Therapeutic Advocacy: Treating and Empowering the Politically Persecuted in Authoritarian Chile ...

127 Pages·2017·1.28 MB·English

Therapeutic Advocacy:
Treating and Empowering the Politically Persecuted in Authoritarian Chile
1973-1990

By Belinda Zhou

Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Bachelor of Arts
In the Department of History at Brown University

Thesis Advisor: Jennifer Lambe

7 April 2017

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgements ..............................................................................................................3
Introduction ..........................................................................................................................4
Chapter 1: The Political Identity and Goals of FASIC’s Medical-Psychiatric Team ........28
Chapter 2: Trauma: Individual and Collective, Direct and Indirect ..................................55
Chapter 3: Testimonio as Therapy and Archive .................................................................85
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................111
Bibliography ....................................................................................................................122
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am incredibly appreciative of Professor Jennifer Lambe’s guidance and time. Without
her knowledge and encouragement, I would not have been able to complete this thesis. I also
credit her with introducing me to the study of the history of psychiatry; had I not taken a course
with her, I certainly would not have conceptualized such a thesis. I would like to express my
gratitude to Professor Ethan Pollock for his constant positivity and support and to Professor
Daniel Rodriguez for introducing me to Steve J. Stern’s trilogy on Chilean memory studies,
which became my entry point to exploring testimonio. My writing benefited greatly from the
feedback of John Giambrone, Ryan Lee, Christopher Shum, and Daniel Ziring. Additionally, I’d
like to thank my friends and family for their support throughout this process.
In Chile, I could not have accessed FASIC’s archives without the help of Angela Schaaf.
I am incredibly grateful to FASIC’s archive manager, María Graciela Acuña, for her assistance
in locating Medical-Psychiatric Program’s documents. I also appreciated the opportunity to
speak with Silvana Vetö and Nancy Nicholls, two knowledgeable scholars of Chilean
psychoanalysis and human rights, respectively. Furthermore, I must thank Vetö for putting me in
touch with Dr. Elena Castro, who graciously answered my questions about her time at FASIC.
Lastly, I am thankful to the Storm family for making Santiago a second home to me.
Here I must also acknowledge the bravery of both FASIC’s therapists and patients.
Despite the violent conditions in which they lived, they demonstrated an incredible openness to
sharing their narratives of trauma and a remarkable dedication to human rights. Through the
research process, I came to deeply admire the subjects of my thesis for their courage, intellect,
and humanity. I sincerely hope I have avoided miscommunicating their sentiments and beliefs in
my efforts to expose their remarkable work to English language audiences.
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INTRODUCTION

On November 9, 1983, a group of six mental health professionals stood before the
Chilean Association of Psychologists to accept the National Psychology Award. A week before
the event, Alfonso Luco Rodriguez, the president of the association, wrote to the six therapists
explaining that they were being honored for their “significant and valiant contribution” to the
“enhancement of our profession.”1 It is typical for a professional association to award those who
have advanced their field of expertise in a “significant” way. However, what exactly made this
group’s contribution “valiant”? Why did a psychological association’s members value their peers
for their bravery?
Luco’s reference to their “valiant” efforts hinted at the nation’s tumultuous political
situation. The ceremony took place in Santiago, Chile, more than ten years after Augusto
Pinochet’s coup d’état, which ended both the democratically elected government and life of
socialist president Salvador Allende (1970-1973). By 1983 the military junta had begun
institutionalizing its efforts under the guise of democratic norms in the hopes of raising its
standing and legitimacy within the international community.2 The Chilean Association of
Psychologists recognized the work of Rosario Dominguez, Elizabeth Lira, Elisa Neumann,
Adrianna Maggi, Eugenia Weinstein, and David Becker, who were all members of the Medical-
Psychiatric Program at the Fundación de Ayuda Social de las Iglesias Cristianas (FASIC), or the
Social Aid Foundation of the Christian Churches.3 The organization provided support services

