The Self in Process: Toward A Post-Rationalist Cognitive Therapy

251 Pages·1991·4.777 MB·English

by  Vittorio F. Guidano

f.
VITTORIO GUIDANO
THE SELF IN PROCESS
TOWARD A POST-RATIONALIST
COGNITIVE THERAPY
Vittorio F. Guidano
"Thu id a creative a11d thought-provoking work, rich
in theoretical i2eaJ and cLi11icaL i,uight,1 which are weff
1
iffu<1trated with exte,uive Cade material. At the heart
of Gui2ano d approach Liu a paddionate and rigorow
commitment to a co,utructividt epidtemowgy and to a
view of human being,1 ad ,1e/f-organi.zing, de/f-determin
i11g agent,1 capa6Le of ongoing growth and differenti
1
ation. A dtirnufating and original contrilmtion."
- - Jeremy D. Safran, Ph.D.
Cognitive psychology, for the most part, still
firmly believes in an objective external reality
that can be readily observed and assimilated. If
environment is primary, the individual must
conform to it to be recognized as "rational." In
this powerful work, Dr. Guidano critiques the
separation of observer and observed, shows how
the very meaning of "self" is thus redefined, and
delineates the clinical ramifications of the newly
conceived self for a "post-rationalist" cognitive
therapy. Clinicians, according to Guidano, can
do more than help patients change dysfunctional
behavior. By directing therapy toward core
emotional themes and utilizing the interactional
aspects of the therapeutic relationship, practi
tioners can modify patients' core patterns of self
perception and thereby realize substantive and
lasting change.
Part I of the volume lays the theoretical ground
work and Part II, replete with case examples,
discusses psychotherapeutic applications. In the
first part, Guidano explicates his construct of the
self, examining the differentiation of self-bound
aries, discussing developmental pathways of self
organization, and describing the impact of self
boundaries on lifespan development.
continued on back/lap
THE SELF IN PROCESS

