The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897–1909

147 Pages·2008·38.799 MB·English

by  William R. Braisted

THE UNITED STATES
NAVY IN THE PACIFIC
1897 1909
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By William Reynolds Braisted
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NAVAL INSTITUTE PRESS
Anllopolis, A1ary/ond
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2008 00177
;VI IL
160
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To my parents
MARGARET BUZARD DRAISTED
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FHANK ALFRED DRAISTED
Naval Institute Press ,,1\lll::v ~ ~ \
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291 Wood Road .
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Annapolis, MD 21402
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1958 by University of Texas Pr . .
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Originally published in 1958 as The_ e c_es Navy an the• P.Jcllic,
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1897-19091>)•\ Villiam Reynolds Oracsced, Cop)•nght 0 1958 b) the
University ofl'exas Press, Renewed 1986 by \\~lliam Reynolds Draistcd.
All rights reserved. Published by arrangement with the Uni\'er:~icy of
Texas Press.
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First Naval Institute Press paperback edition published en ZOOS.
Library of Congress Cacaloging-in-Publicacion Data
Oraisced, \\r,lliam Hcynolds.
1l1e United Scaces Navy in the P.Jcific, 1897-1909/ by \\711iam
Reynolds Oraisccd.
p. em.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISON 978-1-591 14-087-0 (alk. paper)
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I. United Scates-l liscory, Naval-19th century. 2. United States
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History, Naval-20th cencury. 3. United States-Foreign relations-
1897-190l. 4. United States-Foreign relations-1901-1909.
Navy-Histof)~
S. United States. 6. Pacific Ocean-History, Naval.
7. Pacific Area-HistOf)•, Naval. I. 1itle.
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E182.D73 2008
359' .009Z-dc22
2007033553
Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper@
14 13 12 II 10 09 08
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
First printing
T,fu hoo} Aar btm /Jroug,fr ro pu!JIJ' • •
rk gtnmJus assistana of Edr:ard S. trnd loya I. Mil/a:
1«1/Jqn r:u,f
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Preface
Despite the frequent contention of American naval of
ficers that their first objectives are the prevention of war and the ad
vancement of national policies during peace, surprisingly little
consideration has been given to the Navy's continuing influence on
foreign policy. This neglect is particularly noteworthy since even the
most casual observer should recognize the naval officer as a close as
sociate of the diplomat if not a diplomat himself. The patient negotia
tions by Admiral Charles Turner Joy with the Chinese Communists
at Panmunjom are well known. Yet how many appreciate that Ad
miral Joy was one of a long line of American naval officers who have
participated prominently in Far Eastern international relations for
over a century? Such well-known naval figures as Lawrence Kearney,
Matthew Calbraith Perry, Josiah Tattnall, and Robert W. Shufeldt
helped establish a tradition of American naval participation in di
plomacy which has been perpetuated without interruption to the
present day.
The relation of the naval and diplomatic policies of the United
States in the Pacific is treated in the present volume, which is par
ticularly concerned with the period from the eve of the Spanish
American War through the second administration of Theodore Roose
velt.
The study arose from two convictions: first, that American diplo
matic history has too often been written after an examination of
strictly diplomatic correspondence without adequate consideration
of the economic, military, intellectual, and other factors that motivate
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Vlll
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PREFACE IX
PREFACE
foreign policy, and second, that American naval history had too often
adequate but keep it within the bounds of a single volume, I have
been confined to discourses on wars and campaigns without sufficient
limited myself to a period during which a number of the basic Amer
regard for the Navy's inBuence on American foreign and domestic
ican naval and diplomatic policies were formulated and for the study
affairs during times of peace.
of which the essential materials would be available. Having studied
Though the twelve years from 1897 to 1909 represent hut a brief
the Navy in the Pacific during these formative years, I am now ex
period of American naval activity in the Pacific, they have particular
tending my research to an examination of its more recent diplomatic
. significance for the modern American Navy. These years witnessed
role in the Far East.
