The Secret Police and the Revolution: The Fall of the German Democratic Republic

302 Pages·2001·1.274 MB·English

by  Edward Peterson

The Secret Police
and the Revolution:
The Fall of the German
Democratic Republic
EDWARD N. PETERSON
PRAEGER
The Secret Police
and the Revolution

The Secret Police
and the Revolution
The Fall of the German
Democratic Republic
EDWARD N. PETERSON
LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData
Peterson,EdwardN.(EdwardNorman),1925–
Thesecretpoliceandtherevolution:thefalloftheGermanDemocraticRepublic/
EdwardN.Peterson.
p. cm.
Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.
ISBN0–275–97328–X(alk.paper)
1. Germany(East).Ministeriumfu¨rStaatssicherheit. 2. Intelligenceservice—
Germany(East) 3. Germany(East)—Politicsandgovernment. 4. Internalsecurity—
Germany(East) 5. Opposition(Politicalscience)—Germany(East) I. Title.
DD289.P46 2002
943'10878—dc21 2001016321
BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationDataisavailable.
Copyright(cid:1)2002byEdwardN.Peterson
Allrightsreserved.Noportionofthisbookmaybe
reproduced,byanyprocessortechnique,withoutthe
expresswrittenconsentofthepublisher.
LibraryofCongressCatalogCardNumber:2001016321
ISBN:0–275–97328–X
Firstpublishedin2002
PraegerPublishers,88PostRoadWest,Westport,CT06881
AnimprintofGreenwoodPublishingGroup,Inc.
www.praeger.com
PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica
TM
Thepaperusedinthisbookcomplieswiththe
PermanentPaperStandardissuedbytheNational
InformationStandardsOrganization(Z39.48–1984).
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
Contents
Introduction vii
1. The Dark Clouds Forming: 1953–1979 1
The Problem-Filled Structure 1
The Stasi as Shielding Umbrella 19
2. Distant Rumblings: 1980–1986 35
Schwerin 35
Berlin 45
3. The Winds Rising: 1987 61
Schwerin 61
Berlin 71
4. The Lightning Striking: 1988 85
Schwerin 85
Berlin 105
5. The Storm Breaking: Spring 1989 127
Schwerin 127
Berlin 147
6. The Ground Shaking: Fall 1989 175
Schwerin 175
Berlin 194
vi Contents
7. The Shambles Remaining: Winter 1989–1990 229
The MfS on the Brink 230
The MfS by Another Name 232
The More Things Change in the Secret Police... 235
The Whimpering End 241
The Fading Away of Old Agents 243
The Reports of Death Are Premature 249
The Revolution Abandons Its Revolutionaries 251
8. What We Learn from the Secret Police 257
What They Tell of Themselves 257
Of the Enormity of the Public’s Disaffection 258
Of Discontents Like Those in the West 259
The Accuracy of the Secret Police as Reporters and Analysts 260
The Weaknesses of the Secret Police as Enforcers 262
How Realities Defeated the Ideals 265
The Secret Police as Dissidents 266
The Secret Police as Rebels 267
Bibliography 271
Index 279
Introduction
East Germans had themisfortuneofmovingwithoutarealbreakfromthe
National Socialist (NS) state of Adolf Hitler to the Communist state of
Joseph Stalin. One provocative comparison is that the NS state was a gen-
uine German product, which became ever more radicalized, whereas the
Communist dictatorship, which was imposed from outside, became ever
more soft. “The Third Reich was internally supported and overthrown
fromoutside,whiletheDDR[DeutscheDemokratischeRepublik]wassup-
ported from outside and overthrown from within.”1
Following this peaceful revolution of 1989 has come a scholarly revo-
lution, because suddenly the secret documents of the DDR were under the
control of the Bundesrepublik Deutschland (BRD), which had sufficient
incentive to make public the secrets of a former enemy. With Germanic
throroughness and deliberate speed, great masses of documentation were
made available to scholars who had had scarcely a hope of striking it so
rich. The new Russian State had less reason than the Germans to uncover
its Communist past, but some bits of its vast documentation have been
ferretedoutwithrelevancetoitsformersatellite.Memoirsfrombehindthe
Iron Curtain, through which one would formerly have to search for the
grainsofcornamidthemountainofchaff,haveonlythenaturallimitations
of memories.
Researching the forbidden Secret Police documents in a dictatorshiphas
awonderfulringtoit.Wheneverythingissupposedtobekeptsecret,these
policeshouldhavekeptthesecrets.Whenthepublicwastoknownothing,
theSecretPoliceweresupposedtoknoweverything.ErichMielke,thechief
of the Ministry of State Security (known as theStasi),madeeveryeffortto
do precisely that.
viii Introduction
My research of Gestapo documents in Bavaria, such as the Reports on
Public Opinion, disclosed a divergence between the historians’ image and
the secret reality of the Third Reich. Although refused entry as a scholar
tothedictatorshipintheDDR,in1964Ibegan25yearsof“familyvisits,”
with stimulating private conversations and depressing publicobservations.
OncetheBerlinWallcamedown,Ihappilybeganresearchingthecentral
andlocalEastGermanarchivesandfoundtheSovietcorrespondenceuseful
to document the Soviet Occupation as the beginning of the DDR,showing
asimilardivergencebetweenimageandreality(asdescribedinmyRussian
Commands and German Resistance).2
