Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power

624 Pages·1956·8.73 MB·English

by  Howard K. Beale

ALBERT SHAW LECTURES ON DIPLOMATIC HISTORY
The liberality of Albert Shaw, Ph. D. 1884, has
made it possible for The Johns Hopkins University
to provide an annual course of lectures on diplomatic
history. This volume contains the lectures
somewhat revised and enlarged, delivered in 1953.
ALBERT SHAW LECTURES ON DIPLOMATIC HISTORY
1899. John II. I¿atané. The Diplo­ 1930. Victor Andrés Belaunde. Boli­
matic Relations of the United var and the Political Thought of
States and Spanish America. 1900. the Spanish American Revolution.
(Out of print.) 1938. $3.50.
1900. James Morton Callahan. The 1931. Charles Callan Tansill. The
Diplomatic History of the Southern Purchase of the Danish West In­
Confederacy. 1901. (Out of print.) dies. 1932. $3.50.
1906. Jesse Siddall Reeves. Ameri­ 1932. Dexter Perkins. The Monroe
can Diplomacy under Tyler and Doctrine, 1826-1867. 1933. (Out
Polk. 1907. $1.75. of print.)
1907. Elbert Jay Benton. Interna­ 1933. Charles Seymour. American
tional Law and Diplomacy of the Diplomacy during the World War.
Spanish-American War. 1908. 1934. Second printing 1942. $3.00.
$1.75. 1935. Frank H. Simonds. American
1909. Ephraim Douglass Adams.
Foreign Policy in the Post-war
British Interests and Activities in
Years. 1935. $2.00.
Texas, 1838-1846. 1910 (Out of
1936. Julius W. Pratt. Expansionists
print.)
1911. Charles Oscar Paullin. Diplo­ of 1898: The Acquisition of Ha­
matic Negotiations of American waii and the Spanish Islands. 1936.
(Out of print.)
Naval Officers, 1778-1883. 1912.
$2.25. 1937. Dexter Perkins. The Monroe
1912. Isaac J. Cox. The WTest Doctrine, 1867-1907. 1937. $3.50.
Florida Controversy, 1798-1813. 1938. Arthur Preston Whitaker. The
1918. $3.00. United States and the Independ­
1913. William R. Manning. Early ence of Latin America, 1800-1830.
Diplomatic Relations between the 1941. (Out of print.)
United States and Mexico. 1916. 1939. William Spence Robertson.
$2.50. France and Latin-American Inde­
1914. Frank A. Updyke. The Diplo­ pendence. 1939. $3.75.
macy of the War of 1812. 1915. 1941. Thomas A. Bailey. The Policy
(Out of print.) of the United States toward the
1917. Payson Jackson Treat. The Neutrals, 1917-1918. 1942. $3.50.
Early Diplomatic Relations be­ 1942. Wilfrid Hardy Callcott. The
tween the United States and Japan, Caribbean Policy of the United
1853-1865. 1917. $2.75. States, 1890-1920. 1943. $3.50.
1921. Percy Alvin Martin. Latin 1946. Malbone W. Graham. Ameri­
America and the War. 1925. $3.50. can Diplomacy in the International
1923. Henry Merritt Wriston. Ex­ Community. 1949. $3.25.
ecutive Agents in American For­ 1950. Herbert Feis. The Diplomacy
eign Relations. 1929. $5.00. of the Dollar, First Era, 1919-
1926. Samuel Flagg Bemis. Pinck­ 1932. 1950. $2.25.
ney’s Treaty: A Study of Ameri­
1951. Edward Hallett Carr. German-
ca’s Advantage from Europe’s Dis­
Soviet Relations Between the Two
tress, 1783-1800. 1926. Second
World Wars, 1919-1939. 1951.
printing 1941. $3.00.
$3.00.
1927. Bruce Williams. State Secu­
rity and the League of Nations. 1953. Howard K. Beale. Theodore
1927. $2.75. Roosevelt and the Rise of America
1928. J. Fred Rippy. Rivalry of the to World Power. 1956. $6.00.
United States and Great Britain 1954. Max Beloff. Foreign Policy
over Latin America. 1808-1830. and the Democratic Process. 1955.
1929. (Out of print.) $3.00.
THEODORE ROOSEVELT
and the Rise
of America
to World Power

