Theories of Democratization

17 Pages·0.112 MB·English

by  Welzel C.

Theories of
16
Democratization
Christian Welzel
(cid:127) Introduction 74
(cid:127) The Nature and Origin of Democracy 75
(cid:127) Social Divisions, Distributional Equality, and Democratization 78
(cid:127) Colonial Legacies, Religious Traditions, and Democracy 80
(cid:127) Modernization and Democratization 80
(cid:127) International Confl icts, Regime Alliances, and Democratization 81
(cid:127) Elite Pacts, Mass Mobilization, and Democratization 82
(cid:127) State Repression and Democratizing Mass Pressures 83
(cid:127) Institutional Confi gurations and Democracy 86
(cid:127) The Human Empowerment Path to Democracy 86
(cid:127) A Typology of Democratization Processes 87
(cid:127) Conclusion 88
Overview
This chapter provides an overview of the factors that describes human empowerment as an evolutionary
have been proposed as determinants when, where, force channelling the intentions and strategies of
and why democratization happens. Several of these actors towards democratic outcomes.
factors are synthesized into a broader framework that
Introduction
The question: which political regime prevails in Democratization can be understood in three
which society, and why, has been at the heart of diff erent ways. For one, it is the introduction of
political science since Aristotle’s fi rst treatment of democracy in a non-democratic regime. Next, democ-
the problem. And so is the question as to when and ratization can be understood as the deepening of the
why societies democratize. democratic qualities of given democracies. Finally,
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6 THEORIES OF DEMOCRATIZATION 75
democratization involves the question of the survival There are many different explanations of democ-
of democracy. Technically speaking, the emergence, ratization processes. Provided a grain of truth is in
the deepening, and the survival of democracy are most of these explanations, researchers have too
strictly distinct aspects of democratization. But they often tried to take sides, favouring one particular
merge in the question of sustainable democratization, factor over all others. But the real challenge is to
that is, the emergence of democracies that develop theorize about how different factors interplay in the
and endure. Democratization is sustainable to the making of democracy. This is what this chapter aims
extent to which it advances in response to pressures to achieve.
from within a society.
The Nature and Origin of Democracy
Before one can think about the causes of democra- mount pressure on elites (Tarrow 1998). Under these
tization one has to have an understanding of what conditions, bargaining power is vested in wider parts
democracy means—for one needs to have an idea of the public as elites cannot access their resources
of the nature of the phenomenon one wants to without consent. And if elites try to extract resources
explain. from people, they have to make concessions in the
In its literal meaning, ‘government by the people’, form of civic freedoms. Such was the case when the
democracy is about the institutionalization of people principle of ‘no taxation without representation’ was
power. Democratization is the process by which this established during pre-industrial capitalism in North
happens. People power is institutionalized through America and Western Europe (Downing 1992).
civic freedoms that entitle people to govern their lives, To be sure, no democracy in pre-industrial history
allowing them to follow their personal preferences in would qualify as a democracy under today’s standards
governing their private lives and to make their politi- because one defi ning element of mature democracies,
cal preferences count in governing public life. universal suffrage, was unknown. All pre-industrial
In the history of states, the institutionalization democracies were nascent democracies that restricted
of people power has been an unlikely achievement. entitlements to the propertied classes. But nascent
As power maximizing actors, power elites have a democracy was necessary to create mature democ-
natural tendency to give as little power away as racy, encouraging yet disempowered groups to also
possible. There is a natural resistance among elites push for civic freedoms, until universal suffrage cre-
to grant civic freedoms to the wider public because ated mature democracies early in the twentieth cen-
such freedoms limit elite power (Vanhanen 2003). tury in parts of the Western world (Markoff 1996).
