Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War

257 Pages·2007·1.23 MB·English

by  Daniel L. Byman

B A SABAN CENTER AT THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION BOOK
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“Iraq is rapidly descending into all-out civil war. A
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Unfortunately, the United States probably will D A N I E L L . B Y M A N
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not be able to just walk away from the chaos.
K E N N E T H M . P O L L A C K
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Even setting aside the humanitarian nightmare L
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that will ensue, a full-scale civil war would likely A
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consume more than Iraq: historically, such mas-
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sive conflicts have often had highly deleterious Containing the Spillover
Daniel L. Byman is a non-
effects on neighboring countries and other
resident senior fellow with
from an Iraqi Civil War
outside states. Spillover from an Iraqi civil war the Saban Center for Middle  
East Policy at the Brookings
could be disastrous.”
Institution. He also directs
the Security Studies Program
Things
and the Center for Peace and
Thus begins this sobering but essential analysis of
Security Studies at Georgetown
what the near future of Iraq could look like, and what
University’s Edmund A. Walsh
the United States can do to reduce the threat of a wider T
School of Foreign Service.
conflict. Preventing spillover of the Iraqi conflict into h
His books include Deadly
neighboring states must be a top priority. In explaining
Connections: States that Sponsor i
how that can be accomplished, Daniel Byman and n FALL
Terrorism (Cambridge, 2005).
Kenneth Pollack draw on their own considerable g
Kenneth M. Pollack is a senior
expertise as well as relevant precedents. s
fellow in Foreign Policy Studies