the territorial expansion of the United States across the Pacific and
the formulation of basic American foreign policies in the Far East
which would make increasing demands on the Navy during the suc
Only a small number of those who made this book possible can be
ceeding years. At the same time, American naval officers first began
mentioned here. The problem was first suggested by Professor Harley
actually to plan for the effective use of the steam and steel ships of
Farnsworth MacNair, who died before the study was well begun.
the so-called New Navy to meet their growing responsibilities on
Professors Donald F. Lach, Arthur Pearson Scotl, and Walter John
opposite sides of the globe.
son read the entire manuscript and made a number of thoughtful
The study of the Navy's relation to American diplomacy inevitably
suggestions. Valuable encouragement and advice were received from
involves a consideration of the making of policy as well as its execu colleagues at the University of Texas, particularly Professors J. Harry
tion. Although such exalted bodies as the National Security Council Bennett, Jr., Edward L. Cannan, Barnes F. Lathrop, and Archibald
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were unknown fifty years ago, there is a R. Lewis. Mrs. Jean Holloway made editorial comments on the manu
wealth of private and official correspondence which shows how the script after reviewing it carefully. The staffs of both the National
presidents and the state and defense departments co-operated or Archives and the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress
failed to co·operate in the formation of the Far Eastern policies of were tireless in their assistance. The Navy Department gave per
mission to examine the records of the General Board. The Mississippi
the United States. Scholars have combed the records of the State
Valley Historical Association and the Pacific Historical Review have
Department for years, but those of the Army and Navy which relate
kindly permitted the incorporation into the hook of materials which
to foreign affairs have never been systematically examined. After
previously appeared in articles in their journals, and the President
studying the opinions of the molders of naval policy as they appear
and Fellows of Harvard College have granted permission to quote
in the military and naval records previously closed to or little used by
from the Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, edited by Elting E. Morison.
other historians, I have concluded that, while naval men did not dic
The manuscript was finished with the assistance of a grant from the
tate American foreign policy, naval considerations were often deter
Social Science Research Council, and its publication was made pos
mining factors in the formulation of the Far Eastern policies of the
sible by a grant from the Research Council of the University of Texas.
United States during the years 1897-1909.
It is a source of regret that, as my study was essentially completed
Previous failure to study the diplomatic role of the Navy has led
before my departure for an extended visit to Japan in 1955, I have
to. a number of unfortunate assumptions regarding the "military
been unable to make adequate reference in my footnotes and bibli
mmd" a d th " · I" 1
n e typtca nava attitude toward foreign relations. Like
ography to subsequently published research.
~ost unsubstantiated stereotypes, these generalizations are usually
WILLIAM REYNOLDS BRAISTED
btased or witho t l'di h
. u any va ty w atsoever. I hope that my research
1
Austin, Texas
~11 help estab1ish a more accurate understanding of the Navy's func
November, 1957
tions as an ann of foreign policy. In order to make the treatment
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Contents
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Preface .
Vll
• • • • • • • • •
3
l. Winning the Outposts of Empire
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3
Looking Outward
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21
The War with Spain
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33
The German Threat
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42
Dewey and Aguinaldo
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50
Dividing the Spoils with Germany
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The Conquest of the Philippines 64
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2. 75
The Navy and the Boxers.
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75
Admiral Kempf! off Taku
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93
Localizing the Conflict
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104
Meeting the Crisis in North China
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115
3. One among the Great Naval Powers
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Laying the Foundations 115
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124
The Advanced Base in China
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Supporting the Open Door, 1901-1904 136
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154
4. The Russo-Japanese War and After
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Some Burdens of Neutrality 154
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Naval Diplomacy, 1904..-1905 169
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1905-1906. 181
Tripartite Policing of the Pacific,
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CONTENTS
5. Japan as America's Pacific Naval Problem
191
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The Crisis, October 1906-May 1907 .
191
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The War Game, 1u ne October 1907 .
203
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The Army Attack on Subig Bay . .
216
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The World Cruise . . . .
223
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Toward a Two-Ocean Navy .
232
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The United States Navy
6. Conclusion . 24.0
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in the Pacific, 1897-1909
Bibliography . . 24.7
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Index . . 263
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3
1 . . .