To acquire civic freedoms, ordinary people had usu- Since then people’s struggles for empowerment have
ally to overcome elite resistance and to struggle for continued and expanded. Within established democ-
their cause (Foweraker and Landman 1997). This is racies, civil rights and equal opportunity movements
no easy achievement. It requires wider parts of the did and do fi ght to deepen democracy’s empower-
public to be both capable and willing to mount pres- ing qualities. Beyond established democracies, peo-
sures on power elites. ple power movements did and do pressure to replace
Quite logically then, the conditions under which authoritarian rule with democracy.
democracy becomes likely must somehow affect the It is impossible to understand the driving forces
power balance between elites and masses, placing con- of democratization without understanding why and
trol over resources of power in the hands of the peo- where democracy fi rst emerged. So we must have
ple. Only when some control over resources of power a closer look at the origin of nascent democracy in
is distributed over wider parts of the public, are ordi- pre-industrial times and the factors giving rise to it.
nary people capable to coordinate their actions and to Without exception, all nascent democracies are found
join forces into social movements that are capable to in agrarian economies of the freeholder type. Most
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76 CHRISTIAN WELZEL
freeholder societies organized defence in the form of a Zealand (Midlarsky 1997). These are the areas where
militia, the citizen-army (Finer 1999). In a freeholder- we fi nd the threefold constellation of freeholdership,
militia system, all men owning a slot of land provide pre-industrial capitalism, and nascent democracy.
military service and, in return, are entitled with civic Besides the continuity of rainfall, another natural
freedoms. In pre-industrial times, a citizen army could endowment was conducive to nascent democracy.
only be sustained in a freeholder system. Only the This condition, too, favours democracy by limiting
yeoman who could sustain a family on his own could centralized control over resources—in this case not
afford the armoury necessary for military service. In over water but armoury. When a territory is, by means
a freeholder-militia system citizens had bargaining of its topography, shielded from the continuous threat
power against central authorities—for citizens could of land war, there is no necessity to sustain a standing
boycott taxes and military service. Without a stand- army at the exclusive disposal of a monarch (Down-
ing army at their exclusive disposal, rulers lacked the ing 1992). With no standing army at hand, a ruler’s
means to end such boycotts, disabling them to deny control over coercion is limited. Hence, the proportion
or abrogate civic freedoms (McNeill 1968). of sea borders (an island position in the optimal case)
Nascent democracy limited participation to the has been found to be positively related with the occur-
propertied classes. Still, compared to other pre-indus- rence of nascent democracy (Midlarsky 1997). Iceland,
trial regimes, nascent democracy is characterized the UK, and Scandinavia are examples. A functional
by relatively inclusive civic freedoms. This constel- equivalent of the shielding effect of sea borders are
lation refl ects relatively widespread access to basic mountains. Shielded by the Alps from war with neigh-
resources, such as water, land, and armoury, and lack bours, Switzerland never needed a standing army. It
of central control over these resources. These con- sustained a freeholder-militia system, and is hence
ditions vest action capacities and bargaining power among the prime examples of nascent democracy.
into the wider society and limit the state’s repressive Since democracy is about people power, it origi-
potential. The absence versus presence of democracy nates in conditions that place resources of power in
is about the absence versus presence of centralized the hands of wider parts of the populace, such that
control over resources of power (Dahl 1971). authorities cannot access these resources without
making concessions to their beholders. But when rul-
ers gain access to a source of revenue they can bring
Democracy and resource distribution under their control without anyone’s consent, they
have the means to fi nance tools of coercion. This is
Freeholder systems not only gave rise to nascent the basis of absolutism, despotism, and autocracy—
democracy but also to pre-industrial capitalism. The the opposite of democracy. The Spanish monarchy
combination of freeholdership, pre-industrial capital- turned more absolute after the crown gained control
ism, and nascent democracy is hardly the result of an over the silver mines in South America. From then on,
ingenious act of social engineering, such that some the Spanish Habsburgs did not have to ask for consent
wise men decided at one point in history to create free- in the cortes to fi nance military operations (Landes
holdership, capitalism, and democracy. Instead, this 1998). This is a pre-modern example of what is today
constellation evolved in a cumulative process that was known as the ‘resource curse’. It is a curse for democra-
favoured by certain natural endowments. Freeholder cy when a country is endowed with immobile natural
systems only emerged where there was lack of central- resources that are easily brought under central con-
ized control over the resource that makes land valu- trol, giving rulers a source of revenue that requires no
able: water (Jones 1985). This was the case only where one’s consent (Boix 2003). These revenues allow rulers
continuous rainfall over the seasons made water so to invest into the infrastructure of their power. Thus,
generally available that a centrally coordinated irri- ‘oil hinders democracy’ as Michael Ross (2001) put it.
