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Law and Philosophy Library 138 Verena Klappstein Maciej Dybowski Editors Theory of Legal Evidence - Evidence in Legal Theory Law and Philosophy Library Volume 138 SeriesEditors FranciscoJ.Laporta,AutonomousUniversityofMadrid,Madrid,Spain FrederickSchauer,UniversityofVirginia,Charlottesville,VA,USA TorbenSpaak,StockholmUniversity,Stockholm,Sweden EditorialBoardMembers AulisAarnio,SecretaryGeneraloftheTampereClub,Tampere,Finland HumbertoÁvila,UniversityofSãoPaulo,SãoPaulo,Brazil ZenonBankowski,UniversityofEdinburgh,Edinburgh,UK PaoloComanducci,UniversityofGenoa,Genova,Italy HughCorder,UniversityofCapeTown,CapeTown,SouthAfrica DavidDyzenhaus,UniversityofToronto,Toronto,Canada ErnestoGarzónValdés,JohannesGutenbergUniversity,Mainz,Germany RiccaroGuastini,UniversityofGenoa,Genova,Italy HoHockLai,NationalUniversityofSingapore,Singapore,Singapore JohnKleinig,CityUniversityofNewYork,NewYorkCity,NY,USA ClaudioMichelon,UniversityofEdinburgh,Edinburgh,UK PatriciaMindus,UppsalaUniversity,Uppsala,Sweden YasutomoMorigiwa,MeijiUniversity,Tokyo,Japan GiovanniBattistaRatti,UniversityofGenoa,Genova,Italy WojchiechSadurski,UniversityofSydney,Sydney,Australia HoracioSpector,UniversityofSanDiego,SanDiego,USA MichelTroper,ParisNanterreUniversity,Nanterre,France CarlWellman,WashingtonUniversity,St.Louis,USA TheLawandPhilosophyLibrary,whichhasbeeninexistence since1985,aimsto publish cutting edge works in the philosophy of law, and has a special history of publishing books that focus on legal reasoning and argumentation,including those thatmayinvolvesomewhatformalmethodologies.Theserieshaspublishednumer- ous important books on law and logic, law and artificial intelligence, law and language, and law and rhetoric. While continuing to stress these areas, the series hasmorerecentlyexpandedtoincludebooksontheintersectionbetweenlawandthe Continental philosophical tradition, consistent with the traditional openness of the seriestobooksintheContinentaljurisprudentialtradition.Theseriesisproudofthe geographicdiversityofitsauthors,andmanyhavecomefromLatinAmerica,Spain, Italy,theNetherlands,Germany,andEasternEurope,aswell,moreobviouslyforan English-languageseries,fromtheUnitedKingdom,theUnitedStates,Australiaand Canada. Moreinformationaboutthisseriesathttp://www.springer.com/series/6210 (cid:129) Verena Klappstein Maciej Dybowski Editors Theory of Legal Evidence - Evidence in Legal Theory Editors VerenaKlappstein MaciejDybowski UniversityofPassau LegalTheoryandPhilosophy Passau,Germany AdamMickiewiczUniversity Poznań,Poland ISSN1572-4395 ISSN2215-0315 (electronic) LawandPhilosophyLibrary ISBN978-3-030-83840-9 ISBN978-3-030-83841-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83841-6 ©TheEditor(s)(ifapplicable)andTheAuthor(s),underexclusivelicensetoSpringerNatureSwitzerland AG2021 Thisworkissubjecttocopyright.AllrightsaresolelyandexclusivelylicensedbythePublisher,whether thewholeorpartofthematerialisconcerned,specificallytherightsoftranslation,reprinting,reuseof illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similarordissimilarmethodologynowknownorhereafterdeveloped. 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Theregisteredcompanyaddressis:Gewerbestrasse11,6330Cham,Switzerland Contents IntroductiontoTheoryofLegalEvidence-EvidenceinLegal Theory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 MaciejDybowskiandVerenaKlappstein PartI TwoBigQuestionsLookedUponfromaHistoricalPoint ofViewandtheViewofContemporaryTheoryofScience CanThereBeaScienceofProof?ACross-AtlanticDialogue (1898–1947). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 OlivierLeclerc WhyDoesLegalReasoningNecessitateanInterdisciplinary DiscourseandanExaminationfromthePointofTheoryofScience?. . . 37 VerenaKlappstein PartII TheoryofLawPutinContactwithEvidenceIssuesand Scholarship WhyAreWeBoundbyEvidence?OnTheNormativeStanceofLegal Proof. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 WeronikaDzięgielewska AGoodEnough(Meta)TheoryofEvidenceinLaw:AnInferentialist Account. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 MaciejDybowski TheArchitectureofEvidentialJustificationBetweenAtomismand Holism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 DanielaAccatino TheoriesofTruthinLegalFact-Finding.. . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. 149 ViktorGazda v vi Contents PartIII LegalEvidencePutinPractice Expert’s(Meta)Testimony:AnEpistemologicalPerspective. . . . . . . . . . 