The authors scrutinize several recent civil wars— at the Brookings Institution, F
A
including conflicts in Lebanon, Afghanistan, Chech- where he is research director
nya, Kosovo, and current struggles in Africa—for for the Saban Center. He is L
Apart
lessons on how civil wars can affect other nations. They author of The Persian Puzzle: The L
draw from those experiences in developing recommen- Conflict between Iran and America
A
dations for what the United States should do to contain (Random House, 2004) and
p
spillover. It won’t be easy, and history suggests the odds The Threatening Storm: The Case
are against success. Options are difficult and imperfect. for Invading Iraq (Random a
r
But even while the Bush administration attempts to House, 2002).
t
prevent further deterioration of the situation in Iraq, it
needs to plan for a full-scale civil war if one develops.
Brookings Institution Press
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Washington, D.C. r
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www.brookings.edu o
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Cover photograph: © Thomas Anderson/Corbis g
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Cover by Nancy Bratton Design
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Things Fall Apart
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Things Fall Apart
Containing the Spillover
from an Iraqi Civil War
Daniel L. Byman
Kenneth M. Pollack
brookings institution press
Washington,D.C.
1379-1 ch0 frontmatter 4/16/07 3:11 PM Page iv
about brookings
The Brookings Institution is a private nonprofit organization devoted to research,
education,and publication on important issues ofdomestic and foreign policy.
Its principal purpose is to bring the highest quality independent research and analysis
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Copyright © 2007
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All rights reserved.No part ofthis publication may be reproduced or transmitted
in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the
Brookings Institution Press.
a saban center at the brookings institution book
Originally released as Analysis Paper 11,January 2007
Library ofCongress Cataloging-in-Publication data
Byman,Daniel,1967–
Things fall apart :containing the spillover from an Iraqi civil war / Daniel L.Byman,
Kenneth M.Pollack.
p. cm.
“Originally released as Analysis Paper 11,January 2007”—T.p.verso.
Summary:“Studies the history ofrecent civil wars to derive lessons regarding the
impact offull-scale civil wars on the security,prosperity,and national interests of
other states.Proposes recommendations for the United States as it confronts the pos-
sibility ofa similar conflict in Iraq and its spillover into the region”—Provided by
publisher.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN-13:978-0-8157-1379-1 (pbk.:alk.paper)
ISBN-10:0-8157-1379-7 (pbk.:alk.paper)
1.Iraq War,2003– 2.Civil war—Iraq. 3.Civil war 4.Peace-building. I.Pollack,
Kenneth M.(Kenneth Michael),1966– II.Title.
DS79.76.B96 2007
303.6'4—dc22 2007012276
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed on acid-free paper
Typeset in Minion
Composition by Peter Lindeman
Arlington,Virginia
Printed by Victor Graphics
Baltimore,Maryland
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Contents
Preface vii
Acknowledgments xi
Abbreviations xiii
1 Introduction 1
Part I Patterns of Civil Wars and Policy Options
2 Civil Wars and Spillover 17
3 Policy Options for Containing Spillover 60
Part II Civil War Case Studies
4 Afghanistan 101
5 Congo 120
6 Lebanon 134
7 Somalia 165
8 Yugoslavia 177
Notes 203
About the Authors 227
Index 229
v
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Preface
W
ith each passing day,Iraq sinks deeper into the abyss of
civil war.The history ofsuch wars is that they are disas-
trous for all involved.Asking who won most civil wars is a bit
like asking who “won”the San Francisco earthquake.Unfortu-
nately,we may soon be forced to confront how best we can avoid
“losing”an Iraqi civil war.
Starting to answer that question is the purpose ofthis study.
We hope that the leaders ofthe United States and Iraq will find
a way to stop what seems to be an irrevocable slide into an all-
out civil war. Given their repeated failures to do so, and how
badly the situation had deteriorated by the time this report went
to press,however,we believe that the United States and its allies
must begin thinking about how to deal with the consequences
ofmassive failure in Iraq.
During the course ofthe research for this study,one ominous
fact that loomed large from history was that in previous civil
wars there seemed to be a “point of no return”—a moment
when the psychological forces propelling civil war became
irreversible—but that moment was never apparent to the par-
ticipants themselves.Historians looking back on a conflict could
vii
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viii preface
often agree on when that point was reached,but at the time those caught up
in the struggle typically believed that solutions and alternative paths were
still available long after they had been overtaken by events.This should sober
us to the possibility that it may already be too late to save Iraq.While we want
to believe that an all-out civil war can still be averted,albeit ifonly through
Herculean exertions on the part ofWashington and Baghdad,the warnings
of history suggest that perhaps we too are simply repeating the same mis-
takes ofthose caught up in past civil wars.
When we began this study in the spring of2006,we made a list ofindi-
cators of when a state in civil strife passes such a point of no return.We
watched with dismay as the situation in Iraq worsened and indicator after
indicator went from our drawing board to Iraq’s daily reality (these indica-
tors are contained in Appendix F).
With this in mind, we set out to mine the history of recent similar
internecine conflicts for lessons that might help the United States to devise
a set ofstrategies to deal with the looming prospect ofa full-scale Iraqi civil
war.We scrutinized the history of civil wars in Lebanon in the 1970s and
1980s;Afghanistan,Bosnia,Chechnya,Croatia,Georgia,Kosovo,Macedonia,
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,and Tajikistan during the 1990s;as well as
the conflicts in Congo and Somalia that rage to this day (we present eight of
these cases in five appendices to the paper to provide additional historical
insight for readers wishing to delve deeper into this question themselves).
From these wars we distilled a set of lessons regarding how civil wars can
affect the interests of other countries, even distant ones like the United
States,and then used those lessons to fashion a set ofrecommendations for
how Washington might begin to develop a new strategy for an Iraq caught
up in all-out civil war.
In doing so,we attempted to set aside our own feelings ofsympathy and
concern for the Iraqi people themselves. The only thing that the United
States can do to help them is to preventthe descent into full-scale civil war.
Once it has happened,the United States will have failed them;and this self-
same history makes frighteningly clear that it is impossible for well-meaning
outsiders to limit the humanitarian tragedies ofan all-out civil war,unless
they are willing to intervene massively to bring it to an end.We note that the
commitments needed to end such a war are effectively the same resources the
United States and its allies are unwilling to commit today to prevent its out-
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break.Consequently,we felt that we had to look past the tragedy that will be
visited upon the Iraqi people (for whose sake the United States nominally
launched the invasion in 2003),and instead consider how such a civil war
could affect U.S.interests and what the United States could do to minimize
those effects.
Our conclusions are not encouraging.We found that much of what is
considered “conventional wisdom”among Westerners about how to handle
civil wars is probably mistaken.For instance,we found little to support the
idea that the United States could easily walk away from an Iraqi civil war—
that we could tell the Iraqis that we tried,that they failed,and that we were
leaving them to their fates.We found that “spillover”is common in massive
civil wars;that while its intensity can vary considerably,at its worst it can
have truly catastrophic effects;and that Iraq has all the earmarks ofcreating
quite severe spillover problems.By the same token,we also found that the
commonly held beliefthat the best way to handle a civil war is to back one
side to help it win was equally mistaken.We found few cases ofan outside
country successfully helping one side or another to victory,and the outside
power usually suffered heavy costs in the process.
Nevertheless, because we fear that the United States will not have the
option to avoid the problems that will be created for U.S.strategic interests
by Iraq’s descent into all-out civil war,we have presented a series ofU.S.pol-
icy choices that Washington might employ to do so.They mostly amount to
a reinforcing set ofefforts designed to contain the likely spillover from this
nightmare.Each flows from one or more aspects ofour analysis ofthe pat-
terns of spillover from civil wars.They suggest that if the United States is
skillful,determined,patient,and lucky,it may be possible to limit the impact
ofan all-out Iraqi civil war.To be blunt,the same history suggests that it will
be very,very difficult to do so.Few nations that tried to contain spillover
from an all-out civil war were successful,and while they were all less pow-
erful than the United States and did not attempt a systematic analysis of
how to contain spillover from civil wars,the frequency oftheir failure should
be foremost in our minds.It was arrogance in the face ofhistory that led us
to blithely assume we could invade without preparing for an occupation,and
we would do well to show greater humility when assimilating its lessons
about what we fear will be the next step in Iraq’s tragic history.