The Structure of Idealization: Towards a Systematic Interpretation of the Marxian Idea of Science (Synthese Library (139), Band 139)

289 Pages·2009·23.405 MB·English

by  Leszek Nowak

THE STRUCTURE OF IDEALIZATION
SYNTHESE LIBRARY
STUDIES IN EPISTEMOLOGY,
LOGIC, METHODOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Managing Editor:
JAAKKO HINTIKKA, Academy of Finland, Stanford University
and Florida State University Tallahassee
Editors:
ROBERT S. COHEN, Boston University
DONALD DAVIDSON, University of Chicago
GABRIEL NUCHELMANS, University of Leyden
WESLEY C. SALMON, University of Arizona
VOLUME 139
THE STRUCTURE OF
IDEALIZAT ION
Towards A Systematic Interpretation Of
The Marxian Idea Of Science
by
LESZEK NOWAK
Springer-Science+Business Media, B.V.
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data CE
Nowak, Leszek.
The structure of idealization.
(Synthese library; v. 139)
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Science-Philosophy. 2. Marx, Karl, 1818-1883.
I. Title.
Q175.N67 501 79-20656
ISBN 978-90-481-8356-2 ISBN 978-94-015-7651-2 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-015-7651-2
All Rights Reserved
Copyright © 1980 by Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Originally published by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland and copyright
holders as specified on the appropriate pages within in 1980.
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1s t edition 1980
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ix
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS xi
PART I: THE METHODOLOGY OF CAPITAL.
AN ATTEMPT AT A RECONSTRUCTION
CHAPTER 1/ CASE STUDY: THE THEORY OF VALUE
1. The Law of Value 3
2. Transformations of the Law of Value in Capital 10
CHAPTER 2/ THE METHOD OF IDEALIZATION AND
CONCRETIZATION
1. Introductory Comparative Analysis 23
2. Another Example: The Theory of Reproduction 25
3. Some Basic Notions: The Method of Idealization and
Concretization 28
4. Current Interpretation of the Marxian Method 31
5. Galileo of the Social Sciences 34
PART: II: MARX'S IDEAS AND MODERN
METHODOLOGICAL TRENDS
CHAPTER 3/IDEALIZATION AND IDEAL-TYPICAL
METHOD: MARX AND WEBER
1. Ideal-Typical Method 41
2. Idealization and the Ideal-Typical Method: Scope 43
3. Marx and Engels as Methodological Naturalists 44
4. Idealization and the Ideal-Typical Method: Methodological
Nature 47
5. Idealization and the Ideal-Typical Method: Philosophical
Assumptions 51
v
VI CONTENTS
CHAPTER 41 IDEALIZATION AND POSITIVISM
1. Extreme Positivist's Dilemma 54
2. Moderate Positivist's Dilemma 61
3. The Problem of Explanation 67
CHAPTER 51 IDEALIZATION AND HYPOTHETICISM
1. Popper's Concept of Laws of Science 71
2. Popper's Concept of Testing 74
CHAPTER 6/1DEALIZATION AND 'METHODOLOGICAL
IRRATIONALISM'
1. The Principle of Empiricism 82
2. Kuhn's Criticism of Empiricism 83
3. Factual and Idealizational Empiricism 85
4. Reinterpretation of Kuhn's Observations 88
5. Is Irrationalism Necessary? 90
PART III: AN ATTEMPT AT A SYSTEMATIC
CONSTRUCTION OF THE IDEALIZATIONAL
CONCEPT OF SCIENCE
CHAPTER 71 ASSUMPTIONS
1. Essentialism and Ontological Phenomenalism 95
2. Idealizational and Factual Conceptions of Science 104
3. Idealizational Conception of Science: The Starting Point 106
CHAPTER 81 THE MARXIAN MODEL OF SCIENTIFIC
ACTIVITY (MODEL I)
1. Idealizing Assumptions of the Idealizational Theory of
Scientific Activity 111
2. Pre-theoretical Aims 112
3. Law and Theory 119
4. Experimental Testing 125
5. Explanation 128
6. Idealization and Truth 134
CHAPTER 91 DEDUCTION AND MODELLING (MODEL II)
1. Theory as a Sequence of Models 140
2. The Internal Structure of an Idealizational Theory 142
CONTENTS vii
3. Modelling 152
4. Conclusions 156
CHAPTER 10/ APPROXIMATION (MODEL III)
1. Approximation Theory 159
2. Measurement 160
3. Verification of an Approximation Theory 163
4. Conclusions 164
CHAPTER 11 /SEMI-IDEALIZATION AND PROBABILITY
(MODEL IV)
1. Semi-Idealizational Statements 166
2. Semi-Idealizational Theories 168
3. . Idealization and Determinism 175
CHAPTER 12/ PROGRAMMING AND PRACTICAL SCIENCES
(MODEL V)
1. Explaining and Programming 179
