The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics

203 Pages·2014·13.38 MB·English

FM 100-2-1
Headquarters
Department of the Army
OPERATIONS
AND TACTICS
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*FM 100-2-1
Headquarters
Field Manual
Department of the Army
No. 100-2-1
Washington, DC, 16 July 1984
THE SOVIET ARMY:
Operations and Tactics
PREFACE
This field manual is part ofFM series 100-2, 1beSovietArmy. The other volumes are
FM 100-2-2, ]be Soviet Army: specialized Warfare and Rear Area Support, and FM
100-2-3, ]be Soviet Army: Troops, Organization and Equipment These manuals
cannot stand alone but should be used interchangeably.
These field manuals serve as the definitive source of unclassified information on
Soviet ground forces and their interaction with other services in combined arms
warfare. These manuals represent the most current unclassified information and they
will be updated periodically. More information would become available in the event of
war or national emergency.
Users of this publication are encouraged to recommend changes and submit
comments for its improvement. Key comments to the specific page and paragraph in
which the change is recommended. Provide a reason for each comment to insure
understanding and complete evaluation. To send changes or comments, prepare DA
Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) and forward it
to Deputy Commander, USA CACDA, ATIN: ATZL-CAT, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027.
66027.
FM 100-2-1
The cover design is an adaptation of this patch which
is worn by Soviet motorized rifle troops, whose organiza
tion is representative of the Soviet combined arms theme.
ii
FM 100-2-1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Quick Reference _________________________________
CHAPTER TITLE NUMBER CHAPTER TITLE NUMBER
INTRODUCTION ........................... 1 ARTILLERY SUPPORT ...................... 9
SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE ............. 2 ANTITANK SUPPORT ..................... 10
COMMAND AND CONTROL ............... 3 AIR DEFENSE ............................ 11
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS: FRONT AIR SUPPORT ............................ 12
AND ARMy ................................ 4 SMOKE ................................... 13
OFFENSIVE TACTICS: DIVISION AND ENGINEER SUPPORT ..................... 14
LOWER .................................... 5 ELECTRONIC WARFARE .................. 15
DEFENSE. WITHDRAWAL. AND RELIEF .... 6 NUCLEAR. BIOLOGICAL AND
RECONNAISSANCE ....................... 7 CHEMICAL WARFARE .................... 16
FIRE SUPPORT ....... " ................... 8
PAGE PAGE
1 INTRODUCTION ........................ 1-1 ORGANIZATION OF HEADQUARTERS ...... 3-2
SOVIET GROUND FORCES ................ 1-1 COMMAND POST ........................ 3-3
GROUPS OF FORCES .................... , 1-1 TACTICAL COMMUNiCATIONS ............ 3-3
The TVD ............................... 1-1 DIVISION-LEVEL COMMAND AND
The Soviet Front . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1-1 CONTROL ............................ 3-4
STRENGTH AND DEPLOYMENT OF Dual Allegiance ........................ 3-5
FORCES ............................ , 1-1 Division Command Group ............. :. 3-5
Division Command and Staff
2 SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE ........... 2-1 Procedures ........................ 3-10
THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF WAR ........... 2-1 REGIMENT-LEVEL COMAND AND
THE STRUCTURE OF SOVIET MILITARY CONTROL. .............................. 3-12
THOUGHT ................................ 2-1
Principles of Military Art ................ 2-2 4 OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS: FRONT
The Laws of War ....................... 2-2 AND ARMy ............................. 4-1
THE SOVIET CATEGORIZATION OF TVD OFFENSIVE .......................... 4-1
COMBAT ACTIONS ....................... 2-5 FRONT OFFENSIVE ...................... 4-1
COMBINED ARMS OFFENSIVE WARFARE .. 2-5 Offensive Planning ..................... 4-1
The Attack in Depth ..................... 2-6 Offensive Phasing ...................... 4-2
Nuclear Warfare Implications ............ 2-7 Rapid Advance ......................... 4-4
Limited Nuclear War Considerations ..... 2-8 Concentration of Forces ................. 4-4
Nonnuclear Warfare .................... 2-9 Attack Echelons ........................ 4-5