169 AdamDyrdaandMaciejPróchnicki RethinkingExpertOpinionEvidenceasanArgumentfromEpistemic Authority. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189 BohdanPretkiel TestimonyandHearsay. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205 GiovanniTuzet NeuroscientificEvidenceinCourtroom:ClashofTwoAnthropological Paradigms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225 MarcinRomanowicz AnEpistemicDefenseofExclusionaryRulesintheCriminalJustice System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249 JohnR.Harris ConstitutionalEvidence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265 MargaridaLacombeCamargo Introduction to Theory of Legal Evidence - Evidence in Legal Theory MaciejDybowski andVerenaKlappstein 1 Background of the Debate on Legal Evidence The volume “Theory of Legal Evidence - Evidence in Legal Theory” deals with theoreticalandphilosophicalproblemsoflegalevidence.Theconceptofevidenceis expected to fill a number of distinct roles in science, philosophy, but also in legal theoryandlaw.Someoftheserolesarecomplementary,whileothersstandintension orhavelittleincommon.Thetitleofthisvolumesuggeststwotypesofproblems. Let us begin with the first one—that of a theory of legal evidence. Imagine a jurisprudencescholarwhowantstofindsecurewaysofnavigatinginthewavesof evidence scholarship. Other legal theorists may overwhelm her by referring to diverse approaches to evidence and proof in legal systems of the contemporary world. Some of those differences would stem from general differences between commonandcivillaw.E.g.partiesplayanactiveroleinfact-findingincommonlaw countries, while in civil law countries, the judge plays the main investigatory role. Describing the concept of legal evidence might therefore become something like cleaningouttheAugeanstables,bytryingtocomparethetakingofevidenceinthe Anglo-Americanandcontinentalsystems,butwithoutsuccess.Professionallawyers are bound to deal with evidence and proof, but they are certainly not bound to theorizeaboutit. If our inquisitive scholar is dissuaded from comparative endeavours, he might still want to pursue an alternative project of understanding legal evidence by M.Dybowski LegalTheoryandPhilosophyDepartment,AdamMickiewiczUniversity,Poznań,Poland e-mail:[email protected] V.Klappstein(*) UniversityofPassau,Passau,Germany e-mail:[email protected] ©TheAuthor(s),underexclusivelicensetoSpringerNatureSwitzerlandAG2021 1 V.Klappstein,M.Dybowski(eds.),TheoryofLegalEvidence-EvidenceinLegal Theory,LawandPhilosophyLibrary138, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83841-6_1 2 M.DybowskiandV.Klappstein studying different theories of it. There have been countless academic attempts at a systematic analysis of the legal fact-finding. Even if they may be reduced to conceivingoflegalevidenceasanobjectofsensoryevidence,asafact,asapremise in evidentiary reasoning or as what counts as evidence in law (Ho 2008), such conceptionsaresusceptibletofurthertheoreticalexaminationsandinterpretations. Athirdvastareaofexplorationforajurisprudencescholarwhowantstogetthe layoflegalevidencescholarshipappearstoberestricted.“’Tisdangerouswhenthe basernaturecomesBetweenthepassandfellincensèdpointsOfmightyopposites.”1 Hamlet’swarningappliesheretohighlyspecialisedscholarlydebatesinwhichthe concept of legal evidence is a function of adopted accounts of value or strength attachedtoevidence,typicallyadmittedintrials.Suchaccountsmayormaynotbe inter- or cross-disciplinary, and they may concern such fundamental issues as application of mathematical theories of probability, also by arguing against such reasoning,ase.g.in“relativeplausibility”theoryinitiatedbyAllen(1986). In brief, the problems explored within the received theories of legal evidence seemtorelatetheapproachtosuchevidenceto:(1)specificlegalsystemsortypesof legalsystemsanddifferentfieldsoflaw;(2)differenttheoreticalaccountsofwhatit isfor somethingtobelegalevidence;and(3) theoriesconcerningtheascriptionof value (strength, weight) to items or total body of evidence. Within each of these fields,thelegalconceptofevidenceconstantlychanges,andthedebateconcerning thedistinctionbetweenalegalconceptofevidence,theordinaryconceptofevidence and the concept of evidence in science is far from being settled. In short, legal theorists’interestinevidencemayincludesuchdiverseobjectsasbloodiedknives, sense data, linguistic entities or psychologically recognized