The Albert Shaw Lectures
on Diplomatic History, 1953
THEODORE ROOSEVELT
and the Rise
of America
to World Power
by HOWARD K. BEALE
Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956
© 1056, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore 18, Md.
Second printing 1957
Third printing 1960
Fourth printing 1961
Distributed in Great Britain by
Oxford University Press, London
Printed in U. S. A. by J. H. Fürst Company, Baltimore
Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 56-10255.
Preface
These lectures are the result of a good deal of
questioning over a long period of years. For three decades
the United States and other great powers have been pur­
suing policies that have not led to the better world for which
men and nations have hoped. Obviously, no nation has
wished to proceed to the present desperate state of inter­
national relations that threatens to destroy civilization itself;
equally obviously, no one nation alone has brought the world
to this state of things. Too little is known about historical
causation to say what has led to this dénouement. It cannot
be said with any certainty that the trend in international
affairs has been inevitable or that the course of international
events has been determined by forces over which man has
no control. Nor yet can it be asserted, in the present state
of historiography, that man by taking thought and making
decisions has been fully responsible for what has happened.
Yet there has been a certain inexorability about the sequence
of events from World War I to the present. Decisions made
by statesmen in each successive situation have been governed
to a considerable extent by values already accepted and by
decisions already made by predecessors under whom the
direction foreign policy was to take had been established.
vii
Vlll PREFACE
Often it has seemed that what was really needed was to
change the direction, to abandon the road that led to the
1950’s and start out in an entirely different direction. My
first question therefore was: How did America get started
down this road and was there a time, perhaps before World
War I, when decisions were made that account for the
direction national policy has taken? What decisions so
affected the nation’s course?
Closely related was a second baffling question to which
historians seldom offer an answer, namely, whether indivi­
dual men or only blind forces influence history. Leaders
occupy important rôles in history as it is usually recounted,
but historians often seem to assume that it is forces and not
men who determine what happens. A thorough study a few
years ago of what historians had written about the causes
of the Civil War revealed that all the writers had told the
story in terms of leaders of the day and many of them also in
terms of forces, but that most of them had kept men and
forces in separate compartments as if there were no inter­
action between them. Not one had come to grips with the
problem as to which was more important or whether the
leaders had any effect upon history at all. So, too, in recent
history. Consequently, the question is still to be faced
whether there was a time at which a route different from the
one taken in recent foreign policy could have been chosen by
the people or their leaders.
/ A third question that has never been satisfactorily an­
swered is why America shifted from the assumption in 1914
that war in Europe could not have serious meaning for
America to her conviction three years later that she must
enter that war. If events between 1914 and 1917 do not
provide an entirely satisfying answer, what effect, if any,
had the history of the years before 1914 upon this change of
heart and America’s ultimate support of France and England
against Germany? And what accounted for Theodore Roose-
PREFACE IX
velt's insistence earlier and more vigorously than most that
we enter the war?
In view of later criticisms of imperialist powers in general
and American imperialism in particular and in view, too, of
the strength of opposition to expansion and imperialism
among Americans at the turn of the century, an answer has
long been needed to a fourth question: Why did America
decide in favor of rather than against expansionism and
imperialism? Or did her leaders not make the decision but
merely find themselves pushed into policies by forces too big
for them?
In so far as Roosevelt and other expansionists and imperial­
ists did determine our policy, what were their motives? Was
it national pride, a sense of the white man’s burden, con­
viction about democracy, a sense of mission in the world,
desire for economic gain, sheer love of power, or what, that
propelled the men of 1900 into further extension of America's
concern and influence to far parts of the world? This was
a fifth question to which the answer could be found in part
in Roosevelt.
A sixth question concerned Theodore directly. While he
was alive and during the years following his death, literature
on Roosevelt tended to reflect the popular admiration of his
contemporaries for his handling of international problems.
Then the tide turned and a series of studies appeared that
questioned both his wisdom and his ability as an inter­
national statesman. His importance in events in which he
unquestionably participated was denied. His veracity in
telling of other events and his part in them was questioned.
It seemed now time to ask whether the early admiration or
the later depreciation or perhaps a third more balanced view
was the soundest.
Finally, in several years of preparation of a biography of
Theodore Roosevelt I have increasingly been preoccupied
with the question as to what impact he did have upon world
X PREFACE
affairs. An answer to this seemed important, too, for all
Americans interested in recent history.
The invitation to deliver a series of lectures at The Johns
Hopkins University on some phase of the foreign policy of
Theodore Roosevelt offered a chance to pursue answers to
some of these questions. This volume is an expansion of the
Albert Shaw lectures there given. The lectures are Roose­
velt-centered. No attempt has been made to narrate the
history of foreign relations during his time except where he
was vitally concerned. The topics dealt with have been
chosen for investigation because Roosevelt was involved in
them. Important international happenings have been dis­
cussed, or little-known episodes described, or long-known
stories retold in these lectures as part of an effort to view
them as Roosevelt viewed them and to determine and evalu­
ate his rôle. The hope has been that new light would be
thrown on the foreign relations of the period by thus viewing
them through the eyes of one of the leading participants.
Obviously, satisfactory answers have not been found to
all the questions to which answers were sought. Some of
the conclusions have had perforce to be tentative. Some of
the questions may never be answered, but it is hoped that
these lectures may make it possible to come nearer to finding
answers, and that, in any case, they may bring new under­
standing of one of the most colorful and important actors in
international affairs in recent times. Through him men may
perhaps learn better to comprehend what determines history.
Furthermore, new questions have arisen in the course of the
study, some of them of fundamental importance to an under­
standing of American foreign policy in the later twentieth
century; and it is hoped that the lectures may illuminate
these new problems and may provoke others to pursue the
problems further.
I am under obligation to many for courtesies or assistance
while these lectures were being prepared. I wish to thank for