The Secret Connexion: Causation, Realism, and David Hume PDF
Preview The Secret Connexion: Causation, Realism, and David Hume
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,12/3/2014,SPi The Secret Connexion OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,12/3/2014,SPi OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,12/3/2014,SPi The Secret Connexion Causation, Realism, and David Hume REVISED EDITION Galen Strawson I am not such a sceptic as you may, perhaps, imagine. (Hume, letter to Stewart, February 1754) 1 OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,12/3/2014,SPi 3 GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OX26DP, UnitedKingdom OxfordUniversityPressisadepartmentoftheUniversityofOxford. ItfurtherstheUniversity’sobjectiveofexcellenceinresearch,scholarship, andeducationbypublishingworldwide.Oxfordisaregisteredtrademarkof OxfordUniversityPressintheUKandincertainothercountries #inthiseditionGalenStrawson2014 Themoralrightsoftheauthorhavebeenasserted Firstpublished1989 Firstissuedinpaperbackwithcorrections1992 Thiseditionpublished2014 Impression:1 Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedin aretrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans,withoutthe priorpermissioninwritingofOxfordUniversityPress,orasexpresslypermitted bylaw,bylicenceorundertermsagreedwiththeappropriatereprographics rightsorganization.Enquiriesconcerningreproductionoutsidethescopeofthe aboveshouldbesenttotheRightsDepartment,OxfordUniversityPress,atthe addressabove Youmustnotcirculatethisworkinanyotherform andyoumustimposethissameconditiononanyacquirer PublishedintheUnitedStatesofAmericabyOxfordUniversityPress 198MadisonAvenue,NewYork,NY10016,UnitedStatesofAmerica BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationData Dataavailable LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2014933805 ISBN 978–0–19–960584–2(Hbk.) 978–0–19–960585–9(Pbk.) Asprintedandboundby CPIGroup(UK)Ltd,Croydon,CR04YY LinkstothirdpartywebsitesareprovidedbyOxfordingoodfaithand forinformationonly.Oxforddisclaimsanyresponsibilityforthematerials containedinanythirdpartywebsitereferencedinthiswork. OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,12/3/2014,SPi [N]aturehaskeptusatagreatdistancefromallhersecrets,andhasaffordedus only the knowledge of a few superficial qualities of objects; while she conceals from us those powers and principles on which the influence of these objects entirelydepends. [W]eareignorantofthosepowersandforces,onwhich[the]regularcourseand successionofobjectstotallydepends. [E]xperienceonlyteachesus,howoneeventconstantlyfollowsanother;without instructingusinthesecretconnexion,whichbindsthemtogether,andrenders theminseparable. (Enquiry32–3/4.16,55/5.22,66/7.13) OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,12/3/2014,SPi OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,12/3/2014,SPi Preface to the First Edition DoesHumeendorsearegularity theoryofcausation?Theviewthathedoesisvery widely held—it seems that it is still the standard view. But there seems to be no evidenceforitinthefirstEnquiry—whateveronethinksabouttheTreatise. MydoubtsbeganwhenIstartedteachingthefirstEnquiryatanelementarylevelat Oxfordin1980.ThisdiscussionofHumegrewdirectlyfromthatteaching.Ifinished the first draft convinced that I was heroically alone in my doubts, but I was quite wrong. Three works deserve particular mention. Craig’s The Mind of God and the Works of Man(1987) refutes the commonlyacceptedconception of Hume’s philo- sophical position. Wright, in The Sceptical Realism of David Hume (1983), and Livingston, in Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life (1984), also argue powerfully againstit.Asfarasthequestionofcausationisconcerned,theyarguenotonlythat Humeisnotaregularitytheorist,butalso,ashere,thathebelievesintheexistenceof something like natural necessity—in the existence of causal power conceived of in someessentiallynon-regularity-theoryway.1 Thefactremains:theviewthatHumeheldaregularitytheoryofcausationisstill the standard view.2 It is still worth arguing against. As Beauchamp and Rosenberg say, ‘[al]most all recent writers on causation believe that Hume holds a pure regularity theory of causation’ (1981: 31). As Blackburn remarks, Hume has ‘been shamefullyabusedbymanycommentatorsandtheirvictims’(1984:211). This is not just a book about Hume. It also argues directly against the regularity theoryofcausation,whichhastakenonalifeofitsown.Chapters5,8,and22.2form adiscussionoftheregularitytheoryofcausationwhichisindependentofthematerial on Hume. Chapter23, on the meaning of ‘cause’, is independent both of this discussion of the regularity theory of causation and of the main discussion of Hume. Chapter7 on the notion of the ultimate nature of reality, together with its Appendix,canalsobereadindependentlyofthediscussionofHume. 1 ThroughoutthisbookIusetheexpression‘causalpower’tomean‘causalpowerconceivedofinsome essentiallynon-regularity-theoryway’. 2 Forrecentexpressionsoftheview,seee.g.Woolhouse:‘Hume’sconclusion[is]thatsofarasthe externalobjectswhicharecausesandeffectsareconcernedthereisonlyconstantconjunction’(1988:149); sofarasthe‘operationsofnaturalbodies’areconcerned,‘regularityandconstantconjunctionareallthat exist’(p.150).SeealsoO’Hear:Humeansholdthatthereisnot‘anymoretocausalitythan‘regularityof succession’’(1985:60).