The Winds of Change: Macmillan to Heath 1957-75

242 Pages·1996·17.039 MB·English

by  John Ramsden

A History of the Conservative Party
This series, originally to have been published in four volumes, is now
complete in six. It was established by an editorial board consisting of
John Barnes, Lord Blake, the late Lord Boyle ofHandsworth and Chris Cook.
The Foundation of the Conservative Party 1830-1867
Robert Stewart
"
The Age of Disraeli, 1868-1881: the Rise of Tory Democracy
Richard Shannon The Winds of Cha,nge:
The Age of Salisbury, 1881-1902
Richard Shannon Macll1illan Heath,
to
The Age of Balfour and Baldwin 1902-1940
John Ramsden
1957-1975
The Age of Churchill and Eden, 1940-1957
John Ramsden
The Winds of Change: Macmillan to Heath, 1957-1975
John Ramsden
John Ramsden
Longman
London and New York
contents
Longman Group Limited,
Longman House, Burnt Mill,
Harlow, Essex CM20 2JE, England
and Associated Companies throughout the world.
Published in the United States of America
by Longman Publishing, New York
,,
Acknowledgements Vll
©Longman Group Limited 1996 Abbreviations used in the text and footnotes IX
Introduction II 1
All rights reserved; no part of this publication may be
reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted Part I The Macmillan Ascendancy
in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording, or otherwise without either the
prior written permission of the Publishers or a licence Chapter 1 The rise of 'Supermac', 1957-59 19
permitting restricted copying in the United Kingdom issued The Macmillan Government 19
by the Copyright Licensing Agency Ltd, t Macmillan and the 'Edwardian style' 24
90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1P 9HE. Economic policy 29
'Supermac' turns the tide 36
First published 1996 Inaction on immigration 41
ISBN 0 582 27570 9 CSD Hai/sham rings the bell 46
Advertising and electioneering 55
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data The 1959 General Election 60
A catalogue record for this book is
Chapter 2 Macmillan's Party 68
available from the British Library
The Party managers 68
Central Offices 77
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Area organisations 82
Ramsden, John, 1947- The National Union 86
The constituency associations 92
The winds of change: Macmillan to Heath, 1957-1975 I John Ramsden.
p. cm. - (A history of the Conservative Party) Agents 108
Includes bibliographical references and index. Parliamentary candidates and their selection 111
ISBN 0-582-27570-9
1. Conservative Party (Great Britain)-History. Chapter 3 'Modernise with Macmillan', 1960-62 129
2. Great Britain-Politics and government-1945-
Losing momentum in Government 129
I. Title. II. Series.
Losing momentum in the organisation 134
JN1129.C7R24 1996 95-14489
The 'return of idealism to politics' and the satire wave 142
324.24104'09'045-dc20 ClP
Empire or Europe? 146
Set by SEE in 10/121h pt Bembo The discontent of 'Orpington Man' 154
The 'New Approach' of 1962 158
Produced by Longman Singapore Publishers (Pte) Ltd.
Printed in Singapore 'Selwyn Lloyd ausgebootet' and the July purge 164
Contents
Vl
Chapter 4 Macmillan to Heath, 1962-65 172
Failure to enter the EEC and its consequences 174 Acknowledgements
180
Recovery begins
The Vassall and Profumo scandals 183
"~ ,. Macmillan's leadership challenged 189
.!' The leadership crisis of October 1963 196
Sir Alec as Prime Minister 214
(J), 221
01'~ The 1964 recovery
226
The 1964 General Election
230
Back in opposition, 1964-65
,.
234
Heath becomes Leader
To a great extent, my thanks are due to the same people whose assistance was
acknowledged in The Age of Churchill and Eden. Withou,t the leave granted
Part II Heath and the Heathmen
by Queen Mary and Westfield College, the research gr;nt awarded by the
then Social Science Research Council and the hospitality of Corpus Christi
Chapter 5 A Government in exile, 1965-70 243 College, Oxford, this volume too would have been seriously handicapped.
