The Valentine in North Africa, 1942-43 (Armour in Action I)

80 Pages·1972·17.42 MB·English

by  Bryan Perrett

ARMOUR IN ACTION . I

The Valentine

in North Africa 1942-43

BRYAN PERRETT
LONDON

IAN ALLAN
First published 1972
Contents
Acknowledgements page 6
Foreword 7
I Egypt, July 1-22, 1942 9
SBN 7IIO 0262 2 2 Egypt, July 22,1942 15
3 Egypt, July 23-0ct 23,1942 27
4 Egypt, Oct 23-Nov 3, 1942 38
5 Egypt and Libya, Nov 3, 1942-Jan 23, 1943 53
6 Tunisia, Jan 23-May 16, 1943 60
Appendices:
The Infantry Tank Mark III Valentine

and its derivatives
68
Subsequent History of 23rd Armoured Brigade 78
All rights reserved, No part of this book may be
reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any
means, electronic or mechanical, including photo­
copying, recording or by any information storage
and retrieval system, without permission from the
Publisher in writing,
() Bryan Perrett, 1972
"I" '/r, /; /I,/ h I, ll' ,,11/,1/, T,ld, ShvPPl'rum, SW'rey, and printed in the United
)-111;/1 /11/11 /11' '1"1••, (/,/I'(/IiI' ( ;;111 /'/'as.' r.imil.('d, Letchworth, SG6 IJS,
Acknowledgements Foreword
by MAJOR GENERAL G. W. RICHARDS, CB, CBE, DSO, Me, DL
IN WRITING this book I have received a vast amount of help and A VERY LARGE number of books have been written about the last
guidance from Major General G. W. Richards, CB, CBE, DSO, war and most of these are concerned with the strategy and high­
MC, DL, who commanded 23rd Armoured Brigade for most of level command decisions. This book is different. It is the story of
the period covered, and who has most kindly written the the 23rd Armoured Brigade during the advance across North
Foreword. Mrica. It is an epic of courage and endurance, and a thrilling tale
I have also received much invaluable advice from Major ofmany hard-fought battles told by soldiers who actually took part
General Douglas Wimberley, CB, DSO, MC, DL, LLD, GOC in them. They were a devoted band ofwarriors bound together by
51st (Highland) Division throughout the North Mrican Campaign a sincere belief in their cause and by a remarkable comradeship in
and beyond, who frequently had the 23rd Armoured Brigade, in arms.
whole or in part, under his command, and who has generously This book shows that it was not only the tank crews who con­
permitted me to have access to certain of his private papers. tributed to victory, but the untiring endeavour of the mechanics,
I have also received much assistance from many ofthe Brigade's fitters, supply men, sappers and drivers who saw that the crews
former officers and soldiers, amongst others. were supplied with all their instruments of war, and who often
From 40th RTR Col J. L. Finigan, DSO, TD, DL, Lt Col F. G. took tremendous risks in doing so.
Pinnington, TD, Major J. B. Lumby, MC, TD, E. L. Wiard, Esq, This brigade consisted mainly of Territorial units and exists no
Mr Cyril Rogers, Mr Harold Sowden. longer, but wherever you meet men ofthe 23rd Armoured Brigade
From 46th RTR Col T. C. A. Clark, DSO, OBE, Col E. F. you will find that they uphold the spirit of service and comrade­
Offord, DSO, MBE, Mr Leslie Jones, Mr Edward Roberts, Mr ship for which this formation was famed.
Peter Dignum.
Trewarren
From 50th RTR Major L. F. Williams, MC, Major C. Walters,
22·3·71.
TD, Mr Allan Abbess, Mr Donald Hamblin, Mr Bill Burnell, Mr
Leslie Cliff, Mr Don Ellery, Mr D. G. Ward, Mr Bob Smallman,
and to all these gentlemen, I should like to express my sincere
thanks.
I should also like to thank Mr Donald McKay, who drew the
diagrams which illustrate several of the Brigade's actions, and the
photographic librarians of the Imperial War Museum, the
Australian War Memorial, and the West German Bundesarchiv.
6 7
CHAPTER ONE
Egypt, July 1-22, 1942
ANY BRITISH SCHOOLBOY can tell you about El Alamein. He will tell you that
the British Army, after its defeat by Rommel and his Afrika Korps, withdrew
to the Alamein Line and that here it gathered its strength, and when it was
ready, gave Rommel such a thrashing that the Afrika Korps was chased out
of Egypt, across Libya, and into Tunisia, where it finally surrendered.