‘TheHumeanattitudetocausalityis...thatthereisnothinginthecause...that mean[s]theeffecthastofollow’(p.61).SeealsoKripke:‘IfHumeisright,...evenifGodweretolookat [twocausallyrelated]events,hewoulddiscernnothingrelatingthemotherthanthatonesucceedsthe other’(1982:67).Hamlyn,bycontrast,scrupulouslyavoidsthiserror,inhisHistoryofWesternPhilosophy (1987).SodoesSchacht(whorestrictshisdiscussiontotheEnquiry)inhisClassicalModernPhilosophers: DescartestoKant(1984). OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,12/3/2014,SPi viii PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION Ialsodiscussanumberofotherquestionsaboutmeaning,understanding,know- ledge,andexistence.Thesearequestionswhicharenaturallyandvividlyraisedbythe studyofHume—questionsabouttherelationsbetweensemantics,epistemology,and ontology and metaphysics. I defend—where I do not assume—a straightforwardly realist position on these issues (see especially Chapters 7 and 12). Virtually all the worthwhilefeaturesofthecurrentdebateaboutthemarepresentintheseventeenth- andeighteenth-centurydebate.3 Someonewhobelievedthattheregularitytheoryofcausationwastrue,andcame totheconclusionthatHumeneverheldit,wouldprobablynotmuchenjoywritinga bookthattriedtoshowthatthiswasso.Butifonethinksthattheregularitytheoryof causationis(initsstandardversion)metaphysicallyfantasticoneseesthingsdiffer- ently. One’s task is to clear a great philosopher of a damaging charge, and to show that his attitude to the question of causation is in most respects right. This is how Iseeit. The foundations of the case for saying that Hume believes in causal power or naturalnecessitycanbeestablishedwithoutanycloseconsiderationofwhathesays about causation, and I try to do this (among other things) in Part 1. One problem with this approach is that the more detailed analyses of Hume’s discussion of causationinParts2and3(whichconsidertheTreatiseandtheEnquiryrespectively) may then come as an anticlimax. I have accordingly signalled short cuts at various pointsthroughoutthebookforthosewhowanttogetontoPart2orPart3quickly. Aperiodofillnessinthespringof1984gavemetimetorereadHumeandorganize the quotations used in this book. The main text was written up in the spring and summer of 1987,and for comments on whatI wrongly took to be thefinal version I am most grateful to John Cottingham, Edward Craig, William Jordan, Paul Snowdon,andP.F.Strawson.Forsomehelpfulconversations,andforcontributions toaclassIgaveonHumeatOxfordintheHilaryTermof1988,Iwouldliketothank Thomas Baldwin, Bob Hargrave, Dan Isaacson, Martha Klein, John Roe, Helen Steward,LuigiTurco,andDavidWomersley.Forcommentsofanon-philosophical kind I am grateful to Angela Blackburn, Redmond O’Hanlon, Andrew Rosenheim, andfinallytoJose´ Strawson. 3 ThisbookcontainsrelativelylittlediscussionoftheintellectualcontextinwhichHumewrote(Kant, ratherthananyofHume’scontemporariesorimmediatepredecessors,providestheothermainsourceof historicalreference).ForagoodaccountofMalebranche’sinfluenceonHume’sthoughtaboutcausation, seeMcCracken1983:257–69. OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,12/3/2014,SPi Preface to the Paperback Edition I wrote this book very fast. The speed of writing shows in the tone and in the excessively numerous and sometimes intrusive footnotes. I have not, however, done any major rewriting for this paperback edition. Instead I have made a few corrections,afewsmallcuts,andafewsmalladditions.Themostsubstantialchanges occurintheparagraphonpp.56–7,onpage201innote5,onpage203whichhasa newnote8,andonpage210whichhasanewnote8.(Thesepagereferencesareto thefirstedition.) AsremarkedintheoriginalPreface,Chapters5,8,and22.2ofthisbookpresentan attackonthe‘regularity’theoryofcausationwhichisindependentofthediscussion ofHume.Oneobjectiontotheattackissocommonthatitisworthmentioninghere. Briefly, it claims that one must in the end admit that the regularity of the world’s behaviourisa‘brute’fact,andhenceadmitthattheregularitytheoryofcausationis true. For if one tries to deny that the regularity of the world is a brute fact, and proposes that there is something x which is other than the regularity of the world, andisthereasonfortheregularityoftheworld,thenonewillneedanaccountofwhy xisitselfregularinitsunderwritingoftheregularityoftheworld.Andeitheronewill have to say that x’s regularity of operation is itself a brute fact, or one will have to embark on a regress which can be stopped only by saying that there is something whose regularity of operation is a brute fact. Hence the regularity theory of causation—orsomethinglikeit—mustbetrue. Itriedtoanswerthissortofobjectiononpp.91–2ofthisbook.I’mnotsurewhat ‘brute’means,butI’mnotworriedbythebrutishnessoftheregularityoftheworldso long as it does not have the consequence that the regularity of the world is, as it continues from moment to moment, and from year to year, a continuous fluke or chance matter. With hindsight, I think that the best statement of the correct alternative to the regularity theory that the book contains is on pp. 225–6 below). Imadeathirdbriefattempttosaywhatiswrongwiththeregularitytheoryinapaper called ‘The Contingent Reality of Natural Necessity’ [1991; included here as an AppendixtoChapter22]. The 1996 and 2003 paperback impressions incorporate a few minor corrections, a moresubstantialchangetonote30onpage50,andanewIndexofPassagesfromHume.
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