Winning the Outposts of Empire
Looking Outward
to stress political, cultural,
ISTORIANS HAVE TENDED
economic, and social aspects of contacts between
East and West while avoiding the importance of anned force, particu
larly naval power, as a determining factor in the international rela
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tions of Eastern Asia and the Pacific. Yet to Asians, foreign ships in
their territorial waters were tl1e embodiment of the wealth and the pre
tensions of the Westerners who came uninvited to their shores. The
officers and men of these ships, no less than diplomatic and consular
officials, were foreign representatives by whose words and deeds the
East judged the intentions of tl1e West. To this day Asian nationalists
are stirred to deep resentment by the memory of foreign warshipss-
tlle symbols of Western domination-moored in their ports.
Through the years the major powers have stationed naval ships
in the Far East as evidences of might, designed both to compel Asians
to respect their economic, missionary, and political interests and to
check each other's ambitions. In either case, warships constituted
instruments of coercion, admissions that diplomacy, unsupported by
force, was insufficient. They were a declaration that the nations pos
sessing ships and guns would use force if necessary to have tl1eir
wills prevail.
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4 5
WINNING THE OUTPOSTS OF EMPIRE
LOOKING OUTWARD
The twelve years, 1897 to 1909, m~rked th~ emergence of the
diplomacy in Asia where at least six major powers were competing
't d States as a major naval power With the will and the capacity
U
for influence. Russia's defeats in 1904/ 1905 and the recall of other
m e · th P 'fi · h
rican interests rn e ac1 c agarnst t e most fonni-
Ame
to d ef en d .
Western fleets to Europe left the American Navy practically alone to
dable antagonists. To examine the growth of ~encan nava~ power
watch Japan. Although American naval officers would have pre~e rred
during this period is to reveal the extent to which naval pohcy and
to co-operate with Japan and Great Britain on ?eha.l£ of .peace. m the
diplomacy interacted, sometimes malcing commo~ ca~se, sometimes
Pacific after 1905, they were obliged by the unrmgrahon cnses of
kin at cross-purposes, in the constantly w1demng sphere of
1906 to 1909 to add the Asian empire to their list of possible enemies.
wor g 'hil'i · E h d'
America's interests and responsi ties. ac succee mg year the
That the Navy dealt successfully with these expanding responsi
State and Navy departments seemed to make increasing demands
bilities, without neglecting the major American interests in the At
n each other, the expanding naval force making possible a more
lantic, reflected its growth as an effective fighting force. In 1897 the
~itious
foreign policy, and the enlarged diplomacy requiring a
Navy had no fleet policy to govern the disposition and use of its half
more powerful navy. The result of .this. spiraling ac~ion was the con
dozen battleships. By 1909 American naval strategists were debating
version of a token force in the Pac1fic mto a fleet With two-ocean re
the best Beet organization for thirty battleships so that the Navy could
sponsibilities and the expansi~n of t~e diplo~atic commitments of
serve the nation decisively on opposite sides of the globe. To support
the United States until the entire Pacific and Its shores became the
its fleets, the Navy was building in the Caribbean and in the Pacific
Navy's problem.
bases whose location and characteristics had been determined during
In 1897 the weak American naval forces in the P acific were used
almost a decade of planning for war with various possible antagonists.
primarily to show the flag in the ports of weaker states. The little
In short, though progressive naval officers failed to overcome con
ships on the Asiatic Station usually moved singly on their police mis
servative opposition in Congress and elsewhere to the establishment
sions between points in China, Japan, and Korea, while those in the
of a naval general staff, the Navy's general staff work was constantly
Eastern Pacific, on the Pacific Station, cruised along the coasts of
pressed fon vard. Consequently, the Navy in 1909 was probably
North and South America and westward as far as Hawaii and Samoa.
second-to-none in technical proficiency, and it vied with Germany for
Though both stations constituted Bag commands, the ships on neither
second place after Great Britain in ships and guns.
were organized as a fleet to combat a powerful enemy.
