The Sputnik Challenge: Eisenhower's Response to the Soviet Satellite

264 Pages·2006·15.82 MB·English

by  Robert A. Divine

THE
SPUTNIK
CHALLENGE
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T HE
SPUTNIK
C H A L L E N GE
Robert A. Divine
New York Oxford
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
Oxford University Press
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Copyright © 1993 by Robert A. Divine
Published by Oxford University Press, Inc.,
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All rights reserved. No part of this publication
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Divine, Robert A.
The Sputnik Challenge / Robert A. Divine.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN: 978-0-19-505008-0
1. United States—Politics and government—1953-1961.
2. Eisenhower, Dwight D. (Dwight David), 1890-1969. 3. Artificial
satellites—Social aspects—United States. 1. Title.
E8735.D535 1993
973.92 l-ndc20 93-8835
To Alex and Thomas
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P R E F A CE
a
As the Cold War passes from the realm of current events into his-
tory, Sputnik remains one of its most enduring landmarks. The Soviet
launch of the world's first artificial earth satellite created a crisis in
confidence for the American people. How could a backward Commu-
nist nation beat the United States into space? Many citizens reacted by
questioning the vitality of an entire way of life, expressing concern
that Sputnik signaled the weakness of American science, the failure of
American schools, and the complacency of American political lead-
ership. Worst of all, they feared that the Soviet Union had gained a
lead in developing long-range missiles, thereby threatening the very
security of the United States in the nuclear age.
The panicky response to Sputnik had long-lasting effects on Ameri-
can life. It opened a debate over the state of education, science, space
exploration, and national security that lasted well into the 1960s. The
Sputnik furor contributed significantly to the election of John F. Ken-
nedy in 1960, to the passage of massive federal aid-to-education mea-
sures under Lyndon B.Johnson, and to the decision to send American
astronauts to the moon. In a sense, the anxiety raised by Sputnik did
not end until Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin took their historic steps
in July 1969.
Dwight D. Eisenhower was one of the few Americans who was not
impressed by the Soviet feat. Contemporaries saw his calm reaction as
proof of his complacency, if not senility, and condemned him for a
lack of leadership. The passage of time has confirmed the wisdom of
the president's response. He believed that American science and
American education were much sounder than critics charged, and,
above all, he was confident that the United States held a commanding
lead over the Soviet Union in strategic striking power. His refusal to
viii PREFACE
support hasty or extreme measures in the wake of Sputnik proved
fully justified.
Yet Eisenhower, for all his prudence and restraint, failed to meet
one of the crucial tests of presidential leadership: convincing the
American people that all was well in the world. His inability to under-
stand the profound uneasiness and sense of impending doom that
gripped the American public as a result of Sputnik was a political
failure of the first order. He simply could not comprehend why the
nation refused to accept his reassurances; he finally was forced to go
against his deeply ingrained fiscal conservatism and approve defense
expenditures he did not believe were really needed.
In this book, I have focused on Eisenhower's response to Sputnik,
viewing the crisis from a White House perspective. This approach was
made possible by the richness of the files at the Dwight D. Eisenhower
Library, which stand as a tribute to a military man's insistence on
keeping a detailed record of all the deliberations involved in the
decision-making process.
In particular, I owe a deep debt of gratitude to three remarkable
individuals. Andrew Goodpaster, the president's staff secretary, regu-
larly sat in on all Oval Office meetings relating to national security.
Within a few hours, or a day or two at most, he prepared lengthy
memoranda of the White House meetings that laid out the ideas,
suggestions, and conclusions of Eisenhower and his advisers. The re-
sult is a reliable record of the key decisions of the Eisenhower adminis-
tration that appears to be free of Good paster's own feelings and views.
L. Arthur Minnich was the assistant staff secretary who took minutes
of both cabinet meetings and the president's regular sessions with
congressional leaders. In addition to preparing the formal summary
of these meetings, Minnich kept a handwritten notebook that contains
many candid comments by both Eisenhower and those trying to influ-
ence him. Many of the most revealing statements cited in the pages
that follow come from Minnich's invaluable notes. Finally, Ann C.
Whitman, the president's devoted private secretary, kept a diary that
gives an insight into the mood of the Eisenhower White House and the
state of the president's emotions. Intensely loyal, Whitman not only
recorded her own feelings about the impact of Sputnik on Eisenhower
but also persuaded the president to dictate occasional diary notes for
posterity.
I wish to acknowledge the help of a number of archivists and li-
brarians who assisted me with the research of this book: John Wick-
man and Martin M. Teasley at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in
Abilene, Kansas; Claudia Anderson at the Lyndon B.Johnson Library
in Austin, Texas; Lynn Wolf Gentzler at the Western Historical
Manuscript Collection at the University of Missouri Library, Colum-
P R E F A C E iixx
bia, Missouri; and Sheryl B. Vogt at the Richard B. Russell Memorial
Library, University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia.
The award of a semester free from teaching by the Research Insti-
tute of the University of Texas at Austin enabled me to begin research
for this study. I wish to thank Bill Brands for his advice and counsel
and Peter Felten for preparing the index.
Once again, I am indebted to Gerard McCauley, a resourceful and
gracious literary agent, and to Sheldon Meyer, a wise and patient
editor. India Cooper proved to be alert, intelligent, and tactful in
helping prepare the manuscript for publication. My wife, Barbara
Renick Divine, prodded me gently to finish what began to seem like a
never-ending project and provided companionship during the long
days of research and writing. I am grateful for her support and her
willingness to accompany me to distant archives. Finally, I am dedicat-
ing this book to my grandchildren; may the next generation enjoy a
world free of the nuclear peril that has cast such a long shadow over all
our lives.
Austin, Texas R. A. D.
September 1992