1 Letter, Alfonso Luco Rodriguez to Elizabeth Lira, “National Psychology Award 1983 to the Medical-Psychiatric
Program of FASIC: Letters, Acceptance Speech,” November 1983.
2 Pablo Policzer, The Rise and Fall of Repression in Chile (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009),
116-117.
3 Rosario Dominguez Vial, Elizabeth Lira Kornfeld, Elisa Neumann Garcia, Adriana Maggi Valenzuela, Eugenia
Weinstein Levy, and David Becker Mathis, “Acceptance Speech for the Award ‘Association of Psychologists,’”
FASIC (9 November 1983): 5.
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for the victims of political persecution, including mental health treatment caused by the military
junta’s repressive tactics, such as torture, execution, and disappearance. Chief among the
association’s reasoning for honoring these therapists was their innovative therapeutic methods
and their willingness to oppose the military junta by treating the politically persecuted.
In their acceptance speech, the FASIC team discussed their conviction in providing
mental health services for those suffering from political repression, despite the sacrifices that
they had to make in becoming affiliated with FASIC. “We were not prepared,” they said, and
proceeded to list the situations of various patients they had encountered, such as “María who is
already sixty-seven years old and does not have anyone…one day in November 1974, her
husband was disappeared, later her son [was disappeared] and soon after her daughter left the
country.”4 They shared patient profiles ranging from those experiencing economic hardship to
children coping with living in exile, because, as they posited, societal “repair begins by naming
things for what they are.”5 However, they also believed that the award had “put us in the difficult
position of speaking about our work. Never before had we publicly [done so]...because we know,
for example, that torture and disappearances are incidents that uncover wounds that divide us.”6
They concluded by expressing hope that their work would go beyond improving individual
psychology by “bringing us closer...to the peace that we all yearn for.”7
The speech revealed the intimate knowledge that these therapists had of their patients and
how deeply intertwined patients’ political, social, and psychological experiences were.
Additionally, the psychologists made it clear that their work went beyond the therapeutic realm.
The group aspired to effect change in the political sphere by criticizing the military regime in

4 Dominguez, et al., “Acceptance Speech for the Award ‘Association of Psychologists,’” 1.
5 Ibid., 5.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
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hopes that these efforts would help bring an end to authoritarianism. Yet they also recognized
and hoped to prevent the divisive potential of state violence in a post-Pinochet Chile.
FASIC’s Medical-Psychiatric Team resisted the Pinochet regime in both practice and
rhetoric. In the process, they brought progressive politics into the therapeutic space during an era
in which individuals associated with the left were being aggressively persecuted by the military
junta. This contrasted with the “neutral” stance adopted by many healthcare professionals, who
wished to keep their work “objective” and completely apolitical. While FASIC’s therapists did
not take a politically partisan stance, they combined their mental health expertise with the
language of human rights to speak out against the Pinochet regime. This group of therapists
focused on addressing the psychological trauma caused by political repression, which was
broadly defined to include torture, exile, and economic hardship. These mental health
professionals produced multiple pamphlets analyzing the impact of the political situation on
mental health. They also developed new therapeutic tools, most prominently through
incorporating testimonio into the treatment process, which both recorded denunciations of the
military junta’s brutality and helped patients cope with their trauma. FASIC’s Medical-
Psychiatric Program presented an example of the politicization of mental health forged out of
resistance rather than dominance. Furthermore, the team’s involvement in constructing national
memory in the post-Pinochet era demonstrated the political influence that the mental health field
could wield in the aftermath of collectively experienced trauma. Despite the rhetoric of national
healing, present-day Chile continues to be deeply divided along political lines, raising questions
about societal memory.
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From Democracy to Military Junta: Setting the Stage for the September 11 Coup
Before exploring FASIC’s therapeutic and political work, it is important to understand
the historical conditions that brought Chile to a state of authoritarianism. The 1973 coup was
partly the result of rising political tension in Chile between conservative portions of society and
more center-left and leftist groups. Salvador Allende held a tenuous grip on the Chilean
presidency—he had only won 36.2% of the vote in the 1970 elections, a plurality that required a
congressional ratification in accordance with Chilean law due to the failure to win a simple
majority of the vote.8 Even within his own coalition, Popular Unity (Unidad Popular, or UP),
tensions existed between those who agreed with Allende’s pledge to work towards a “peaceful
transition to socialism” and those who supported armed struggle as the method that the Chilean
people should use to bring about a socialist nation.9
Allende’s desired plan focused on economic reform to diminish income inequality in
Chile with the ultimate goal of giving more political power to the popular classes. He invested
more heavily in social programs started by President Eduardo Frei (1964-1970), providing
additional health, educational, and housing facilities to low-income sections of Chilean society.10
Allende also nationalized the copper industry, prompting the ire of U.S. companies in the
Chilean mining industry. Despite this, the nationalization bill passed unanimously in Congress,
showing broad support among politicians for the move.11 Although conservative and centrist
politicians were willing to collaborate with the UP on these early pieces of legislation, their