Heath as Opposition Leader 243 The work of Chris Stevens in collecting most of the material from local
The policy review of 1964-70 253 Party minute books and other dispersed records has made an even more
The 1966 General Election 261 central contribution to this volume than to the previous one, and to all
Party organisation, 1964-70 267 these people I am deeply grateful. A work of this sort that tries to look
Powell's economic challenge 276 intensively at a complex organisation over a longish period needs to rely on
Europe, Rhodesia and immigration 287 the published secondary sources as well as the institution's own archives, and
'Selsdon Man' 297 my references acknowledge these. The footnotes also indicate my especial
The 1970 General Election 304 debt to Philip Norton's books on voting and dissent within parliament,
What did the 1970 victory mean? 314 Michael Pinto-Duschinsky's thesis on local Conservative associations, and
,_cl
.f' Chapter 6 The Heath Government, 1970-74 319 the Institute of Contemporary British History's splendid series of witness
Heath as Prime Minister 319 seminars. I have relied most of all on the six volumes of the Nuffield College
(~ Election series that fall within these years; David Butler has authored or
~ The Industrial Relations Act 330
Implementing promises 334 co-authored all of the Nuffield volumes since 1951 (as well as helping to
supervise my own initial research into the Conservative Party) and I had
The 1972 U-turns 346
Party reactions to the U-turns 357 in 1970 the opportunity that he has extended to many Nuffield students of
working on the study of that election. Like many others, I owe to David a
The Oil Crisis and the Miners' Strike, 1973 368
huge debt for personal kindnesses as well as for that series of books which
To go or not to go? 372
have become an incomparable resource for the historian of post-war Britain.
The February 1974 General Election 375
When dealing with such recent subjects, the contemporary historian can
Chapter 7 Reversing the trend? 384 derive much material too from personal interviews, not least in the avoidance
The aftermath of February 384 of gratuitous error that can otherwise be re-cycled from the press into works
Heath and his Party critics 393 of serious history. I am grateful to the following for giving up their time to
Modernising the machine 403 discuss some of the matters covered in the book, recently or in time past:
New directions in policy 413 Rt Hon. Lord Barber, the late Rt Hon. Lord Boyle of Handsworth, Rt Hon.
The October 1974 General Election 427 Lord Carr of Hadley, Rt Hon. Lord Deedes, Lord Fraser of Kilmorack CBE,
Heath and his critics after October 434 Rt Hon. Sir Edward Heath MP, Rt Hon. Lord Howe of Aberavon, Rt Hon.
Heath versus Thatcher 440 Lord Jenkin of Roding, the late Rt Hon. Lord Joseph, Rt Hon. Enoch Powell
Bibliography 458 MBE. Ifl single out from all of these Michael Fraser, it is because his kindness
Index 474 to me over the writing of what is now five books on the Party has gone far
~ beyond the call of duty either to history or to the Conservative Party.
(~
v111 Acknowledgements
Friends and colleagues have looked at this text in whole and in part.
While what remains is my responsibility alone, I have gained much from
Abbreviations used in the text and footnotes
the comments and advice of Stuart Ball, John Campbell, Peter Hennessy,
Chris Stevens and John Turner.
For permission to see and guote from the Conservative Party's papers,
including a number that are not normally open to scholars, I gladly acknowl
edge the approval given by Dr Alastair Cooke of the Conservative Political
Centre; for permission to see the minute books of the 1922 Committee for
the period after 1964, I am especially grateful to Sir Marcus Fox MP. For
permission to guote from private collections of papers, I am grateful to the
following: the Librarian, Leeds University Library (for extracts from the
ACC
papers of Lord Boyle of Handsworth); the Master and Fellows of Trinity Association of Conservative Clubs
ACML
College, Cambridge (for extracts from the papers of Lord Butler of Saffron Anti-Common Market League
ACP
Walden); Sir Nicholas Hedworth Williamson (for an extract from the papers Advisory Committee on Policy }
AGM
of Lord Hailes); Lady Miranda Cormack (for an extract from the papers of Annual General Meeting !
BBC
the 1st Earl of Kilmuir); the Earl of Woolton (for extracts from the papers British Broadcasting Corporation
of 1st Earl of Wool ton). CA
Conservative Association
CAER
Conservative Action for Electoral Reform
CA]
Conservative Agents' journal
John Ramsden CBF
(Conservative) Central Board of Finance
January 1995. CBI
Confederation of British Industry
cco
Conservative Central Office
CND
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
CPA
Conservative Party Archive
CPC
Conservative Political Centre
CPRS
Central Policy Review Staff
CPS
Centre for Policy Studies
CRD
Conservative Research Department
DN
Daily Notes (issued during election campaigns)
DTI
Department of Trade and Industry
EC
Executive Committee
EEC
European Economic Community
EFTA
European Free Trade Area
F and GP
Finance and General Purposes (Committee)
GDP
Gross Domestic Product
GLC
Greater London Council
GNP
Gross National Product
lCBH
Institute of Contemporary British History
IEA
Institute for Economic Affairs
ITA
Independent Television Authority
ITN
Independent Television News
ITV
Independent Television
Lee
Leader's Consultative Committee (shadow cabinet)
LSE
London School of Economics and Political Science
NCP
Notes on Current Politics
NEDC
National Economic Development Council
x Abbreviations used in the text and footnotes
NF National Front
NFU National Farmers' Union