Before proceeding to a detailed discussion of the Navy's role in
By 1909 naval officers in Washington had assumed responsibility
the Pacific during the years 1897 to 1909, it is necessary first to con
for defending American territories on both sides of the Pacific and
sider briefly the development of the "New Navy" prior to 1897 and
for supporting the State Department's diplomacy with an effective
its tasks on the Pacific and Asiatic stations.
Beet. They were willing to share control of the ocean with J apan, the
For fifteen years before 1897 a series of able naval secretaries, as
principal remaining naval power in the Pacific, only to the extent
sisted by progressive officers, had pressed construction of steam-pro
that the island empire would be assured initial supremacy in her home
pelled, steel ships for the new navy. Naval building, however, was
waters upon the outbreak of hostilities. This striking naval change
plagued by conservatism in both the Navy Department and in Con
w_~ paralleled by a comparable enhancement of the diplomatic po
gress as well as by a lack of public appreciation of the principles
sahon of ~he United States in the Pacific. American diplomacy and
which govern the creation of an effective naval force.1 The individual
naval pohcy proceeded hand in hand.
who, more than any other, influenced public thinking regarding tlte
.Thus, in the war with Spain, the Navy won and defended against
proper uses of the Navy was Alfred Thayer Mahan. As the result of
po~e~
thud an overseas empire which established the United States
as a temtonal power . th F E Th . . 1 Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Poarer, 1776-
m e ar ast. ereafter, 1t upheld Amencan
1918 (Princeton, 1946), pp.
1~201.
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6
. WINNING THE OUTPOSTS OF EMPIRE
7
studies at the Naval War College, Captain Mahan in 1890 LOOKING OUTWARD
coHm~leted
his first outstanding book, The Influence of S ea Power u
surpassed by those of the Policy Board of 1890, a body of six officers
1660-1783. pon l.Story,
appointed to determine the needs of the Navy. The board's request
Mahan developed the thesis that national power d d
for a navy of thirty-five battleships, however, was more than even
epen s on the
·a
h f
exc ange o goods and flow of wealth. Three factors M
Tracy would approve. 6
, sat ahan
ib t1
contr ute to 1e greatness of seafarina nations· "pr d · ' Proposals such as those of Mahan, Tracy, and the Policy Board
. . o · o uction, with
I
t te necessity of exchangmg products, shipping, whereby th h pointed the way for progressive American naval thought. Yet by 1897
. . d d I . e exc ange
Is carne on, an co omes, which facilitate and enlar th the fighting ships of the new navy capable of participating in a fleet
. f h. . d d ge e opera-
boos o s Ippmg an ten to protect it by multipl · · action numbered but four first-class battleships, two second-class
" ymg pomts of
safety. As a natural corollary, Mahan stressed that th · . battleships, and two armored cruisers. Of these, only the battleship
. . e mantune
states s It ou ld b ui ld tI 1 e1r naVIes to protect their comm 1 . Oregon was stationed in the Pacific. 0
. . erce t 1e pn-
Turning to the situation on the Pacific Station, American eyes fell
mary source of theu natiOnal strength- and to in terce t th hi ·
of their enemies. Real naval effectiveness lay in com PI t e s ppmg first on Hawaii as they looked outward across the ocean. American
p e e command
f t1 contacts witl1 the island kingdom extended back to the early nine
o te sea. It was essential for the United States to eqm· ·t .
. I . p s navy With
1
teenth century when missionaries and traders began arriving in the
captta shtps that could drive the fleets and shipping of ·t ·
1
from the high seas.:! s enemies islands. A reciprocity treaty in 1875, by which Hawaii and the United
States agreed to exchange their important products without duties,
To Mahan, the supreme exemplar of his theories was Great Britain
soon converted the kingdom into a virtual economic dependency of
England had won command of the great commercial artery extendin .
the republic. American naval interest in Hawaii as a Pacific outpost
from West to East tlrrough the Mediterranean and Suez Mahan h ~
was attested in 1887 when the United States obtained exclusive use
Unit~d
that the States would control a similarly impo;tant mari::e
of Pearl Harbor for a naval station.7 As the islands lay only 2,000
route extendmg. from the Atlantic westward through an isthmian
miles from the American Pacific coast, it seemed imperative that they
canal to the Pactfic. The United States lay "between two Old W ld
and two great "B h · or s remain in friendly hands. Eventually, they would become a vital
b oceans. ut t Is advantageous strategic position would
stopping point on the main American communications line across the
~avl ~weakness
eta should die United States fail to develop its naval
po entia. Pacific.