This expresses those momentous events in the most simple terms. This is
what his teachers have been taught, and their instruction in its turn has been
coloured by the official presentation of the various situations as they
developed throughout 1942.
For, apart from a small defensive box on the coast, there never was an
"Alamein Line" to retire into. There simply were not the resources available
in Egypt in June 1942 to construct or man a line stretching 40 miles from the
coast to the Quattara Depression. The "Battle of Alamein" is really two
battles, called for convenience First and Second Alamein. Each battle
Emblem of the 23rd Armoured Brigade
contained numerous actions, some of which were a battle within a battle, and
between the two principal engagements was fought the Battle of Alam Halfa.
The series of operations commonly called First Alamein began with the
mobile cut and thrust that had characterised the Desert War up to that time,
and finished with the Germans and Italians, and not the British, on the
defensive behind thickening minefields. The front had simply congealed on a
line running south from a point slightly west of the El Alamein box, with
both armies having shot their bolt.
Rommel had been stopped by sheer hard fighting, and also by a line of a
different sort-his supply line. The demands made by mobile armoured
forces upon their supply echelons are enormous. There is always an insati­
able demand for fuel, lubricants, ammunition, spare parts, water and food
and of these fuel was always in shortest supply during the North African
Campaign. The reason for this was that fuel was a self-consuming load. The
further a commander advanced from his supply depots, the greater the
distance his supply trucks must travel. This meant not only that replenish­
ments occurred at longer and longer intervals, but also that each replenish­
ment became smaller. For example, a truck carrying petrol from Benghazi
eastwards to supply Axis troops at Alamein would have to fill its tanks, and
those of other vehicles not carrying fuel, from its load several times before
arriving, with the result that only half the original load might arrive. Not
only this, the Axis fuel supply was dangerously low to start with, thanks to
the attentions of the Royal Navy's submarines between Italy and the North
African coast. The fuel situation coloured the whole of Rommel's strategic
thinking, and dictated the tactics which he could employ against his enemy.
For part of First Alamein, and the whole of Second Alamein, he simply
dared not allow the British to break through his front and reinstitute a
9
10 THE VALENTINE IN NORTH AFRICA 1942-43 H<;Yl'T, JULY 1-22, 1942 II
mobile form of warfare that would drain his Panzers tanks dry and leav~ ..f 1,500 prisoners. The 2,000 Italian prisoners were released in a state of
them at the enemy's mercy, as this could, and eventually did, lead to the .I.ubious jubilation.
destruction of his army. Point 63 was therefore lost, although Point 64 remained in the hands of 5
The Alamein battlefield stretched from the sea in the north, southwards Indian Division, in spite of an attack made by Afrika Korps on July 16,
for 40 miles to the Quattara Depression, the sands of which were impassable which was broken up by the Corps Artillery, the infantry's anti-tank
to vehicles. The salient features of the battlefield were the coast road, the wcapons, and the tanks of 1st Armoured Division, and which cost Rommel
railway just inland from it, and three ridges, Miteiriya, Ruweisat and Alam '4 tanks.
Haifa. None were more than a swelling in the stony desert, but the overview So ended the first Battle of Ruweisat. Some ground had been gained, some
they gave of the surrounding terrain gave them an importance similar to nerman tanks knocked out and Italian X Corps was finished for a while. On
Paschendaele in W orId War I. IllC Axis side, a major breakthrough had been averted, one New Zealand
Our story begins at Ruweisat Ridge, a long slender feature on the North hrigade was left in ruins, another badly knocked about. Each side had some
Central sector of the front, running from East to West. The Ridge was the Hlight cause for satisfaction, but the British armour had not distinguished
scene of repeated actions throughout July, until its battered slopes became itself, bringing its relations with the infantry to an all-time low.
one of the most fiercely contested pieces of ground in Africa. This friction had been building up for some time. Now, the New
Here the Panzer Divisions of the Afrika Korps blundered into the waiting Zealanders' feelings towards British armour were of intense distrust, not to
1st Armoured Division on July 3, and were bundled along the Ridge Hay hatred, and these were reflected elsewhere in other Divisions.
westwards. The infantry claimed, with some justice, that the armour was never about
Italian infantry then began to arrive in the form of the Italian X Corps, to support them when it was most needed, and the armour said that they had
comprising the Brescia and Pavia Divisions, who established defensive Ilad enough of charging anti-tank gun screens which should have been dealt
positions along a line running North-South across the western half of the with by the infantry.
