The Yogacara Idealism

253 Pages·1987·8.99 MB·English

by  Ashok Kumar Chatterjee

THE

y o g a c a r a
IDEALISM
ASHOK KUMAR CHATTERJEE

TH E_
YOGÄCÄRA
IDEALISM
ASHOK KUMAR CHATTERJEE
MOTILAL BANARSIDASS
Delhi Varanasi Patna Madras
First Published 1962
Second Revised Edition 1975; Reprinted 1987
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FOREWORD
The Yogácara-Vij ňánaváda Ideálům was the last great creative
synthesis of Buddhism and its position in that tradition is comparable
to that of the Advaita Vedanta in the orthodox Hindu tradition. It
is perhaps the only original epistemological idealism to be formulated
on the Indian soil. Its impact on the other systems of thought was
tremendous. Even those philosophies that were completely out of
line with idealism, like the Nyáya, the Mimámsá and Jainism, had to
reckon with it. Considering the important role played by the Yogacara
Idealism in Buddhism and in Indian philosophical and religious thought
in general, it is surprising that there had been no full or reliable exposi­
tions of this philosophy. This gap in our knowledge is admirably
filled by the present work of Dr. Chatterjee.
The author deals with the Yogácára-Vijňánaváda in all its aspects
and bearings, historically, analytically and comparatively. The first
two chapters of the book show, with great clarity and sufficient detail,
the origin and development of the Yogacara idealism as an outcome of
those fruitful and dynamic ideas associated with the previous schools
of Buddhism, especially with the Sautrantika and the Madhyamika.
The originality of the Yogacara synthesis of Buddhist teachings has
been clearly brought out, and the individual contribution made by the
philosophers of this school, such as Asanga, Vasubandhu, Sthiramati,
Dignaga, Dharmakirti and šántaraksita, has received adequate attention.
The subsequent chapters, which form the core of the work,
represent a constructive and critical exposition of the Yogacara meta­
physics, its idealism and absolutism as well as its spiritual discipline.
Dr. Chatterjee has utilised nearly all the sources available on the subject
and has given a faithful and persuasive account of this system of thought.
He has not hesitated to go behind the literal meaning of the texts to
extract their real significance. There is a measure of risk in such a ven­
ture, and at some places one might choose to disagree with the author’s
interpretation. However, the duty of a scholar is not just to reproduce
literally, but to re-interpret and to re-construct his theme.
Comparison of the Yogacara with other forms of idealism and
absolutism, Indian as well as European, has been undertaken in the
VI FOREWORD
last two chapters of the work. This serves to bring out the affinities
and distinctions which are only too often blurred. These comparative
studies are among the best specimens of the author’s keen analysis and
lucid exposition.
I cannot help feeling that the work of Dr. Chatterjee would have
gained considerably more in comprehension and authoritativeness if
the Yogacara texts in Chinese and Tibetan or their translations in French
had been made use of more fully. I have no manner of doubt, how­
ever, that the work of Dr. Chatterjee , even as it stands, will prove
a valuable and outstanding contribution to our understanding of a very
important phase of Indian thought. It is an excellent piece of philoso­
phical writing, both with regard to the range of problems covered and
the delightful manner of presentation. There is hardly any dull or un-
stimulating page in a work of 230 pages.
It is a matter of personal gratification to me that the line of thought
nitiated by mein dealing with the basic philosophy of Buddhism in my
study of the Madhyamika system (The Central Philosophy of Buddhism,
George Allen & Unwin, London, 1955) has been largely accepted
and carried out by my student and friend, Dr. Ashok Kumar Chatterjee.
His study of the Yogacara Idealism may well be considered as a sequel
to my book on the Madhyamika Absolutism which together constitute
the revolutionary Mahayana movement.
T. R. V. Murti
PREFACE
An attempt is here made to expound the metaphysics of the
Yogácára school of Buddhism and to analyse its logical implications.
It may not be rash to think that little apology is needed for making
such an attempt. The expository literature on the Yogácára system
is plentiful, but unfortunately, not adequate. Scholarly studies on
the subject from the historical point of view are not lacking. There is
hardly any work, however, which treats of the system as an original
contribution to philosophy. At best, it is construed as a phase
in the historical development of Buddhism. The account of the Yogá­