beliefs. They may be accountedforinanatomisticorholisticmanner,andsoon. What is more, the problem of evidence is central to both epistemology and the philosophyofscience,andbyextensiontoouracademicthinkingaboutlaw.Thisis wherethesecondtypeofproblemsindicatedinthetitleofthisvolumecomestothe fore: evidence in legal theory. This is also where—often implicit—impulses from philosophers are received by legal theorists and jurisprudential analysis becomes self-centred, especially with regard to fundamental concepts and methodologies adopted in discussing the status of facts found and used in legal theory. As shown by Haack’s commitment to bridging the gap between philosophy of science and legal theory, original and distinctiveworksin thetheoryof knowledge and philos- ophyofsciencemaybearonreal-lifelegalissues(seee.g.Haack2014).Indeed,the point of departure for a separate range of interdisciplinary issues involving the conceptofevidenceandlawmightcomefromthephilosophyofscienceorgeneral epistemology. Someeffortshavebeenmaderecentlytodeclutterthetheoreticalandphilosoph- icaldebateonlegalevidence.TogivejustafewexamplesinAnglo-Americanlegal systems,nexttothecontributionofHaack’sfocusonthephilosophyofscience,the mainideasappliedtotheorderingofthefieldcentreonvariousguidingprinciples.It 1TheCompleteWorksofWilliamShakespeare,Vol.XIV,Boston1881,Hamlet,ActV,p.302. IntroductiontoTheoryofLegalEvidence-EvidenceinLegalTheory 3 maybemoralresponsibilityinfact-findingandethicsinlegalevidence(Ho2008). Itmayalsoberelatingtheproblemsofevidenceinlawtothehandlingofevidencein other kinds of practical decision-making and in other disciplines, with a degree of common sense (Twining 2006). Other hybrid attempts, combining probability theory, epistemology, economic analysis and moral philosophy, involve focusing evidence law on apportioning the risk of error in conditions of uncertainty (Stein 2005).Meanwhile,Europeanlegaltheoryremainslargelywithdrawnfromproduc- ingnewtheoreticalaccountsoflegalevidence. In summary, the need for theoretical investigation of evidence seems to have gatheredmomentuminthecurrentstateoflegalscholarshipdevotedtoproblemsof evidence. Not that it is scarce—on the contrary. However, when it comes to more theoreticalaccountsitiseitherattheleveloflaymanpsychology,disinterestedinthe use of latest trends and knowledge taken from other scholarly disciplines, or it is specialised to the degree of being detached from lawyers’ perceptions. The same conclusionmay apply towhat thelegal practitioners,especiallyjudges,do.Onthe onehand,theymostlyseemtorelyonthe‘hardscience’ofexpertopinions,onthe other, they can be satisfied with commonsensical, albeit uncritical evidence reasoning. 2 Main Ideas Guiding the Book “Theory of Legal Evidence - Evidence in Legal Theory”, being a collection of contributions from legal theorists experienced in different legal cultures, including notjustEurope,butalsoLatinAmericaandtheUnitedStates,followsthemainidea oftheneedforaninterdisciplinaryapproachtothestudyofstandardsofproofand evidence-taking in law. As the opening article of Olivier Leclerc’s suggests, the volume emphasizes the need to revive and re-assess the approach characteristic of the legal scholarship of the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth century, with its interestinsocialandnaturalsciencesandopennesstothetransatlanticdialogue.This interdisciplinary approach, rather widespread and willingly declared in contemporary academic writing, is put to work in the present volume with regard to to two specificdimensionsofintegrationoflegalscholarship. First, the authors of thearticles differ in their theoreticalprofiles and methodologies, but they all share the interdisciplinary and externally-integrating view of legalscholarship,callingfortheinclusionofsocialsciencesandhumanitiesinorder tograspthecomplexpictureofhicetnunclawinaction,andevidencefunctioning within it. This view, for most authors—especially those of European tradition— follows from the dissatisfaction with the European legal scholarship’s self- imposed isolation and growing focus on the technical side of dogmatic analysis. This is true, perhaps surprisingly, of both Western and post-communist legal systems. Such an opinion about legal scholarship in Europe appears to be vague, and some exceptions to the general trend can be shown, but the intersection between socialsciencesandlawremains,forthemostpart,neglectedinthecaseofevidence