Ridge. The root of the problem lay in the way the two arms viewed their
Now British strategy at this stage of the Desert War was to concentrate on casualties. When an infantryman was killed or wounded, it was by a bullet,
the destruction of the weaker brethren, the Italians, and in so doing involve bayonet or high explosive shell, all things which he understood. But the
Afrika Korps in a wearing series of rescue operations that would consume tanlmlan fought in a travelling bomb, packed with explosives and high octane
valuable fuel and drive the German armour into the ground through lack of fuel. All tankmen have a horror of being burned to death in a blazing vehicle
maintenance and replacements. whilst they are trapped because of jammed hatches or personal injury, and
On the night of July 7/8, an Australian infantry raid disclosed the the tankmen of the earlier desert battles had heard the screams and smelled
presence of Italians on the Ridge, and a major operation involving elements the stench too often not to pay the greatest respect to the crack of an 88 shot.
from both British Corps was mounted against them. As a result, their actions were now governed by supreme caution and
This commenced at 23.00 on the night of July 14. The New Zealand staleness, not that this in any way excuses them from failing to protect
Division (XIII Corps) and 5th Indian Division (XXX Corps) were to attack their infantry; and especially not as the same performance was to be repeated
respectively Point 63 and Point 64 on the Ridge from the South East. 'aweek later.
The two divisions pressed home their attack with some aggression and These factors were fully appreciated by General Auchinleck and his staff,
secured these objectives, completely overrunning the wretched Italians who who also appreciated that ifa breakthrough at Ruweisat similar to that made
surrendered in such numbers that one estimate gives a figure of 2,000 on the night of July 14-15 could be exploited by armour, the rewards could
prisoners awaiting transport to the Delta next morning. be enormous. The great problem was, which armoured formation was going
However, all was not well by any means. During the night the right hand to do the hazardous job of breaking through the enemy anti-tank gun
New Zealand Brigade, the 5th, had trodden on the tail of a sleeping tiger ~creen? The combat-experienced Armoured Brigades fully understood the
when they by-passed the night Laager of the 8th Panzer Regiment. At first risks, and would be unlikely to enter the project with any enthusiasm. What
light they received a furious mauling from the enraged Germans, who was needed was a formation which was unaware of the dangers, but which
withdrew westwards to rejoin their fellows after they had knocked out all the had sufficient self-confidence to tackle the enemy aggressively. And a kindly
Brigade's anti-tank guns and inflicted considerable casualties. Fate had provided the planners with just such a formation.
4 New Zealand Brigade, on the left of 5 Brigade, fared even worse. Their For on July 6 the 23rd Armoured Brigade had disembarked at Port
left flank, ie the flank nearest to the main Axis front line, was supposed to Tewfik. This Brigade, together with 24th Armoured Brigade, formed the 8th
have been protected by 22nd Armoured Brigade against the inevitable first Armoured Division, and had been a sea for two months. The 24th
light counter-attack by Afrika Korps' Panzers. Armoured Brigade were still en route to the Middle East as their ship had
At first light 22nd Armoured Brigade were nowhere to be seen. In fact broken down at Durban.
they had not even left their night location at Alam Nayil, eight miles to the 23rd Armoured Brigade was commanded by Brigadier Lawrence Misa.
south east. When they got on the move, it was too late, and the panzers were Not only was it an all Territorial Brigade, its three armoured regiments also
already biting deep into 4 Brigade which was eventually overrun, with the loss all wore the black beret of the Royal Tank Regiment.
12 THE VALENTINE IN NORTH AFRICA 1942-43 II' ) Y I'T, JULY 1-22, 1942 13
The senior regiment, the 40th (The Kings) Bn Royal Tank Regiment, 11111111 a fortnight to completely "de-bug" a tank before all systems work to
commanded by Lt Col H. V. Dunbar, was directly descended from 7th Bn Ih,' crew's entire satisfaction. By hard work and the cannibalisation of some
The Kings Regiment, which in turn sprang from the 4th Lancashire Rifle ,.1' I he absent brigade's vehicles, the regiments of 23rd Armoured Brigade got
Volunteers, who had been founded, like many volunteer units, to combat a Ih eir Valentines into running order. But one major bug remained. The radio
potential invasion at a time when relations between Her Majesty's rl ~ had not all been adjusted to work in tropical climates by the time the
Government and that of Napoleon III were least cordial. Volunteers had Ilr'jgade was committed to action, with frequently fatal results.
