The Spartan Twilight

235 Pages·1986·21.906 MB·English

by  Linda J. Piper

Spartan Twilight
LINDAJ. PIPER
Aristide D. Caratzas
Publisher
New Rochelle, New York
1986
List of Abbreviations
AC L'Antiquite Classique
AC lass Acta Classica
AHR American Historical Review
AIV Atti delflstituto Veneto di Scienze Lettere ed Arti
AJA American Journal ofA rchaeology
AJAH American Journal ofA ncient History
AJPh American Journal ofP hilology
AncSoc Ancient Society
A then Athenaeum
BCH Bulletin de Correspondance Hellenique
BFC Bol/etino di Fiwwgia Classica
BHJ Birmingham Historical Journal
BSA Annual oft he British School at Athens
CAH Cambridge Ancient History
CH Cahiers d' H istoire
CPh Classical Philology
CQ Classical Quarterly
CR Classical Review
cs
Critica Storica
CSCA California Studies in Classical Antiquity
cw Classical World (formerly Weekry)
DHA Dialogues d'Histoire Ancienne
DOP Dumharton Oaks Papers
FGrHist F. Jacoby, Die Fragmente der griechiscben H istoriker
FHG Muller, Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum
GIF Giorna/e Italiano di Filologia
Hist Historia
HN2 Head, Historia Numorum, ed 2
IG lnscriptiones Graecae
jHS Journal ofH ellenic Studies
JRS Journal ofR oman Studies
Abbreviations
XI
LEC Les Etudes Classiques
OCD Oxford Classical Diaionary
pp La Parola del Passato
P-P Past and Present
QUCC Quademi Urhinati di Cultura Classica
RAL Rendiconti della Accademia dei Lincei
RD Revue Historique de Droit Franfais et Etranger
RE Realencyclopiidie der classiscben Altertumswissenscbaft
REA Revue des Etudes Anciennes
REG Revue de Etudes Grecques
RFIC Rivista di Filologia e d' Istruzione Classica
RH Revue H istorique
RIL Rendiconti delflstituto Lombardo
RPh Revue de Pbilologie
RSA Rivista Storica deU Anticbita
RSI Rivista Storica Ita/iana
RSV Bible, Revised Standard Version
SCI Scripta Classica Israelica
SEG Supplementum Epigrapbicum Graecum
SIG3 Dittenberger, Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum, ed 3
TAPhA Transaaions and Proceeding; oft he American
Philological Association
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Chapter I
Sparta After Alexander
In 37 1 B.C., the Greek world heard with disbelief that a small The ban
force had defeated a larger Spartan army at Leuctra. The Spartan
military had seemed invincible for so many years that victory was
almost a commonplace in Spartan foreign affairs. Yet if the other
Greeks were shocked by the news, the men and women within
Sparta took it in a typically calm and stoical fashion, firm in their
belief that it was merely a temporary setback This was not to be so,
however. Discontent with Spartan hegemony had been festering in
the Peloponnesus for many years, suppressed only by Spartan mili
tary supremacy. The news of the The ban victory brought this discon
tent to the surface, and many cities, especially those in the central
Peloponnesus, seized the opportunity to break with the Pelopon
nesian League and form their own defensive organizations; the Arca
dian League was in existence by 370 B.C. This was the beginning of
the end for Sparta
Yet worse was to cQme. That same year, 370, the Theban army,
backed by Arcadian forces greedy for plunder, invaded Laconia and
ravaged the couptryside. The city of Sparta held strong, even though
· her walls were still merely the shields of her citizens, and E paminon
das wisely bypassed it Before returning to Boeotia, however, he laid
the foundations for a new city of Messene at Mount lthomeand sur
rounded it with a strong wall thus depriving Sparta of her control
over Messenia and the inhabitants, who had for so long worked the
land as helots of the Spartan citizens. Sparta had lost both prestige
and property; it is small wonder that most historians ring down the
6 L J Piper
curtain on Spartan history at this point This is premature, however,
since the history of Sparta was far from over. To be sure, it is the story
of a long twilight and one which can only be imperfectly recon
structed from scattered sources, but if much is obscure, there are also
