Theodore Roosevelt, Culture, Diplomacy, and Expansion. A New View of American Imperialism

251 Pages·1985·41.401 MB·English

by  Richard H. Collin

Theodore Roosevelt,
Culture, Diplontacy,
and Expansion
!
A New View ofA merican Imperialism
RICHARD H. COLLIN
LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS
BATON ROUGE AND LONDON
Copyright© 1985 by Louisiana State University Press
All righrs reserved
Manufactured in the United States of America
Designer: Albert Crochet
Typeface: Linotron Galliard
Typesetter: G&S Typesetters, Inc.
Library ofC ongress Cataloging in Publication Data
Collin, Richard H.
Theodore Roosevelt, cuJrure, diplomacy, and expansion.
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
l. Roosevelt, Theodore, 1858- 1919. 2. United States
Foreign rclarions-1897- 1901. 3. United States- Foreign
rclarions-1901- 1909. 4. United States-Territorial
expansion. I. Title.
E757.C65 1985 973.91'1 84-25094
ISBN 0-8071-1214-3
The author gratefully acknowledges permission to quote from the following: Brigadier
General Frank McCoy, lmritled manuscript, May 19, 1919, in Theodore Roosevelt Col
lection, Harvard University, the Houghton Library, Cambridge, Mass., reprinted by per
mission of the Houghton Library. Elting E. Morison, john Blum, and Albert Chandler,
eds., The Letters of TheorWre Roosevelt, 8 vols., Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
Mass., 1950-54, reprinted by permission of Harvard University Press. The Papers of
Henry Cabot Lodge, the Papers of John D. Long, and the Papers of Agnes Storer, Mas
sachusetts Historical Society, Boston, Mass., reprinted by permission of the Massachu
setts Historical Society. Various documents in RU 45, Box 108, Smithsonian Institution
Archives, Washington, D.C., reprinted by premission of the Smithsonian Instirution
Archives.
'
\ r I
•'(
For my parents) Esther and Barney)
and for my wife) Rima
Contents
Preface and Acknowledgments tx
Abbreviations xi
Introduction 1
Part I
The New President 17
1 I Setting the Stage: American Cultural Expansion and Charles McKim's
Restoration of the White House 25
2 I Theodore Roosevelt's Salon: Style in the American Presidency 47
3 I Cultural Expansionism: Theodore Roosevelt and Charles Freer's
New National Art Museum 66
Part II
A New Balance of Power: Foreign Policy in the New Century 95
4 I The Legend of Imperialism: Theodore Roosevelt and the Myths
of the War of 1898 104
5 I The Legend of Anti-Imperialism: Theodore Roosevelt and the Not-So
Splendid War for Philippine Independence, 1896-1902 135
6 I Great Britain: A New Detente with an Old Enemy 154
7 I Theodore Roosevelt and the Alaskan Boundary Dispute: The Preservation
of the New Anglo-American Detente 173
Epilogue I Theodore Roosevelt and Henry James: Cultural Nationalism
versus Imperialism in Modern America 187
Bibliographical Essay 199
Index 237
Preface and
Acknowledgments
My historical relationship with Theodore Roosevelt began almost
twenty years ago. I am not at all sure that a personal meeting, even if it
were possible, would be as rewarding. Theodore Roosevelt would un
doubtedly charm and impress me, but the gulf between an academic
historian and a successful president is one not easily bridged. Besides,
we have other differences. Roosevelt was an aristocrat; I am a first
generation son of emigrant working-class parents from England, and a
member of a family that rarely even considers voting Republican. As a
child of the depression I grew up thinking that Franklin D. Roosevelt
and president were synonymous; FDR's death was my first inkling of
the possibility of monumental change in the world.
The Theodore Roosevelt I have written about is not the Theodore
Roosevelt that most people admire. Once in a frivolous moment, I
thought of titling the book "His Name Wasn't Teddy," but recon
sidered, lest I be remembered as the historian who tried to end the
Teddy legend. Nothing can (or should) change the enduring affection
for the aristocratic president known universally by his nickname. That
affection reflects the unique relationship of Americans and their presi
dents and the magic of charisma. This book is not about the legendary
Theodore Roosevelt but about the Theodore Roosevelt I have been
working with, a historical figure of substance as well as charm.
