The Warp of the Serbian Identity

252 Pages·2016·1.45 MB·English

HELSINKI COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN SERBIA
17
studies
THE WARP OF
THE SERBIAN
IDENTITY
anti-westernism,
russophilia,
traditionalism...
BELGRADE, 2016
THE WARP OF THE SERBIAN IDENTITY
Anti-westernism, russophilia, traditionalism…
Edition:
Studies No. 17
Publisher:
Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia
www.helsinki.org.rs
For the publisher:
Sonja Biserko
Reviewed by:
Prof. Dr. Dubravka Stojanović
Prof. Dr. Momir Samardžić
Dr Hrvoje Klasić
Layout and design: Ivan Hrašovec
Printed by: Grafprof, Belgrade
Circulation: 200
ISBN 978-86-7208-203-6
This publication is a part of the project “Serbian Identity in the 21st Century”
implemented with the assistance from the Open Society Foundation – Serbia. The
contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the Helsinki Committee
for Human Rights in Serbia, and do not necessarily refect the views of the Open
Society Foundation – Serbia.
CONTENTS
Publisher’s Note 5
TRANSITION AND IDENTITIES
JOVAN KOMŠIĆ
Democratic Transition And Identities 11
LATINKA PEROVIĆ
Serbian-Russian Historical Analogies 57
MILAN SUBOTIĆ,
A Diferent Russia: From Serbia’s Perspective 83
SRĐAN BARIŠIĆ
The Role of the Serbian and Russian Orthodox Churches
in Shaping Governmental Policies 105
RUSSIA’S SOFT POWER
DR. JELICA KURJAK
“Soft Power” in the Service of Foreign Policy Strategy
of the Russian Federation 129
DR MILIVOJ BEŠLIN
A “New” History For A New Identity 139
SONJA BISERKO, SEŠKA STANOJLOVIĆ
Russia’s Soft Power Expands 157
SERBIA, EU, EAST
DR BORIS VARGA
Belgrade And Kiev Between Brussels And Moscow 169
DIMITRIJE BOAROV
More Politics Than Business 215
PETAR POPOVIĆ
Serbian-Russian Joint Military Exercise 235
SONJA BISERKO
Russia and NATO: A Test of Strength over Montenegro 241
5
PUBLISHER’S NOTE
The problem of national identity especially troubles unfnished
nations and the countries wherein ethnicity and statehood do not
overlap or, moreover, wherein the discrepancy between the two is too
large.
In historical perspective, national identities have emerged from com-
munities the members of which would protect at all costs; the same
as their leaders they took their major responsibilities were – national.
What was probably inevitable once is not enough today. In a world of
globalization people belong to many imagined communities – local,
regional, constitutional, national or cosmopolitan – that are overlap-
ping mostly thanks to technological and communications revolution
and rather affordable travel. Sovereignty is no longer the absolute it
used to be to the people.
Bearing in mind the complexity of the problem and the background
against which Serbia is in search of its new identity – the pan-Serbian
project that suffered defeat at the end of the 20th century and ensu-
ing frustration, and the responsibility for the war and war crimes Ser-
bia would hardly admit – the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights
prepared this collection of papers hoping it would trigger off a wider
debate on the Serbian national identity.
Instead in modern times Serbia seeks its identity in the past by invok-
ing its “traditionally authentic political identity” – actually, the legacy
of the Middle Ages, Eastern Orthodoxy, Byzantine heritage, the folk-
lore of its culture and anti-Westernization.
The frst and second Yugoslavia are called into question – especially
the latter which is criminalized through revisionism and relativism of
fascism.
6
th
By wiping off the 20 century from its experience and memory, the
Serbian culture actually renounces its greatest achievements. The
patriarchal and the modern civilization are in clash in Serbia – at this
point, regretfully, renewal of the patriarchal society has the upper
hand. Serbia’s mainstream strongly resists the postulates of a modern
state: the rule of law, human rights, plurality and tolerance.
The majority of right-wing groups and intellectuals advocate “St. Sava
identity of the Serbian people” as a mainstay of “all the victories” and
“a hope for Serbia’s recovery.” The predominant nationalistic elites
strongly oppose reforms of the country and the society under the pre-
text of their being destructive to the Serbian identity. But, in fact, Ser-
bia’s modernization would undermine their interests that are tied up
with political structures. They see the pro-European civil sector and
everyone arguing for Serbia’s membership of EU and NATO as the big-
gest threat to “St. Sava identity.”
Russia – with its growing presence and infuence on Serbia’s cultural
and political scenes – plays a major role in shaping a new identity.
Russia fuels Serbia’s frustration and the thesis about Yugoslavia as
Serbia’s great delusion; and so it also fuels the thesis about artifcial
nations such as Macedonians, Bosniaks and Montenegrins. The infu-
ential, pro-Russian, conservative bloc keeps entrenching the “Russian
component” in Serbia’s identity; they promote “Russifcation of the
Serbian nation,” argue for the superiority of the Eastern Orthodox civ-
ilization, its Byzantine heritage and Slavic culture, and speak of Slav
nations helping one another throughout history.
The Serbs and the Russians alike, as Srđan Barišić notes in his paper,
have closely connected Eastern Orthodoxy with state-building, and in
both cases Eastern Orthodoxy has been – in the times of many deep
crises – a strong integrative factor of the safeguard of national iden-
tity. And in both cases, the period of social atheism marginalized and
minimalized the signifcance of public religiousness, whereas with dis-
th
integrations of once federations in the last decade of the 20 century
revitalization of religion began.
7
Both Russia and Serbia experienced failed transitions and exhausting
identity wanderings at the international arena, the same as at domes-
tic scenes. Russia compensates for these failures by renewing impe-
rial ambitions and revenging itself for the humiliation it was subject
to after the end of the Cold War. And this is the end that justifes the
means, including the mechanism of soft power it has been using most
successfully and especially in Serbia. Russia is expanding its infuence
on the Balkans at the time when all the countries of region are uncon-
solidated and vulnerable, have not rounded off their identities yet and
are, therefore, prey to pressure.
This is the subject matter of this collection of papers the authors of
which are dealing with various aspects of Russia’s presence in Serbia.
Russia’s today’s presence in the Balkans is nothing new: it logically fol-
lows from Russia’s imperialism and Serbian-Russian analogies. The
majority of Serbia’s electorate supports the party that is deep-rooted
in Serbia’s political tradition. And all this, as Latinka Perović put it,
along with the shaky consensus on Serbia’s accession to EU is seen as
a confusion; the longstanding process the upcoming stages of which
cannot be anticipated for sure without proper understanding of the
process itself. And the alternative is possible only when this process is
truly understood.
Sonja Biserko
I
TRANSITION AND
IDENTITIES