THE SELF IN PROCESS
Toward a Post~Rationalist Co,Rnitive Therapy
VITTORIO F. GUIDANO
THE GUILFORD PRESS
New York London
© 1991 The Guilford Press
A Division of Guilford Publications, Inc.
72 Spring Street, New York, NY 10012
AU rights reserved
No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic,
mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording, or otherwise,
without wri.r.ten permission from the Publisher.
Printed in the United States of America
This book is printed on acid-free paper.
Last digit is print number: 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Guidano, V. F.
The self in process: toward a post-rntionalist cognitive therapy
/ Vittorio F. Guidano.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-89862-44 7-9
l. Cognitive therapy. 2. Self psychology. I. Tide.
[DNLM: 1. Cognitive Therapy. 2. Self Concept. WM 425 G946s]
RC489.C63G85 1991 .
616.89' 142-dc20
DNLM/DLC
for Library of Congress 90-14129
CIP
Preface
Although the powerful development of the cognitive sciences
that has taken place over the last two decades has succeeded in
fostering more articulated models of human behavior and knowing
processes, the nature of human experience and the role that affectiv
ity, meaning, and so forth play in its construction are domains that
1
have remained largely overlooked.
What the nature and structure of human experience might be is,
in fact, a question that is not even asked in the empiricist epistemo
logical perspective underlying the prevailing rationalist trend in
cognitive psychology. If reality is taken as a univocal, objectively
given, external order that exists independently from our observation
of it, we will inevitably take for granted our own characteristics as
observers. The only possible kind of investigation remaining in the
face of something "already objectively given" is that of limiting oneself
to the observation of various aspects of that given; and the most likely
methodology resulting from this is that in which the description ends
up coinciding with the explanation. Thus, describing the intercurrent
mechanism between environmental stimuli and their sensory registra
tion substantially amounts to the same as explaining the human
sensory system. In the same way, describing human identity as merely
an organized set of cognitions, perceptions, and memories correlated
to a correspondent repertoire of feelings, emotional experiences, and
psychophysiological patterns amounts to the same as explaining the
nature and structure of selfhood.
If, on the other hand, we assume a nonempiricist perspective,
the essential point becomes instead that of understanding how our
V
vi PREFACE
characteristics as observers are involved in the process of observing,
and this brings us to a radical change in the fonnulation followed up to
now. It is not so much a question of describing what we feel or the
ingredients that appear in individual identity, but rather one of asking
why we feel what we feel, or why it is necessary to have a unit,iry sense
of self continuous in time in order to be able to function. In other
words, the unavoidable question becomes: "What is human experi
ence?", and the only possible answer lies in researching the underlying
mechanisms and processes causative of the phenomena (i.e., human
experience) to be explained.
Hence, the assumption of an evolutionary epistemological per
spective-that is, the study of evolving knowledge and knowing sys
tems-necessarily become; the basic methodological stance, given
that, emphasizing how we cannot escape our particular way of being
animal, such a stance enables the reconstruction of the human em
beddedness of human experience. Moreover, if the ordering of our
world is inseparable from our experiencing it, then the development of
knowledge unfolds into an irreducible ontological dimension in which
subjectivity underlies any ordering of that objective dimension of
reality commonly called human experience.
This interdependence between subjective and objective, emo
tioning and cognizing, experiencing and explaining, etc., is con
stitutive of any human knowing process, just as feeling ourselves to be
alive and the continuous explanation of this is constitutive of our
nature and is at the base of our experience of selfhood. Because
understanding is inseparable from existing, all understanding is self
understanding. The experiencing/explaining interdependence un
derlying self-understanding unfolds into an endless process of circular
ity between the immediate experience of oneself ( the acting and
experiencing "I") and the sense of self that emerges as a result of
appraising and self-referring that ongoing experience (the observing
and evaluating "Me").
This crncial feature inherent in selfhood dynamics is the es
sential thread around which the two parts of this book revolve. In Part
I, which is of a theoretical nature, we attempt to outline the dynamics
of the experiencing/explaining interface in selfhood development as
well as the role that affectivity, meaning, and so forth, exert on the
whole process. In Part II, of a more clinical nature, we try to show
how working in a therapeutic setting on the experiencing/explaining
interface may be a promising alternative to the rationalist methodics,
Preface. vii
essentially "persuasive" in nature, still largeli adopted in cognitive
therapy.
In conclusion, this book attempts to point out some of the basic
features and essential processes that underlie human experience with a
twofold intent: firstly, ·that of presenting an ontological model of
knowledge in which knowing is seen from the point of view of the
experiencing subject (i.e., how an individual experiences and is
affected by the self-knowledge he or she has been able to process);
secondly, that of deriving, in a ,manner consistent with the model
presented, a methodology and strategy of intervention for cognitive
therapy.
I wish to express my gratitude to the Center for Cognitive
Therapy of Rome for the support and collaboration given me, and, in
particular, to Giampiero Arciero, who, with involvement equal to
enthusiasm, has sustained me throughout the drafting of this book
with continual advice and suggestions.
There are many colleagues and friends to whom I owe thanks,
and it would be impossible to name them all. I recall with particular
gratitude the help of John Bowlby, Walter B. Weimer, Antonio
Caridi, Toto Blanco, Jeremy Safran, Mayte Miro Barrachina, Oscar F.
Goncalves, Mauro Ceruti, and Valeria Ugazio.
I extend special thanks to Michael J. Mahoney, both to cele
brate a decade of friendship and to emphasize how this friendship has
profoundly influenced my personal and scientific development.
I should also like to thank all my trainees, with whom I have
discussed at length, and always profitably, the main ideas contained in
this book.
There are many people to whom I am grateful for having made
the editing and publishing work stimulating. Particular thanks to
Matthew Dallaway for helping me put the work into the final English
form; the readiness and professional competence of the staff of The
Guilford Press, together with the unconditional support and friend
ship of Seymour Weingarten, have considerably eased the whole
operation.
V. F. G.