The Theory of Social Action: The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz and Talcott Parsons

171 Pages·1978·11.75 MB·English

by  Alfred Schutz

Studies in Phenomenology and
Existential Philosophy
GENERAL EDITOR
JAMBS M. EDIE
CONSULTING EDITORS
David Carr William L. McBride
EdwardS. Casey J. N. Mohanty
Stanley Cavell Maurice Natanson
Roderick M. Chisholm Frederick Olafson
Hubert L. Dreyfus Paul Ricoeur
William Earle George Schroder
J. N. Findlay Calvin O. Schrag
Dagfinn F0llesdal Robert Sokolowski
Marjorie Grene Herbert Spiegelberg
Dieter Henrich Charles Taylor
Emmanuel Levinas Samuel J. Todes
Alphonso Lingis Bruce W. Wilshire
The Correspondence of
Alfred Schutz and Talcott Parsons
THE THEORY OF
SOCIAL ACTION
Edited by Richard Grathoff
INDIANA UNIVERSITY PRESS
Bloomington and London
Copyright © 1978 by Richard Grathoff
All rights reserved
No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form
or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying
and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system,
without permission in writing from the publisher. The Association
of American University Presses' Resolution on Permissions constitutes
the only exception to this prohibition.
Manufactured in the United States of America
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Schutz, Alfred, 1899-1959.
The theory of social action.
(Studies in phenomenology and existential
philosophy)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Social sciences—Methodology. 2. Schutz,
Alfred, 1899-1959. 3. Parsons, Talcott, 1902-
I. Parsons, Talcott, 1902- joint author.
U. Grathoff, Richard H., 1934- III. Title.
H61S443 1978 300U'8 77-15761
ISBN 0-253-35957-0 1 2 3 4 5 82 81 80 79 78
CONTENTS
Foreword by Maurice Natanson ix
Introduction by Richard Grathoff xvii
Part I: Inquiry into the Structure of Social Action 1
A Letter from Parsons (October 30, 1940) 3
A Letter from Schutz (November 15, 1940) 4
Parsons' Theory of Social Action: A Critical Review
by Alfred Schutz 8
A. Some Outstanding Features of Parsons' Theory
8
B. A Critical Examination of Parsons' Theory 21
Part II: The Schutz-Parsons Letters: January 16, 1941 to
April 21, 1941 61
Parsons: "We seem to be unable to have a meeting of
minds." (January 16, 1941) 63
Schutz: f'A line to acknowledge receipt." (January
21, 1941) 71
Parsons: rT find nothing in your argument to shake
my position." (January 23, 1941) 72
Parsons: rT must confess to being skeptical of
phenomenological analysis." (February 2, 1941) 79
Schutz: r7 shall let you have my reaction soon."
(February 10, 1941) 94
Schutz: "You have to go a few steps further in
radicalizing your theory." (March 17, 1941) 95
Parsons: ''Not to become involved in a
misunderstanding." (March 29, 1941) 107
Vlll THE THEORY OF SOCIAL ACTION
Schutz: "Discussion is a poor 'Ersatz' for a
dialogue." (April 21, 1941) 110
Editor's Note 112
Part HI: Retrospect 113
Talcott Parsons: A 1974 Retrospective Perspective 115
Richard GrathofT: How Long a Schutz-Parsons
Divide? 126
Notes 131
Index 143
FOREWORD
Soon after I came to the Graduate Faculty of the New School
for Social Research in 1951 to study with Alfred Schutz, he told
me about his meetings and correspondence with Talcott Parsons.
It was only in recent years, however, that I had an opportunity
to read the manuscripts from which this book is drawn. Although
the past twenty-five years have brought forth significant contribu
tions to the literature of the theory and methodology of the social
sciences, I am left with the impression that the themes of the
Schutz-Parsons correspondence are still vital to an under
standing of the logical foundations of social science. To be sure,
the correspondence focuses on a sociological debate, which is car
ried on by two remarkable social scientists. Readers may legiti
mately find in the exchange further insight into the positions of
Schutz and Parsons as well as valuable suggestions regarding the
thought of Max Weber and others. No doubt, readers will also find
interesting analyses of the substantive points on which Schutz
and Parsons disagree and, occasionally, concur. For some, this
correspondence will have predominantly historical interest; they
may think that the issues under consideration have been ab
sorbed and transformed by more recent developments in the so
cial sciences but that it is important to respect the sources of
sociological thought. My own view of the correspondence is that
its dominant albeit reluctant theme is the relationship between
philosophy and social science. Such an interpretation demands
not only explanation but defense.
Early in Schutz's discussion of Parsons' The Structure of Social
Action, he says that Parsons' "purpose is to demonstrate that the
four men in question [Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim, and Weber],
though of different nationalities, different social origin, different
education, and different attitudes toward their science, neverthe
less converge, in all essentials, upon certain fundamental postu-
THE THEORY OF SOCIAL ACTION
