THINGS FALL APART: - Brookings Institution

140 Pages·2007·1.34 MB·English

ANALYSIS PAPER
Number 11, January 2007
T F a :
hings all parT
C S
ontaining the pillover
F i C W
rom an raqi ivil ar
D l. B
aniel yman
K m. p
enneth ollaCK
ANALYSIS PAPER
Number 11, January 2007
T F A :
HINGS ALL PART
C S
ONTAINING THE PILLOVER
F I C W
ROM AN RAQI IVIL AR
D L. B
ANIEL YMAN
K M. P
ENNETH OLLACK
T C
ABLE OF ONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .V
ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VII
PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .XIII
THE AUTHORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXIII
CIVIL WARSAND SPILLOVER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
POLICY OPTIONSFOR CONTAINING SPILLOVER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
AN UGLY PRACTICE RUN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
APPENDICES: CIVIL WAR CASES EXAMINEDAND CIVIL WAR INDICATORS
A. AFGHANISTAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
B. CONGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
C. LEBANON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
D. SOMALIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
E. YUGOSLAVIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
F. GENERAL INDICATIONSAND WARNING OF ALL-OUT CIVIL WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
THE SABAN CENTER AT THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION III
A
CKNOWLEDGEMENTS
T
his study represents the culmination of con- Stimson Center; Ivo Daalder, Khalid Koser, Michael
siderable labor over the course of the past year, O’Hanlon, and Carlos Pascual of the Brookings Insti-
and as can only be the case there were many people tution, and Martin S. Indyk, Bruce Riedel, and Tamara
whose assistance proved invaluable. We benefi ted from Cofman Wittes of the Saban Center, provided us with
outstanding support for our research. Sara Moller, at penetrating insights into our various case studies as
Georgetown University, and Irena Sargsyan, at the Sa- well as trenchant criticisms of the study itself. In addi-
ban Center, served as our principal research assistants tion, we presented versions of this work to a range of
during this time and their efforts defy superlatives. We experts in the U.S. military and intelligence commu-
simply could not have completed this task without nities at various times during 2006. While we cannot
them. They, in turn, were assisted by Brad Humphries, thank them all by name, their reactions, suggestions,
Bilal Saab, and Blair Trimble at the Saban Center, all of and even disagreements were critical to us in refi ning
whom took up their own pieces of our research with our treatment of this subject.
energy, enthusiasm, and effi ciency.
Andrew Apostolou of the Saban Center did his usual
A great many of our colleagues were willing to provide superb job of editing this monster, and Chris Kru-
extremely useful comments on our work at various pinski handled the layout with her usual style—and
stages. Rochelle Davis of Georgetown; Bernard Har- unusual speed—to ensure that it was produced in a
borne of the World Bank; Emile El-Hokayem of the timely fashion.
THE SABAN CENTER AT THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION V
A
BBREVIATIONS
ACR ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT
AMAL AFWAJ AL-MUQAWAMA AL-LUBNANIYA (BATTALIONSOFTHE LEBANESE RESISTANCE)
BCT BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM
BOSNIA BOSNIAAND HERZEGOVINA
GCC GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL
GDP GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
GIA GROUPE ISLAMIQUE ARMÉ (ARMED ISLAMIC GROUP)
IDP INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSON
IRA IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY
IRGC IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS CORPS
IRP ISLAMIC RENAISSANCE PARTY
KDP KURDISTAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY
KLA KOSOVO LIBERATION ARMY
LTTE LIBERATION TIGERSOF TAMIL EELAM
NATO NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
NGO NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION
NSC NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
OPEC ORGANIZATIONOF PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES
PC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE
PKK PARTIYA KARKERÊN KURDISTAN (KURDISTAN WORKERS’ PARTY)
PLA PALESTINE LIBERATION ARMY
PLO PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION
PUK PATRIOTIC UNIONOF KURDISTAN
RCT MARINE REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM
RPF RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT
SCIRI THE SUPREME COUNCILFORTHE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONIN IRAQ
SLA SOUTH LEBANON ARMY
UAE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
UNHCR UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONERFOR REFUGEES
UNITA UNIÃO NACIONALPELA INDEPENDÊNCIA TOTALDE ANGOLA (NATIONAL UNIONFOR
THE TOTAL INDEPENDENCEOF ANGOLA)
UNITAF UNIFIED TASK FORCE
UNOSOM UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONIN SOMALIA
UNPROFOR UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE
WFP WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME
THE SABAN CENTER AT THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION VII
P
REFACE
W
ith each passing day, Iraq sinks deeper into an all-out civil war can still be averted, albeit if only
the abyss of civil war. The history of such wars through Herculean exertions on the part of Washing-
is that they are disastrous for all involved. Asking who ton and Baghdad, the warnings of history suggest that
won most civil wars is a bit like asking who “won” the perhaps we too are simply repeating the same mistakes
San Francisco earthquake. Unfortunately, we may soon of those caught up in past civil wars.