To document the DDR, I was first frustrated by the persistent obfusca-
tion ofrealityinthePartysources,nottomentiontheanti-historicalnews-
papers. Then in 1994 I gained access to the Ministry for State Security
(MfS) documents, which were prepared in “The Gauck Office” in Berlin.
I was shown the fascinating documents of the Central Evaluation Office
(Zentrale Auswertungs & Informationsgruppe, or ZAIG), which was the
integrationofthelocalreportsanddescribedtheworseningconditionsand
the increasing opposition in the DDR up to December 1989.
With a long-standing fascinationwithhistory,wieeseigentlichgewesen,
that is, at the local level, I first returned to Leipzig. Despite its distinction
as the center of the revolution, its files were relatively unrewarding. The
keeper of its MfS documents, who had helped to occupy the building in
December 1989, was aware that much had been destroyedsomewhereelse
in that large building.
Having also researched the Soviet Occupation in Schwerin, I requested
access to its holdings and discovered that this was the most completely
processed local collection. The Bismarckian joke about Mecklenburg was
that everything happens later there—in this case, perhaps, a delay in doc-
ument destruction. With the excellent assistance of the staff, I could ex-
amine the very interesting local reports on which the Berlin reports were
based.ThesubsequentopeningofthearchivestomeinMagdeburgin1998
offered a further perspective.
Whatemergesfromthedocumentsisacontemporaryjudgmentthatsup-
plements the many unofficial contemporary views and the post-1989anal-
ysis of that people’s discontent. These reports of problems are the more
credible because they were tabulated not by the enemies of the DDR but
by its defenders, its “Shield and Sword.” They are not accusable of hind-
sight or capitalist hostility.
The resulting wealth of detail of public complaints has enabled an ex-
planationofthecausesoftherevolution,abitlikethecahiersoftheFrench
Revolution. The fall of the Republic came with such surprise to outside
observersthatitmaycomewithevengreatersurprisethattheSecretPolice
reported the conditions and the public reaction as already dangerous in
1987. These recognized elements led to the revolution, and the MfS can
Introduction ix
withsomejustificationclaimtohavepredicteditand,withlessjustification,
claim that had the Politbu¨ro heeded its advice, it would have saved a re-
formed DDR.
The MfS reports are in sharp contrast to the rosy information that the
DDRmediapresentedthepublic,whichfoundinmostSocialistUnityParty
(SED) documents, and even in the minutes of the Politbu¨ro, an avoidance
of bitter realities. Outside the MfS, no one was apparently admitting, ex-
cept in the privacy of a few trusted friends, the serious problems until
thousandsofyoungpeoplepouredthroughtheHungarianHoleintheIron
Curtain, the first gap since the building of the Berlin Wall. The world,
including most Germans behind the Wall, saw it all on television.
The Schwerin documentation evidenced that the local MfS, with
“German efficiency,” had created a very thorough system, which was ac-
curatelyreportingtheproblemsofCommunism.Itsagentswerepassingon
reports of their unpaid “Unofficial Colleagues” (IMs),whowere“tellingit
like it is.” The local situation reports (Lageberichte) were also describing
thefatalbreakdownoftheeconomy,notonlyasexperiencedbythecitizens
but as described by its spies assigned to factories and offices.
MfS members were the only ones who dared tell the truth because they
could arrest anyone else who told the truth. No one would censor them
because no free historian was ever to see what they reported. Behind the
mantle of secrecy, the truth could be told.
The views of nearly every social group were reflected in the MfS files,
especially farmers, workers, doctors and teachers. Thus, the MfS docu-
mentsseemthebestpossibledocumentationofwhatmassesofpeoplewere
thinking. Memoirs can describe only a person’s small circle. Foreign jour-
nalists could describe only the few whom they encountered, who could
possibly whisper the truth. Even the Western intelligence would have lim-
ited access, primarily to those who succeeded in leaving. The MfS’ many
thousands of agents were in a position to know all corners of thecountry,
from top to bottom, encouraged, rather than impeded, by the authorities.
They and the hundreds of clerks who typed the reportsweretheunwitting
friends of history.
The documents provide also a record of the collapse of the economy,
which became the major concern of the spies, and Minister Erich Mielke
occasionally passed on to the Politbu¨ro a credible description of the core
problems of the socialist economy. At the end the MfS made a frank ad-
mission of the weakness of the Secret Police, even the cherished Chekist
techniques imported from the Soviet Union.
Afurtherresultoftheresearchistheinsightintohowadictatorialsecret
service operated, what it thought important to know, what it discovered,
itsproblems,itsweaknessesanditsimageofitself.Itisfascinatingjusthow
its thinking evolved and how the thought of the old Erich Mielke differed