flashes of brilliance, so that the later history of Sparta helps illuminate
the Hellenistic world
At Leuctra Epaminondas shattered both the Spartan army and its
myth of invincibility, and there is no minimizing the proportions of
the military disaster. But the defeat in 371 B.C. served only as a pre
lude to further reverses later in the fourth century. The Spartans
remained aloof from the Athenian-Boeotian coalition formed to
thwart the ambitions of Philip II of Macedon, but after Philip tri
umphed over his enemies in 3 38 , he turned against all those who had
remained neutral Although the majority of the Peloponnesian cities
welcomed Philip, the Spartans refused to receive him into their city,
preferring instead to suffer once again the plundering of Laconia and
the further loss of territory. Through Philip's generosity, Sparta's
neighbors gained the always disputed border territories of Laconia:
Arcadia took the Sciritis, Messenia the Dentheliatis, and Argos the
Cynuria1 Sparta was thus restricted to the territory between Mount
Ta5'getus and the coast of the Aegean Sea with her borders extending
as far north as Sellasia and south to the Laconian Gulf This was the
best part of Laconia, but the loss of almost one-half of her former
possessions was a serious blow to Spartan pride and especially to
her economy.
Of Spartan leaders in this period we know very little. Although the
Agiad king Cleomenes I I was then in the midst of an extremely long
reign (369-309), he remains a shadowy figure. The most known
about him is that he had two sons, Acrotatus and Cleonymus, neither
of whom succeeded him. FortUnately the Eurypontid monarchs
were more forceful and therefore made more of an impresssion on
history; this is certainly the case with Archidamus III (361-338) and
his sonAgis III (3 38-3 31). Diodorussays thatAgis' father, Archidamus
III, died in Italy fighting in the service ofTarentum on the same day
and even at the same hour that the Greek alliance failed at Chaeronea2
This would perhaps account for the absence of a Spartan force in
Boeotia on that fateful day. but it does not explain why Archidamus
would take an army to Italy at a time when Philip was an active threat
to Greek independence. The king and his force were no doubt fight
ing as mercenaries; Tarentum was a colony of Sparta, but to attribute
Sparta After Alexander 7
altruistic motives to the Spartans or anyone else in this period would
be idealistic. Sparta had been in difficult economic straits since the
loss of Messenia, so it is possible that Archidamus' campaign was a
state-sponsored, money-making venture, much in the order of the
campaigns of Agesilaus II in Egypt in 361 B.C. He may also have felt
that Philip was a danger to northern Greece only and, in typical Spar
tan fashion, was unconcerned about affairs north of the Pelopon
nesus. How many men Archidamus had with him is unknown, but
neither Cleomenes II nor Agis attempted to lead a Spartan force
north to Chaeronea.
After Philip had established his control over Greece, he called all
of the allies together at Corinth and founded a new Hellenic League.
The Spartans obstinately refused to join, stating that "their customs
did not permit them to follow others, but to lead"3 Although they
had not dared to face Philip's forces in the earlier invasion of Laconia,
Philip, on the other hand, had decided against an attack on Sparta,
which would be strenuously defended and might detain his atten
tion too long from the rest of Greece, where his hold was still tenuous
at best4 Philip needed the support of the Greek allies for his pro
jected invasion of Asia Minor. So at Corinth, Philip laid the ground
work for his eastern campaign and ignored the insult from Sparta,
recognizing it as a feeble gesture of defiance from a city badly weak
ened and surrounded by enemies.
Assassination put an end to Philip's plans, but Alexander con
tinued his father's pplicies concerning both Asia and the Greeks.