By 1890 a small minority of foreign residents, principally Ameri
fac~o
res£ ponsiblel naval authority could avoid the conclusion that the
cans, had gained a large share of tlte wealth in tlte islands and practi
0 geograp ty forced th N
widely se arated upon. . : . avy responsibilities in two cally controlled the government. The native dynasty, however, re
t~ceans,
but not e:ded b resp?nsibdtlies which might he lightened
mained a rallying point for opposition to the white oligarchy. And a
;onstr~chon
the Navy BenJ.:mine of an isthmian canal. Secretary of
long anticipated crisis broke in January, 1893, when tlte Queen,
racy m 1889 urged th ·
separate fleets of batt I h. e construction of two Liliuokalani, attempted to introduce a new constitution. Encouraged
Atlantic and the C ihesb Ips, one for the Pacific and another for the
by John L. Stevens, the expansionist American minister, and wid1 at
ar ean Tracy s d . h
t he former and t 1 f · uggeste e1g t battleships for least the moral support of a landing party from the U.S.S. Boston,
' we ve or the latte • H·
r. 1s recommendations were the Queen's opponents organized a provisional government which
Allred Thayer Mahan The
2 11 U.S. Congress, Report of Policy Board, Sen. Exec. Doc. No. 43, 51st Cong.,
17~ I,~.
(Boston.I894), lnPuence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-
1st Sess.
A. T. Mahan, "Tb U .
6 Annual Reports of the Navy Department 1897, pp. 8-9.
LXVI (0 be c nlled Stales Look· 0
, A ecem r, 1890) 816-24 Jng utward," Atlantic Monthly
the 1 For a discussion of the reciprocity treaty nnd the Pearl Harbor concession,
nnual Reports of N, . '
see S. K. Stevens, American Expansion in Hawaii, 1842-1898 (Hnrrisburg,
avy Department 1889, p.IO.
1945), pp. 108-86.
•
8
THE OUTPOSTS OF EMPI
WINNING
9
hastily concluded a treaty of annexation with th . RE
LOOKING OUTWARD
lican administration of Benjamin Harrison Th Qe outghomg Repub.
th
. B . e ueen owed t Cleveland finally decided to leave solution of the question to Con
new regune. ut she appealed to the President to · . 0 e
Investigate th gress. In a stirring message to the legislature in December, 1893, the
d uct o f S tevens and the American Navy which h e con.
. ' s e averred h d d President affirmed that the legal government of Hawaii had been
pnved her of her throne.8 a e-
'
overthrown through the connivance of the diplomatic and naval of
•
Grover Cleveland, Harrison's Democratic succe f
. ssor, a ter recall' . ficers of the United States. The Congress, however, declined to undo
th 5
e controversial treaty of annexation from the t d lllg
the achievements of the revolution. And the Senate piously resolved
. . . ena e, espatched
J ames A . BI ount as commissioner to Investigate th
in May, 1894, that, while the Hawaiian people were entitled to es
e occurrences t
H lui
Bl Am ·
ono u. ount shortly concluded that the a
tablish their own government, the intervention by a third power in
en cans who had
h I d d hr h
e pe et one t e Queen would he encouraged t f h
the islands would be "an act unfriendly to the United States."11
o urt er 1a wies
ness if the y were assured the protection of American f s- Meanwhile, Hilary A. Herbert, Cleveland's secretary of the navy,
1
. nava orces
an d h e ord ere d th. e withdrawal of all landing parties f h ' guarded against further naval interference in Hawaiian politics. After
. rom s ore as
we ll as t I1 e Io wenng of the American flag that had b · the Secretary noted sympathy for the republican government in the
een ra1sed over
th
e government palace. The Commissioner stressed · h · I despatches of Rear Admiral Joseph S. Skerrett, he transferred the
ength
• lD IS
report m July, 1893, that the revolution had succeeded I b y Admiral from the Pacific to the Asiatic Station. Herbert also spe
· d f M' · on Y ecause
f th
o e attitu e o mJster Stevens and the American 1f cifically ordered the naval forces to refrain from protecting Amer
. . nava orces 8
Th
icans involved in an abortive royalist uprising in 1895.1 The Dole
ere little doubt that Cleveland and his cab· t ·
IS :!