I am grateful for the advances in technology that changed my working
habits as this book progressed. The book began as a longhand draft on
legal pads; it was transcribed by typists, edited, retyped and reedited
ix
Preface andAcknowledgments
many times. In its final stages, the manuscript was copied onto com
puter disks. Perhaps the most comforting blessing of the computer as a
writing instrument is its elimination of the mountain of paper that inex
orably grows as a book progresses. The computer did not exorcise my
mistakes, but at least it effectively hid the physical evidence.
Many persons helped in the research and writing of this book. Grants
by the University of New Orleans College of Liberal Arts Organized
Research Fund were timely and helpful. The staffs at the Library of
Congress, the National Archives, the Smithsonian Institution Archives,
the Freer Gallery of Art Archives, and the Massachusetts Historical So
ciety were consistently helpful and kind. Wallace Finley Dailey, the cu
rator of the Theodore Roosevelt Collection at Harvard College, was es
pecially attentive to my many inquiries.
A nun1ber oflibrarians at the Earl K. Long Library oft he University of
New Orleans have been especially helpful over a long period of time.
To Evelyn Chandler, Sybil Boudreaux, Greg Spano, Antl1ony Tassin,
and Donald Hendricks my deep gratitude for their invaluable assis
tance and their patience. I am also grateful to Margaret Fisher Dalrym
ple and Catherine F. Barton of Louisiana State University Press for
their support.
Professor Willard B. Gatewood, Jr., of the University of Arkansas
and Professor William H. Harbaugh of the University of Virginia read
earlier versions of the manuscript; their suggestions improved the final
version, and I am grateful for their careful readings, and their useful
critical comments. Altl1ough the final book is a collaboration between
the writer and the editor, it is the writer's name tl1at appears on the title
page. For tl1e record, let me thank Shannon Sandifer for her meticulous
editing of the final manuscript. My wife, Rima Drell Reck, by her ex
ample, her presence, and her intellect, offered essential support tl1rough
all the stages of the book.
The book's inevitable errors I hereby blan1e on the computer, though
we all know who is responsible for computer errors.
X
Abbreviations
AHR America11 Historical Review
FRUS Papers Relati~zg to the Foreign Relations oft he United States, 1861-
(Washington, D.C., 1861-)
JAH ]om'nal ofA merica1~ Histmy
]SH journal of Southern History
LC Library of Congress
MRL Elting E. Morison, John Blum, and Alfred E. Chandler, Jr. (eds.),
The Letters ofTheo®re Roose~>elt (8 vols.; Cambridge, Mass.,
1950- 1954)
MVHR Mississippi Valley Historical Review
NA National Archives
ONI Office of Naval Intelligence
PHR Pacific Historical Review
RG Record Group
RU Record Unit
SIA Smithsonian Institution Archives
Works, Nat. Ed. The Works ofTheodm·e Roosevelt, National Edition (20 vols.;
New York, 1926)
Introduction
Theodore Roosevelt was already a master at creating political legends
when he became president in 190 l. With d1e help of journalists, histo
rians, and Roosevelt's own ability to steal the spotlight, d1e legends
especially of ilie sickly Teddy who became a virile cowboy and of the
big stick-have become folktales. Roosevelt hated the nickname Teddy
wiili its terrible childhood associations: "No man who knows me well
calls me by ilie nickname. . .. No one of my family, for instance, has
ever used it, and if it is used by anyone it is a sure sign he docs not know
me." 1 Nevertheless, Roosevelt allowed ilic nickname. to project for him
the aura of an ordinary man of the people, which was more politically
attractive d1an ilie image of an intellectual, an aristocrat, or an urban
dandy.
Theodore Roosevelt was hardly ilic first president to foster an image
mat differed from reality; successful American presidents arc gifted
at building images. William McKinley went out of his way to ap
pear powerless and even simpleminded, a presidential tactic Abral1am
Lincoln raised to a classic level. Andrew Jackson, hardly a plain man of
ilie people, led a political revolution by pretending to be democracy in
carnate in his batde with the intellectual and aristocratic John Quincy
Adams. George Washington, a soldier, aristocrat, and gentleman, used
both ilie pomp of power and d1e simplicity ofi lie new America's repub
lican mores as symbols of d1e new presidency.
Most political myilis arc not as seriously at odds wiili reality as
l. TR ro John Moulder Wilson, December 9, 1902, in MRL, III, 392.
l
Theodore Roosevelt
Theodore Roosevelt's. The idea that modern America's first almost
intellr.ctual president was at heart merely a power-hungry adolescent is
as misleading as the idea that Roosevelt created the imperial presidency
single-handedly. Roosevelt's image as an intrepid big-game hunter and
fearless soldier helped Americans to accept a president who befriended
poets and artists, and made it possible for Roosevelt, the gentleman and
aristocrat, not to appear effete. The bigger problem of his image lies
with Roosevelt's diplomatic ideal of"speak softly and carry a big stick."
