The US Army in the Vietnam War 1965-73

100 Pages·2008·34.19 MB·English

by  Gordon Rottman

The US Army in the
Vietnam War 1965-73
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
GORDON LROTTMANenteredthe USArmyin 1967,volunteeredfor
Special Forcesand completed training asaweaponsspecialist.Heserved in
the5th Special ForcesGroupinVietnamfrom 1969-70and subsequently
inairborneinfantry,long-rangepatrol,and intelligenceassignmentsuntil
retiring after26years.Hewasaspecial operationsforces scenariowriterat
theJointReadinessTraining Centerfor 12years,and isnowafreelancewriter.
Battle Orders • 33
The US ArlllY in the
Vietnalll War 1965-73
Gordon L Rottman
Consultant Editor Dr Duncan Anderson • Series editors Marcus Cowperand Nikolai Bogdanovic
FirstpublishedinGreatBritainin2008byOspreyPublishing, Author's note
MidlandHouse,WestWay,Botley,OxfordOX2OPH,UnitedKingdom.
443ParkAvenueSouth,NewYork,NY10016,USA
Theauthoris indebted toJoeTrevithick,Lynne Black,Shelby
Email:[email protected]
Stanton,Stephane Moutin-Luyet,SteveSherman ofRADIX Press,
©2008OspreyPublishingLtd. andYvesJ.Bellangerfortheirassistance.
Allrightsreserved.Apartfromanyfairdealingforthepurposeofprivatestudy,
research,criticismorreview,aspermittedundertheCopyright,DesignsandPatents
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Keyto militarysymbols
xxxx xxx xx III II I ••• •• •
D D D D D D D D D B
Army Corps Division Regiment Battalion Company/battery Platoon Section Squad Admin
EJ bd ~ B 8 8 EJ ~ ~
IAIDSTAI
Aidstation Airborne Airmobile Antitank ArmySecurity Artillery Assault Aviation Chemical Combatsupport
Agency company
~ LSJ G G 0 EJ 8 G
IDiVARTYI IDiSCOMI
TRACK
Combattracker Communications Divisional Divisionsupport Engineer Forward Ground Headquarters HQandHQBty HQandHQCO
rartilnlery command observer surveillance
I
8 [g] B 0 G EE ~ ~
MESS I
CTR HIST
HQandHQ Infantry Infantrymortar Long-range Public Maintenance Medical Messagecenter Messenger Militaryhistory
Troop patrol information
0 0 00 Ilral B 0 GJ
Keytounits
Military Militarypolice Motor Quartermaster Ranger Recon Rocket ~
Unit Parent
intelligence transport identifier unit
[][] bd 8 [Q] CWPN~ Figuresnexttoaunitsymbol,e.g."I5-235,"
DOG indicatethenumberofofficersandenlistedmen Commander
. . . respectivelywithinaunit.Ifthreenumbersare.shown, (+.)addedelements (-)lesselements
Scoutdog Supply Support Tank Weapons e.g."I5-25-35,"thisindicatesthenumbersofofficers,
Keytoweaponsan•dvehicless•ilhouettes • nonc-ommissionedofficers,andenlistedmenrespectively.
~
~
M48A3tank MI13AIAPC MI13AIACAV MS77command MI06AI(4.2in.) MS78armored M88armored IOSmmMlOAIhowitzer
postvehicle orMI2SAI(8Imm) recoveryvehicle recoveryvehicle
~67 mortarcarrier
recoillessdfle ~ III ,.M79grenadelauncher
Contents
Introduction 4
Combat mission 6
Unit organization 10
Organizational principles •Unitdesignation practices •The divisions•Separatebrigades
Maneuverbattalions •Armored cavalry•Small infantryunits•Artilleryunits
Otherunits •"Corps"troops
Tactics 44
Weapons and equipment 55
Weapons • Equipment
Command, control, communications, and intelligence 60
Command and control •Communications •Intelligence
Combat status 65
Lessons learned 90
Chronology 91
Bibliography 93
Abbreviations 94
Index 95
Introduction
The seminal book on the organization of the US Army in Vietnam is Shelby
u.s.
Stanton's Vietnam Order ofBattle: A Complete Illustrated Reference to Army
CombatandSupportForces in Vietnam 1961-1973.This extremelydetailedtome
examinesallechelonsoforganizationinunitsdeployedtoVietnamduringthe
courseofalengthywar. Itprovidesthedatesofarrivalanddeparture, strengths,
function, and assignment ofeveryunit down to battalion level. It also lists all
company-levelunits and orderofbattle ofthe US ArmyinVietnam.
This more modest work is designed as a companion and focuses on the
small-unit level, battalion and below, although divisions and brigades are not
neglected. HoweachdeployedtoVietnamisdiscussed alongwithitsmissions,
where it fought, and when it returned home. Units in Vietnam were more
often than not understrength, and this had a major impact on how units
were internally organized and how they were employed. US Army units were
organized and equipped for a conventional war, and even a nuclear war, in
Europe in an armor and mechanized environment. The Army, however,
Much ofVietnamwas densely recognizedthatitcouldbecalleduponto deployforces inlower-levelconflicts
forested.Itwas nottrulyjungle in
anywhere in the world. The specter of counterinsurgency operations and
manycases,buttothe soldieron
unconventional warfare was recognized, though not fully understood, as
theground itmade no difference
evidencedbythefact thatmanyoftheheavierweaponsassignedtounitswere
whatitwas called.Visibilitywas
often limitedto 3-30m (la-30ft). inappropriate orunnecessaryfor the type offighting experiencedinVietnam.
4
N Theterrainofthe RepublicofVietnam
A
MekongDelta
Coastallowlands
Coastalplain
Piedmont
Plateau
Centralhighlands
SOUTH
•Kontum
VIETNAM
c A M B o o A
---------,-, .
(_...
'.
,,~
I'..... .
..,-/,._._._."l
SOUTH CHINA SEA
50 100mi
I I
50 100 150km
Theterrain hadamajorimpactoncombatoperations inVietnam,necessitatingdifferenttacticsandaffectingground mobility. 5
• •
Combat mission
