THE UNITED STATES ARMY AND RECONSTRUCTION 1865-1877 ******* by James E. Sefton GREENWOOD PRESS, PUBLISHERS WESTPORT. ONNI:CTICU r r Lihrary of Congress Catalo~ing in Publication Data Sefton, James E The United States Army and Reconstruction, l865-l877· Reprint of the ed. published by Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge. Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. Reconstruction. 2. United States--History, Military--To l900. 3. United States. Army--History. I. Title. [E668.s46 l980] 973 ISBN 0-3l3-22602-l; (lib. bdg.) Copyright© 1967 by Louisiana State University Press Reprinted with the permission of Louisiana State University Press. Reprinted in 1980 by Greenwood Press, a division of Congressional Information Service, Inc. 88 Post Road West, Westport, Connecticut 06881 Printed in the United States of America 1098765 4 32 1 (\ ..) To My Mother and the Memory of My Father Preface Some Thoughts Upon the Work of Others and Upon the Sources TQ)OOKS and articles dealing with Reconstruction are legion, but none J..Q) offer any satisfactory treatment of the Army's role in that troubled twelve-year period. We have heard about the "prostrate South" and about its great postwar social and economic problems, largely from the still useful works of William A. Dunning and his students. We have heard about the unfortunate and undeniable plight of the Negro and about the obvious need for some form of protection for the Negro's rights, from works of more recent vintage. And we have heard about the purely political aspects of Reconstruction, notably the struggle be tween President Johnson and Congress, from a long and still lengthen ing list of historians. But we have heard little about the role of the United States Army as an occupation force, except as a peripheral topic in works having a different focus. An investigation of the problems the Army faced in the South, as a military institution enforcing civil policy, in addition to being valuable as a study in military history, also throws new and different light on past and present interpretations of the political, constitutional, and social aspects of Reconstruction. In recent years historians have showed renewed and sustained interest in Reconstruction. Their efforts, however, have been principally directed toward revising earlier appraisals of Andrew Johnson and the "Radical Republicans." Kenneth Stampp, David Donald, Eric McKitrick, John and LaWanda Cox, W. R. Brock, John Hope Franklin, and Harold M. Hyman have all recently produced significant works; but only the last two have showed much interest in the military aspect or offered sig nificant conclusions with regard to the Army's role. Franklin, in support ing the contention that Radical Reconstruction was not really hard on vii - --~~------~---·------~---- vm Preface the South argues that the power and influence of the Army betwe~~ 1867 and' 1877 was small and that federal military activity was neg l- ible There is more to the basic question of whether Radical Recon g . 'I' ower struction was hard on the South than just the matter of m1 ttary P ' but Franklin's position on the Army's influence is untenable. He b~ses his conclusion simply on the number of troops in the South. at gtven times, which superficially may seem a sound analysis; in reality, how ever, power, influence, and activity are functions of much more than mere numbers. . Hyman, working in part with the late Benjamin P. Thomas, deals 1.n greater detail than Franklin with the Army in the South, but his analysts also presents difficulties. The Hyman thesis is essentially that the struggle between Johnson and Congress should be viewed as a struggle for control of the Southern occupation forces. These forces were .under executive leadership in mid-1865 but three years later, accordt~g to this interpretation, were essentially a legislative agency. Johnson ts .the shortsighted, obstinate President who alienates the Army by a too-lement policy and by failure to support the Army's Southern activities; Sta~ton and Grant shield the soldiers from the ill effects of Johnson's acttons and facilitate the Army's transfer from an executive to a legislative agency. Hyman's case is weakened by doubtful interpretations of critical events during 1866-68. Actually, many of the Army's actions never received presidential review, and of those that did, most did not come before him in a form which necessitated definite action on his part. Con s~q~ently, whatever action Johnson took was often upon his own. in~ tiatlve. Because his action was both voluntary and discretionary, 1t ts particularly important to realize that he did not often directly overrule a general's decision, and in several instances the fact that he did not do so is even more significant. On the other hand, there were occasions when Johnson supported the Army in conflicts with civil officials and ap proved sentences imposed by military commissions. In contras~ to the contention that Johnson precipitated most of the problems which plagued generals in the South, it can be demonstrated ~hat Congress caused the Army fully as much difficulty as the President, If not more. The lawmakers refused acquiescence in the results of John son's plan i~ Decem~er, 1865. They then kept the Army in suspense as to the natiOnal Rolley on reconstruction by frittering away the entire year of 1~66, passmg only four significant laws bearing on