Chemical Warfare ...................... 2-9 The Front Operational Maneuver Group .. 4-5
ECHELONS AND FORCE RATIOS ......... 2-10 Nonnuclear Front Offensive ............. 4-6
First and Second Echelons ............. 2-10 ARMY OFFENSIVE ........................ 4-6
Reserve Forces ........................ 2-11 Echelonment of Forces .......... , ....... 4-6
Force Ratios ........................... 2-11 Use of Forward Detachments ............ 4-7
NORMS. INITIATIVE. AND FLEXiBILITy .... 2-11 The Army OMG ........................ 4-9
Other Support Elements ................. 4-9
3 COMMAND AND CONTROl. ............ 3-1
THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND 5 OFFENSIVE TACTICS: DIVISION
AUTHORITy .............................. 3-1 AND LOWER ............................ 5-1
THEATER OF MILITARY OPERATIONS ...... 3-2 TACTICAL FORMATIONS AND
COMMANDERS .......................... 3-2 MOVEMENT ..........•.•............. 5-1
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FM 100-2-1
PAGE PAGE
The March ............................. 5-1 TARGET DAMAGE CRITERIA .............. 8-1
Prebattle Formation ..................... 5-8 PHASES OF FIRE SUPPORT ............... 8-1
Attack Formation ...................... 5-11 FIRE SUPPORT ZONES .................... 8-2
ATIACKING A DEFENDING ENEMy ....... 5-13 AIR SUPPORT ............................ 8-2
Concept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 5-1 3 FIRE SUPPORT ASSETS ................... 8-3
Forms of Ma neuver .................... 5-13 TRENDS IN FIRE SUPPORT ................ 8-3
Objectives ............................. 5-14
Planning .............................. 5-14 9 ARTILLERY SUPPORT ................... 9-1
Rei nforcements ........................ 5-1 6 ARTILLERY ASSETS ...................... 9-1
Fire Planning .......................... 5-17 Allocation Procedures ................... 9-1
Division Attack ..........•............. 5-18 Organization for Combat ................ 9-1
Regimental Attack ..................... 5-22 COMMAND AND CONTROL ............... 9-3
Battalion Attack ... ; ................... 5-24 Command Relationships ................. 9-4
Conduct of the Attack .................. 5-27 Coordination, and Communications ..... 9-4
Combined Arms Tactics ................ 5-27 FIRE CONTROL AND TARGET
THE MEETING ENGAGEMENT ............ 5-29 INTELLIGENCE ........................... 9-6
Objectives and Characteristics ......... 5-29 Observation Posts ...................... 9-6
The March Prior to Engagement ........ 5-31 Reconnaissance and Target Acquisition .. 9-6
Initial Phase ........................... 5-34 EQUIPMENT .............................. 9-7
Deployment of Main Force ............. 5-34 ARTILLERY AMMUNITION ................. 9-7
Follow-on Forces ...................... 5-36 TACTICAL DEPLOYMENT OF AN ARTILLERY
PURSUIT ................................ 5-36 BATIALION .............................. 9-8
TACTICAL DEPLOYMENT OF MULTIPLE
6 DEFENSE, WITHDRAWAL,AND RELIEF .. 6-1 ROCKET LAUNCHERS .................... 9-11
THE ROLE AND NATURE OF THE METHODS OF FIRE ...................... 9-12
DEFENSE ................................ 6-1 Offensive Fire ......................... 9-12
CONCEPTS OF THE PREPARED DEFENSE .. 6-1 Defensive Fire ......................... 9-15
Security Echelon ....................... 6-2 FIELD ARTILLERY CONDUCT OF FIRE ..... 9-16
Main Defensive Area ................... 6-2 FIRE PLANNING ......................... 9-18
Fire Sacks .............................. 6-2 FIELD ARTILLERY IN THE OFFENSE ....... 9-20
Minefields and Obstacles ............... 6-2 FIELD ARTILLERY IN THE DEFENSE ....... 9-22
Anti-tank Defense ...................... 6-3 FIRING NORMS ......................... 9-22
Counterattacks ......................... 6-3
CONCEPTS OF THE HASTY DEFENSE ...... 6-3 10 ANTITANK SUPPORT .................. 10-1
Reverse Slope Defense .................. 6-3 ANTITANK WEAPONS SySTEMS ......... 10-1
Support Elements ...................... 6-4 ORGANIZATION AND EQUiPMENT ........ 10-1
CONDUCT OF THE DEFENSE .............. 6-4 TACTICAL EMPLOyMENT ................ 10-1
Defensive Planning ..................... 6-4 THE OFFENSE ........................... 10-2
Division-level Defense .................. 6-5 THE DEFENSE ........................... 10-3
Regimental-level Defense ............... 6-6
Battalion-level Defense ................. 6-7 11 AIR DEFENSE .......................... 11-1
WITHDRAWAL .......................... 6-10 CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES ............. 11-1
