Theories of Perception in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy PDF
Preview Theories of Perception in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy
THEORIESOFPERCEPTIONINMEDIEVALANDEARLYMODERN PHILOSOPHY STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY OF MIND Volume6 Editors HenrikLagerlund,TheUniversityofWesternOntario,Canada MikkoYrjo¨nsuuri,AcademyofFinlandandUniversityofJyva¨skyla¨,Finland BoardofConsultingEditors LilliAlanen,UppsalaUniversity,Sweden Joe¨lBiard,UniversityofTours,France MichaelDellaRocca,YaleUniversity,U.S.A. Eyjo´lfurEmilsson,UniversityofOslo,Norway Andre´ Gombay,UniversityofToronto,Canada PatriciaKitcher,ColumbiaUniversity,U.S.A. SimoKnuuttila,UniversityofHelsinki,Finland Be´atriceM.Longuenesse,NewYorkUniversity,U.S.A. CalvinNormore,UniversityofCalifornia,LosAngeles,U.S.A. AimsandScope Theaimoftheseriesistofosterhistoricalresearchintothenatureofthinkingand the workings of the mind. The volumes address topics of intellectual history that wouldnowadaysfallintodifferentdisciplineslikephilosophyofmind,philosoph- icalpsychology,artificialintelligence,cognitivescience,etc.Themonographsand collections of articles in the series are historically reliable as well as congenial to the contemporary reader. They provide original insights into central contem- porary problems by looking at them in historical contexts, addressing issues like consciousness, representation and intentionality, mind and body, the self and the emotions. In this way, the books open up new perspectives for research on these topics. THEORIES OF PERCEPTION IN MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN PHILOSOPHY Editedby SIMOKNUUTTILA UniversityofHelsinki,Finland and PEKKAKA¨RKKA¨INEN UniversityofHelsinki,Finland Editors SimoKnuuttila PekkaKa¨rkka¨inen UniversityofHelsinki UniversityofHelsinki DepartmentofSystematic DepartmentofSystematic Theology Theology Aleksanterinkatu7 Aleksanterinkatu7 FI-00014Helsinki FI-00014Helsinki Finland Finland ISBN:978-1-4020-6124-0 e-ISBN:978-1-4020-6125-7 LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2007938165 (cid:2)c 2008SpringerScience+BusinessMediaB.V. Nopartofthisworkmaybereproduced,storedinaretrievalsystem,ortransmitted inanyformorbyanymeans,electronic,mechanical,photocopying,microfilming,recording orotherwise,withoutwrittenpermissionfromthePublisher,withtheexception ofanymaterialsuppliedspecificallyforthepurposeofbeingentered andexecutedonacomputersystem,forexclusiveusebythepurchaserofthework. Printedonacid-freepaper. 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 springer.com Contents Preface............................................................ vii Contributors....................................................... xi Aristotle’sTheoryofPerceptionandMedievalAristotelianism .......... 1 SimoKnuuttila PlotinusonSensePerception......................................... 23 Eyjo´lfurKjalarEmilsson TheStoicsonSensePerception....................................... 35 Ha˚vardLøkke DegreesofAbstractioninAvicenna................................... 47 CristinaD’Ancona TheOntologicalEntailmentsofAverroes’UnderstandingofPerception .. 73 AlfredL.Ivry RobertKilwardbyonSensePerception ............................... 87 Jose´ FilipeSilva PerceivingOne’sOwnBody .........................................101 MikkoYrjo¨nsuuri Pietrod’AbanoandtheAnatomyofPerception ........................117 HenrikLagerlund IdQuoCognoscimus................................................131 RobertPasnau SeeingandJudging:OckhamandWodehamonSensoryCognition ......151 DominikPerler v vi Contents HorseSenseandHumanSense:TheHeterogeneityofSensePerception inBuridan’sPhilosophicalPsychology ................................171 JackZupko ObjectsofSensePerceptioninLateMedievalErfurtianNominalism .....187 PekkaKa¨rkka¨inen RenaissanceViewsofActivePerception...............................203 LeenSpruit TimeandPerceptioninLateRenaissanceAristotelianism...............225 MichaelEdwards Malebranche’sOntologicalProblemofthePerceptionofBodies .........245 MartinePe´charman LockeontheIntentionalityofSensoryIdeas...........................271 RalphSchumacher AuthorIndex ......................................................285 SubjectIndex ......................................................291 Preface Senseperceptionisoneoftheclassicalthemesinphilosophy.Althoughperhapsnot amongthemostexcitingtopics,itistraditionallyconsideredanecessarypreamble to many of these, such as the mind-body