lates of the methodology and epistemology of the social sciences."
And later, in summarizing what he takes to be the "many great
merits" of Parsons' work, Schutz tells us that
they consist, first of all, in the attempt to build up a basic methodology
of the social sciences by starting from the question: what do the great
masters of sociology really do in performing their concrete research
work? Secondly, the attempt is made to unify their methodological
remarks into a great system of theory, the theory of action, and to
outline the constructive elements of such a theory as well as the
implications which arise both from the historical background of the
social sciences and from their logical structure.
He goes on, then, to regret "that Professor Parsons intentionally
renounces the examination of the logical and philosophical foun
dations upon which a correct methodology of the social sciences
must be based." Parsons replies:
we seem to be unable to have a satisfactory meeting of minds because
our foci of interest in these problems are quite different. I found myself
marking at a number of points statements of yours which imply that
my book was, along with the secondary examination of the work of
other people, primarily a study of the methodology and epistemology
of social science. On the very first page of your manuscript you refer
... to my purpose of demonstrating that the four men converged on
certain fundamental postulates of this methodology and epistemology.
This statement seems to me symptomatic of a point of view which runs
throughout your treatment. I think it is fair to say that you never
carefully and systematically consider these problems in terms of their
relation to a generalized system of scientific theory. It is this, not
methodology and epistemology, which was quite definitely the central
focus of my own interest.
The quotations just given are representative of the encounter
between the two thinkers. Much of the essential vocabulary of the
discussion is understood by each man in a fundamentally differ
ent way: not only "methodology" but also "theory" is necessarily
philosophical for Schutz; Parsons understands his work to be con
cerned with problems of a primarily scientific rather than philo
sophical character. I am not suggesting that terminological
confusions on both sides account for the failure of the discussion
to be joined. To the contrary, it is philosophical matters which
Foreword xi
explain the confusion in language. Parsons is explicit about
Schutz's philosophical orientation:
at a great many points you are interested in certain ranges of philo
sophical problems for their own sake which, quite self-consciously and
with specific methodological justification, I have not treated. You are,
for instance, continually attempting to point out certain things about
what the subjective processes of action really are in what must be
taken as a directly ontological sense. At another point you speak of the
problem of ultimate value, again in a strictly philosophical sense. It
is, I think, a corollary of my concentration of interest on a system of
theory that I have attempted to minimize discussion of, and commit
ment to positions on, this philosophical level as much as possible.
But to say that methodology and theory are philosophical, for
Schutz, does not mean that in his view a sociologist must become
an epistemologist. Neither does it mean that Parsons is not enti
tled to limit the scope of his inquiry. The terminological problem
is merely the tip of a philosophical iceberg.
Late in the correspondence, Schutz writes: "I realized immedi
ately the importance and the value of your system and also the
fact that it starts exactly where my own book ends." A full ac
count of the meaning of the last part of that statement would
provide the beginnings of an explanation of Schutz's conception
of the relationship between social science and philosophy; in turn,
such an account would explain the reasons for Schutz's conviction
that Parsons' work was important, valuable, and open to philo
sophical grounding in terms of an approach which Schutz had
tried to provide in Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt Very
briefly, Schutz believed that most often social scientists are, philo
sophically speaking, "naive realists," that is, they begin analysis
by taking for granted the epistemic status of the common-sense
world within which their professional problems arise. In phenom-
enological terms, most social scientists remain within the "natu
ral attitude" in which the "world" of "social world" is untroubled
by philosophical doubts. It is hardly the case for Schutz that naive
realism is primordial sin! The sociologist is fully entitled to enter
into sociological work which is not philosophically grounded. But
the price exacted for such entrance is that the fundamental terms
of sociological discourse are tacitly affected by the epistemological
implications of naive realism. The philosopher's work consists in
the radical clarification of the conditions necessary for the possi-