The Week the World Stood Still: Inside the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Sheldon M. Stern Stanford University Press (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:3)(cid:3)(cid:6)(cid:4)(cid:7)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:12)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:8)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:12)(cid:7)(cid:13)(cid:10)(cid:10) Stanford Nuclear Age Series General Editor, Martin Sherwin advisory board Barton J. Bernstein, David Holloway, and Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky The Week the World Stood Still Inside the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Sheldon M. Stern Stanford University Press, Stanford, California 2005 Stanford University Press Stanford, California ©2005 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system without the prior written permission of Stanford University Press. Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Stern, Sheldon M. The week the world stood still : Inside the secret Cuban Missile Crisis / Sheldon M. Stern. p. cm. — (Stanford nuclear age series) Rev. and condensed version of: Averting ‘the final failure’ : John F. Kennedy and the secret Cuban Missile Crisis meetings. 2003. Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn 0-8047-5076-9 (cloth : alk. paper) — isbn 0-8047-5077-7 (pbk : alk. paper) 1. Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962. 2. Kennedy, John F. (John Fitzgerald), 1917–1963. 3. National Security Council (U.S.)—History—20th century. 4. United States—Foreign relations—1961–1963—Decision making. 5. National security—United States—Decision making. I. Stern, Sheldon M. Averting ‘the final failure’. II. Title. III. Series. e841.S758 2005 972.9106'4—dc22 2004020532 This book is printed on acid-free, archival-quality paper. Original printing 2005 Last figure below indicates year of this printing: 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 07 06 05 Designed and typeset at Stanford University Press in 10/12.5 Sabon Acknowledgments The original, full-length version of this book, Averting ‘The Final Fail- ure’: John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings, began, at least in my mind, over twenty years ago when, as JFK Library historian, I first listened to the still-classified ExComm tapes. I was es- pecially intrigued by the October 26 morning meeting in which U.N. ambassador Adlai Stevenson, my hero in the 1950s, attempted unsuc- cessfully to overcome the hostility of his ExComm critics. I later told my wife that a narrative account of these meetings would make a fas- cinating book. But the project had to wait until all the tapes from these historic thirteen days were finally declassified in the late 1990s. This revised and condensed version of Averting ‘The Final Failure’ aims to make this unique historical event completely comprehensible— especially for students and general readers. And, of course, genuinely interested readers can always move on to the full-length version. I am particularly indebted to Muriel Bell, director of acquisitions at Stanford University Press, and Professor Martin Sherwin, general editor of the Stanford Nuclear Age Series, in which the original version of this book first appeared. Finally, I can never adequately sum up the support from my wife Helen, my daughter Jennifer, and especially my son Jeremy, a historian in his own right, throughout this project. Sheldon M. Stern Newton, Mass. This page intentionally left blank Contents 1 The JFK Cuban Missile Crisis Tapes 1 2 The Making of the Cuban Missile Crisis 11 The Cold War: JFK’s Crucible 11 The Cold War and Cuba 14 Nuclear Confrontation in Cuba 18 The Kennedy Paradox 23 Key Members of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council 29 3 The Secret Meetings of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council 37 Epilogue: The November Post-Crisis 205 Conclusion 213 Notes 219 Selective Bibliography 231 Index 235 (Six pages of photographs follow page 36) This page intentionally left blank (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:3)(cid:3)(cid:6)(cid:4)(cid:7)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:12)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:8)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:12)(cid:7)(cid:13)(cid:10)(cid:10)
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