gation system was unnecessary (Midlarsky 1997). So, we fi nd both prosperity and democracy to be
Continuous rainfall over the seasons is only found associated with climate. The more temperate the cli-
in certain climatic zones, especially in North-West mate of a country, the more likely it is both to be rich
Europe, North America, and parts of Australia/New and democratic (Landes 1998). According to A cemoglu
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6 THEORIES OF DEMOCRATIZATION 77
and Robinson (2006), the geographic pattern of both society. In the liberal revolutions and the liberation
prosperity and democracy simply refl ects that white wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the
Europeans embarked early on a path of both capital- middle classes used this bargaining power against
ist and democratic development. They brought with monarchs to establish the principle ‘no taxation
them the institutions of capitalism and democracy without representation’ (Tilly 1997). This is the birth
wherever they could settle in larger numbers, that is, of nascent democracy, and capitalism preceded it.
wherever they found a European-like climate. And However, two qualifi cations of the claim that capi-
when they settled in hotter climates, such as the talism led to democracy are due (see also Ch. 9). First,
Southern states of the USA or Brazil, they brought capitalism led to democracy only where propertied
slavery and other exploitative institutions with them groups, such as rural freeman and urban merchants,
and resisted democracy. In this view, the global geo- represented broad middle classes—not tiny minori-
graphic distribution of capitalism and democracy ties (Moore 1966). This condition was limited to the
simply refl ects where climate ‘required’ Europeans hubs of the pre-industrial capitalist world economy,
settlers to introduce slavery and exploitative planta- centring on North-West Europe and its overseas colo-
tion economies. nial offshoots in North America (Wallerstein 1974).
But why did Europeans embark on a path of capital- Colonies that were unsuited for large-scale European
ist-democratic development? Simply viewing this as a settlement were kept under an exploitative regime.
smart historic choice of Europeans is unsatisfactory. Democracy was not imported by Europeans where the
Following Jared Diamond (1997), the more likely colonial interest was focused on extraction rather than
reason why Europeans embarked on a course of capi- settlement (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). Second,
talist-democratic development is that some unique pre-industrial capitalism only ever established nascent
natural endowments made this a more likely ‘choice’ democracy, limiting civic freedoms to the propertied
in Europe than elsewhere. classes. The establishment of mature democracy with
universal (male) suffrage was a product of industrializa-
tion and the working class’s struggle for political inclu-
sion (Huber, Stephens, and Rueschemeyer 1992). Yet,
Capitalism, industrialization, and
industrialization did not always lead to mature democ-
democracy
racy, at least not to enduring mature democracy. Mature
democracy in a stable form followed industrialization
One of the reasons why the duo of pre-industrial cap- only where royal absolutism was prevented or aban-
italism and nascent democracy emerged in Europe, doned and where nascent democracy was established
is that, among the major pre-industrial civilizations, already in pre-industrial times (Huntington 1968).
Europe was the only one that sustained rainfed free- There is no uniform connection between industri-
holder societies on a larger scale (Jones 1985). But alization and democracy. In fact, the fi erce class strug-
within Europe, this feature varies on a geographical gles connected with the rising industrial working
gradient, becoming ever more pronounced as one class often operated against democracy. Of course,
moves north-westward, culminating in the Nether- industrialization almost always led to the symbolic
lands and England. integration of the working class by granting universal
As one approaches Europe’s north-west, the conti- suffrage. But universal suffrage was as often organ-
nuity of rainfall increases as a result of the infl uence ized in authoritarian ways as in democratic ones.
of the Gulf Stream. In late medieval times, this led to Communist, fascist, and other forms of dictatorship
an increasing agrarian surplus towards the north-west all adopted universal suffrage in the industrial age.