relationship, consciousness, knowledge, and scepticism. This introductory role is not the only reason for the philosophical interest in perception. It is also a phenomenon which raises important questions about what is perceived, how a perceptual experience is caused, what the content of perception is, whether this content is conceptual, how perception is related to epistemicattitudes,andsoon.Whilephilosophicalpsychologyisthemainareain whichperceptionisdealtwithincontemporaryphilosophy,itisalsodiscussedinthe theory of knowledge, cognitive science, philosophical aesthetics and metaphysics. Inrecentyears,therichtraditionofvariousphilosophicaltheoriesofperceptionhas beenincreasinglystudiedbyscholarsofthehistoryofphilosophyofmind.Itmay beaddedthatthereisofcoursealargenumberofscientificstudiesofperceptionin psychology,physiologyandcontemporaryneuroscience. The aim of this collection is to shed light on the developments in theories of sense-perceptioninmedievalArabicandLatinphilosophy,theirancientbackground, andtraditionalandnewthemesinearlymodernthought.Aristotle’streatisesOnthe Soul and On Sense and Sensibilia are the most influential philosophical works on perception.Themaintenetsofhistheoryandthecentralthemesofthephilosophy ofperceptioninmedievalAristotelianismarediscussedbySimoKnuuttila.Manyof thequestionsputforwardinthischapterarealsodealtwithinotherpapersinthis volume.ThecentralAristotelianideaisthatthesensesareperceptualpowerswhich arecausallyactivatedbythethingswhicharetheobjectsofperceptions.Aristotle’s approach to perception and other psychological matters by analysing various po- tentialitiesandtheirinteractionhasbeenverypopularinthehistoryofphilosophy, andeventhoughthephysicalaspectsofAristotle’stheoryarebadlyoutdated,many (thoughnotall)philosophersinterestedinancientthoughtcontinuetoconsiderita valuableconceptualmodel. AnotherinfluentialancienttheorywasPlotinus’Neoplatonicaccountofpercep- tion,whichisdiscussedbyEyjo´lfurEmilsson.PlotinusreinterpretedtheAristotelian theoryfromthepointofviewofhisstrictdualism.Externalcausalityisrestrictedto thechanges insense-organs.The realsubjectofperception istheimmaterialsoul, whichcanbedirectlyawareofprocessesinsense-organs,withoutbeingaffectedby vii viii Preface theminanyway.NeoplatonicviewsinfluencedmedievalArabicandLatinthought by several routes. The Stoic theory of perception, which is analysed by Ha˚vard Løkke,isathirdancienttheorywhichshapedlaterdiscussions.Thisapproachwas associatedwithaspecialcausalviewofthephysiologicalaspectofperceptionand psychologicalassumptionswhichstressedtheactivityofthesubjectinawaywhich wascompatiblewiththeantidualistmetaphysicsoftheStoics.Someelementsofthe Stoictheory,suchastheconceptionofself-perceptionandperceptiveattention,were also embedded in Neoplatonic accounts of perception, including the Augustinian tradition. The elements of ancient theories were known to early medieval Latin authors through works of Augustine, the translation of Nemesius of Emesa’s De natura hominis by Alfanus of Salerno c. 1080 and then Burgundio of Pisa c. 1165. The sixthbookofAvicenna’sShifa¯’,translatedbyGundissalinusandAvendauthc.1150 as Avicenna’s De anima, was another source for Latin psychology before the sys- tematicstudiesofAristotle’spsychologicalworks,whichreceivedanimpulsefrom thetranslationof Averroes’s commentaries inc.1230. Avicenna’s work combined Aristotelian, Galenic and Neoplatonic themes. Its Neoplatonic elements are sur- veyed by Cristina D’Ancona, particularly the role of sense perception in forming universalconceptsandAvicenna’sattempttocombineAristotelianandNeoplatonic ideas of concept formation. Averroes’s interpretation of Aristotle’s conception of thescienceofthesoulisdealtwithbyAlfredIvry,aswellAverroes’stheoryofthe sensitiveformasanintentioninthemediumandthesouland,furthermore,therole of these intentions in forming universal concepts. Ivry is particularly interested in howtheindividualpowersofperceptionandimaginationarerelatedtotheactsof theintellect,whichisunderstoodintermsofnon-individualmonopsychism. Thirteenth-century commentaries on Aristotle’s psychological works by Albert theGreat,ThomasAquinasandothersusuallytookupthequestionsofthelocation oftheunifyingcommonsensewhichalsowastheultimateseatofallexternalsenses, thenatureofthe‘spiritual’or‘intentional’changeintheorganandthemediumbe- tweentheobjectandthesense-organ,andhowthesensibleandintelligiblespecies which activate perceptual and intellectual capacities are the same as sensible and