NHS National Health Service Introduction
NIC National Incomes Commission
,§ NOP National Opinion Polls
$' NSA National Society of (Conservative) Agents
NUCC National Union Central Council
(j,
"'~ NUEC National Union Executive Committee
NUFGP National Union Finance and General Purposes (Committee)
NUM National Union of Mineworkers
ORC Opinion Research Centre
PAR Programme Analysis and Review By 1955, when the Eden Government was re-elected with an increased
PEST Pressure for Economic and Social Toryism majority, the Conservative Party faced the future with .tonfidence. It had
PLDF People's League for the Defence of Freedom survived the catastrophe of 1945, when many even in its own ranks had feared
PM Prime Minister for its future electability, and it had survived fifteen years of Churchillian
PPS Parliamentary Private Secretary indifference to its corporate prosperity. It had also developed a myth about
RPM Resale Price Maintenance the recovery of the Party itself that would last for years ahead, a myth that
SACC Standing Advisory Committee on Candidates offered assurance about the Party's own inherent adaptability in a changing
SNP Scottish National Party world. Oliver Poole, who was Party Chairman in 1957, thought that the
TUC Trades Union Congress recovery after 1945 'was the biggest change for a hundred years, between
UA Unionist Association those who were anxious to put the clock back as far as possible to the
ucs
Upper Clyde Shipbuilders pre-war world and those who preferred the post-war. Intellectually, we
UN United Nations captured the party.' Harold Macmillan, whose credentials as a Conservative
VAT Value Added Tax who was open-minded about the future went back to the start of his career,
YC Young Conservative was fond of describing the same process in a different way, emphasising
~ economic progress and consumerist benefits, most notably in the valedictory
message that was read to the Blackpool Conference at the time of his 1963
?
resignation:
Since 1945, I have lived to see the party of our dreams come into being . .. I have
seen our_policies develop into that pragmatic and sensible compromise betwee;ti;e
e-;;emes of collectivism and individualism for which the party has alw-:iY~ ~rood in
i s great periods. I have seen it bring to the people of our own country a degree of
comfort and well-being ... such as I and my comrades could not have dreamed
of when we slogged through the mud of Flanders nearly fifty years ago. Thus,
the silent, the Conservative revolution, has come about.
(Much of Heath's later Conservative stance derived from this period in which
he served under Macmillan, and perhaps his 'quiet revolution' offered in 1970
drew on this too?) For Iain Macleod, the Party's recovery of confidence after
1945 derived from it~b{ilty-Tclrecognise its own mistakes, because it was
at heart pragmatic rather than ideologically dogmatic. As Party Chairman,
he told the Conference in 1962 that 'it would have been impossible for the
Conservative Party, after its defeat in 1945, to reform and reorganise itself
if it had contemptuously said that the electors had chosen wrongly. Instead,
Introduction 3
2 The Winds of Change: Macmillan to Heath, 1957-1975
we started from the assumption that it was we, the Conservative Party, who fast enough rate to square that political economy circle, then their priority
were at fault and not the people of this country. '1 would lie with maintaining social expenditure rather than in cutting both
Such confident statements were all very well when the Party had been in expenditure and tax; although the sum of money finally at issue when the
office for more than a decade, but in 1955 a sharp recession and the onset Treasury Ministers resigned in January 1958 was a mere £50 million, and
of foreign difficulties sapped at such confidence very quickly after Eden won although the Chancellor overplayed his hand and antagonised his colleagues,
the Election, as the previous volume in this series has described. In the the principle involved was arguably a strategic one of importance. In 1958-59,
longer-term history of the Conservative Party, the Suez crisis that prompted public expenditure as a proportion of Gross National Product (GNP), which
the downfall of Anthony Eden and allowed Harold Macmillan to seize the had been falling since the Tories returned to power, began an increase that
leadership in January 1957 was a relatively minor event. Even before President would continue until they left office in 1964. Facing a strategic choice on
Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal Company, Eden was a beleaguered Leader an equally narrow issue in 1951, Attlee's Government h~.d decided to stick
whose ministerial colleagues were already anticipating his early downfall. with its Chancellor and to part company instead with the defenders of social
As a Prime Minister unfamiliar with the small-change domestic issues of spending; but in 1957, rather than agreeing to raid f::rmily allowances or
prices, jobs, rents and interest rates, and consequently unable to persuade the to postpone the end of conscription, Macmillan's Mijiisters cheerfully let
public or the Party that he was an effective leader in the difficult economic their Chancellor go. This can be seen - according to taste - as evidence
)
circumstances he inherited, Eden could not compensate (as so many Tory of a consensus of conviction between the parties on' the minimum social
predecessors had done in the past) by demonstrating his diplomatic skills on programme inherited from the post-war settlement, or it can be seen as
the world stage. Henceforward, as Sir Alec Douglas-Home's partial reversion evidence of the Conservatives' deep-seated fear of the electoral consequences