be forced to confront how best we can avoid “losing”
an Iraqi civil war. When we began this study in the spring of 2006, we made
a list of indicators of when a state in civil strife passes
Starting to answer that question is the purpose of this such a point of no return. We watched with dismay as
study. We hope that the leaders of the United States the situation in Iraq worsened and indicator after indi-
and Iraq will fi nd a way to stop what seems to be an cator went from our drawing board to Iraq’s daily reality
irrevocable slide into all-out civil war. Given their re- (these indicators are contained in Appendix F).
peated failures to do so, and how badly the situation
had deteriorated by the time this report went to press, With this in mind, we set out to mine the history of re-
however, we believe that the United States and its allies cent, similar internecine confl icts for lessons that might
must begin thinking about how to deal with the conse- help the United States to devise a set of strategies to deal
quences of massive failure in Iraq. with the looming prospect of a full-scale Iraqi civil war.
We scrutinized the history of civil wars in Lebanon in
During the course of the research for this study, one the 1970s and 1980s; Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya,
ominous fact that loomed large from the history was Croatia, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, the Nagorno-
that in previous civil wars there seemed to be a “point Karabakh confl ict, and Tajikistan during the 1990s; as
of no return”—a moment when the psychological well as the confl icts in Congo and Somalia that rage to
forces propelling civil war became irreversible—but this day (we present eight of these cases in fi ve appendi-
that moment was never apparent to the participants ces to the paper to provide additional historical insight
themselves. Historians looking back on a confl ict could for readers wishing to delve deeper into this question
often agree on when that point was reached, but at the themselves). From these wars we distilled a set of lessons
time those caught up in the struggle typically believed regarding how civil wars can affect the interests of other
that solutions and alternative paths were still avail- countries, even distant ones like the United States, and
able long after they had been overtaken by events. This then used those lessons to fashion a set of recommenda-
should sober us to the possibility that it may already tions for how Washington might begin to develop a new
be too late to save Iraq. While we want to believe that strategy for an Iraq caught up in all-out civil war.
THE SABAN CENTER AT THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION IX
In doing so, we attempted to set aside our own feelings marks of creating quite severe spillover problems. By
of sympathy and concern for the Iraqi people them- the same token, we also found that the commonly held
selves. The only thing that the United States can do to belief that the best way to handle a civil war is to back
help them is toprevent the descent into full-scale civil one side to help it win was equally mistaken. We found
war. Once it has happened, the United States will have few cases of an outside country successfully helping
failed them; and this self-same history makes frighten- one side or another to victory, and the outside power
ingly clear that it is impossible for well-meaning out- usually suffered heavy costs in the process.
siders to limit the humanitarian tragedies of an all-out
civil war, unless they are willing to intervene massively Nevertheless, because we fear that the United States will
to bring it to an end. We note that the commitments not have the option to avoid the problems that will be
needed to end such a war are effectively the same re- created for U.S. strategic interests by Iraq’s descent into
sources the United States and its allies are unwilling to all-out civil war, we have presented a series of U.S. policy
commit today to prevent its outbreak. Consequently, choices that Washington might employ to do so. They
we felt that we had to look past the tragedy that will be mostly amount to a reinforcing set of efforts designed
visited upon the Iraqi people (for whose sake the Unit- to contain the likely spillover from this nightmare. Each
ed States nominally launched the invasion in 2003), fl ows from one or more aspects of our analysis of the
and instead consider how such a civil war could affect patterns of spillover from civil wars. They suggest that
U.S. interests and what the United States could do to if the United States is skillful, determined, patient, and
minimize those effects. lucky, it may be possible to limit the impact of an all-out
Iraqi civil war. To be blunt, the same history suggests
Our conclusions are not encouraging. We found that that it will be very, very diffi cult to do so. Few nations
much of what is considered “conventional wisdom” that tried to contain spillover from an all-out civil war
among Westerners about how to handle civil wars is were successful, and while they were all less powerful
probably mistaken. For instance, we found little to than the United States and did not attempt a system-
support the idea that the United States could easily atic analysis of how to contain spillover from civil wars,
walk away from an Iraqi civil war—that we could tell the frequency of their failure should be foremost in our
the Iraqis that we tried, that they failed and that we minds. It was arrogance in the face of history that led us
were leaving them to their fates. We found that “spill- to blithely assume we could invade without preparing
over” is common in massive civil wars; that while its for an occupation, and we would do well to show great-
intensity can vary considerably, at its worst it can have er humility when assimilating its lessons about what we
truly catastrophic effects; and that Iraq has all the ear- fear will be the next step in Iraq’s tragic history.