Roosevelt first used tl1e big stick phrase to attack ilie Republican ma
chine while he was governor of New York. Cartoonists picked up tl1e
phrase, and ilie image, and often drew caricatures of Roosevelt carrying
a huge dub studded witl1 spikes. Roosevelt understood the irony of a
popularity that came from a distorted image: "It is very curious. Ever
since I have been in tl1e presidency I have been pictured as a huge crea
ture with enormous clenched teem, a big spiked club, and a belt full of
pistols, ... and yet all t11e time I have been growing in popularity."
Before the phrase became politically identified witl1 him, Roosevelt was
aware of its dangers: "If a man continually blusters, if he lacks civility, a
big stick will not save him from trouble; and neitl1er will speaking softly
avail, if back of me softness there docs not lie strength, power." By tl1e
end of his presidency, me popularity of the phrase had triwnphed over
Roosevelt's own skepticism; he not only accepted but embraced t11e dis
torted imagc.2
But the inuge of big-stick diplomacy was rarely realized. Roosevelt,
as his critics have frequently observed, did not always speak softly-he
often bellowed. And the United States did not have me diplomatic lux
ury of a big stick. As president, Roosevelt frequently complained of an
inadequate navy and an almost nonexistent army. America's best strate
gic advantage lay in its geographic situation- for three centuries effec
tive isolation from tl1e world's most powerful European navies and a pro
digious land mass tl1at made amphibious invasion almost inconceivable.
2. Henry Pringle, Theodbre Roosevelt: A Biography (New York, 1931), 279; Joseph B.
Bishop, Theodbre Roosevelt 1111d His Times (2 vols.; New York, 1920), I, 240; Address at
Minnesota State Fair, September 2, 1901, in Works, Nat. Ed., XIII, 474-75. See also TR
to Whitelaw Reid, December 4, 1908, in MRL, VI, 1410, and TR,Autobiograpby (New
York, 1913), rpr. Works, Na.t. Ed., XX, 524.
2
Introduction
However, physical isolation was no longer a sufficient safeguard in
Theodore Roosevelt's time. The United States had become a modern
industrial nation dependent on free world trade. Africa had been totally
colonized, China was in danger of a similar partition, and Latin Amer
ica was a tempting undefended area for strong and ambitious European
navies. Technological innovations had diminished the protection offered
by the huge oceans and had made modern navies swifter, more efficient,
and capable ofi ntervening anyv.,here in the world. The end of America's
natural geographic isolation as an effective defensive buffer called for a
more active naval policy. Strategic necessity demanded the prevention of
tactical footholds in key places by foreign powers. Americans had long
resisted European efforts to control a Central American canal, or to di
vide Latin America as Africa had been divided. Hut by 1900 with Ger
many and Japan as new and threatening ambitious powers, America had
to change its defensive posture-not to become imperialistic as lusto
rians have argued, but to better defend its newly vulnerable prosperity. 3
Strategic necessity, not imperialism nor the big stick, caused Ameri
can intervention in the Philippines and Panan1a. Americans were reluc
tant to appear to inlltate even vaguely anything European. The United
States Senate disliked Spaniards being in Cuba and wanted them out,
but the Americans wanted no part of the Cubans themselves, as the
Platt Amendment dearly shows. Because much ofA merica was racist in
1900, the idea of making Cubans and Filipinos citizens was abhorrent.
The Americans managed to get the Spaniards out of Cuba and the
Philippines, and in Cuba were successful in getting themselves out as
welL In the Philippines, however, the getaway was interrupted by an
unforeseen Philippine war for independence. When Panan1a's volatile
situation was added to the Philippine episode, the big stick legend be
came almost a permanent part of American history. Who is not familiar
with the swashbuckling Teddy Roosevelt and his big stick making war
on the Spaniards in 1898 (both in the Philippines and Cuba), on the
Colombians in 1903, and with the cruise of the Great White Fleet, on
the Japanese in 1907?
3. The strategic necessity argument is summarized best in John A. S. Grenville and
George Berkeley Young, Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy: Stt1dies in Foreign Pol·
icy, 1873-1917 (New Haven, 1967), 267-96.
3