Thinking Like a Lawyer: A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning

256 Pages·2009·0.74 MB·English

by  Frederick Schauer

thinking like a lawyer

THIN KING LI KE A LAWY E R
A NEW INTRODUCTION
TO LEGAL REASONING
Frederick Schauer
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge,Massachusetts
London,England
2009
Copyright©2009bythePresidentandFellowsofHarvardCollege
Allrightsreserved
PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica
LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData
Schauer,FrederickF.,1946–
Thinkinglikealawyer:anewintroductiontolegalreasoning/FrederickSchauer.
p. cm.
Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.
ISBN0-674-03270-5(alk.paper)
1.Law—Methodology. I.Title.
K212.S3252009
340′.1—dc22 2008035011
forBobbie

CONTENTS
Preface xi
1 Introduction:IsThereLegalReasoning? 1
2 Rules—inLawandElsewhere 13
2.1 OfRulesinGeneral 13
2.2 TheCoreandtheFringe 18
2.3 TheGeneralityofRules 24
2.4 TheFormalityofLaw 29
3 ThePracticeandProblemsofPrecedent 36
3.1 PrecedentinTwoDirections 36
3.2 Precedent—TheBasicConcept 37
3.3 AStrangeIdea 41
3.4 OnIdentifyingaPrecedent 44
3.5 OfHoldingsandDicta 54
3.6 OntheForceofPrecedent—Overruling,Distinguishing,
andOtherTypesofAvoidance 57
4 AuthorityandAuthorities 61
4.1 TheIdeaofAuthority 61
4.2 OnBindingandSo-CalledPersuasiveAuthority 67
4.3 WhyRealAuthorityNeedNotBe“Binding” 75
4.4 CanThereBeProhibitedAuthorities? 77
4.5 HowDoAuthoritiesBecomeAuthoritative? 80
5 TheUseandAbuseofAnalogies 85
5.1 OnDistinguishingPrecedentfromAnalogy 85
5.2 OntheDeterminationofSimilarity 92
5.3 TheSkepticalChallenge 96
5.4 AnalogyandtheSpeedofLegalChange 100
vii
CONTENTS
6 TheIdeaoftheCommonLaw 103
6.1 SomeHistoryandaComparison 103
6.2 OntheNatureoftheCommonLaw 108
6.3 HowDoestheCommonLawChange? 112
6.4 IstheCommonLawLaw? 117
6.5 AShortTouroftheRealmofEquity 119
7 TheChallengeofLegalRealism 124
7.1 DoRulesandPrecedentsDecideCases? 124
7.2 DoesDoctrineConstrainEvenIfItDoesNotDirect? 134
7.3 AnEmpiricalClaim 138
7.4 RealismandtheRoleoftheLawyer 142
7.5 CriticalLegalStudiesandRealisminModernDress 144
8 TheInterpretationofStatutes 148
8.1 StatutoryInterpretationintheRegulatoryState 148
8.2 TheRoleoftheText 151
8.3 WhentheTextProvidesNoAnswer 158
8.4 WhentheTextProvidesaBadAnswer 163
8.5 TheCanonsofStatutoryConstruction 167
9 TheJudicialOpinion 171
9.1 TheCausesandConsequencesofJudicialOpinions 171
9.2 GivingReasons 175
9.3 HoldingandDictaRevisited 180
9.4 TheDecliningFrequencyofOpinions 184
10 MakingLawwithRulesandStandards 188
10.1 TheBasicDistinction 188
10.2 Rules,Standards,andtheQuestionofDiscretion 190
10.3 StabilityandFlexibility 194
10.4 RulesandStandardsinJudicialOpinions 196
10.5 OntheRelationbetweenBreadthandVagueness 200
11 LawandFact 203
11.1 OntheIdeaofaFact 203
11.2 DeterminingFactsatTrial—TheLawofEvidence
andItsCritics 206
11.3 FactsandtheAppellateProcess 212
viii
CONTENTS
12 TheBurdenofProofandItsCousins 219
12.1 TheBurdenofProof 219
12.2 Presumptions 224
12.3 DeferenceandtheAllocationofDecision-Making
Responsibility 229
Index 235
ix