the South ern question. Two of these which made the Army's task more difficult Johnson opposed (though not for that reason); the one which helped --~~-- Preface ix the Army he did not veto. By the spring of 1867 Congress finally formu lated a "plan" of reconstruction, but in such vague terms that for several more months the Army was still not sure what powers it pos sessed. It is clear from recent research that some Congressmen objected to Johnson's plan because of their sincere and understandable concern that it did not require sufficient repentance from the South or ensure the inviolability of the Negro's civil and political rights. It is also clear that the composition of Congress, and other factors, partially account for the delay in formulating a replacement plan. But recognition of these things does not alter the fact that Congress' action of December, 1865, plus its inaction of the following months, taken together, left the Army in a quandary over national policy and thus compounded the Army's problems. The idea that the Army changed from an executive to a legislative agency is not really as remarkable as it might seem. A clear Constitu tional provision does, to be sure, make the Executive the Commander in-Chief. However, that provision does not prevent Congress from using the Army to carry out a law; and once such a law is passed, the Army becomes ipso facto a "legislative agency." In the case at hand, the Army was by far the most important instrument of federal authority in the South, and it was the only available enforcer of national recon struction policy, regardless of whether that policy was under executive leadership or congressional. Hence, the statement that the Army became a legislative rather than executive agency has no real meaning. Indeed, it is debatable whether Johnson really lost all control of the Army in the South by virtue of the 1867 legislation. The ultimate measure of control would seem to be the power to remove Southern commanders, and Johnson certainly exercised that power after July, 1867. The 1867 legislation on the high command of the Army was meant to reduce Johnson's powers as Commander-in-Chief, but the full extent of its effectiveness was never demonstrated, and the First Reconstruction Act would have made the Army a "legislative agency" even had the other measure not been passed. Because Thomas and Hyman are primarily concerned with War Sec retary Edwin M. Stanton, their work is very properly Washington centered; but when one's primary concern is the Army during Recon struction, one's focus must be carefully divided between Washington and the South. If insufficient attention is accorded to Washington, where the highest level political and military decisions were made, or to the South, where these decisions were executed, the picture that emerges will be one of the Army operating in a vacuum. Among the indispensable --- x Preface fileS of . are the l h records for studying the Army during ReconstructiOn t the Sol.lt correspondence and orders kept at command posts througho: se records and now lodged in the National Archives. The bulk of t et'ton :even . f R onstruc . ·n has not been heretofore exploited by students o . ec m and certat h though these records are vast, there are still gaps 11_1 the dquarters, types of documents are sometimes missing for partlcul~r e~d printed especially at the post or garrison level. Both manuscr~p~ .a to chrono~ copies of orders exist; outgoing correspondence was ~opte tn pondence logically organized large bound letterbooks; incommg. corr~:sS x es after was briefed in registers and the original copies put mto such as receiving document file numbers. Other useful types of rec~r ~vailable. files of legal opinions and records of military courts, are a~ ·Jllportant 1 Although the Army was generally careful to keep a dern in~ papers, it did not always keep them in a fashion to please lll~s of an vestigators. Sometimes it is possible to find complete reco~ but just event, with pertinent correspondence, all in the same place, ial. The as often one must piece the details together from scattered mater d with system of passing papers up and down the chain of commanc ing of eac~ headquarters adding an endorsement, facilit~tes the tr;ssession 1 particular cases; but since the headquarters that retmned fina P t one is of a document did not always add a concluding endorsemen Further, sometimes hard put to ascertain the final disposition of a. c~~;·r t turned mili~ary records do not always indicate how a partic~la.r 1?c1 the civil out 1f the case passed from Army hands into the junsdtcttOn . h to base authorities. The Army's own records contain evidence ~n whtc itizens criticism of military actions since letters of complatnt from c received the same treatment as other correspondence. suited, The records kept at Washington headquarters must also b~ ~ot~e ones thoug? previous historians have done more with thes~ t~an Wlt u h even kept m the South. The nature of the material is similar 1~0 g t Gen more voluminous. Most important are the records of the Ad]utan dence eral's Office, through which the bulk of official military correspon f the 0 passed. The Office of the Secretary of War and the fleadqua~ters tance Army also maintained records, but they are of secondary 1~por rec to those of the Adjutant General. One characteristic of all mlltta~ nee ord collections is duplication. For any given