The UK's relations with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain - publications

258 Pages·2013·2.94 MB·English

House of Commons
Foreign Affairs Committee
The UK's relations with
Saudi Arabia and
Bahrain
Fifth Report of Session 2013–14
Volume I: Report, together with formal
minutes, oral and written evidence
Additional written evidence is contained in
Volume II, available on the Committee website
at www.parliament.uk/facom
Ordered by the House of Commons
to be printed 12 November 2013

HC 88
[Incorporating HC 917-i, -ii, -iii, -iv Session 2012-13
Published on 22 November 2013
by authority of the House of Commons
London: The Stationery Office Limited
£23.00
The Foreign Affairs Committee
The Foreign Affairs Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to
examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office and its associated agencies.
Current membership
Rt Hon Richard Ottaway (Conservative, Croydon South) (Chair)
Mr John Baron (Conservative, Basildon and Billericay)
Rt Hon Sir Menzies Campbell (Liberal Democrat, North East Fife)
Rt Hon Ann Clwyd (Labour, Cynon Valley)
Mike Gapes (Labour/Co-op, Ilford South)
Mark Hendrick (Labour/Co-op, Preston)
Sandra Osborne (Labour, Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock)
Andrew Rosindell (Conservative, Romford)
Mr Frank Roy (Labour, Motherwell and Wishaw)
Rt Hon Sir John Stanley (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling)
Rory Stewart (Conservative, Penrith and The Border)

The following Members were also members of the Committee during the
parliament:

Rt Hon Bob Ainsworth (Labour, Coventry North East)
Emma Reynolds (Labour, Wolverhampton North East)
Mr Dave Watts (Labour, St Helens North)
Powers
The Committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of
which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No
152. These are available on the internet via www.parliament.uk.
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Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including news
items) are on the internet at www.parliament.uk/facom. A list of Reports of the
Committee in the present Parliament is at the front of this volume.
Committee staff
The current staff of the Committee are Kenneth Fox (Clerk), Peter McGrath
(Second Clerk), Zoe Oliver-Watts (Senior Committee Specialist), Dr Brigid Fowler
(Committee Specialist), Louise Glen (Senior Committee Assistant), Vanessa
Hallinan (Committee Assistant), and Alex Paterson (Media Officer).
Contacts
All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Foreign Affairs
Committee, House of Commons, London SW1A 0AA. The telephone number for
general enquiries is 020 7219 6105; the Committee’s email address is
[email protected].
The UK’s relations with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain 1
Contents
Report
Page
Summary 3 
Conclusions and recommendations 7 
1  Introduction 15 
Our inquiry 15 
2  Broader context: UK ties with the Gulf 17 
Historic ties with the Gulf States 18 
Ongoing interests 19 
UK Government policy: renewing ties 20 
The UK’s support for reform and human rights in the Gulf 22 
A change of policy toward Gulf States? 23 
3  Bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia 28 
Historical ties 28 
UK-Saudi diplomatic relationship today 29 
Shared interests 29 
Pursuing a ‘strategic partnership’ with Saudi Arabia 29 
People to people contacts and public opinion 31 
Engaging with the Saudi public 32 
Economic and commercial relations 35 
Saudi economy 35 
UK-Saudi trade and commercial relations 36 
Barriers to trade: visas 39 
Defence sales to Saudi Arabia 40 
Defence and security cooperation 46 
Counter-Terrorism 48 
Saudi Arabia as a foreign policy partner 52 
Diplomatic capacity 52 
Regional influence: a force for moderation? 54 
Shared interests 55 
Reform and human rights in Saudi Arabia: current situation 61 
Political reform 61 
Human rights 62 
Is Saudi Arabia reforming? 63 
How effectively is the UK supporting reform and human rights in Saudi Arabia? 65 
Strategy of engagement 65 
4  Bilateral relations with Bahrain 70 
Why is Bahrain important? 70 
A divided society 70 
Close historical ties 71 
Brief summary of recent political history 72
2 The UK’s relations with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain
National dialogue 74 
UK response to events in Bahrain: testing times for UK-Bahrain relations? 74 
Criticism of the relationship 76 
People to people contact and public opinion 78 
Engaging with the public 79 
Trade and commercial relations 80 
Bahrain’s economy 80 
UK-Bahrain trade 81 
Defence sales and export licences 82 
Cyber technology exports 83 
Defence and security relationship 84 
UK-Bahrain military cooperation 85 
Co-operation withdrawn? 85 
The UK’s support for human rights and reform in Bahrain 88 
Ongoing violations 89 
UK engagement on human rights and reform since 2011 90 
Too close to Bahrain? 91 
UK support for action by NGOs and International Organisations 93 
Bahrain’s international context 94 
5  FCO resources in the Gulf 97 
Staff resources 97 
Arabic language skills 97 
6  Future of UK-Gulf relations 100 
Annexes 101 
Annex A: Committee meetings in Riyadh and Manama 101 
Annex B: Informal meetings in the UK relevant to this inquiry 102 
Appendix 1: List of MOUs and treaties between the UK and Saudi Arabia 104 