served in the South Mrican War, and 7th Kings served on the Western '('he Brigade had an excellent record in training, and on arrival they were
Front during W orId War I. lold. that great things were expected of them. The Regiments were not
The 40th recruited in the Liverpool and Bootle area, as did their sister !t ll.:king in confidence in either themselves or their Valentines. They im­
regiment, the 46th (Liverpool Welsh) Bn RTR, who had been founded as a 1'1\.::;~ed those they met with their keenness to fight and get on with the job
Second Line to the 40th shortly before the outbreak of World War II, v!h.en I hey had been training for since 1939, an attitude found refreshing after the
politicians at last awoke to the significance of the events taking place in I'l·cent staleness shown by British armour.
Middle Europe, and decided to double the size of tlle Territorial Army. It was normally the practice when a formation arrived in the Middle East,
The 50th Bn Royal Tank Regiment recruited in the Bristol area, and had It) give it some weeks to acclimatise its personnel and to train for the harsh
been fonned in the same circumstances as tlle 46th, being the Second Line of \lid. demanding conditions of desert war. The planners gave 23rd Armoured
44th Bn RTR. The 46th and 50th were commanded respectively by Lt Col Brigade fourteen days before they pitchforked its regiments into action with
T . C. A. Clarke and Lt Col J. E. Cairns. Ileither vehicles nor crews fully prepared.
23rd Armoured Brigade was equipped with the Valentine Infantry Tank. The operations in which the Brigade was to participate involved the
This was a product of the muddled thinking of the inter-war years that had Jctachment of 50th RTR to support an Australian attack on Miteiriya Ridge,
led to the British Army being equipped with two types of tank, the Cruiser lind another attack at Ruweisat Ridge, to take place on the night of July
and the Infantry tank. The Infantry Tank was supposed to go into the attack Z{ -22 and to continue throughout July 22.
with the Infantry, as its name suggests, and for tIlls reason was well The Ruweisat attack, predictably, had been planned to repeat the success
armoured, but also slow. It was not intended in its original form that it of the night attack during 1st Ruweisat, and to exploit with armour the
should engage enemy armour, but how it could avoid this occupied but little fOllowing morning. The attack was to be planned and executed under the
of the planners' thoughts. The second Infantry Tank, the Matilda II, was direction of XIII Corps. There were to be three phases.
given a 2-pdr gun which could fire a solid armour-piercing shot, but not a
high explosive shell, and this weapon was also fitted to the Valentine, or Phase I was to be executed during the hours of darkness during the night
Infantry Tank Mark III. Not only did the 2-pdr have a very limited AP of July 21-22, tasks being as follows:
range, which was exceeded by both the German pzKw III and IV, the lack
(I) The New Zealand Division would attack to the North West and
of a high explosive round was fatal in trying to deal with the Infantry Tank's
capture Point 63 on Ruweisat Ridge.
most formidable opponent, the anti-tank gun, for a near miss with an HE
(II) 161 Indian Motor Brigade would attack West along the Ridge and
shell can incapacitate a gun crew, when only a direct hit will serve with an
capture Deir e1 Shein, a hollow feature at the North Western end of
AP round. Elevation and depression of the gun was by means of a shoulder
the Ridge.
piece in conjunction with friction dampers, which meant in practice that each
(III) 22nd Armoured Brigade would secure the left flank of the New
round had to be re-Iaid for elevation even when the vehicle was stationary
Zealanders.
because the muzzle kicked up when the weapon was fired.
(IV) Gaps would be made in the enemy minefield to permit the passage
There were, however, points in the Valentine's favour. It was a small tank,
of armour during Phases II and III.
and could be put into a hull down position easily in almost any fold in the
ground. Once sited thus, it was difficult for German and Italian attackers to Phase II at 08.00 the two remaining regiments of 23rd Armoured Brigade
detect the vehicle. It was also a reliable vehicle mechanically, and caused its would advance along the southern edge ofRuweisat Ridge through the cleared
crews few of the mailltenance problems associated with other designs, minefield, break the enemy anti-tank gun screen, and press on to El Mireir,
thereby saving them from unnecessary fatigue. another hollow feature to the South West of the Ridge, and there halt.