X THINGS FALL APART: CONTAINING THE SPILLOVER FROM AN IRAQI CIVIL WAR
E S
XECUTIVE UMMARY
I
raq is rapidly descending into all-out civil war. lessons derived from these cases regarding the impact
Unfortunately, the United States probably will not of full-scale civil wars on the security, prosperity, and
be able to just walk away from the chaos. Even setting national interests of other states to derive recommen-
aside the humanitarian nightmare that will ensue, a dations for the United States as it confronts the pos-
full-scale civil war would likely consume more than sibility of a similar confl ict in Iraq.
Iraq: historically, such massive confl icts have often had
highly deleterious effects on neighboring countries and
PATTERNSOF SPILLOVER
other outside states. Spillover from an Iraq civil war
could be disastrous. America has too many strategic The United States will confront a range of problems
interests at stake in the Middle East to ignore the stemming from the collapse of Iraq into all-out civil
consequences. Thus, it is imperative that the United war. These will likely include the humanitarian tragedy
States develop a plan for containing an all-out Iraqi of hundreds of thousands (or more) of Iraqis killed
civil war. along with several times that number maimed and
millions of refugees. American infl uence in the Middle
As part of a containment approach, our new priority East will be drastically diminished, as will our ability to
would have to become preventing the Iraqi confl ict promote economic and political reform there. The loss
from spilling over and destabilizing neighboring states: of Iraqi oil production could have a signifi cant impact
an approach that requires deterring neighboring states on global oil prices, and supply disruptions elsewhere
from intervening, helping mitigate the risks associated in the region, particularly in Saudi Arabia, could be
with refugees, striking terrorist havens, and otherwise particularly devastating.
changing our policy to refl ect the painful reality that
the U.S. effort to bring peace and stability to Iraq has However, the greatest problems that the United States
failed. Not planning now for containing the Iraqi civil must be prepared to confront are the patterns of “spill-
war could lead its devastation to become even greater, over” by which civil wars in one state can deleteriously
engulfi ng not only Iraq but also much of the surround- affect another, or in some cases destabilize a region or
ing region and gravely threatening U.S. interests. create global threats. Spillover is the tendency of civil
wars to impose burdens, create instability, and even
To that end, this study draws on the history of the re- trigger civil wars in other, usually neighboring coun-
cent civil wars in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Con- tries. In some cases, spillover can be as relatively mild
go, Croatia, Georgia, Kosovo, Lebanon, the Nagorno- as the economic hardships and the limited numbers
Karabakh confl ict, Somalia, and Tajikistan. It employs of refugees that Hungary and Romania coped with
THE SABAN CENTER AT THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION XIII
during the various Yugoslav civil wars of the 1990s. At a state embroiled in civil war. A civil war may also en-
the other end of the spectrum, spillover can turn civil courage groups in neighboring states to demand, or
war into regional war—as Lebanon did in the 1970s even fight, for a reordering of their domestic political
and 1980s—and can cause other civil wars in neigh- arrangements. Examples of this radicalization phe-
boring countries—just as the civil war in Rwanda trig- nomenon include the anger felt by ethnic Albanians
gered the catastrophic civil war in next-door Congo. in the Balkans at the treatment of Kosovar Albanians
Unfortunately, Iraq appears to possess most, if not all, by the Serbian regime during the Kosovo war—which
of the factors that would make spillover worse rather might very well have pushed the Albanian government
than better. to intervene had NATO not done so instead—as well as
the decision by Syria’s Sunni Muslim Brotherhood to
Historically, six patterns of spillover have been the rise up against the ‘Alawi regime which led to a Syrian
most harmful in other cases of all-out civil war: civil war from 1976-82.
Refugees. In addition to the humanitarian consider- Secession breeds secessionism. Some civil wars are
ations for innocent civilians fleeing civil war, refugees caused by one group within a country seeking its in-
can create strategic problems. They represent large dependence, while in other cases the civil war leads
groupings of embittered people who serve as a ready one group or another to seek its independence as the
recruiting pool for armed groups still waging the civil solution to its problems. Frequently, other groups in
war. As a result, they frequently involve foreign coun- similar circumstances (either in the country in civil
tries in the civil war as the neighboring government war or in neighboring countries) may follow suit if
attempts to prevent the refugee-based militias from the first group appears to have achieved some degree
attacking their country of origin, and/or the neighbor- of success. Thus Slovenia’s secession from Yugoslavia
ing government must protect the refugees from attack started the first of those civil wars, but it also provoked
by their civil war enemies. Moreover, large refugee Croatia to declare its independence, which forced Bos-
flows can overstrain the economies and even change nia to follow suit, which later convinced Kosovar Al-
the demographic balances of small or weak neighbor- banian nationalists to try for the same, and eventually
ing states. provoked a secessionist movement among Albanians
in Macedonia.