(Jones 1985). From this followed an entire chain of And while the working class almost always fought
consequences, as shown in Figure 6.1: a larger urban for universal suffrage, it often sided with populist,
population, a denser network of cities, a more com- fascist, and communist parties that aborted the civic
mercialized economy, more advanced capitalism, and freedoms that defi ne democracy (Lipset 1960).
bigger and economically more powerful middle class- Achieving mature democracy in a stable form at an
es. Capitalism vested bargaining power in the wider early stage was neither the achievement of the m iddle
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78 CHRISTIAN WELZEL
Closeness to the
Northern Atlantic
Stronger commer-
Larger urban
cialization and
More continuous Greater agrarian population and Sea trade and
monetization of
rainfall surplus greater density settler colonies
the economy: pre-
of cities
industrial capitalism
Bigger and more
powerful middle
classes
Rulers’attempts at Liberal revolutions
unconsented taxation and liberation wars
Prevention or Democratic Abondining the
overcoming of freedoms for privileges of
royal absolutism the propertied the feudal
classes: nascent aristocracy
democracy
Middle classes not
blocking the working Early
class’s claim for industrialization
universal suffrage
Early Full Democracy
Fig 6.1 Factors explaining the northern Atlantic origins of capitalism and democracy
classes nor the working class alone. It appeared on state repression was an option in dealing with
when the middle classes did not take sides against the working class. Partly for reasons originating in
the working class (Collier 1999). This in turn only natural endowments, these conditions were histori-
happened when the middle classes’ victory over the cally unique to North-West Europe and its overseas
aristocracy and royal absolutism was so decisive that offshoots (Moore 1966).
neither an alliance with the aristocracy, nor reliance
Social Divisions, Distributional Equality, and
Democratization
Except under conditions found in North-West cleavages and group distinctions turn into enmity,
Europe and its overseas offshoots, the social class political camps fi ght for the monopolization of state
struggles associated with industrialization did not power in order to become capable of repressing the
generally work in favour of democracy. This can claims of rival groups. This pattern works against
be turned into a more general point. When class democracy (Dahl 1971).
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6 THEORIES OF DEMOCRATIZATION 79
Class cleavages turn easily into enmities when the state (Dahl 1971). Peaceful power transfers from
classes are segregated into separated milieus, when one group to another, as democracy foresees them,
political parties are single-class parties, and when are not accepted under these conditions. Instead,
the distribution of economic resources between military coups and civil wars that end up in the
classes is extremely unequal. Under such circum- dictatorship of one group over others are the reg-
stances, class coalitions and compromises are ular result of polarized societal cleavage structures
unlikely. Rivalry and enmity between groups will (Huntington 1968).
prevail (Lipset 1960). In European countries with a The logic of group enmity does not only apply
tradition of royal absolutism and continued privi- to social class. Societies can also be segregated into
leges of the aristocracy, industrialization regularly hostile groups on the basis of religion, language, and
produced such class divisions, polarizing an impov- ethnicity, and the chances for this to happen increase
erished rural and urban working class against a priv- with a country’s religious, linguistic, and ethnic frac-
ileged class of land owners, industrialists, bankers tionalization, especially when fractionalization goes
and offi ce holders in the state apparatus and the together with spatial group segregation (Rokkan
army (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Outside Europe, 1983). Spatial segregation facilitates the stabiliza-
industrialization had the same effect in areas the tion of group identities, and this is an important pre-
Europeans colonized out of ‘extractive interests’ condition for the development of group hostilities.