intelligibleformsintheobjects.Thesetopics,whichweremedieval developments ofAristotelianthemes,arebrieflydescribedinKnuuttila’spaper.Jose´ FilipeSilva discussestheattempttoreconcileAristotelianandAugustinianideasinRobertKil- wardby’s De spiritu phantastico, written in the 1250s. Employing the medical vo- cabularyofthepsychicspirit,Kilwardbydescribestheaffectsofsense-organsand nervesascorporealmotions.Perceptionsthemselvesareactsoftheimmaterialsen- sitivespirit,whichiscontinuouslyawareofthemovementsofthecorporealspirits. In addition to the Neoplatonic criticism of the passivity of perception, some thinkers were sceptical of the interpretations of the Aristotelian doctrines of the change of the medium and the reception of sensible form without matter. Peter JohnOlivicriticizedthetheoryofthemultiplicationofspecieswhichcombinedthe AristotelianideaofthechangeofthemediumwithAlhazen’stheoryofoptics.Olivi took this to imply a representationalist view of perception which was in disagree- ment with the direct realism of his theory of active perception. William Ockham Preface ix found the spiritual change in the medium more problematic than the assumption that perceptual objects activated perceptual powers without any meditation. These questions are dealt with in Robert Pasnau’s book Theories of Cognition in Later Middle Ages, 1997, in which he also argues for the representationalist nature of Aquinas’saccountofsensitiveandintellectualcognition.InhispaperRobertPasnau re-evaluateshismuch-debatedthesisbydiscussingthedifficultiesofscholasticau- thors in explaining the inherence of accidental forms in their subjects and, analo- gously, the actuality of sensible forms in the sensitive soul. Dominik Perler deals withOckham’sideasaboutsensoryandintellectualcognitionofparticularobjects, criticismofOckham’sviewbyAdamWodeham,andtheconceptionofsensoryde- ception in Ockham. Ockham’s cognitive realism was characterized by a refutation of the spiritual change in the medium and abstract universal objects. He argued that immediate sensory cognition differred from immediate intellectual cognition ofpresentthings,theformerbeingpre-conceptualandnon-judicativeandthelatter conceptual and accompanied by a judgement. Wodeham did not accept that there was a gap between sensory and intellectual acts so that we would need a separate act of conceptualizing the content of a sensory act. This controversy revived the questionofthecognitiveelementofperceptionwhichwasdiscussedearlierinthe Stoictheory. Although medieval discussions of the five senses largely concentrated on sight, allsensesweredealtwithintreatisesonAristotle’spsychologicalworksandsome ofthemelsewhereaswell.OneexampleisPeterJohnOlivi’stheoryofthesenseof touchandtheperceptionofone’sownbody.ThisisdiscussedbyMikkoYrjo¨nsuuri, who also analyses the levels of self-reflexivity in Olivi and compares his views of touch with those of Pietro d’Abano and Descartes. Pietro d’Abano’s extensive work Conciliator differentiarum philosophorum et medicorum contained among other things discussions of such psychological and physiological views of percep- tionaswerethoughtcontroversialintheearlyfourteenthcentury.HenrikLagerlund analysesd’Abano’sviewsofsense-organs,thenaturalandspiritualchangesinthe medium and the perception as a mental act. These considerations were known to Renaissanceauthors;d’Abano’sbookwasprintedmanytimessince1472. WhileOckhamarguedforapluralityofformsinlivingbeings,asmanyFranciscan thinkersdid,JohnBuridan(d.after1358)thoughtthateachindividualhadonlyone soul of its own which was ultimately responsible for their various functions. Jack Zupko discusses Buridan’s position that the human soul, as distinct from the soul ofanimals,isindivisibleandnon-extensive.Thesensationsofhumanbeingsconse- quentlydifferfromthoseofanimals,evenwhenthesense-organsaresimilar.Zupko stresses that in Buridan’s view the operation of the human senses is miraculous. Thereisnoexplanationofhowtheempiricallyobservedfunctionsofthesensesare related to the sensory activity of the soul. Another controversial question among the followers of Ockham and Buridan pertained to whether external perceptions were about perceptible qualities or whether they also involved a perception of the substance.PekkaKa¨rkka¨inendealswiththisdebateamonglatemedievalnominal- ists in Erfurt,particularly Johannes de Lutrea and Bartholomaeus Usingen. Lutrea regarded the objects of sense perception as consisting exclusively of accidents,
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