8 Mark Ensalaco, Chile Under Pinochet: Recovering the Truth (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1999), 5.
9 Ibid., 5-6. The Popular Unity coalition, formed in October 1969, included parties that identified as center-left or
center: Socialist Party, Communist Party, Radical Party, and Popular Unitary Action Movement. The most
influential of these were the Socialist Party and the Communist Party. The former had declared itself Marxist-
Leninist in 1967.
10 Marcus Taylor, From Pinochet to the Third War: Neoliberalism and Social Transformation in Chile (London:
Pluto Press, 2006), 24.
11 Ibid., 25.
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passage eventually led to growing opposition from the middle and upper classes. The inflation
rate and the nation’s deficit continued to grow, and there was a shortage of consumer goods,
leading to long lines for basic commodities and an increasingly influential black market.12 Other
political efforts caused discontent on both the left and the right. Allende continued the trend of
land redistribution that had been enacted by his more conservative predecessors, Presidents Jorge
Alessandri (1958-1964) and Frei. The plan broke up large areas of farmland owned by individual
families, to give property to lower income campesinos.13 Those who owned this land believed
they were being economically threatened, while the campesinos, encouraged by more radical
leftist parties, believed the process was going too slowly.
Even before the formation of the UP coalition, political polarization within the left was
evident, especially in Allende’s own Socialist Party (Partido Socialista, or PS). Despite Allende’s
moderate views, the militant faction of the party, led by Carlos Altamirano, successfully had the
party declare itself Marxist-Leninist in 1967.14 Outside of the formal political system, militant
activists created the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Movimiento de Izquierda
Revolucionaria, or MIR). The MIR’s leaders emerged out of leftist student movements in the
1960s, and the group had wide support in labor unions and shantytown communities, called
poblaciones.15 In the MIR’s view, Allende was not taking enough action to improve the economy
in a way that would serve MIR’s more radical interests. His own nephew, Andrés Pascal
Allende, was a top leader in MIR and frequently criticized the president for his timidity.16 In
contrast to Salvador Allende’s more moderate politics, MIR promoted industrial strikes and land

12 Taylor, From Pinochet to the Third War, 26; Paul E. Sigmund, The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of
Chile, 1964-1978 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), 282.
13 Ensalaco, 11.
14 Ibid.
15 John Dinges, The Condor Years: How Pinochet and His Allies Brought Terrorism to Three Continents (New
York: The New Press, 2005), 43.
16 Ibid.
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takeovers in the countryside, which contributed to economic stagnation and increased violence in
rural areas.17
This violence, usually perpetrated against landowners, pushed those who identified as
conservatives even further right on the political spectrum. Not only were they threatened by the
government’s economic reforms, but they were also physically threatened by militant left-wing
groups operating outside of the government’s purview. As a result, Allende increasingly lost the
political cooperation of the Christian Democrats, who were progressively becoming more
conservative. Although his 1970 opponent for the presidency, Radomiro Tomic of the Christian
Democrats, had supported the legislature’s validation of Allende’s election, three years later, the
Christian Democratic Party aligned with more conservative parties to call for Allende’s
resignation.18 In fact, just prior to the coup, Congressional Christian Democrats had drafted a
non-binding resolution enumerating the “government illegalities” that took place under
Allende.19 The military junta later used this resolution as part of their justification for the coup,
which brought about over fifteen years of dictatorship.
Despite the growing political tensions, it is important to acknowledge that prior to the
coup, Chile had a decades-long history of democratic government. From 1925 to 1973, with the
exception of the months-long military regime in 1931, Chile had been governed by a
democracy.20 Chilean society valued active democratic participation, exhibited by fervent
popular demonstrations and debates leading up to elections. While many Chileans called for
Allende’s resignation, few had hoped for or anticipated a military coup. Prior to his death,

17 Ensalaco, Chile Under Pinochet, 11.
18 Ibid., 14.
19 Ibid., 15.
20 Inger Agger and Sören Buus Jensen, Trauma y cura en situaciones de terrorismo de estado: derechos humanos y
salud mental en Chila bajo la dictadura militar (Santiago: Ediciones Chile América, 1996), 74-75. This is the
Spanish version of Agger and Jensen’s book, which will be denoted from this point forward as “Agger & Jensen,
Trauma y cura” followed by the page number.