rather than for reasons of settlement (Acemoglu Sub-Saharan Africa, as the region with the highest
and Robinson 2006). ethnic fractionalization, exemplifi es the latter type
Wherever industrialization produced class polari- of group enmity and its negative effect on the chanc-
zation of this kind, the privileged classes would fear es of democracy to emerge and survive (see Ch. 22).
working class parties to be voted into offi ce. Once in These insights can be turned into positive conditions
offi ce, these parties might use their power to enforce for the emergence and survival of democracy. The
land reforms and other redistributive measures that presence of a large middle class, in whom economic
deprive the privileged classes of their privileges. Thus, differences do not go beyond a certain range, is a con-
the privileged classes would rely on state repres- dition that eases group enmity, which in turn increas-
sion to prevent working class parties from gaining es the acceptance of democratic power transfers
power. Confronted with state repression, working between groups. Seen in this light, the transition
class activists would, in turn, radicalize and embrace of industrial to post-industrial societies is a positive
revolutionary goals, aimed at a total reversion of the development because it overcomes the sharp division
existing social order (Collier 1999). This is pretty between the working class and the privileged classes
much the pattern that explains Latin America’s long that characterized the industrial age (Bell 1973).
lasting capture between right-wing military regimes When resources are more equally distributed across
and leftist guerrilla warfare (see Ch. 19). socioeconomic, religious, ethnic, and other groups,
Democratic countries in the ‘centre’ of world capi- this can diminish existential hostilities, making
talism would often support the repression of work- groups more inclined to accept each other as legiti-
ing class interests in the ‘periphery’ in order to be mate contenders for political power. If there is less
able to outsource labour into cheap-wage regions at stake in the power game, all groups can be more
and in order to prevent communism from taking relaxed about others winning the game for just one
over countries in the capitalist periphery. During the electoral round. Relative equality in the distribution
Cold War, and before the Washington consensus, of resources has thus a diminishing effect on hostili-
the capitalist world system favoured democracy in ties for all sorts of groupings, be they class-related or
the centres of capitalism, but authoritarian rule in ethnicity-related. In models explaining democratiza-
its periphery (Wallerstein 1974). In any case, it can tion, measures of income distribution are often used
be said that extreme social polarization is detrimen- and have many times been found to signifi cantly
tal to democracy because group polarization turns increase the chances of democracy to emerge and
easily into violent fi ghts for the monopolization of survive (Muller 1995; Vanhanen 2003).
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80 CHRISTIAN WELZEL
Colonial Legacies, Religious Traditions, and
Democracy
In its northern Atlantic origins, democracy is inti- have been granted, creating constitutional monar-
mately connected to two traditions: Protestant reli- chies that are anchored in society rather than being
gion and British descent (Lipset 1959). But this does absolute from it (Lipset 1960).
not mean that Protestantism and British descent Similarly misunderstood is the relationship between
per se favoured democracy. They did so insofar as Islam and democracy. It has often been said that Islamic
they were situated in the northern Atlantic centre traditions are unfavourable to democratization (Hunt-
of pre-industrial capitalism (Bollen and Jackman ington 1996). And indeed, the belt of Islamic countries
1985). Neither Protestantism nor Britishness created from North-West Africa to South-East Asia is still the
pre-industrial capitalism. Countries such as the least democratized region in the world. However, this
Netherlands, Iceland, and Denmark, were located might not refl ect a negative infl uence of Islam per se.