RELIEF .................................. 6-11 ORGANIZATION AND EQUiPMENT ........ 11-2
MISSIONS .............................. 11-3
7 RECONNAISSANCE ..................... 7-1 SUPPORT IN THE OFFENSE .............. 11-4
ELEMENTS USED IN RECONNAISSANCE ... 7-1 SUPPORT IN THE DEFENSE .............. 11-6
CONTROL OF RECONNAISSANCE AIR DEFENSE RECONNAISSANCE ........ 11-8
ELEMENTS ............................... 7-2 PROTECTION OF MARCH COLUMNS ..... 11-9
RECONNAISSANCE ORGANIZATIONS ...... 7-2 AIR DEFENSE AMBUSHES AND ROVING
UNITS ................................. 11-10
8 FIRE SUPPORT .......................... 8-1 PROTECTION OF RIVER CROSSINGS .... 11-10
CONCEPT ................................ 8-1 AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS IN
FIRE SUPERIORITY ....................... 8-1 MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN ............... 11-11
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FM 100-2-1
PAGE PAGE
AIR SPACE CONTROL. .................. 11-11 SOVIET RADIOELECTRONIC COMBAT
WEAKNESSES ......................... 11-11 (REC) ................................... 15-1
TRENDS ............................... 11-12 TARGET PRIORITIES ..................... 15-2
INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS .......... 15-2
12 AIR SUPPORT .......................... 12-1 ELECTRONIC INTERCEPT AND DIRECTION
CONCEPT ............................... 12-1 FINDING ................................ 15-2
AIR SUPPORT DOCTRINE: ................ 12-1 ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES (ECM) 15-3
The Air Operation .............•....... 12-1 USE OF FIREPOWER ..................... 15-4
Air Support of Ground Forces .......... 12-2 GROUND BASED EW CAPABILITIES ...... 15-4
ORGANIZATION A~D EQUIPMENT ........ 12-2 AIRBORNE EW CAPABILITIES ............ 15-4
COMMAND AND CONTROL .............. 12-2 SEABORNE EW CAPABILITIES ............ 15-5
Aviation Control Element ............... 12-2 ELECTRONIC COUNTER-
Forward Air Controller ................. 12-2 COUNTERMEASURES (ECCM) ............ 15-5
Difficulties in Coordination ............. 12-3 Organizational ECCM Techniques ....... 15-5
Night and Weather Conditions .......... 12-3 Individual ECCM Techniques ........... 15-5
PLANNING AND PREPARATION .......... 12-3 Antiradar Camouflage .................. 15-5
PREPLAN NED AIR SUPPORT SATELLITES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1 5-6
MISSIONS ............................. 12-4
IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS .... 12-5 16 NUCLEAR. BIOLOGICAL. AND
AVIATION EMPLOyMENT ................ 12-5 CHEMICAL WARFARE ................. 16-1
Air-Ground Coordination ............... 12-5 NUCLEAR WEAPONS .................... 16-1
Control Versus Mass ................... 12-6 NUCLEAR OPERATIONS ................. 16-2
Reconnaissance and Targeting ......... 12-6 Planning .............................. 16-2
Mission Execution ..................... 12-6 Targeting ..•.......................... 16-2
SUPPORT IN THE OFFENSE .............. 12-8 Offensive Employment ................. 16-2
SUPPORT IN THE DEFENSE .............. 12-9 Defensive Employment ................. 16-3
TRENDS ................................ 12-9 BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ................. 16-3
CHEMICAL WEAPONS ................... 16-3
13 SMOKE ................................ 13-1 SOVIET PROTECTION AND WARNING
TYPES OF SMOKE SCREENS ............. 13-1 EQUIPMENT ......... : ................ : .. 16-5
METEOROLOGICAL INFLUENCES ON CHEMICAL DEFENSE TROOPS ........... 16-6
SMOKE ................................. 13-2 NBC TRAINING .......................... 16-6
Premilitary Training .................... 16-6
14 ENGINEER SUPPORT .................. 14-1 Unit Training .......................... 16-7
ORGANiZATION ......................... 14-1 Training of Chemical Defense Troops .... 16-8
Engineer Support in the Offense ........ 14-2 Training of Chemical Defense Officers .. 16-8
Engineer Reconnaissance .............. 14-2 PROTECTIVE MEASURES ................ 16-9
Movement Support .................... 14-2 NBC Protective Equipment ............. 16-9
Minefield Breaching ................... 14-2 NBC Reconnaissance .................. 16-9
Mine Laying .......................... 14-4 Decontamination Procedures .......... 16-11
Assault River Crossings ................ 14-4 COMBAT IN AN NBC ENVIRONMENT .... 16-12
