The Sole Fact of Pure Reason: Kant’s Quasi-Ontological Argument for the Categorical Imperative PDF
Preview The Sole Fact of Pure Reason: Kant’s Quasi-Ontological Argument for the Categorical Imperative
DeryckBeyleveld,MarcusDüwell TheSoleFactofPureReason Kantstudien-Ergänzungshefte Im Auftrag der Kant-Gesellschaft herausgegeben von Manfred Baum, Bernd Dörflinger, Heiner F. Klemme und Konstantin Pollok Band 210 Deryck Beyleveld, Marcus Düwell The Sole Fact of Pure Reason Kant’s Quasi-Ontological Argument for the Categorical Imperative ISBN978-3-11-069125-2 e-ISBN(PDF)978-3-11-069134-4 e-ISBN(EPUB)978-3-11-069142-9 ISSN0340-6059 LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2020945680 BibliographicinformationpublishedbytheDeutscheNationalbibliothek TheDeutscheNationalbibliothekliststhispublicationintheDeutscheNationalbibliografie; detailedbibliographicdataareavailableontheInternetathttp://dnb.dnb.de. ©2020WalterdeGruyterGmbH,Berlin/Boston Typesetting:IntegraSoftwareServicesPvt.Ltd. Printingandbinding:CPIbooksGmbH,Leck www.degruyter.com Preface ForalongtimewehavebeenconvincedthatthemethodologyofKant’strans- cendentalphilosophyisthatofelicitingthestrictrequirementsofhumanagen- tial self-understanding and subjecting them to critique. Thus, when Kant says thatthecategoricalimperativeisanapriorisyntheticproposition,wemaintain thatheconsidersacceptanceofittobeastrictrequirementofhumanagential self-understanding.However,untilrelativelyrecently,wehavebeenpuzzledas towhatexactlyKant’sargumentforthiscontentionis.Thissaid,wehavenever seen good reason not to take him at his word that the argument he presents andreliesonforthecategoricalimperativeinCritiqueofPracticalReason(CPrR) is the same argument he presents in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (GMM)(seeCPrRAK5:8).Forreasonswewillmakeclearinthisvolume,wehave always found implausible and founded on very shaky grounds the widely ac- cepted view that CPrR, by reasoning from the moral law to free will, abandons GMM’sclaimthatthecategoricalimperativeisestablishedbyatranscendentalde- duction. However, we struggled to provide a convincing portrayal of what Kant doesinGMMandCPrRthatverifieshisconcordanceclaimuntilweconnectedhis claimsaboutthesensuscommunistohisargumentforthecategoricalimperative while reading Critique of the Power of Judgment (CPoJ) with students on the ResearchMastersCourseinPhilosophyinUtrechtin2012.Oncethisconnectionis made,whatKantsaysaboutthesensuscommunisprovidesstrongsupportfor the viewthat the categorical imperative isthe maximof human agentialself- understanding(themaximtorenderthinkingfromtheviewpointofthepartic- ular agent that one is consistent with thinking of oneself from the viewpoint of an agent per se). It also prompts re-evaluation of what Kant is designating when he refers to common human understanding or common human reason inGMMandCPrR.Assoonaswehypothesizedthathewas,thereby,referring to the sensus communis of CPoJ, a completely different picture of the com- monlyacceptedstructureoftheargumentofGMMemerged.Wehadassumed alongwithalmosteveryoneelsethat,inthefirstsectionofGMM(GMMI),by claiming that the categorical imperative is found in common human under- standing,Kantmerelyclaimsthat (1) peopleverygenerallythinkthatthereisacategoricalimperative; (2) GMM II reveals (by analysis of the concept of a categorical imperative) what those who believe that there is a categorical imperative must accept aboutit;and (3) GMMIIIattemptstoshowthatallhumanagentsmustbelievethatthereis acategoricalimperative. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110691344-202 VI Preface ButthinkingofthecommonhumanunderstandingofGMMIasthesensuscom- munisofCPoJsuggestsadifferentview.When,e.g.,Kantsaysthatthecategori- cal imperative is found entirely a priori in common human understanding (GMM AK 4:406), he means that it is found in exercising the a priori powers of mind of the sensus communis (which he says are powers all who possess humanity in their persons must be thought to have [CPoJ AK 5:293–294]). And this gives rise to the thought that he thinks that the categorical imperative is given to human agents as something they must accept by understanding the conceptofthesensuscommunisviewedastheconceptofhumanagentialself- understanding; indeed, that the categorical imperative is the imperative to act in accord with the strict requirements of agential self-understanding. On this basis,becausehemaintainsthatunderstandingtheconceptofacategoricalim- perativerequireshumanagentstothinkthattheyaregovernedbothbytheuni- versallawofmechanismandthattheyhavefreewill(whichtheycannotbein thesameaspect),thetaskforGMMIIIismerelytoshowthatsuchaconception of what it is to be a human agent is coherent. We then found that thinking aboutthestructureofGMMinthiswaymakessenseofsomeotherthingsthat Kant says in GMM and CPrR that are otherwise very puzzling. Chief amongst thesearetwothings.ThefirstiswhyKantthinksthathecanestablishasunde- niable the actual, as against the merely possible, existence of the categorical imperative simply by showing that it is rationally possible (coherent) to con- sider that one has free will. The second is how he can ground the categorical imperativeinpurepracticalreason(thelawofwhichisthemorallawassuch) by reasoning that is not viciously circular, given that he views the categorical imperative as the moral law as such in its application to finite heteronomously affectedagents.Aboveall,thinkingaboutthestructureofGMMinthiswayen- ablesustoseethattheargumentforthecategoricalimperativeinCPrRhas,as Kantclaims,thesamelogicalstructureastheargumentinGMM. We do not claim that our interpretation of Kant’s argument is entirely novel.Indeed,therearemanyofitsdistinctiveelementsinwritings,mostnota- bly, of Lewis White Beck, Pauline Kleingeld, Onora O’Neill, Klaus Steigleder, Kenneth Westphal, and Michael Wolff. What we think we achieve in this vol- ume is to put these elements together in a more complete and consistent way thanothercommentatorshavedonebythewayinwhichwelinkKant’sclaims about the common human understanding to his claims about the sensus com- munisofCPoJandthedegreeofimportanceweattachtounderstandinghisar- gumentforthecategoricalimperativeinrelationtotheroleitplaysinhismoral argumentfortheexistenceofGod. Numerouscolleaguesandfriendshavecommentedonaspectsofthisbookin earlier drafts and presentations in colloquia and conferences. We owe particular Preface VII thankstoJoelAnderson,PatrickCapps,RutgerClaassen,DaschaDüring,Liesbeth Feikema, Joshua Jowitt, Pauline Kleingeld, Cheryl Lancaster, William Lucy, Sem de Maagt, Tim Meijers, Shaun D. Pattinson, Klaus Steigleder, Stuart Toddington, KennethWestphal,andPaulZiche.HenkvanGilshelpedusingettinganoverview over the literature. We have to thank Charlie Blunden, Bram Galenkamp, and SjaroesSalimianforpreparingtheindexandNikèvanWijckforproofreadingthe files.Aparticular thanks we owe toJan van Ophuijsen for hisenormouswork in carefullycorrectingthefiles. DeryckBeyleveld MarcusDüwell November2019 Contents Preface V ChapterOne Introduction–SettingtheScene 1 ChapterTwo Kant’sArgumentfortheCategoricalImperativeConstructed 35 ChapterThree APrioriSyntheticPracticalPropositionsasStrictRequirements ofHumanAgentialSelf-Understanding 57 ChapterFour Kant’sJustificationintheContextofHisCriticalPhilosophy asaWhole 71 ChapterFive TheMoralLawastheSoleFactofPureReasoninCPrR 85 ChapterSix TheMoralLawastheSoleFactofPureReasoninGMM 111 ChapterSeven KlausSteiglederandMichaelWolff 141 ChapterEight OwenWare 175 ChapterNine HowValidisKant’sArgument? 187 Bibliography 199 SubjectIndex 205 PersonsIndex 211
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