to Eden's political position was to show, Tory Governments would stand of such harsh policies as cutting family allowances. The effect is the same on
or fall on the domestic economy and its ability to deliver the goods to an either view. 2
electorate encouraged to expect effortless affluence. By 1960, Thorneycroft was wryly pointing out that public expenditure had
Within six months of succeeding Eden, in the 'Never had it so good' actually risen by fifteen times as much as the sum he had resigned over, and
speech at Bedford that has been signally misunderstood as no more than that his Party had therefore taken a much bigger decision than appeared in
an electioneering appeal to materialism, Macmillan was actually trying to 1958. That fact was masked by three factors. First, the arrival of a long
warn his Party that sa~rifices could be needed to maintain prosperity, and awaited economic upswing during 1958, developing into a full-scale boom in
he kept on offering similar warnings on other occasions too: he told a group 1959-60, encouraged the belief that it had been wise to avoid harsh choices
of backbenchers on 25 June that 'the country simply did not understand that which subsquent evidence had shown to be unnecessary: growth would pay
we were living beyond our income, and would have to pay for it sooner for both public and private affluence, the prospectus on which the Macmillan
or later'. Within another half-year, the Macmillan Government would be Government fought and won the 1959 Election, winning the largest Tory
rocked to its foundations (as successive disputes over foreign and colonial majority for a quarter of a century precisely by ridiculing Labour's tax plans as
policy had so clearly failed to rock it) by the long-postponed debate about the being unnecessary as well as dangerous. Second, Macmillan's virtuoso political
irreducible level of public spending for peacetime. Since 1951, Tory Ministers skills in the years in which he was dubbed 'Supermac' had also done much to
had managed to combine the running down of a war economy with the steady Tory morale and to divert attention away from strategic choices; his
country's favourable international trading position and growth in the domestic inspired choice of Poole and Hai Isham to run the Party machine in improbable
economy to facilitate increases in social spending and tax reductions. That easy partnership had contributed signally to the same process of recovery. Third,
road terminated in the economic downturn of 1955-56 and would never be in the Party's electioneering there had been a sea-change of method and
open again, though the defence review of 1957 demonstrated a determination approach; the 'You're looking at a Conservative' posters of 1957-58 were
to milk the Churchill-Attlee war/Cold War military establishment for the last the storm petrel that heralded the modern world of media and public relations
drops of expenditure reductions. In December 1957, Tory Ministers remained campaigning. The Woolton period of Party recovery up to 1955 had largely
committed to their basic 1951 formula of paying for both spending increases been characterised by the restoration (in far more effective form) of traditional
and tax cuts from the proceeds of economic growth, but in that month they methods and approaches, but in 1957 the revolution actually began. In the
also decided by default that if economic growth could not be achieved at a continuous between-election campaigning that Macmillan, Hailsham and
1 Anthony Sampson, The Anaromy of Britain (all books cited were published in London unless
otherwise indicated] (1962), 77; John Ramsden, 'From Churchill co Heath', in Lord Butler
2 Nigel Nicolson (ed.), Harold Nico/son's Diaries and Letters, 1945-1962 (1968), 335.
(ed.), The Comervatives (1977), 425, 450.
4 The Winds of Change: Macmillan to Heath, 1957-1975 Introduction 5
Poole started in that Summer, in the carefully-researched and professional change? I was delighted. I said to the Chief Whip [Heath] as we were going out,
advertising campaign that dominated the hoardings and the press, and even 'What a pity it is that now we have the most intelligent Prime Minister of the
in the rapid change of broadcasting and press-management strategies adopted century, he has to conceal his intelligence from the public for fear that they will
suspect it, and that only we, on such occasions as this, can be given the full quality
by the Conservatives under pressure during September-October 1959, the
of his mind.' 'Yes', said the Chief Whip, 'Yes.'
Tories approached the formation of electoral opinion as no Party had ever
done before - but as all serious parties would have to do in the future. Having However, Macmillan's inability to play an effective independent role at the
once embarked on this route, the Party would henceforth be faced by the 1960 Summit, and the regular public debates over weapons systems purchased
continuous need to stay one day's march ahead of its political opponents in from the United States in the early 1960s, made the claim to lead as a
the steady move downmarket; at the centre this would present few problems substitute for conquest increasingly difficult to sustain.3 .
except the financial one, for the new campaigning methods were to prove It was equally difficult from 1960 to misunderstand the d~~ft of Conservative
ruinously expensive, but in the backwoods there would be an increasingly colonial policy, against which Salisbury had so ineffectively warned in 1957,
desperate struggle to modernise Party machinery that had been created for but about which there had been little active debate befor.e the 1959 Election.