ENGINEER SUPPORT IN THE DEFENSE .... 14-4 Actions During the March ............. 16-12
CAMOUFLAGE AND WATER SUPPLy ..... 14-5 The Offense .......................... 16-1 2
The Defense ......................... 16-1 2
15 ELECTRONIC WARFARE ............... 15-1 Recovery Operations .................. 16-13
SOVIET EW CAPABILITIES ............... 15-1 CONCLUSIONS ......................... 16-14
v
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
SOVIET GROUND FORCES
This field manual describes the operations and are capable of employing chemical agents from bat
tactics of Soviet general purpose ground forces. The talion level upward.
(."(mtent is based on information in Soviet writings and The Soviets' basic principle ofland warfare is violent,
other open source literature. Most available informa sustained, and deep offensive action. Mechanized and
tion is focused on potential battle in Central Europe. armored formations, supported by aviation and artil
"Ibis manual reflects that focus. Though Soviet military lery, are to seize the initiative at the outset of hostili
activity extends to other parts of the world, the Soviet ties, to penetrate the enemy's defenses, and to drive
forces opposite NATO represent a general model for deeply and decisively into the enemy's rear area.
Soviet forces elsewhere, as well as for forces of Soviet
allies and surrogates.
The ground forces constitute the largest of the five GROUPS OF FORCES
Soviet military services. Soviet armies have always been In peacetime, the major combined arms commands
massive. Today, they are also highly modernized, well are located in the 16 military districts in the USSR and
equipped. and have great firepower and mobility. Man in the 4 groups of forces in Eastern Europe: Group of
power and materiel combined make the present Soviet Soviet Forces, Germany, Northern Group of Forces in
ground forces a very formidable land army. Poland, Central Group of Forces in Czechoslovakia,
The main combat power of the ground forces is and Southern Group of Forces in Hungary. The Soviets
centered in tank and motorized rifle divisions that are also maintain sizable forces in Mongolia and
dt.-ployed under combined arms commands (armies Afghanistan. (See map on page 1-2.)
and fronts) and controlled through the Chief of the In wartime, forces in the groups of forces and mili
(jeneral Staff. The airborne troops are nominally an tary districts will be organized into theaters of military
arm of the ground forces but are subordinate opera operations (Russian: TVD) and fronts (army groups)
tionally to the General Staff. for combat operations. The military districts will con
In the years immediately following World War II, tinue to function as territorial commands, acting as
Stalin maintained massive ground forces to offset the mobilization and training bases and providing
threat of US nuclear power. As the Sovi~ts developed logistical and other support services.
their own strategic nuclear capability and forces, their
t.·mphasis shifted away from the ground forces. Under
Khruschev, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the size The TVD
of the ground forces was reduced, while strategic Besides being a level of command, a TVD is also a
rocket forces increased in size. geographic entity. It consists of a particular territory,
The Soviets are concerned about the growing threat such as a continent or sea, where military forces of the
from China and wars in the Middle East and Far East. USSR and/or its allies operate in wartime. The Soviets
"Ibey are increasingly aware that a war may be fought consider the major t}pe ofw artime operation to be the
without the use of strategic nuclear weapons. For theater strategic operation. Within each TVD there are
~h.t.'"SC reasons, the Brezhnev regime reemphasized the one or more strategic axes. A strategic axis consists of a
Im portance of the ground forces. Steady and sys wide strip of land or sea and the air space above it, lead
tematic improvements continue. More than 30 divi ing the armed forces to the enemy's most important
sions have been added since 1967. Many new weapons administrative-political and industrial-economic
and equipment of all types have been introduced. centers. The TVD's most important function will be to
()ffi~er and conscript training has been improved. New orchestrate and control coordinated theater-wide
tactICS, operational art, and strategy also have been operations involving fronts, fleets, independent
dt.·vcloped. armies, or flotillas.