cára philosophy given in the standard histories of Indian thought is
necessarily all too meagre. The details cannot be discussed with sufficient
fulness within the limited space in such works. Treatises devoted
entirely to the exposition of Buddhism fare no better. The analysis is
sometimes positively misleading. The Yogácára is described merely
as idealism. For a correct appraisement of the system it is very neces­
sary to remember that it is a form of absolutism. This is the central
problem in the Yogácára philosophy—the problem of effecting a logical
synthesis between idealism and absolutism. The Yogácára is wise
enough to perceive that idealism, when pressed, yields an absolutism
by the sheer dynamism of its own inner logic. This point needs bring*
ing out with sufficient deductive clarity. In the existing accounts this
point is not utterly lacking, but it is hardly given that attention and
emphasis which it demands. The late Stcherbatsky was a notable ex­
ception which only proves the general statement.
Other constructive details also of the system have not been fully
analysed. In the present essay I have simply tried to present a more
or less complete picture of the system, to collect the scattered details
into a coherent connected picture and to size it up, not merely as a phase
of Buddhism, but rather as an original and constructive philosophy.
Completeness has been with me more an ideal than an actual achieve­
ment. I have neither the soundness of scholarship nor the maturity
of judgment required for this. Certain omissions are however deli­
berate. The first chapter professes to be a historical introduction to the
Yogácára metaphysics, but history, in its popular sense of chronology
viii PREFACE
of dates and events, will not be found there. Not that such a chronolo­
gical study is uninteresting or unimportant ; it is simply that in a
morphological analysis of any metaphysics, chronology of dates and
events is absolutely beside the point. In the present essay I have
attempted to show that the Yogácára philosophy is a logical elaboration
of the basic epistemological pattern of Buddhism. The first chapter
is a history of the gradual development of the fundamental logic of
Buddhism, culminating in the Yogácára idealism. The omission of
actual chronological details appeared excusable, and is deliberate.
For the same reason, minor doctrinal differences, if any, between
various Yogácára ácáryas, have not been discussed. I have taken
Vasubandhu’s Vijñaptimátratásiddht as the basic work on the system.
Other texts are consulted only as throwing light on the problems rais­
ed in that treatise. The other omission is regarding the insufficient
space devoted to the 8th and 9th chapters, dealing with the discipline
and the religion of the Yogácára system. In a strictly metaphysical
essay, they could very well be deleted. I have said a few words only
for the sake of completeness. Here also the shifting of emphasis away
from these problems appeared to be justifiable, though I do not know
how far this point of view is really justified. All that I ask is to have
the essay judged purely on its merits as a philosophical analysis, and not
as a piece of historical survey.
As regards the plan of the essay, the first two chapters are more
or less historical. The first chapter discusses how the Yogácára school
emerged out of the inner dynamism inherent in Buddhism from the
very outset. The second chapter is devoted to the important ácáryas*
texts, sub-schools, and other such minor details. These two chapters
are in no way integrally related with what follows.
The third and fourth chapters analyse the epistemological basis
of the system. The third is concerned with the refutation of the cate­
gory of the objective, and in the fourth realistic arguments are consi­
dered from the Yogácára standpoint. The fifth chapter sets forth the
elaboration of the Yogácára idealism as a constructive metaphysics,
and attempts to show how consciousness, the sole reality, is actually
diversified into the multi-dimensional forms of the so-called empirical
world. The sixth chapter is again a concession to the ideal of com­
pleteness. It deals with the Dharma-theory, a doctrine of central
interest in entire Buddhism, as adapted by the Yogácára.
PREFACB ix
The seventh chapter attempts to analyse the Yogacara metaphysics
as a form of absolutism. This problem can certainly be said to repre­
sent the very heart of the system. All the other details are to be under­
stood as leading upto this logical climax. To this chapter is added a
section on the doctrine of Three Truths.
The last two chapters are comparative and, as such, do not mate­