Upon disembarkation, 23rd Armoured Brigade was moved to Tel el Kebir, Phase III 2nd Armoured Brigade would follow 23rd Armoured Brigade
where it set about putting its tanks into fighting order. Some preparation of when they had secured El Mireir, pass through their position and exploit
vehicles had taken place before the Brigade had left the United Kingdom, beyond.
but the voyage and two months non-running had inevitably caused
problems. A simple plan, and one that might have succeeded provided there were no
When one takes over a tank, there are always "bugs" to be got rid of. unforeseen hitches. However, certain factors were working against it before
These can involve all three of the tanks prinlary systems, the gWl kit, the the first soldier crossed the start line.
communications equipment, or the automotive components. It usually takes The first was that after the disaster experienced by Italian X Corps during
14 THE VALENTINE IN NORTH AFRICA 1942-43
the night attack of July 14-15, the Ruweisat Ridge sector was now held by
infantry of the Afrika Korps. They had increased the density of the mine
belt, thickened up their anti-tank guns, and had armour on call very close to CHAPTER TWO
the front. The chance to repeat the pushover of the week before did not
exist.
The second, and ultimately disastrous, factor was the casual British staff Egypt, July 22, 1942
work. Although each unit had received its own orders in detail, it was not
properly briefed on the activities or timings of other formations taking part.
Each major formation was working, ifnot in the dark, then in deep twilight.
Nor, for some reason, did XIII Corps Commander think it necessary to hold AT 07.45 ON July 22 the 23rd Armoured Brigade was drawn up by regiments
a unit Commanders conference, although this was to be a major effort on the at the south eastern end of Ruweisat Ridge. The regiments had left their
night leaguer areas at first light and had moved up through the grey dust
part of his Corps.
The operation got off to a good start with the New Zealanders and Indians tunnels of the dawn to their start line, where they were now dispersed with
both taking their objectives during the hours of darkness. Then things began 40th RTR on the right, and 46th RTR on the left. Because they anticipated
to go badly wrong, for 22nd Armoured Brigade had failed to show up, having to negotiate minefield gaps, each regiment had adopted the narrow
its Commander contending that his tanks could not move at night. formation known as column of squadrons, with the squadrons themselves
This was, of course, nonsense, and no satisfactory reason has ever been given restricting their frontage to two troops up. The Regimental Headquarters
for this statement. Nor has it been established why XIII Corps did not troops followed behind the leading squadron.
overrule the brigade Commander, and get the brigade on the move on its own The tank crews had been briefed as to their role, the nature of which did
not surprise them, as they had been trained in the work of an armoured
initiati've.
Granted that a night move by armour is a difficult and wearing task, but at division, like many units who had trained in the United Kingdom with
that very moment German tanks were moving into position for a first light Valentines, for during the early war years this tank was the only one coming
counter-attack. off the production lines in any numbers. In fact, with its low top speed of 15
This fell on the left New Zealand brigade, the 6th, and caused serious mph on good going, the vehicle had never been designed to undertake the
casualties. History had repeated itself, and the New Zealanders were forced lype of operation about to begin.
to relinquish much of their gains. Having sustained over 2,000 casualties in a This fact was not lost on many of the Brigade's officers, many of whom
week because of lack of co-operation from 22nd Armoured Brigade, they had come forward the previous afternoon to reconnoitre the ground ahead.
were in no mood to put themselves out for any formation of British armour, . ('he going was good and hard, but the ground was covered with stones and
and no co-ordinated attempt was made to clear corridors in the Axis rocks, and it was felt that the Valentines would be unable to hold their
mine-belt for the passage of 23rd Armoured Brigade. maximum speed. This had been pointed out at the conference held during
Also, on the right, the 161 Indian Motor Brigade had been attacked at the evening by General Gatehouse, under whose control all armour partici­
Deir el Shein by enemy tanks at first light, and was pulling back eastwards pating in the operation was placed. Brigadier Misa had already voiced his
disapproval of his Brigade being thrown into action without adequate time
along the Ridge.
The scene was now set for the major event of the day. tor preparation or desert training, and now he was joined by Col Clarke of
46th RTR, a veteran of World War I, the expedition to North Russia in
1919, and the early desert battles, in maintaining that the Brigade's attack
could not be made at I5mph as planned. At first these objections were
brushed aside, but the Brigadier was adamant, and at length the speed of
advance was reduced to lomph.