another world, a struggle that would never entirely succeed. None of this Macmillan's choice of Iain Macleod as Colonial Secretafy after his return to
modernising impetus in electioneering had much to do with the presentation power placed in the hot seat the archetypal modern _an~ liberal-minded Tory
of hard choices to the electorate, except insofar as it related to the alleged in place of the more traditional (and more nght-wmg) Alan Lennox-Boyd,
programme of the Labour Party. The Party's determination not to have a who would shortly join the new Monday Club to indicate his displeasure
debate, or even indeed a policy, on immigration in these years is a case 111 at what had happened after he departed. Tory colonial policy, which had
point. All of this is discussed in Chapter 1. in fact been shifting ever since Macmillan took over from Eden, was
Behind the scenes though, if carefully kept off the boil until the 1959 accelerated by Macleod. More importantly Macleod saw it as his task to win
General Election had been won, the Macmillan Government was edging support for his policies by the open advocacy of the case for decolonisation
towards the making of real strategic choices in what Macleod had called where Lennox-Boyd had proceeded more by stealth. Colonial policy was
earlier in the year 'matters involving the long-term re-education of the Party'. in 1961 as contentious as it had been relatively harmonious in 1957. The
The resignation of Lord Salisbury and the repudiation of the Tory whip by Macmillan-Macleod conviction was that Britain's remaining Third World
the right-wing Suez rebels in 1957 were early attempts by the discontented colonies could not now be retained once they demanded independence, since
to demonstrate the way in which the wind was blowing. In both cases, the Britain no longer had either the will or the defence resources to resist such
mismanagement of the issue by the rebels, the adroit footwork of the Prime demands; they saw the proper and most conservative course as being to steer
Minister and the resolute determination of most Conservatives not to allow colonies towards self-government before such demands led to bloodshed and
the boat to be rocked in the year after Suez combined to prevent a wider visible British humiliation. But if this was actually only a change of pace since
debate from taking place. By the time that the Party returned from the 1959 Lennox-Boyd, it seemed to be more to a Party which, since successful military
campaign, implementation of the 1957 Defence White Paper was making campaigns in Malaya and Kenya in the past decade, had been taught to believe
it impossible for Britain ever again to embark on a military operation on that Britain would at least choose the method and the pace of its own retreat
the scale of Suez. Though that shift had not been acknowledged either in from Empire. The elder statesman Lord Halifax, who had known plenty about
the White Paper or in the subsequent debate, Britain had settled for the British weakness even twenty years earlier at the time of Munich, thought in
subordinate status in the Western alliance that Suez had shown to be the May 1958 that 'the difficulty of the Government is that they are tied by their
best now on offer. Yet, as Macmillan was photographed in Moscow and local Conservatives, who do not yet realise that we are no longer a Great
then chatted patronisingly with his wartime chum 'Ike' on primetime TV on Power, and that the days are past when we could assert our authority with
the eve of the 1959 Election campaign, it was easy for the British people to a Maxim gun'. Macmillan's 'winds of change' speech to the South African
miss the point. Nigel Nicolson had reported to his father the shift of approach Parliament in 1960 was in part an attempt to remove that sort of illusion; it was
in Macmillan's first Prime Ministerial address to the 1922 Committee, but also a big political success for the Prime Minister, but the subsequent formation of
the subtlety with which it was concealed: the Monday Club (in direct opposition to his policy and taking its name from
the day on which the speech had been delivered) heralded a running battle
It was superb. His whole speech turned upon the distinction between pride and
vanity in the conduct of international relations, and there was not much doubt
what he had in mind .... He said that the greatest moments in our history have
not been when we have conquered but when we have led. You see the subtle 3 Robert Shepherd, Iain Macleod (1994), 155-61; Nicolson, Harold Nicolson Diaries, 331.