piece of correspon ~ead~ the researcher can expect to find its text in the letterbook of the ther quarters which sent it, the original signed copy in the records of ~~0 and headquarters (not necessarily the one to which it was addresse ' copies of it in two or three other locations. nal Official records cannot provide the whole story; collections of perso Preface xi papers form an important supplement. Not all important individuals kept their private papers, however; and in some cases, because a gen eral's family was with him in the South and he wrote few letters, the existing collections are thin on Reconstruction. Further, the aloofness which many officers displayed toward politics curtailed their correspon dence with congressional and party leaders. No investigator could possibly make a complete search through the hundreds of thousands of official documents and the many collections of personal papers that bear on military reconstruction, but I believe I have made a more thorough investigation of some parts of the official records than any of my predecessors, and have made extensive use of the sources as a whole. Indeed, if all the possible sources of information are counted, there is probably enough material to warrant short mono graphs on the Army's role in each Southern state. The following account, therefore, must of necessity omit repetitive illustrations and details. If the reader comes away from this account with a clearer understanding of the Army's role in the South, with some different insight into other aspects of Reconstruction, and perhaps with some ideas that prompt him to further inquiry of his own, then I shall be satisfied. Acknowledgments \\J.\JliTHOUT wishing to divest myself of responsibility for any short '1//'1/J comings in this volume, I would like to express my sincere grati tude of some of the many persons who have been of assistance during its many stages of preparation. The University of California, Los Angeles, through its program of research grants for graduate students, facilitated an essential trip to Washington, D.C. Of the many archivists and librarians who made available their knowledge and skills I especially want to thank Mr. Victor Gondos of the National Archives' Old Army Branch and his assistants, Mrs. Sara D. Jackson, Mr. Milton K. Cham berlain, and Mr. David C. Haas, as well as Dr. C. Percy Powell and other members of the staff at the Library of Congress Manuscripts Division. Among the many instructors who have taken an interest in my work, my mentor, Professor Brainerd Dyer, deserves the greatest and most profound thanks. He did not seek to impose his own interpretations upon me; he made me wary of the problems and pitfalls of historical research and analysis of evidence; and he greatly improved the clarity and precision of my method of expression. I also wish to thank the other members of my doctoral committee for their interest and encourage ment, and particularly Professors Eugene N. Anderson and Keith B. Berwick, who willingly subjected themselves to the reading of this work in its original, unrevised form as a dissertation and made many helpful suggestions and criticisms. Individual thanks are also due to Professor David G. Farrelly of the Political Science Department, a member of my committee for the first two years of its existence, for his investment of time and interest in my graduate work. Two of my former U.C.L.A. xiii xiv Acknowledgments instructors who are now at other institutions deserve special mention. Professor Bradford Perkins, now at the University of Michigan, always took a gratifying interest in my endeavors. Professor Harold M. Hyman, now at the University of Illinois, supervised some very early research on this topic for an undergraduate project in the spring and. fall of 1960 and suggested the fruitfulness of pursuing the general topic for a dissertation. I also wish to thank Professor John Hope Franklin of the University of Chicago who, though not one of my instructors, has taken a kind interest in my career. College undergraduates are undeservedly the "forgotten men" of ac knowledgment pages in scholarly books. I desire to thank my U.C.L:A. students of 1961-64 for providing a pleasant, valuable, and challengm.g counterbalance to the trials and tribulations of graduate study, the mani festations of which in the moods and temperament of their "T.A." they staunchly endured. Similarly, my more recent students at San Fernando Y~IIey State College deserve thanks for putting up with a measure of Irritability during endless revising and rewriting for publication. Some colleagues and students alike have provided an ample amount of the moral support which authors seem to require . . Mr. Charles East and Miss June Wiley of Louisiana State Univer stt~ Press have been most helpful and generous with their time and patience while getti~g the manuscript ready for publication. Highly es teemed are the services of my two intrepid and persevering proofread ers-Mr. D?nald A. McMaster with an early draft and Mr. Step~en ~· Bedau Wtth the final drafts and galleys. How anyone, while readmg a oud my craggy prose and cryptogrammic footnotes could stay as good natured as they did is a matter of marvel. Finally th~re are hardly words to expre · · f ' ss appreciatiOn or the understanding and encouragement my mother has provided over the years. San Fernando Valley State College J.E.S. Christmas, 1966