The Soviets believe that any future war could involve
the use of nuclear weapons and that the initial stage of
the war will be decisive. Tactical nuclear weapons The Soviet Front
~av~ been assigned at all levels from division up. The The front is the largest field formation in wartime. It
~)\'Je~'i have the largest and most effective array of is an operational and administrative unit, and its size
chemIcal weapons and equipment in the world. They and composition can vary widely depending on the
1-1
FM 100-2-1
Soviet Military Districts and Groups of Forces __________________________
MILITARY DISTRICTS:
1 -Leningrad 5 - Carpathian 9 -Transcaucasus 1J -Central Asia
2 -Baltic 6 - Odessa 10 -Volga 14 - Siberian
J -Belorussian 7 -Kiev 11 -Urais 15 -Transbaykal
4 -Moscow 8 -North Caucasus 12 -Turkestan 16 -Far East
GROUPS OF FORCES IN EASTERN EUROPE:
A -Group of Soviet Forces, Germany C - Central Group, Czechoslovakia
B -Northern Group, Poland o -Southern Group, Hungary
mlsslon and situation. Roughly equivalent to a missile, air defense, engineer, chemical defense, Signal,
US/NATO army group, afrontcould be composed of intelligence, reconnaissance, and rear support units.
three to five armies with organic artillery, missile, air By altering the mix of motorized rifle and tank divi
defense, engineer, signal, intelligence, reconnaissance, sions and artillery and missile support, the army can
and rear service units, plus aviation, air assault, and operate in either offensive or defensive roles in
special pwpose forces. different geographical areas and under various opera
tional constraints.
The Combined Arms Army. The combined arms
army is an operational and administrative organization; The Tank Army. Thetankarmyisanoperationaland
it is the basic Soviet field army. A typical combined administrative unit, and, like the combined arms army,
arms army includes two to four motorized rifle divi is a basic component of afront. The size and composi
sions and one or two tank divisions, plus artillery, tion of the army will depend on the mission, the situa-
1-2
FM 100-2-1
tion, and the area of operations. A typical tank army Many Soviet divisions are maintained at reduced
includes two to four tank divisions and one or two strength in peacetime, but they can be brought up to
motorized rifle divisions, plus artillery, missile, air operational strength quickly by calling up trained
defense, engineer, chemical defense, signal, intelli reservists.
gence, reconnaissance, and rear service units. A typical For over a decade, the Soviets have been modern
role of a tank army is to exploit penetrations deep into iZing and upgrading their ground forces. This has
the enemy's rear areas. involved large-scale improvements in mobility, fire
There are three basic types of maneuver divisions in power, shock action, command and control, obstacle
the Soviet ground forces: motorized rifle, tank, and air crossing capability, air defense, electronic warfare
borne. (For more detailed information, refer to PM (EW), and logistic support. New and advanced equip
100-2-3, The Soviet Army: Troops, Organization and ment has been introduced.
Equipment.) The Soviets have been paying increased attention to
the .development of power projection forces that
would enable them to assert their influence in areas
STRENGTH AND distant from their borders. Naval and air transport
DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES resources can be employed to project regular ground
The Soviet ground forces have a total strength of force units as well as naval infantry and airborne units
about i,825,OOO men. There are currently 191 and independent air assault brigades.
maneuver divisions. There are 134 motorized rifle divi Soviet power projection capabilities are impressive
sions, 50 tank divisions, and 7 airborne divisions. Of in the Persian Gulf region. The Soviets have a sub
these maneuver divisions, 30 are stationed in Eastern stantial number of divisions in varying states of readi
Europe (East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and ness based in Mghanistan and in the Transcauscasus,
Hungary), 80 are stationed in the European portion of North Caucasus, and Turkestan Military Districts.
the USSR, 29 in the Central Asian portion and Soviet aircraft based in Afghanistan can reach most
Mghanistan, and 52 in Siberia, the Far East, and points in the Persian Gulf region and large portions of
Mongolia. the Arabian Sea. Port facilities in the People's
There are four basic deployment groupings: against Democratic Republic of Yemen and Ethiopia greatly
NATO, against China, against the Middle East, and a enhance the operating potential of the Soviet fleet in
strategic reserve. The largest, best-equipped, and most the Indian· Ocean and Arabian Sea
combat-ready is the group deployed against NATO.