2. A Methodological Reconstruction of Practical Research 182
3. Further Concretizations 189
CHAPTER 13/SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY AND PROGRESS
OF SCIENCE
1. The Starting Point of the Theory of Cognitive Practice 197
2. Progress of Science 198
3. Models of Scientific Growth 201
CHAPTER 14/ THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF SCIENCE
1. The Internal Structure of a Cognitive Process 214
2. The Problem of Social Context of the Internal Structure
of a Cognitive Process 217
3. Some Axiological Notions 218
4. Evaluation and Science 223
5. Classes, Values, Cognition 225
CHAPTER IS/THE SOCIAL REASON FOR MAKING
SCIENCE
1. Closed and Open Epistemologies 228
2. The Meaning of the Formula 'Praxis is the Criterion of
Truth' 228
viii CONTENTS
3. Amelioration of Social Practice 231
PART IV: APPLICATION: AN ANALYSIS OF
SOME CRITICISMS OF MARX
CHAPTER 16/THE LAST RESORT
1. Historical Materialism: A Single-Factor Theory? 237
2. The Notion of the Last Resort 238
3. Base and Superstructure 240
CHAPTER 17/THE LAW OF ABSOLUTE PAUPERIZATION
1. The Object of the Controversy 242
2. The Methodological Status of the Law of Absolute
Pauperization 243
3. The Limitations of the Counter-argumentation 244
CHAPTER 181 THE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE THIRD
AND THE FIRST VOLUME OF CAPITAL
1. Bohm-Bawerk's Criticism 246
2. The 'Contradiction' and the Levels of Abstraction 246
3. How is this Criticism Possible? 247
CHAPTER 191 MARX'S HISTORICISM
1. The Charge of 'Historicism' 249
2. The Analysis of Marx's Predictions 249
CHATER 20/THE CONTRADICTIONS AND AMBIGUITIES
WITHIN THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CLASS
1. The Criticism 252
2. The Methodological Nature of the Marxian Theory of Class 253
3. The Marxian Theory of Social Class: An Attempt at a
Reconstruction 255
REFERENCES CITED 266
INTRODUCTION
Much is said in Marxist literature about Marxist methodology which is
supposed to be entirely original - differing a great deal from all other
trends in the modern philosophy of science. On the other hand, however,
it is unfallacious to state that there are no people outside Marxism who
would like to deny this statement. This has to put those who really believe
that Marxism has something important to say in philosophy of science on
guard: if someone says something important others usually are inclined to
protest. But who is inclined to protest when it is stated that Marx em
ployed both induction and deduction, a historical method and a logical
one as well, synthesis, but also analysis, etc? Who is inclined to protest
when it is not known what within this framework 'induction', 'deduction'
'history' or 'logic' mean? Who is inclined to protest when 'Marxist meth
odology' is presented not with the aid of precise definitions and clear
hypotheses but with the aid of a jungle of quotations?
I think that the main malfeasance of the current 'Marxist methodology',
is that of ecclecticism. The methodology of Marx is presented as a col
lection of trivial and/or obscure ideas but not as a system of statements
subordinated to any clear, definite viewpoint presenting a new grasp ofthe
nature of scientific cognition. Search for reconstruction of Marxian meth
odology as a system of the kind is the main aim of this book.
Being conscious of these preliminary points, it becomes clear that there
is no infallible way of finding out what 'Marxist methodology' states. The
only way of finding out whether there is a Marxist methodology or not is
to propose interpretational hypotheses concerning Marx's own scientific
practice, to test them in the light of the analysis of his works, and to com
pare them with what had been explicitly stated by the author of Capital.
This constitutes the first step (see Part! of the book). The problem arises
as to whether the methodological principles employed in the classic works
of Marxism are really original in comparison with modern trends of
philosophy of science. If it is demonstrated that the Marxian methodolo
gical principles, confirmed by his remarks about scientific method, differ
ix