6 The Winds of Change: Macmillan to Heath, 1957-1975 Introduction 7
over African policy in the Party that would last for a generation. Alongside felt for 'Commonwealth'). A sense of Britain's relative economic weakness
the conventionally right-wing elements that formed the Monday Club, and contributed to the same strategy: whereas British policy-makers had allowed
overlapping with them to a great extent, were the many Tories of all types, the early moves towards European integration to proceed in her absence under
highly placed throughout the Party (especially in southern England) for whom the twin illusions that the European Economic Community (EEC) without
the future of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia presented other problems, Britain could do her no economic harm, and that an alternative could be
since so many of them had relatives who had chosen to settle there or had constructed in the European Free Trade Area (EFT A) that would bring
economic interests that they wished to preserve. As other policy areas were equal benefits, by the time of the 1961-62 recession few Tory Ministers
soon to show, the modernising impetus in the colonies ran counter to the doubted that Britain must some day join the Common Market for her
conservative wish to defend property rights and special interests. Against the own economic security. A second economic downswing during the thirteen
uncompromising official view, first of Macleod and then of Maudling when he years of Tory government was crucial here, for it concentrated attention on
succeeded him at the Colonial Office, that Britain's future role was not to be a the accumulating evidence that, while the British econo~y had performed
colonial power and that that future should be embraced with enthusiasm rather impressively in the 1950s when compared to the 1930s (Macmillan's own
1
than with dread, the right - and instinctively very many more in the Party constant point of comparison until 1960), then it had,'not done at all well
too - felt only an uncomfortable reminder of Britain's decline and a betrayal of when compared to the current rates of growth achie~ed by her industrial
the 'kith and kin' who had been encouraged to migrate to Africa by previous competitors. There was an almost inescapable conclusion that Keynesianism
Tory colonial secretaries. In place of Churchill's confidence-building doctrine in one country was not going to prove to be the economic philosopher's
of three circles of British internationalism (Empire, American Alliance and stone and deliver affluence for all; with the increasing pace of decolonisation
Europe) which intersected only in London, there was now within five and the steady drift of the dominions away from traditional ties, Britain must
years of his retirement the recognition of a Special Relationship that existed anyway expect greater competition in the future in what had been her best
only on American sufferance and an Empire whose days were numbered. markets. Once again economics and politics came together; without steady
Macmillan's reassuring rhetoric continued to obscure some of these truths, economic growth, the awkward choice that had faced Macmillan's Cabinet in
but the struggle to defend actual policies without admitting to their primary December 1957 would recur with increasing frequency; how to sustain levels
motivation became more and more desperate. As Anthony Sampson pointed of social spending on which general Conservative popularity was thought to
out at the time, the discussion of this shift of policy direction was enmeshed depend, without over-taxing the economic interests of the middle-class voter
in the perception of the changing personnel of Conservative governments in on whom the Party relied for money and work as well as support at elections,
the generation after Maxwell-Fyfe. The bitterest attack on Macleod's colonial or borrowing to an extent that would induce inflation to the disadvantage of
policy, as 'too clever by half', came in March 1961 when he was assaulted the Tory rentiers. The tensions involved in this strategic change of direction
in the House of Lords by Salisbury; in the subsequent furore, Macleod was are looked at in Chapter 3.
backed by Lords Kilmuir and Hailsham (the latter in what Salisbury himself However, the diagnosis of Britain's declining economic performance did
called 'a speech of extreme violence') and Salisbury's supporters included the not only rest on her international partnerships. Increasingly, the British
Duke of Montrose and the Earl of ~.rran. One peer who observed it thought economy was being said to be held back by its roots in an old-fashioned
that 'it wasn't really about Africa. It was pure class warfare - the upper class political and social culture, archetypally presented to a mass readership by
peers against the middle class peers.' Sampson's own view was that 'it was not Penguin Books' What's Wrong with Britain? series (which concluded that just
only a conflict between classes, and between old and new Conservatives: it was about everything needed putting right). Macmillan himself was no natural
a conflict between a generation strong enough to stand up to its enemies, and conservative - Clement Attlee thought him to be the most radical man
one preoccupied with solidarity and survival. '4 he had encountered in British politics - and was quite ready to embrace
Such worries might have been assuaged more successfully if the Govern this prospective gospel of change. The shift to a neo-corporatist doctrine
ment had managed to put momentum behind an alternative focus for Britain of indicative planning in 1961-62 by the Macmillan Government was to
in the world, had in effect (in Dean Acheson's words) 'found a role' after the premier an opportunity to bring to political centre stage ideas which
having 'lost an Empire'. Entry to the European Common Market had been he had advocated since he co-authored Industry and the State in 1927, and
intended by Macmillan to fulfil precisely the inspirational focus of identity which now seemed to be paying off in the faster growing economies of
which the Empire could no longer supply (and which few Conservatives France, West Germany and Japan. The 'New Approach' of Summer 1962
was an attempt by Macmillan to devise a domestic policy that would
4 Nicolson, Harold Nicolson Diaries, 349; Sampson, Anatomy, 81-2. run alongside entry to the EEC in propelling Britain into modernity; the
8
The Winds of Change: Macmillan to Heath, 1957-1975 Introduction 9
ministerial reshuffle of July 1962 was intended to provide the political Macmillan was further disabled by increasing complaints (mainly from the
counterpart to this economic strategy by highlighting new, younger faces press, but with echoing voices in the Party too), that for all his modernising
at the cuttmg edge of Government policy. It was only the belated and reluctant rhetoric, he was actually a snob who filled his Government with extremely un
recognition that there was no place for Selwyn Lloyd in this brave new world 'modern'-looking ranks of relatives and Old Etonians, and thereby denied real
of Tory modernising, and the catastrophic mishandling of his dismissal by influence to the Party's rising meritocrats. In this context, his determination
Macmillan, that diverted attention from the policy initiative on to political that he should be succeeded by Lord Home when he eventua.Hy had to step
and personal battles. Nevertheless, by late 1962, the Government had changed down in October 1963, and deep suspicions that he had rigged the contest
course towards a European future, and had begun to put in place the domestic so that the 'establishment' candidate would win, were a fatal legacy from
mechanisms of reform to underpin it. As John Campbell has pointed out, it Macmillan both to his Party and to Home himself. For The Economist,
Is a significant pomter for the Party's future that Edward Heath was close
the major national misgiving must be that [Home's J accessipn could retard the
to Macmillan while this shift of gear was being achieved, for the pursuit of
progress of modern Conservatism as a radical innovating force . . The new
economic growth achieved by domestic reform and of European integration
Prime Minister also claims to be by nature a Tory radica!. He has in the past
was .to remam Heath's political agenda throughout his front-bench career _ defined this himself - in a revealing phrase - by saying t~it he sees change as a
and mdeed afterwards too. s
fact of life, not merely to be recognised but welcomed. But l\e has not so obviously
There were though three serious difficulties with such a shift of direction, seen change as something he should strive to initiate and b'ring about. And herein
quite apart from the Party's sentimental attachment to a colonial past and lies the great divide, one which liberal Conservatives like Mr. Macleod are right
t~e economic self-mterest of some of its members in the colonial world. to emphasise and which at least some of those who have sponsored Lord Home's
candidature still seem loth to recognise.
