics of diplomacy? The dynamics of complex social
phenomena and their implications for multilateral negotiations
Aurélia Merçay and John Borrie
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
The rational approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
Pertinence of a physics of society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
Some key concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
Implications for multilateral negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
Chapter 8
Non-linear modelling of small arms proliferation
Aurélia Merçay
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
The dynamics of small arms proliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
A non-linear model of small arms proliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
Evaluation of the model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
Results and implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Why this model is useful . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
Next steps? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
Chapter 9
Security of journalists: making the case for modelling armed
violence as a means to promote human security
Nathan Taback and Robin Coupland
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
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Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
Human security and the effects of armed violence . . . . . . . . . 192
Why study attacks on journalists in conflict areas? . . . . . . . . . . 194
Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
Chapter 10
Investment policies and arms production—
experiences from the Norwegian Pension Fund–Global
Gro Nystuen
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
The ethical guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
Humanitarian principles and negative screening of
certain weapons producers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
Possible consequences of exclusion of weapons producers . . . 219
Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
Chapter 11
The role of non-governmental organizations in
the monitoring and verification of international
arms control and disarmament agreements
Michael Crowley and Andreas Persbo
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
Defining verification and monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
Differing approaches to NGO monitoring and verification . . . . 231
Enhancing the quality and scope of future NGO monitoring
and verification of arms control and
disarmament agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
Final thoughts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
FOREWORD
In late 2004, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
(UNIDIR) began a research project entitled Disarmament as Humanitarian
Action: Making Multilateral Negotiations Work (DHA). The project, assisted
financially by the Governments of Norway and the Netherlands, examines
current difficulties for the international community in tackling disarmament
and arms control. Recognizing that a greater humanitarian focus is relevant
to the work of multilateral practitioners like diplomats and other policy
makers, the project is concerned with developing practical proposals to
help them apply this in functional terms.
Until recently, thinking in disarmament and arms control was focused on
security concepts dominated by external threats to states, especially from
other states. These orthodox approaches have been found wanting in the
face of new international security challenges. Indeed, the majority of
multilateral processes in the disarmament domain failed to make substantial
progress over the last decade, themes discussed in the DHA project’s first
volume of work, entitled Alternative Approaches in Multilateral Decision
Making: Disarmament as Humanitarian Action, published in 2005.
It is here that human security and humanitarian approaches to disarmament
and arms control could have great effect. Such approaches put greater stress
on the individual and their community as reference points for security. This
enables problems of armed violence to be framed in new ways and
appropriate responses to be identified that may not have been considered
before.
The spread and humanitarian effects of small arms, such as assault rifles and
handguns, is an example in which human security perspectives make a
great deal of sense. Not only do small arms kill many of thousands of
civilians each year, their presence can have a chilling effect on trust and
cooperation, clouding the socio-economic prospects of millions of people,
one household or street at a time. The mosaic of small arms proliferation
can be better understood once we start thinking about what drives
individual perceptions of insecurity and the resulting social interactions.
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