The US Army's role in Vietnam was to establish a safe environment within
which the people of South Vietnam could form a government that was
independent, stable, and freely elected - one that would deserve and receive
popular support. The Viet Cong (VC) and the North Vietnamese Army (NVA)
occupiedorcontrolled,tosomedegree,largepartsofthecountryandsubjected
many areas to armed attacks and terrorism. Terrorism and assignations were
mainly directed at government representatives in villages and hamlets as well
as at provincial and district-level officials.
TheUSmilitarygoalwastoestablishasecureenvironmentfree from enemy
exploitation, pressure, and violence and to allow the legal government to
function. US strategy to achieve this goal consisted of three independent
elements: theground and aircampaigninSouthVietnam, the nation-building
effort in South Vietnam, and the naval and air offensive against North
Vietnam. These efforts strove to convincethe Hanoi regime thatits aggression
couldnot succeed andwouldbe too costlyto sustain.
TheUSArmymissionwastoconductaggressivecombatoperationsfocusing
on NVA and VC Main Force units, destroying them by fire and maneuver,
Therewerealso largeopen areas
disrupting their logistics, and supporting and advising the Army of the
inVietnam.Herea distanttree
Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces. They were also to assist the Vietnamese
linefacingafirebase is covered
people in secure areaswith construction, sanitation, and medical care.
bya.50cal M55 quad machinegun
mounted onafiring platform rather Vietnam is often considered a guerrilla war. Guerrillas played an important
than its usual 2112-tontruck. role, although this diminished as the fighting wore on. VC elements were
6
scattered unevenly throughout the country depending on the degree of
governmentcoptrolandthevalueofitsresources (people, food supplies)tothe
VC. VCMain Forceand regularNVAunits operatedout ofLaosand Cambodia
- privileged sanctuaries - thrusting into South Vietnam in efforts to seize key
citiesand areas. While theymightbefound inanyarea, theywere mostactive
in the northern provinces of I CTZ (Corps Tactical Zone), in the Central
Highlands of II CTZ, and throughout III CTZ, focusing on securing a route to
Saigon. They were seldom seen in IV CTZ's Mekong Delta. These Main Force
and NVA units were not guerrillas by any stretch of the imagination. They
werelightconventionalforces. Theywere supportedbylocalguerrillas (scouts,
guides, porters, local security, food supply, and others) and may have used
guerrilla-liketactics and techniqueswhen necessary. However, they conducted
regimental, divisional, and multidivisional operations intended to directly
attack and destroy Free World Forces and seize population centers. They may
have lacked air support and tanks, employed mortars and rockets instead of
tube artillery, used onlylight antiaircraft weapons, and had an extremelylean
logistics tail, but that was out of necessity. This was dictated by the rugged
Thechangingclimate madethe
terrain, the Free World Force's control of the road network, the Main Force
rugged terrainworse.Herea medic
and NVA need to rapidly travel through concealing countryside owingto Free trudgesthrough aseaofmud
World domination of the sky, and the allies' ability to rapidly deploy and duringthe monsoonseason.
sustaintroops byhelicopter.
It was a war of attrition, and, unfortunately,
the Army began to focus on body counts to show
a means of success in the absence of set-piece
battles defeating large forces, liberating cities, and
indicating that a clear-cut victory was in sight.
Instead, it was a war against a shadowy, elusive
enemy, misunderstood as a civil war, being fought
among an often indifferent civilian population
thatsufferedmorethan the soldiers.
The seemingly unending war's long duration,
the weakening of the overall Army, increasing
opposition at home, weak-willed politicians, and
the disintegrationofunit cohesion- owingto the
36S-dayindividual rotationpolicy- coupledwith
increasing racism and drug problems, eventually
degraded the Army to a shadow ofits former self.
The one-year rotation policy is often debated.
Itwas a morale boost to individuals because they
knew how long they would be deployed, but it
made a shambles of unit cohesion. It did not
require ayearbefore the originallydeployingunit
wasturnedover. Withinaboutfive months, aunit
was composed of about SO percent replacements,
owingto casualties, injuries, illness, andtransfers.
After that it was a constant exchange of
experienced troops for green replacements - to
include leaders.
The Army was also hampered by its own
conflicting view of the war. It attempted to
conduct a counterinsurgency that involved large
conventionalforces to "winthe hearts and minds"
ofthe people, while often being forced to destroy
their homes and relocate them to secure areas.
Furthermore, theArmycouldnoteffectivelyattack
the enemy's logistics infrastructure in neighboring
privilegedsanctuaries. 7
N
A
DMZ
DaNang
ThangBinh.
TuanDuong.
TamKy·•
LongPhu •
ChuLai
ngSong
•Kontum
•Pleiku AnKhe
•
•
PleiDoLim Binh·Khe • QuiNhon
SongCau.
.
CAMBODIA BanMeThuot
SOUTH
VIETNAM
SOUTH CH / NA SEA
SocTrang.
50 100mi
I j I
50 100 150km
8 Keylocationsinthe RepublicofVietnam.