rially add to the understanding of the system. They are included in
order to make clear the spiritual affinities and differences between the
Yogacara and other allied schools of idealism and absolutism. For
this purpose, Berkeley and Hegel are selected as representing different
forms of idealism. I had intended to add a section on Leibnitz too;
but had to refrain from doing so because of considerations of space,
A section on Gentile is added however as an appendix to that on
Hegel. The Advaita Vedanta and the Madhyamika are chosen as two
other definitive forms of absolutism.
A few words may be said about the use of the term ‘idealism’ in
the present essay. Idealism is so ambiguous a term and is employed
in metaphysics in so many totally different senses, that its use might
lead to gross misunderstanding unless it is defined with great precision
at the very outset. Some scholars choose to understand it in a very
loose manner. Prof S. N. Dasgupta, for example, says,1 “I shall
call any theory idealistic which asserts that ‘Reality is spiritual’. . . .
Idealism is not committed to any particular kind of epistemological
doctrine the concern of the idealist is with regard to the assertion of
the nature of reality, and it is not difficult to conceive that there should
be an idealism which is largely in agreement with some forms of realism
in the field of epistemology but may yet be thoroughgoing idealism.”’
I venture to think that epistemology is a more primary discipline than
ontology, and idealism therefore should essentially be understood in
an epistemological sense. Any theory of reality presupposes a theory
of knowledge by which it is determined. Nothing can be asserted
about the nature of reality unless certain assumptions are tacitly made re­
garding the nature of knowledge. Prof. Dasgupta’s contention that
idealism is committed to the doctrine “Reality is spiritual” would in­
clude as idealistic systems like those of Ramanuja and Nimbarka,
while exclude systems like that of Kant. This appears to me as some­
thing of an anomaly. The use of the term in the history of Western
1. Indian Idealism, p. 25.
X PREFACB
philosophy would also show that idealism is primarily an epistemolo-
gical doctrine. Kant, for instance, in the famous section on “Refuta­
tion of Idealism”, does not seek to refute any theory of reality being
spiritual or otherwise. The controversy raised by the Neo-Realists
and the Critical Realists is purely an epistemological one.
Idealism as an epistemological doctrine means that knowledge
is constructive. It does not reveal ; it creates. Even this, however,
is not free from ambiguity. Any metaphysics which makes a distinc­
tion between appearance and reality, accepts the creativity of the
subjective in some form or other. In this sense, Kant, the Sautrántika,
and the Advaita Vedántin, would all be idealists. Idealism, in the
strictest sense of the term, connotes three important things, viz. (a)
knowledge is creative; (b) there is nothing given in knowledge ; and
(c) the creative knowledge is itself real. Though Kant, the Sautrán­
tika, and the Advaita Vedanta, accept the first proposition, viz., the
creativity of the subjective, they are also committed to a doctrine of
the thing-in-itself, which is not made or unmade by being known.
These systems are idealistic, but are not pure forms of idealism. For
the Madhyamika, there is no thing-in-itself ; he accepts the second
proposition as well. But he thinks that the creative knowledge also
is only appearance; it is the denial of all metaphysics, including ideal-
lism. My contention is that the Yogácára alone represents idealism in
its strict sense in Indian philosophy. In the Advaita Vedanta the
reality of the given, which is not known but is the implicate of all
knowledge, is scrupulously maintained and as such, it is not idealism.
The system is named ‘Yogácára* in preference to the more well-
known appellation ‘Vijñánaváda* merely for the sake of drawing a
convenient distinction. The school of Dignága and Dharmaklrti
occupies a peculiar position. They essentially accept the doctrine of
Vijñaptimátratá, and the unreality of the object. When they enter into
logical discussions however they endorse the Sautrántika standpoint
of something being given in knowledge. The name ‘Vijñánaváda*
can be reserved for this school and the pure idealism of Maitreya,
Asanga and Vasubandhu be called Yogácára. The entire system
may be called, as is actually done by some scholars and historians,
the system of Yogácára-Vijñánaváda.
Mention might also be made of the standpoint adopted in the essay.
I am not an idealist. I believe that no speculative metaphysics can