When the Persian expedition finally got underway in 3 34 B.C., he left
Antipater behind in Macedonia to keep an eye on Greek affairs. It
was only to be expected however, that once Alexander was occupied
in Asia, Sparta would try to recover both her prestige and her terri
tories. Agis, now asserting his leadership, moved to revitalize the
demoralized Spartan army and to seek new allies. Counting on a Per
sian victory, in 333 B.C., ,he sent envoys to Darius 111;5 he himself
sailed to Siphnuswith a single trireme to meet therewith Darius' rep
resentatives, Pharnabazus and Autophradates, and ask for monetary
aid in raising a Greek revolt agamst Macedonia. Unluckily, Agis
arrived at Siphnus at the same time as the report of Alexander's vic
tory at lssus, but although the Persian commanders were naturally
shocked at the news, the Spartan king still received thirty silver
talents and ten triremes from Autophradatcs, all of which he sent to
his brother Agesilaus at Taenarurn to be used immediately against
8 L J Pip~
the pro-Macedonian cities on the island of Crete. Agis stayed for a
time in the islands before eventually joining Autophradates at Hali
camassus, perhaps in hopes of gaining more aid When it was not
forthcoming. he sailed home.
The Persian defeat at lssus did not prove catastrophic to the Spar
tan plan since 8,000 Greek mercenaries, previously in Darius' army,
now joined Agis, who used them to conquer and garrison many cities
on Crete.6 In this way he gained himself a milital)' reputation, but
even so it was not until Antipater was engaged in quelling a rebellion
in Thrace that the Spartans were able to form an alliance of the
majority of the cities in. the Peloponnese.7 Anti pater rushed back
from Thrace to meet this new threat, and in 331 B.C. faced and
defeated the coalition in a battle fought near.Megalopolis, a city loyal
to Macedonia; Agis died in the battle.8 This ended the Peloponnesian
alliance. According to.Curtius the Macedonian victory broke the
spirit not only of Sparta and her allies but also of others who had
perhaps contemplated rebellion.9 Anti pater, however, was not com
pletely the victor since Alexander's policies concerning Greece had
to be considered For this reason he occupied none of the conquered
cities, including Sparta, and rather than settle the peace himsei(
referred the matter to the council (synedrion) oft he Hellenic League.
The counciL in turn, passed on the decision, especially concerning
Sparta. to Alexander. Anti pater did take hostage fifty of the noblest
Spartiates; the remaining Spartans sent envoys to Asia" hoping to be
forgiven for their mistakes."10 Alexander reaffirmed all of the pre
vious decisions on Sparta. and from this time until the death of Alex·
ander in 3 23 B.C., quiet prevailed in the Peloponnesus.
The Lamian Wa~, which broke out in the autumn of 323, found
most of the Greeks in league against Anti pater, who was now regent
in Macedonia Athens sought and obtained as allies some cities in the
Peloponnesus, but once again Sparta remained aloo£11 There are
several possible reasons for Spartan neutrality, not the least of which
was the fifty hostages taken to Macedonia by Antipater only eight
years before. Sparta had no doubt also suffered a severe loss in man
power in her defeat at Megalopolis in 3 31, and if Sparta had put all of
her resources into the previous effort, war may have been economi
cally impossible. Arcadia must have remained neutral also, since
none of the sources mention any of these cities as allies of either side;
Sparta could not have marched north without going through Arca
dian territocy. Finally, there was the consideration of what might
Sparta After Alexander 9
happen to Sparta ifleft practically undefended against long-standing
enemies in southern Arcadia and Messenia.12 With or without
Sparta, the outcome would probably have been the same. Anti pater
was once again victorious (321 B.C.), and since he was no longer
bound by Alexander s policies, the Greek cities lost their allied status
and became tax-paying subjects of Macedonia; garrisons were placed
in the strongest of the cities, and tyrants, supporting and supported
by the Macedonian regent, took control in others. Of all the impor
tant cities of classical Greece, Sparta was the only one to escape both
garrison and tyrant Antipater also ignored this once great city.