at the northern Atlantic and so they embraced pre- Instead, for reasons of natural endowments, an unu-
industrial capitalism and nascent democracy, despite sual proportion of Islamic societies have based their
the fact that they were not British. Vice versa, Prot- economies on the export of oil. This places revenues
estant Prussia was far off the northern Atlantic, so it in the hands of rulers without requiring anyone’s con-
neither embraced pre-industrial capitalism nor nas- sent, which is what explains the absence of democ-
cent democracy (Tilly 1997). Belgium, by contrast, racy. As Michael Ross (2001; 2008) argues, Islam has
was mainly Catholic but it is located at the northern little negative effect of its own on democracy, once
Atlantic, so it adopted pre-industrial capitalism and one controls for oil exports. The same logic that
nascent democracy. Contrary to Max Weber (1958 explains why the capitalist development of Protestant
[1904]), who claimed that Protestantism created societies favoured democracy explains why oil exports
capitalism, it is just as plausible to argue that socie- in the Islamic societies hinders democracy. Capitalist
ties that were already capitalist adopted Protestant- development tends to spread control over resources of
ism as the religion granting the most legitimacy to power among wider parts of the society. Oil exports,
the capitalist system (Landes 1998). by contrast, tend to concentrate control over resourc-
The relationship between Protestantism and cap- es of power in the hands of dynasties (see also Chs 8
italist democracy is as easily misunderstood as the and 21). On a more general note, explaining certain
fact that many of the early democracies are still mon- countries’ affi nity or aversion to democracy by criteria
archies today (e.g. UK, The Netherlands, Scandina- that simply group them into ‘cultural zones,’ ‘civiliza-
vian countries). Monarchies survived until today in tions’, or ‘families of nation’ is inherently unsatisfac-
some of the oldest democracies because these monar- tory as long as one cannot specify what exactly it is
chies did not insist on royal absolutism. Instead, they about these grouping criteria that creates these affi ni-
negotiated social contracts by which civic freedoms ties and aversions.
Modernization and Democratization
Because of democracy’s obvious link to capitalist 1994). The thesis that modernization favours democ-
development, ‘modernization’ has been most often ratization has been repeatedly challenged, but time
championed as the decisive driver of democratization and again it has been re-established against these
(Lerner 1958; Lipset 1959; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck challenges. Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi
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6 THEORIES OF DEMOCRATIZATION 81
(1997), for instance, thought to demonstrate that actions for common demands, mounting effective
modernization only helps existing democracies to pressures on state authorities to respond. Given that
survive but does not help democracy to emerge, but state authorities, by the nature of their positional
Carles Boix and Susan Stokes (2003) used their data interest, aim to preserve as much autonomy from
to show that modernization operates in favour of mass pressures as possible, democratization is an
both the emergence and the survival of democracy. unlikely result, unless the masses become capable
As of today, the fact that modernization operates in to overcome the authorities’ resistance to empower
favour of democracy is beyond serious doubts. them (Vanhanen 2003). The major effect of mod-
The reasons as to exactly what it is about mod- ernization, then, is that it shifts the power balance
ernization that operates in favour of democracy are between elites and the masses to the mass side.
less clear. Modernization constitutes a whole bun-
dle of intertwined processes, including productivity
growth, urbanization, occupational specialization,
social diversifi cation, rising levels of income and
prosperity, rising literacy rates and levels of educa- Box 6.1 Key points
tion, more widely accessible information, more
intellectually demanding professions, technological (cid:127) Social divisions that foster group enmities hinder
advancement in people’s equipment and available peaceful power transfers that are necessary for
infrastructure, including means of communication democracy to function.
and transportation, and so on. Which of these proc- (cid:127) Democracy is anchored in social conditions in which
esses does exactly what to increase the chances of a resources of power are widely distributed among the
country to become and remain democratic is an unre- population so that central authority cannot access
solved problem, and most likely these effects are not these resources without their beholders consent.
isolable. Perhaps, it is precisely the fact that they are
(cid:127) Certain natural conditions have been favourable to
so closely intertwined that makes them so powerful.
a more widespread control over resources but mod-
One thing, however, seems clear that all these ernization can happen everywhere and it is impor-
processes do together. They enhance the resources tant because it tends to distribute the control over
available to ordinary people, and this increases the resources in the ways that favour democracy.