1-3
CHAPTER 2
SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE
THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF WAR
To the Soviets, war is a manifestation of the class tary decision-making level. The system deals with all
struggle. It is an expression of the co¢1ict between the military issues, ranging from national defense policy
"progressive forces of socialism" and the "reactionary down to platoon tactics. Soviet military officers are
forces of imperialistic capitalism," which they feel will quite familiar with the entire system of thought and
be ultimately resolved in favor of socialism. The Soviet routinely express themselves in these terms. They
concept of war represents a continuation ofp olitics. In think and formulate decisions using these concepts.
Western perceptions, war occurs when politics fail to Military science is the study and analysis of the
resolve conflicts nonviolently. The Soviets feel that war diverse psychological and material phenomena rele
is the least desirable method by which the forces ofh is vant to armed combat for developing practical recom
tory will move toward complete victory for soc~sm. mendations for the achievement of victory in war.
The Soviet political and military theorists compare Unlike doctrine, military science is characterized by
the socialist and capitalist camps by a concept called controversy and debate. In military science, there may
the "correlation of forces." This concept compares the be several points ofv iew, diverse "scientific" concepts,
relative political, moral, economic, and military and original hypotheses that are not selected as doc
strengths of both sides. In the Soviet view, the correla trine and therefore are not accepted as official state
tion of forces has been shifting in favor of the socialist views on military issues. Military science encompasses
camp since the Soviet defeat ofN azi Germany in World virtually all things military.
War II. Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideology requires the Military art is the most important and primary field
correlation to shift continuously in favor of socialism. within military science and is the basis for strategy,
The correlation of forces may be advanced by both operational art, and tactics. It is the theory and practice
violent and nonviolent means. When it is advanced by of conducting armed conflict. The principles ofmili
violent means, the military component of the correla tary art are the basic ideas and the most important
tion is the dominant factor. recommendations for the organization and conduct of
battles, operations, and warfare.
The concept of military art and its role in military
THE STRUCTURE OF science are not just empty exercises in the Marxist
SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT Leninist theory. Many Soviet military officers hold
Soviet military doctrine is the officially accepted set advanced degrees in military science and are serious
of concepts that delineate the ways and means to and intense in their study. They are convinced of the
achieve military objectives in the interest of politics. superiority of this methodology for preparing the
This doctrine also specifies the structure of the Soviet Soviet armed forces to achieve success in modem war
armed forces, allocates industrial resources and out fare. The structure of ideas, terminology, and concepts
put, and orients research and development efforts to associated with this system of thought constitutes the
support armed forces. Military doctrine is the blue very vocabulary through which Soviet officers express
print drawn up by the highest Soviet political leaders their perceptions of military problems and the mea
that describes in specific detail the shape of the armed sures they develop to resolve them.
forces and the way they are to be used. Military art applies to three separate but interdepen-
The formulation of Soviet military doctrine is a con- dent levels of combat activity:
tinuous evolutionary process based on: • Strategic -national and theater level.
• Communist ideology. • Operational -fronts and armies.
• Soviet foreign policy. • Tactical -division and below.
• Economic and military strengths of adversaries. Soviet perspectives on and prescriptions for armed
• Soviet resources and geography. conflict require that tactical success leads to opera
• History. tional success. Similarly, operational gains lead to
• Science and technology. strategic success.'
Soviet military doctrine is based on an elaborate, It is often difficult to separate Soviet tactics from
integrated system of thought. The doctrinal concepts what the Soviets call "operational art" because the
are precisely defined, and each has its place in a maneuver divisions that are the subject of tactics are
hierarchy of importance that corresponds to its mili- the maneuver elements that achieve the" operational"
2-1