me accepted the
BI
regime was thus assured of the Navy's neutrality until a change in
ount report as a faithful exposition of the facts Co . d th
· nvmce at
S tevens an d the Navy had caused the overthrow of a f . di Washington would permit annexation of the islands by the United
n en y govern
CI I States.
Ri
ment, eve and searched for means to right the ' h -
OJn
h vrong. c ard
The change came with the Republican victory in the presidential
ey, t e attorney general, advised that the President' I
under th C · · vas power ess
election of 1896. As his naval secretary, William McKinley selected
. e onshtuhon to use the Navy to restore the Queen without
John D. Long, a former governor of Massachusetts. Long was an
pnor consent of Congress. Cleveland's own sympathies for the in. ured
affable, easy-going gentleman whose conservative ways were unlikely
lady may well have cooled after Liliuokalani intimated th t 1
restored to her thr h uld . a , once to win large naval appropriations from the Congress or to force a
one, s e wo depnve her enemies of their h d
as well as of the' F ea s decision in Hawaii. Whatever the Secretary may have lacked in de
Ir property. urthermore, the Hawaiian r epublican
i
termination, however, was fully compensated for by the energy of
government, under the presidency of Sanford B Dole was . .
{
orces to r · t · · ' orgamzmg his young assistant, Theodore Roosevelt. Both McKinley and Long
esis a reviva 1 of the monarchy.lo
had misgivings when Roosevelt's appointment was pressed by his
a J. . W. Pratt, The Expansionists /18 . . . . close confidant, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge.13 They soon found that,
°
9
Spanuh !sland-s (Baltimore 8. the Acqm.sttton of Hawaii and the
1936
7
to Hawa1i during the 189()''. I ), PP·. 4-109. Naval correspondence relating and His Public Service (Boston, 1923), p. 88; Allan Nevins, Grover Cleveland;
45 , Th e Na val Records Colsi Jst " ocatfe d hm the Nat·J ona l Arc ht'v es, R ecord Group a Study in Courage (New York, 1932), pp. 548-62; Willis to Gresham, Novem
°
Area 9 File. Hereafter d ec Jon t e Office of Naval Records and Library ber 16, 1893, Foreign Relations 1894, Appendix II, pp.l24l-43.
th. RG (R , ocuments at theN ti 1 A h" '
e•r · · ecord Group) h . . a ona rc tves will be cited by 11 C1eveland to Congress, December 18, 1894, Foreign Relations 1894, Ap
group. num er Wtth mdication of their location within the
pendix II, p. 445; Congressional Record, XXVI, 5499.
• Blount to G h A .
12 Herbert to Skerrett, October 3, 1893, R.G. 45, Confidential Letters Sent;
F . R . res am, pr•l 8, 1893 ] l 17
ore&gn elattons of the Un · d S • u Y • 1893, Papers Relating to the Herbert to Skerrett, October 9, 1893, Herbert to Beardslee, January 19, 1895,
1
Hereafter cited as Foreinn R& le . tates 1894, Appendix II, pp. 475-76 567 ~n~
R.G. 45, Ciphers Sent.
Io Olney to G h ~:>· e alrons. , -vvv.
18 H. F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt; a Biography (New York, 1931), pp.
IPa lte Q . res am, October 9 1893 M G
Ii
r umton Gresham (Chicago' 1919} resham, The Life and Letters of 168-69; Lodge to Roosevelt, December 2, 1896; J. B. Bishop, Theodore Roose
7
' ' • 56-57; H. James, R ichard Olney velt and His Time Shown in His Letters (New York, 1920), I, 71; Lodge to