masses’ capabilities to launch and sustain collective
International Confl icts, Regime Alliances, and
Democratization
The fact that scores of countries have democratized confrontations between the enduring alliance of
in distinctive international waves suggests that proc- Western democracies and shifting counter-alliances
esses of democratization cannot be considered as of antidemocratic empires. Thus, regime changes
isolated domestic events (see Chs 4 and 7). They are towards and away from democracy are not only a
infl uenced by international factors, especially the matter of power struggles between pro-democratic
outcome of confrontations between opposing regime and antidemocratic forces within countries. Instead,
alliances. Therborn (1977) noticed that countries power struggles between opposing regime forces
democratize as much as a consequence of wars as of take also place on the international stage, in con-
modernization. frontations between democratic and antidemocratic
Whether, and when, countries democratize has regime alliances. Indeed, three waves of democratiza-
often been decided by the outcome of i nternational tion followed precisely such confrontations. W estern
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82 CHRISTIAN WELZEL
democracies defeated the alliance of Germany, insofar as people fi nd freedom and prosperity attrac-
Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire in World tive, democracy has become the preferred type of
War I; this led to a (later reversed) wave of democ- regime in most populations of the world (Fukuyama
ratization in Central and Eastern Europe. Western 1990; Klingemann 1999; Inglehart 2003).
democracies again, together with the Soviet Union, The economic, technological, and media domi-
defeated the fascist axis powers in World War II and nance of Western democracies are important explan-
this led to another wave of democratization, includ- atory factors in the recent spread of democracy.
ing, for the fi rst time, countries outside the West, such Democratization is hence, to some extent, an exter-
as India and Japan. Finally, Western democracies tri- nally triggered phenomenon. But whether externally
umphed over communism in the Cold War, leading triggered democratization leads to viable and effec-
to the most recent and massive wave of democratiza- tive democracy still depends on domestic conditions
tion throughout Eastern Europe and parts of Africa within a country. External infl uences can open impor-
and Asia (Huntington 1991, McFaul 2002). tant opportunities for democratic forces in countries
Part of the explanation as to why democracy has where such forces exist. But external infl uences can-
been spreading is the technological and military not create democratic forces where they do not exist.
superiority of democracies, and their tendency to And without democratic forces growing strong inside
join forces against antidemocratic empires. Togeth- a country, democracy will not be socially embedded.
er, these two factors have enabled democracies to It remains a socially aloof, and hence, hollow phe-
free societies from the tyranny of antidemocratic nomenon. Even if most people in a country associate
empires—when necessary, Western democracies have positive things with the term democracy, this does not
used their power to install democracy by military necessarily mean that people understand the freedoms
intervention, as in Grenada or Iraq. Since the 1980s, that defi ne democracy nor that they have the means
they have also used their economic power to press and the will to struggle for these freedoms.
countries depending on Western credits to adopt elec- Externally triggered democratization has led to
toral democracy. This was a dramatic paradigm shift. a spread of electoral democracy, but not necessar-
During the Cold War, the capitalist world system was ily effective democracy (Welzel and Inglehart 2008).
favourable to democracy in the centres of capitalism Many new democracies have successfully installed
and to authoritarian rule at its periphery. But since the competitive electoral regimes but their elites are
Washington consensus, Western countries promoted corrupt and lack a commitment to the rule of law
electoral democracy throughout the globe. Installing that is needed to enforce the civic freedoms that
a system of electoral accountability seemed to be a defi ne democracy (O’Donnell 2004). These defi cien-
better safeguard of investment security than the arbi- cies render democracy ineffective. The installation
trary rule of eccentric dictators, especially after com- of electoral democracy can be triggered by external
munism and socialism lost their appeal. In addition, forces and incentives. But whether electoral democ-
rich Western democracies dominate the global enter- racy becomes effective in respecting and protecting
tainment industry and images of the living condi- people’s civic freedoms depends on domestic factors.
tions in Western countries spread around the planet. Democracies have become effective only where the
Consequently, people associate everywhere democra- masses put the elites under pressure to respect their
cy with the freedom and prosperity of the West. And freedoms (Welzel and Inglehart 2008).