Formal Minutes 108 
Witnesses 112 
List of printed written evidence 113 
List of additional written evidence 113
The UK’s relations with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain 3
Summary
The Gulf region remains critical to the UK’s interests. The Government is correct to place
emphasis on the UK’s long-standing relationships with partners in the Gulf and to seek to
further extend these ties. The ‘Gulf Initiative’ launched by the Government in 2010 is
largely a re-branding exercise but as a sign of the UK’s commitment to its relationships in
the region it appears to have been appreciated.
The Arab Spring in 2011 brought about a renewed focus on the UK’s approach to
supporting human rights and democratic reform. The Gulf States were particularly
challenging for FCO policy in this regard: although their domestic situations vary, some
Gulf States are among the least democratic in the world, and they generally have poor
human rights records. However, most are also wealthy and powerful, and vitally important
to many of the UK’s interests in the region. The Government had to reassure its old allies
in the Gulf of its reliability while simultaneously pressing them more urgently for change
and reform. In this context, the Government’s emphasis on gradual reform based on
participation and consent is a realistic approach, though the FCO should continue to
monitor the effectiveness of its policy closely.
The Government is correct to seek to strengthen its diplomatic relationship with Saudi
Arabia, which is important to the UK’s defence, security and commercial interests. Despite
some efforts by the UK to establish a ‘strategic partnership’, official arrangements for a UK-
Saudi annual dialogue have lapsed since 2011, for reasons largely outside the Government’s
control. There is value in such structured relations and the UK should continue to pursue a
formal dialogue arrangement with Saudi Arabia.
There is limited but worrying evidence of a poor public perception of the UK in Saudi
Arabia, including among its young population, as well as a negative perception of Saudi
Arabia among the UK population. This is a matter of concern, particularly at a time when
public opinion and public diplomacy is rising in importance. The Government should
make public engagement a priority for its Embassy in Riyadh.
Democratic governments such as the UK face a challenge in trying to reconcile their liberal
constituencies at home with the need to maintain relationships with undemocratic and
conservative regimes that are important to their interests on a regional and global level. We
understand that to encourage a government such as that of Saudi Arabia towards reform, a
combination of private and public pressure is required. By their very nature, private
conversations are difficult to explain publicly. However, we are particularly concerned that
some witnesses not only disagreed with UK policy but appeared to disbelieve the
Government’s account of its private conversations with Saudi Arabia on reform. The
Government appears to have a credibility problem and must do more to explain its policies
and consider where it can point to specific progress as a result of its human rights work.
Saudi Arabia is a large and growing market for the UK, and the Saudi government’s large-
scale spending programmes offer huge opportunities for British businesses. Saudi Arabia is
also an important if controversial buyer for the UK defence industry. We have seen no
conclusive proof that Saudi Arabia has misused the equipment sold by the UK, and the UK
4 The UK’s relations with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain
provides training alongside its sales programmes which enhances the UK-Saudi defence
relationship and benefits Saudi forces’ training. Ending defence sales would have
significant costs for the UK-Saudi relationship and there is little evidence to suggest that it
would have any positive effect, particularly given the presence of other sellers in the
market.
Saudi Arabia continues to be a vital but complicated counter-terrorism partner for the UK
and wider international community. Counter-terrorism co-operation has proven to be of
great and practical benefit to both sides and has been instrumental in protecting British
lives and interests. However, Saudi Arabia is part of the problem as well as part of the
solution. We recommend that the Government make it a priority to engage with its
counter-terrorism partners in Saudi Arabia to improve the monitoring of the funding
flowing from Saudi Arabia to organisations with an extremist message so that it can be
more effectively disrupted. The Government should also encourage Saudi Arabia to ensure
that its legitimate promotion of religious values does not inadvertently contribute to the
furtherance of extremism, especially with regard to states in North Africa that have been
particularly vulnerable to the influence of extremist groups, as well as in states in other
regions such as Pakistan, Bangladesh and Indonesia.
We note the reported supply of arms by Saudi Arabia to groups in Syria; the Government
should set out in its response to this report its assessment of the situation and the actions it
is taking to monitor any groups that are receiving funding and arms from Saudi Arabia,
and its efforts to engage with the Saudi authorities regarding any concerns about those
groups.
The aggressive manner in which Bahrain’s security forces handled events in 2011 has
deeply damaged Bahrain’s international reputation and complicated its relationship with
the UK and others. Its failure quickly to implement the recommendations of the Bahrain
Independent Commission of Inquiry further damaged good faith and good will toward
Bahrain. The Government was correct to take a firm line in 2011 with regard to the
unacceptable violence, but it has successfully re-established relations since then and the UK
is now well placed to help Bahrain shape its future.
Bahrain is subject to intense pressure from Saudi Arabia and Iran, which have strong and
opposing interests in what happens in Bahrain and which somewhat limit the freedom of
movement of Bahrain’s leadership. This regional and sectarian context is not always well
understood or explained by Western press. However, it cannot excuse the continuing
stalemate and slow rate of progress in Bahrain.
Nonetheless, the UK is right to be understanding of Bahrain’s dilemmas. For its region,
prior to the protests Bahrain was relatively liberal and reforming, and there is not an easy
answer to its internal political issues. However, many of Bahrain’s problems are of its
Government’s own making. The UK must press with greater urgency and force for Bahrain
to implement the BICI reforms, engage seriously in dialogue and welcome UN
mechanisms in order to re-establish good faith in its intentions. If there is no significant
progress by the start of 2014, the Government should designate Bahrain as a ‘country of
concern’ in its next Human Rights Report.
Although the UK and Bahrain share warm and long-standing ties, public opinion has
The UK’s relations with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain 5
hardened in both states since 2011. The UK has received criticism from various directions
in Bahrain both for being too critical and for being too supportive. The UK has a very high
profile in Bahrain and must be careful about the message it sends to the broader public in
Bahrain and internationally as it positions itself as a ‘critical friend’.
Defence cooperation and sales with Bahrain have proved controversial since the violent
events of 2011. However, we are persuaded that Bahrain provides an immensely valuable
home in the Gulf for UK naval assets which would be difficult to find elsewhere, and the
UK provides important training to Bahraini forces which can help to raise standards and
embed best practice. Nevertheless, we are disappointed that the Government was able to
provide so little detail of its recent Defence Accord with Manama.
There is a continuing problem with a lack of Arabic language skills among FCO diplomats
though the FCO has taken some steps to address this, including the opening of its language
school. It will take time to re-build Arabic language capacity but the goal must be for all
senior diplomats in the region to speak Arabic.