Spartan foreign policy was still almost nonexistent when Anti pater
died in 319 B.C. He had taken no notice of Sparta in the last years of
h"is reign, and this state of affairs might have continued indefinitely if
Sparta had not become involved in the power struggle between
Antipater's son. Cassander, and his designated successor, Polyper
chon. Although the Spartans gave active support to neither contes
tant, they were openly in sympathy with Polyperchon until Cassander
besieged Tegea in 31 i B.C. They then began to regrettheirchoiceand
to prepare for an invasion of Laconia. Justin says that Sparta strength
ened both her army and her fortifications, seeing in the latter clear
evidence of the degeneration of fourth-century Sparta and the in
creasingweakness ofher position_B Although she could still mobilize
two to three thousand men plus mercenaries,14 the Spartan peripheral
protection no longer existed, and the Spartan soldier now faced the
enemy on his own frontier. Since Sparta still had no walL the forti
fications Justin mentions would have been meager at best, so the
Spartans must have been greatly relieved when trouble in Macedonia
forced Cassander to lift the siege ofTegea and return home. He had
settled affairs by 3 16 B.C., however, and in the next year was back in
the Peloponnese.
By 3 15 B. C. the struggle between Cassander and Polyperchon had
become international in scope with each of the eastern satraps taking
sides. Most of the Peloponnesus, either willingly or unwillingly. was
allied against Cassander, but although he invaded Argos, Arcadia,
and Messenia, he carefully avoided Laconia,1' perhaps because the
Spartans had made no overt movement against him. At about the
same time, howe\'er. Aristodemus of Miletus, who had just arranged
an alliance between Polyperchon and Antigonus, arrived in Laconia,
where he sought and received permission from the Spartans tore
cruit mercenarie.;, in their territory. He hired eight thousand men
10 L J Piper
from the Peloponnesus,16 many of whom were probably Spartans.
After the loss of Messenian land and subsequent decline in the Spar
tan economic system, the Spartiatewho had been dispossessed of his
property had few opportunities for employment open to him, and it
is significant that the old Spartan citizen-soldier was well into the
process of becoming a professional soldier for hire. At the same time,
mercenary service resulted in a dangerous loss of man power on the
home front.
It is impossible to assign a date for the beginning of Spartan mer
cenary service. For centuries Sparta was a closed society with a train
ing program designed to provide the best citizen army in Greece.
Even the number of exiles were few, the best known in the fifth cen
tury being the former king, Demaratus, who returned to Greece with
the invading Persian army in some sort of advisory capacity to King
Xerxes.17 In the fouith century, however, even Spartiates in good
standing with the government volunteered for mercenary service.
Spartans served in the army of Cyrus in his war against his brother,
King Artaxerxes II, and no doubt could have been found in the Per
sian armies facing Alexander.18 Mercenary service could also be
government policy. King Agesilaus I I took aS partan force to fight for
Egypt in 361 B.C.,19 and in 338, Archidamus III had an army in
°
southern ltaly.2 Closely allied to Spartan mercenary service in the
fourth century was the use of Taenarum on the southern tip of
Laconia as a recruiting base.21 Agis III sent the money and ships got
ten from Autophradates to Taenarum, which seems also to have
been a point of departure for Crete, since Agis' brother sailed from
there. For some unknown reason recruiting operations ceased there
after the fourth century, but for about fifty years Taenarum saw a
great deal of activity.
That Spartan soldiers maintained a good reputation is evident in
the fact that Spartan military aid was still sought by other cities. In
317 B.C., Syracusan exiles arrived in Sparta from Acragas, charged
with the responsibility of bringing back a general to lead an alliance
of a few Sicilian cities against Agathodes ofSyracuse.21 Acrotatus, the
elder son of Cleomenes II, quickly accepted the position, eager for
the fame that a foreign command could bring him and anxious to get
away from Sparta where he was extremely unpopular; he had op·
posed the decree that lifted the shame from those who had survived
at Megalopolis.23 He left immediately with only a few ships and
without obtaining permission from the ephors, probably because he