Elite Pacts, Mass Mobilization, and Democratization
Besides mass-level factors, actor constellations at the authoritarian rule to democracy, scholars distinguish
elite level are widely considered decisive for democ- two opposing sets of actors: the regime elite and the
ratization processes. Considering transitions from regime opposition. The regime elite is usually not
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6 THEORIES OF DEMOCRATIZATION 83
a monolithic bloc but a coalition of forces that can possible. This interpretation sees negotiated transi-
split under certain circumstances into an orthodox tions via elite pacts as the ideal path to democracy.
status quo camp and a liberal reform camp. The Mass anti-regime mobilization is not only unneces-
regime opposition, too, is often divided into a mod- sary for democratic regime transitions from this point
erate bargaining camp and a radical revolution camp of view; it even endangers their success by prompting
(Casper and Taylor 1996). the regime elite to close its ranks and tempting it to
The early transition literature argued that a regime issue repressive measures (Casper and Taylor 1996).
opposition in an authoritarian system cannot achieve The recent democratization literature has altered
a transition to democracy unless a split in the regime these views rather decisively, emphasizing the posi-
elite occurs and a liberal reform camp becomes visible tive role of non-violent mass opposition in knocking
(O’Donnell et al. 1986; Higley and Burton 2006). Such over authoritarian regimes and establishing democ-
a split is likely to occur after a major economic crisis, racy (Karatnycki and Ackerman 2005; Ulfelder 2005;
a lost war or other critical events that undermine the Welzel 2007). These studies show that democracy is
legitimacy of the regime. Such critical events lead to in most cases achieved when ordinary people strug-
the formation of a liberal reform camp that aims to gle for it against reluctant elites. Democratization
regain legitimacy by initiating a liberalization process. processes of recent decades have been most far-reach-
If in such a situation the regime opposition is domi- ing and most successful where the masses were mobi-
nated by a moderate camp whose proponents are will- lized into democracy movements in such numbers
ing to bargain with the reform camp in the regime and so ubiquitously that state authorities could not
elite, a negotiated transition to democracy becomes suppress them easily.
State Repression and Democratizing Mass Pressures
Recent studies on the positive role of mass opposi- when people come to fi nd appeal in the freedoms
tion have altered our view on the survival of authori- that defi ne democracy that they begin to consider
tarian regimes. Usually it was held that authoritarian dictatorial powers as illegitimate. Only then does the
regimes can use repression to silence opposition and threat of repression become a relevant stabilization
that this allows them to endure, even if the masses factor of authoritarian rule. And yet, there is ample
fi nd their regime preferences ‘falsifi ed’ (Kuran 1991). evidence from the non-violent, pro-democratic mass
However, most authoritarian regimes did not survive upheavals of recent decades that when a population
because of their ability to repress mass opposition begins to long for freedoms, mass opposition does
(Wintrobe 1998). In fact, most authoritarian regimes emerge—in spite of repressive threats (Karatnycki
did not have to deal with widespread mass opposi- and Ackerman 2005; Schock 2005; Welzel 2007).
tion most of the time (Francisco 2005). This might Once opposition becomes manifest, the success of
partly be so because a credible threat of repression attempts at repression does not only depend on the
alone can keep people from opposing a regime. Yet, extent of coercion used; it depends as much on the
for the credibility of repression to become the key size and scope of the mass opposition itself. Indeed,
factor in stabilizing authoritarian rule, there must be mass opposition can grow so wide that repression
a widespread belief in the illegitimacy of authoritar- becomes too costly, overwhelming the power holders’
ian rule in the fi rst place. And this does not always repressive capacities. In such cases power holders are
seem to be the case. In fact, as Samuel Huntington forced to open the way to a regime change. This hap-
(1991:143) notes, most of the authoritarian regimes pened quite often during the last three decades. Huge
that were swept away by mass opposition movements mass opposition swept away authoritarian regimes
late in the twentieth century, were initially ‘almost in scores of countries, including some strongly coer-
always popular and widely supported’. It is only cive regimes. The point here is that the desire for
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