Terrorism. Terrorists often find a home in states in
civil war, as al-Qa‘ida did in Afghanistan. However, the Economic losses. Civil wars can be costly to other
civil wars themselves also frequently breed new terror- countries, particularly neighbors. First, there are the
ist groups—Hizballah, the Palestine Liberation Orga- direct costs of caring for refugees, fighting terrorism,
nization, Hamas, the Groupe Islamique Armé (Armed and mounting major interventions, whether covert or
Islamic Group) of Algeria, and the Liberation Tigers of overt. Beyond that, civil wars tend to scare off invest-
Tamil Eelam were all born of civil wars. Many of these ment, impose security and insurance costs on trade,
groups start by focusing on local targets but then shift disrupt transportation networks and supplier arrange-
to international attacks—usually against those they ments, and increase a state’s health care burden, to
believe are aiding their enemies in the civil war. name but a few.
Radicalization of neighboring populations. Neigh- Neighborly interventions. The problems created by
boring populations often become highly agitated and these other forms of spillover often provoke neigh-
mobilized by developments in the civil war next door. boring states to intervene—to stop terrorism as Israel
Groups in one state may identify with co-religionists, tried repeatedly in Lebanon, to halt the flow of refu-
co-ethnics, or other groups with similar identities in gees as the Europeans tried in Yugoslavia, or to end (or
XIV THINGS FALL APART: CONTAINING THE SPILLOVER FROM AN IRAQI CIVIL WAR
respond to) the radicalization of their own population 1.Don’t try to pick winners. There will be an
as Syria did in Lebanon. These interventions usually enormous temptation for the United States to
turn out badly for all involved. Local groups typically aid one Iraqi faction against another in an ef-
turn out to be poor proxies and are often unable or fort to manage the Iraqi civil war from within.
unwilling to accomplish the objectives of their backers. In theory, the United States could choose prox-
This often provokes the intervening state to use its own ies and use them to secure its interests. How-
military forces to do the job itself. The result is that ever, proxies often fail in their assigned tasks
many civil wars become regional wars because once or turn against their masters. As a result, such
one country invades, other states often do the same, if efforts rarely succeed, and in the specifi c cir-
only to prevent the initial invader from conquering the cumstances of Iraq, such an effort appears par-
state in civil war. ticularly dubious.
Iraq is already manifesting all of these patterns of spill- It is extremely diffi cult to know which group
over. This suggests that these factors may intensify as will be able to prevail in a civil war. Civil wars
the civil war worsens, and argues that the United States are highly susceptible to the emergence of skill-
should be bracing itself for particularly severe manifes- ful military leaders who tend to start the war
tations of spillover throughout the Persian Gulf region. as unknowns and only gain power by prov-
ing their skills in battle, such as Afghanistan’s
Ahmed Shah Massoud. Numbers alone rarely
OPTIONSFOR CONTAINING SPILLOVERFROM
prove decisive—Lebanon’s Druze were a ma-
AN IRAQI CIVIL WAR
jor force in their civil war despite the small
The historical record of states that attempted to mini- size of their community, whereas Lebanon’s
mize or contain spillover from all-out civil wars is Sunnis rarely wielded power commensu-
poor. Nearly all of them failed to do so. Those that rate with their demographic weight. This
“succeeded” often paid such a high cost as to render makes it diffi cult, if not impossible to know
their victories pyrrhic. In many cases, states failed so which group could benefi t from external as-
miserably to prevent spillover that they were eventu- sistance, and history is rife with states that
ally forced to mount massive invasions to attempt to poured arms and money into a civil war to
end the civil war instead. Successful efforts to end civil back a faction that could not make use of it.
wars generally required a peace agreement to bring
the war to closure and then an international secu- M oreover, Iraq is badly fragmented—especially
rity intervention with a personnel-to-population ra- within its ethnic and religious communities—
tio of 20 per thousand (or higher) to keep the peace, making this approach even more diffi cult. There
combined with a major injection of international re- is no single “Shi’i” or “Sunni” faction to back.
sources. In Iraq (excluding Kurdistan), such a security There are only dozens of small to medium-sized
deployment could equate to a deployment of roughly militias, most of which hate one another with
450,000 troops. equal intensity regardless of ethnic or religious
differences, or similarities. Moreover, there is no
Despite these odds, if Iraq does descend into all-out manageable way for the United States to back one
civil war, the United States probably will have no faction or another from a diplomatic and logis-
choice but to try to contain it. Drawing on the patterns tical perspective. The Shi’i groups are all tied in
of spillover described above, we developed a baker’s some way to Iran, and would have to be supplied
dozen of possible tactics that the United States might through Iran because Iraq’s other neighbors (ex-
use, alone or in combination: cept Syria, which has no border with Iraq’s Shi’i
THE SABAN CENTER AT THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION XV