"Anyway," somebody had told the Brigadier and the two Colonels, "after
the first mile, it will simply be a case of motoring through."
Now, the Egyptian sun was climbing upward and beginning to throw
down its heat. The air was vibrating with the rumble of diesel engines idling
lind revving. Fitters and crewmen attended to last minute faults, adjusting
budly firing engines and taking up the last of the slack track. In the turrets,
gunners checked their main and co-ax armament again and again, and radio
operators cursed the repeatedly blowing fuses of their untropicaIised sets.
Over one hundred tanks waited in the sun, all Valentines save for the two
dose-support Mati1das attached to each regiment. A proud and confident
lIight with pennons flapping amongst the forest ofaerials.
IS
16 THE VALENTINE IN NORTH AFRICA 1942-43
On the start line the two regiments encountered stragglers and wounded
from 161 Indian Motor Brigade, a formation as new to the desert as they
were themselves, and which, it will be recalled, had been counter-attacked
heavily at first light. The survivors encountered were shocked and confused,
and could not say whether the minefield had been gapped, or indeed what
situation existed forward.
Col Clarke did not like what he heard. After conferring with his second-in­
command, Major Eric Offord, he contacted Col Dunbar of the 40th, who was
equally uneasy. Together the two commanding officers suggested to
Brigadier Misa that the attack should be postponed until the position was
clarified.
It is not at all clear what happened next. Brigadier Misa may have passed
on his regimental commander's opinion to General Gatehouse, who in turn
may have referred it to XIII Corps HQ. Staff Officers' memories on this
point are curiously vague and non-committal in view of subsequent events.
Whatever happened, the two colonels were told by Misa that the artillery fire
support plan was already in motion and that the attack must go on as
scheduled. Now, there was a rumour that intercepts of German radio signals
from Deir el Shein indicated distress in that area, although why this should
be so is difficult to understand, since Mrika Korps had already pushed 161
Indian Motor Brigade away from the feature. Possibly the planners intended
to take full advantage of this imagined distress, in spite of the previous
night's debacle. However, such a piece of battlefield intelligence would not Valentine tank Retort of A Sqn 50th RTR
normally be available at Brigade level. In any event, it seems unlikely that a receives atteqtion at 'West Camp, Crowborough
brigade commander would take such an initiative in these circumstances in a ill [941. [Imperial War A-luseum
battle planned at Corps level unless he had received specific instructions
from above.
Commanding 10 Troop of the 40th'S C Squadron was 2/Lt E. L. Wiard,
:rew members of the Retort prepare to carry out
who describes his feelings towards his forthcoming baptism of fire as being
gun cleaning. [IWAI
understandably more than a little apprehensive. C Squadron was leading the
regiment, and 9 and 10 Troops led the squadron. Whilst the regiment had
been at sea, 2/Lt Wiard had had a most humorous time at the expense of A
Squadron's 1 Troop Leader, pointing out continually the latter's slim
chances of survival. This arose from the obiquitous and annoying habit, still
practised today, of regimental and squadron commanders arranging things
neatly so that whatever happened 1 Troop of A Squadron always seemed to
be in the lead. Now the tables had been turned.
Col Dunbar strolled up from his RHQ tanks to speak to Major Dick
MacLaren, C Squadron's commander, who was standing in 10 Troop's area.
2/Lt Wiard's fears were not eased by hearing his Colonel say "Last night's
party has gone wrong, but we're going in just the same".
Shortly after this all crews mounted their vehicles, and exchanged final
jokes and good wishes with the fitters and the left-out-of-battle parties who
had come forward to see them off. As the minutes ticked away towards 08.00
drivers slammed their hatches closed and turret crewmen eased themselves
into their fighting positions.
At precisely 08.00 the two Colonels ordered their regiments to move. In
104 tanks commanders reached for their Tannoy microphones and ordered
"Driver-advance! "
The drivers engaged first gear, revved up, and let in their clutches. The. air
;;.
Retort's main armament is cleaned. On the left The cramped interior of a Valentine turret,
a Matilda tank Badger of HQ Sqn receives ,flowing method of loading a 2-pdr round, spent
similar attention. [IWM case deflector shield and gunner's elevating
(jhoulder piece. [IWM
A Valentine driver talks to his commander
Slack track is taken up prior to the vehicle through his Tannoy microphone whilst using an
taking to the road. [IWM ,·piscope. [IWM