The UK’s relations with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain 7
Conclusions and recommendations
Broader context: UK ties with the Gulf
1. The Gulf is a region that remains important to the UK’s defence interests and offers
substantial commercial opportunities. The UK has benefited from its historical links
with the Gulf States, including with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. The UK’s long-
standing relationships in the Gulf place it in a good position to extend and benefit
from these ties in the coming years. (Paragraph 12)
2. The UK is correct to prioritise its Gulf relations, which remain key to the UK’s
national interests. We are satisfied that the Gulf Initiative is being appreciated by the
UK’s partners in the Gulf. It is largely a re-branding exercise, but that does not
invalidate its worth as a signal of the UK’s commitment to the region. However, we
find no conclusive proof of neglect by previous governments. (Paragraph 18)
3. The Arab Spring in 2011 revealed some of the differences between the UK and the
Gulf with regard to differing domestic governance systems and approach to the
revolutions. The Government had to reassure its old allies in the Gulf of its reliability
while simultaneously pressing them more urgently for change and reform. In this
context, the Government’s emphasis on gradual reform based on participation and
consent is a realistic approach, though the Committee believes the FCO should
continue to monitor the effectiveness of its policy closely. (Paragraph 26)
Bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia
4. The UK-Saudi relationship continues to be important for the UK. We have no
reason to suspect that the failure so far to establish a formal ‘Strategic Partnership’
indicates that the friendship between the UK and Saudi Arabia has suffered. It
appears that practical reasons have prevented progress. However, we agree with the
Government’s original position that structured relations can provide a useful forum
to enhance co-operation on common interests and to raise issues of concern, and the
lapse of regular annual talks is therefore regrettable. The FCO should include the
reinstatement of talks via a strategic partnership, or the reinstatement of the Two
Kingdoms Dialogue, as a goal in its business plan and should continue to represent
the benefits of such structured talks to the authorities in Saudi Arabia. (Paragraph
34)
5. Evidence of negative perceptions of the UK among young Saudis is deeply
concerning, particularly in a state in which over 60% of the population is under 30
years old. It is difficult with so little evidence to draw conclusions as to the reason for
the low level of trust in the UK, but we recommend that the Government set out in
response to this report any research it has conducted on the public perception of the
UK in Saudi Arabia, and its views on the reasons for the poor public perception of
the UK. (Paragraph 39)
6. We recommend that the Government make public engagement with the wider Saudi
population a priority for its digital diplomacy team in the Gulf and Embassy in Saudi
Arabia. The Government should also set out in response to this report its public
8 The UK’s relations with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain

engagement strategy, including the steps it is taking to engage with Saudi youth on
social media, how it is representing the UK to the younger generation in Saudi
Arabia, and what staff and resources it is dedicating to this task. (Paragraph 44)
7. The work of the British Council is particularly useful in Saudi Arabia as it is one of
the only channels of direct contact between the UK and Saudi public. As a provider
of valued language training services, it is able to co-operate with and support the
Saudi authorities at the same time as engaging directly with the Saudi public and
promoting a positive image of the UK. (Paragraph 45)
8. The growing Saudi market and the Saudi government’s spending plans offer huge
opportunities for British businesses across a wide range of sectors. Given the large-
scale opportunities available, we see no reason why the UK should not set ambitious
targets for growth in UK-Saudi trade and investment. (Paragraph 56)
9. We recommend that the Government facilitate a leading role for British businesses
in international consortiums to bid for projects in Saudi Arabia. In its response to
this report, the Government should set out what resources it is dedicating to this
task. (Paragraph 57)
10. We recommend that the Government assess whether it would be beneficial to lower
the costs of its introduction services to British businesses for a temporary period in
order to boost the UK’s participation in the Saudi market, particularly for small and
medium sized enterprises. (Paragraph 59)
11. The current visa regime is a significant source of difficulty and inconvenience for
both Saudi and British businessmen and undermines the UK Government’s stated
priority of increasing trade with Saudi Arabia. The improvement of the visa terms
would be of benefit to both states and we are disappointed that the UK has not
managed to secure reciprocal terms for its business visas. We recommend that the
Government make improving the visa regime a priority in its discussions with the
Saudi government when seeking to establish a strategic partnership. (Paragraph 62)
12. Saudi Arabia is an important buyer for the UK defence industry, and defence sales
are important to the overall UK-Saudi relationship. The UK provides valued training
alongside its defence sales that is beneficial to both UK and Saudi forces. With other
competitors in the market, there is little to suggest that ending the UK’s defence sales
would have any effect on overall defence sales to Saudi Arabia, or that it would give
the UK additional leverage to effect positive improvements. The government must
adhere strictly to its existing policy to ensure that defence equipment sold by UK
firms are not used for human rights abuses or internal repression. In its response to
this report the Government should provide further evidence that it is doing so in
practice, including any evidence gathered by end-use monitoring. (Paragraph 78)
13. Saudi Arabia continues to be a vital but complicated counter-terrorism partner for
the UK and wider international community. Counter-terrorism co-operation has
proven to be of great and practical benefit to both sides and has been instrumental in
protecting British lives and interests. However, Saudi Arabia is part of the problem as
well as part of the solution. We recommend that the Government make it a priority
to engage with its counter-terrorism partners in Saudi Arabia to improve the
monitoring of the funding flowing from Saudi Arabia to organisations with an