First, while . Macmillan was indeed a man with a radical mind second to
none, and with a ruthless determination to press through his 'new approach', When the symbolic Tory meritocrat lain Macleod, a co-author of One
he was. also a man. who had only recently traded most successfully on his Nation's 1954 publication Change is Our Ally, first refused to serve under
own v1s1ble embodiment of Britain's past. The 'Edwardian style' of dress, Home and then penned the most informed press attack on what Macmillan
walk, language and political persona that he had consciously adopted in the had done in October 1963, such claims could not be ignored. Home himself,
1950s had been deeply reassuring to a Party that was quite happy not to though he actually lacked 'side' to as great an extent as any Tory Leader
confront the true lessons of Suez, preferring to accept Macmillan's confident between Baldwin and Major has ever done, seemed to epitomise through his
assurances that Britain was still a great country, that she could remain a world background and social position the backward-looking side of Macmillan that
power by cultural superiority'. example and diplomatic skills even if no longer he himself had been striving to subordinate. 6
able to dommate by economic and military power. The significance of the Home's narrow failure to win the 1964 Election, which was anyway a huge
cartoon char~cter 'Superm.ac' lay in this collision of the romantic past and task after the ructions of 1963, and his poor performance in the rougher
the tough-mmded future 111 the real Macmillan. But the 'New Approach' world of opposition in 1965, prompted his early downfall. In Edward Heath,
(as even the name he gave to it suggested) had to eschew the past and the Party elected in July 1965 a Leader whose meritocratic origins were
welcome the future with open arms, to advocate change with enthusiasm reflected in his 'blessed are the pacemakers' rhetoric, and for whom the
an.cl with.out regret. To a large extent Macmillan was incapable of doing modernisation of Britain and entry to the EEC were twin poles of the policy
this convmcmgly, and the. problem only increased as he himself aged, at just of a true believer. He won the leadership contest over Reginald Maudling
the moment when sweepmg changes in the popular culture of the Western whose language and policy preferences were remarkably close to his own;
world were. bringing forward the spirit of youth. Even without the terminal both men had emerged at the top at the end of the Macmillan period, and
damage mfhcted on his Government by Vassall, Profumo and the failure to both of them saw Britain's future along the lines that the Macmillan Cabinet
get. mto the EEC, Macmillan would in 1963 have had increasing difficulty in had embraced in 1962. For many of the younger generation of Conservatives,
mamtammg his ascendancy in a Cabinet that was a generation younger than Heath's advent therefore seemed a golden opportunity to unite the future
he was, and agamst an Opposition Leader who was even younger than that they believed in with a political style that did not distract with its over-the
N (and who constantly harped on the fact), in a world where political leaders shoulder nostalgia; and he was a man whose leisure pursuits would not locate
n
were measured againstJohn F. Kennedy rather than 'Ike'. him photographically among the country's landowners. A letter received at
Central Office in December 1963 from a 44-year-old industrial manager put
5 John Campbell, Edward Heath (1993), 134.
6 The Economist, 26 Oct. 1963.
10 The Winds of Change: Macmillan to Heath, 1957-1975
Introduction 11
r just this viewpoint, and very persuasively. In choosing Home, the Party had,
opposed. The creation of the National Economic Development Council and
:II he felt, showed that the
the National Incomes Commission by the Macmillan Government therefore
'establishment' ... would rather lose the election than lose their power in the provided both a further, pressing argument for keeping the Trades Union
Party. We are looking for a 1963 leader. Do you remember Kennedy? We liked Congress (TUC) in cooperative mood and - to Tory critics of this policy -
him. We are sick of seeing old-looking men dressed in flat caps and bedraggled
fresh evidence that the unions would not give up anything in return for being
tweeds strolling with a 12-bore. For God's sake, what is your campaign manager
involved in a national governing partnership; such schemes" were therefore
doing? These photographs of Macmillan's ghost with Home's face date about 1912.
