Table Of Content

No historical event has exerted more influence on America’s post-1945 use of military force than the failure of Anglo-French appeasement of Nazi Germany at the 1938 Munich Confer- ence. Informed by the supposed grand lesson of Munich—namely, that capitulating to the demands of aggressive dictators always invites further aggression and makes inevitable a larger war on less favorable terms—Ameri- can presidents from Harry Truman through George W. Bush have relied on the Munich analogy not only to interpret perceived security threats but also to mobilize public opinion for military action and to condemn critics as appeasers or defeatists. In The Specter of Munich, respected defense analyst Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at the disastrous diplomatic history of the 1930s. Af- ter identifying the complex considerations be- hind the Anglo-French appeasement of Hitler and the reasons for the policy’s failure, Record disputes the stock thesis that unchecked aggression always invites further aggression. He argues that appeasement failed primarily be- cause Hitler was both unappeasable and unde- terrable—an extremely rare situation. Record proceeds to identify other lessons of the 1930s that are more relevant to meeting today’s U.S. foreign policy and security challenges. Among those lessons are the severe penalties that foreign policy miscalculation can incur, the perils of strategic overextension, the constraints of public opinion in a democracy, and the virtue of consistency in threatening and using force. The Specter of Munich concludes that the Unit- ed States can learn a great deal from British and French failures of the 1930s, but the con- tinued reliance on the specter of Adolf Hitler to interpret today’s foreign security threats is a mistake. Making this analogy clouds the judg- ment of policymakers and the public, narrows policy options, and has and will continue to lead the country into unnecessary wars. oo of owe Munich Also by Jeffrey Record Dark Victory: America’s Second War Against Iraq Making War, Thinking History: Munich, Vietnam, and Presidential Uses of Force from Korea to Kosovo The Wrong War: Why We Lost in Vietnam Hollow Victory: A Contrary View of the Gulf War Beyond Military Reform: American Defense Dilemmas Revising U.S. Military Strategy: Tailoring Means to Ends ecter 2 By c— ¢ “ + Gi) i i SD. ISG GJ4 . ¢A of Munich Reconsidering the Lessons of Appeasing Hitler Jeffrey Record Potomac Books, Inc. Washington, D.C. Copyright © 2007 by Potomac Books, Inc. Published in the United States by Potomac Books, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission from the publisher, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews. Library of Congress Cataléging-in-Publication Data Record, Jeffrey. The specter of Munich : reconsidering the lessons of appeasing Hitler / Jeffrey Record. — Ist ed. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-10: 1-59797-039-5 (alk. paper) ISBN-13: 978-1-59797-039-6 (alk. paper) 1. World War, 1939-1945—Diplomatic history. 2. World War, 1939- 1945—Causes. 3. Munich Four-Power Agreement (1938) I. Title. D748.R44 2006 940.53’ 112—dc22 2006008922 The views expressed in this book are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of the Air War College, Air Force, Department of Defense, or any other federal government agency. (alk. paper) Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper that meets the American National Standards Institute Z39-48 Standard. Potomac Books, Inc. 22841 Quicksilver Drive Dulles, Virginia 20166 First Edition LO) ONSa7 Oe Se4es) a There was never a war in all history easier to prevent by timely action than the one which has just desolated great areas of the globe. It could have been prevented without the firing of a single shot, but no one would listen. —wWinston Churchill, 1946! Appeasement in itself may be good or bad according to the circumstances. Appeasement from weakness and fear is alike futile and fatal. Appeasement from strength is mag- nanimous and noble, and might be the surest and only path to world peace. —Winston Churchill, 1950? arene ahingiuerscds . ‘sae Vir idcienee oare? he e*o psC g.a il eA : ao be ssp eg aia Ce eee Mer Wiens it ain mS iain ad Cours ea, wat g itplentncnd aa coal bad4 0 to keen on ag pe i