only delaying the moment when the Government would have to take
The nearest approach to our man is Heath. In every task he performs, win or lose,
he has the facts, figures and knowledge. We don't give a damn ifhe is a bachelor. responsibility for modernising industrial relations practices by law. The failure
He is our age, and he is capable, he looks a director (of the Country), and most of of the Home Government to face up to this issue during its short life - when
all he is quite different from these tired old men, their 19th century appearance and it was quite ready to deal with the equally contentious m~tter of Resale Price
their 18th century platitudes. Capable as we think Mr. Heath is, we don't believe Maintenance (RPM) which hit the Tory shopkeeper vote hard - was seen by
he or his kind will ever be allowed to take the reins from the tired, old men, or
some of its Tory critics as evidence of its poor political strategy. After power
the Etonians.
was lost in October 1964 the dam burst within weeks, pnd by Summer 1965
The loss of votes by the Conservative Party in 1964 from exactly the type of the Conservative Party was irrevocably committed to frade union legislation
young manager for whom this correspondent claimed to speak (and for which that would if necessary be imposed. But that dramati~ shift was once again
there was abundant evidence at the time) undoubtedly helped to get Heath's easily misunderstood, for neither Heath, who largely engineered the policy
leadership campaign rolling. Heath's election as Party Leader therefore seemed change before he became Leader, nor the successive Party spokesmen on
a belated denial of these claims that the 'establishment' would ever give up its industrial relations, had actually abandoned the 'partnership' approach to the
power to such a man. It was easy in all of this not to notice that Heath's rise maintenance of low inflation and high growth rates that they themselves had
through the ranks had been very much as an insider, in the successive positions followed in office. That approach was no longer unchallenged within the Party
\'I
N of Chief Whip, trusted confidant to Macmillan as Prime Minister and main high command, for by 1965 Enoch Powell had laid out the full prospectus for a
domestic prop to the Home Government. He had permeated the establishment 'deflationist' economic strategy - and this fact too led to a blurring of Heath's
rather than overturning it, as say Macleod or Powell might have done, and as intentions and to new possibilities of misunderstanding - but neither Heath
Heath's own successor in the leadership would quite deliberately attempt. 7 nor his closest advisers ever abandoned in their own minds the instinctive
The second problem with the Macmillan 'new approach' as carried forward corporatism that they had practised since 1962. Much of this is explored in
to Heath's leadership election was the specific policy area of industrial Chapter 5.
relations. Throughout the 1950s, and especially at the end of the decade, The third problem with the modernising thrust of policy from the early
the Party leaders had stifled or ignored the increasing demands of the 1960s was that many Conservatives at every level of the Party did not
rank and file for legislative action to curb the freedom of the trade unions. actually like it very much. Quite apart from those whose personal interests
Successive Tory Ministers of Labour after Walter Monckton, with only the might be threatened by a meritocratic Toryism, there were many who
partial exception of Macleod and Heath, had seen it as their job to encourage disliked the rhetoric of modernising change simply because they were natural
and strengthen trade union leaders against their own shop stewards, and to conservatives who did not therefore see it as their Party's business to preach
do nothing that would make their position weaker. As the union leaderships the opposite viewpoint. As each area came up for review - economic policy,
entered on a more left-wing phase of activity, and as unofficial strikes education, industrial relations, transport, local government - it was possible
and demarcation disputes made the unions a favourite Tory scapegoat for to educate the Party to the need for the reforms proposed, but it was far less
Britain's poor economic performance, the Government's position became easy to make Conservatives into enthusiasts for change as such. Indeed, in
steadily more difficult to maintain. But the 'New Approach' required the 1964 Oliver Poole told David Butler that this was the main fault-line in the
cooperation of union leaders in corporate harmony with the Government contemporary Conservative Party, separating
and the leaders of industry in the pursuit of economic growth, harmony
those who positively like modern British society, with its motor cars, modern
N that would not be encouraged by legislation that the unions themselves
u buildings and egalitarianism, and those who do not. The traditionalists recognise
that change is necessary and seldom try to impede it, but they do not welcome it,
and their lack of enthusiasm is always a force to be reckoned with. Much of the
7 John Ramsden, The Making of Consemative Party Policy: The Conservative Research Department Party's history from 1960 onwards becomes intelligible only in the light of this
since 1929 (1980), 225-6. division.